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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is, through a critical account of the development of ethical 
thought in medicine from Ancient Greece to the early 21st Century, to demonstrate 
the value of Beauchamp and Childress’ four principles of biomedical ethics both as an 
aid to moral decision-making in medical practice and as a contribution to 
philosophical moral theory. The first section, Introduction and Method, explores 
these aims in more detail and sets out some reasons for pursuing them in this 
particular way.
Part One examines the development of historical traditions o f medical ethics from 
the ancient Near East through Greece and the medieval West to Europe and North 
America in the 19th Century. In doing so, it advances the argument that the 
Hippocratic and Professional traditions of ethics do reflect substantive ethical 
concerns in medicine, and that the responses they offered to these can be better 
understood with reference to the social and historical context in which they were 
produced.
Part Two considers the limitations of these traditions when faced with new moral 
concerns in medicine from the mid-20111 Century onwards, and of the relationship 
between these concerns and the traditions themselves, before proceeding to examine 
how and why these concerns led to the growth of interdisciplinary efforts to tackle 
them. The section considers the contribution made by philosophy to these efforts, and 
concludes with a discussion of some criticisms of philosophical involvement in 
medical ethics from both within and outside the discipline. It is argued that these 
criticisms fail to properly understand the role philosophy played in 1316-20* Century 
medical ethics, and that the way in which philosophical approaches to these issues 
continued to grow and change throughout this time.
Part Three examines the development of Beauchamp and Childress ‘four principles’ 
approach to medical ethics from the 1st to the 6th Editions of Principles o f  Biomedical 
Ethics, arguing that it has, thanks to changes in the authors’ conception of 
philosophical moral theory, been able to productively incorporate the views of many 
of its critics over this time; that it is also able to incorporate features of different
ethical approaches such as virtue ethics, narrative ethics and ethics of care; and that, 
properly understood, it continues to provide a good framework both for moral 
reflection in medicine and the provision of concrete action-guides. The thesis 
concludes by considering this view of the four principles in the light of the earlier 
sections’ approach, and attempting to demonstrate further demonstrate their value 
through two case-studies.
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Introduction and Method:
For as long as there has existed amongst humans a discipline (magical, religious, 
scientific or otherwise) concerned with the treatment of illness, injury and disease 
there appear to have existed a set of moral concerns related to it. Yet the relevance of 
these historical concerns to what we today understand as ‘medical ethics’ is a matter 
o f dispute. As Beauchamp and Childress have argued, in the current (6th) edition of 
their Principles o f  Biomedical Ethics, ‘[medical] ethics [in Europe and North 
America] enjoyed a remarkable continuity from the time of Hippocrates until the 
middle o f the 20th Century, when developments in the biological and health sciences 
created concerns about the adequacy of traditional moral guidelines’. For this reason, 
and as a result o f what they contend are the failings o f historical traditions of medical 
ethics (which they believe ‘had neglected ethical problems of truthfulness, privacy, 
the distribution of health care resources, communal responsibility, the use of research 
subjects and the like’) they elect to eschew historical investigation and instead employ 
an approach based on ‘philosophical reflection on morality that is distanced from the 
history of professional medical ethics’1.
Insofar as such an approach follows from their conception of the ‘failures’ of 
historical traditions, however, it may be seen to prompt three further questions. To 
begin with, there is the matter of just what that tradition entails. Jonsen, in The Birth 
o f  Bioethics, has argued that it is composed of works covering three distinct areas. 
First o f all were those that outlined the ‘character or qualities of persons that might 
win them praise or blame’, meditations on the character and virtues of ‘the good 
physician’ or ‘bedside manners’ such as those found in the Hippocratic Corpus. 
Secondly, and following these, came those comprising injunctions as to ‘the duties 
and obligations that bind humans to perform, and to refrain from performing, certain 
actions’ (matters o f ‘a more grave morality’ governed by oaths or the ‘stringent rules’ 
laid down in church or state legislature) which he sees as epitomised by the 
Hippocratic Oath. Finally (and after a considerable period of time) emerged those that 
explored the social dimension of such characteristics and duties and ‘[inquired] how 
the existence of communities is related to the purposes of the individual’. Jonsen sees
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these ‘social ethics’, which attempted to define the responsibilities of the physician to 
society, as exemplified by the professional ethics of the 19th Century2.
We will further consider the validity and/or utility of such distinctions later in this 
section. For the time being, however, it is enough to note that they prompt our second 
initial question. It is clear from such an account that, whatever ‘remarkable 
continuity’ may have been present in medical ethics over the course of the two-and-a- 
half millennia since Hippocrates of Cos drew (or so it was once supposed) the line 
forever separating naturalistic medicine from superstition, historical traditions of 
medical ethics in Europe (and later, North America) did change and evolve over time. 
We are, then, compelled to ask why these traditions seem to have found themselves 
unable to cope with the pace of change brought about by medical advances in the 20th 
Century. This is a question for which Beauchamp and Childress, in their choice of 
method, appear to have an answer: what had been missing, or so they seem to suggest, 
was the ‘philosophical reflection’ they aim to provide.
Yet this answer itself prompts another question for, as long as there has existed 
medicine in a sense that we may recognise it (that is, since at some point around the 
time of Hippocrates), there has also existed some form of philosophical reflection. 
Despite their having shared a common time-frame, and despite an assumption 
amongst some writers that the two have always been linked, at least one historian has 
‘[dismissed] as balderdash the notion that philosophical theories have [historically] 
influenced medical ethics’. This is a curious state of affairs, given that both 
disciplines have found themselves unable to resist the urge (or imperative) to explore 
(and, in some cases at least, claim the authority to pronounce upon) moral matters. 
Why then, we may ask, have philosophical ethics ‘influenced medical ethics only 
during a few brief periods’? Why is it that, ‘[aside] from these periods... doctors 
dealing with medical ethics did not dialogue with philosophers or apply moral 
philosophy to moral issues in medicine’3? It is these questions that this work will 
investigate. In a critical account of the historical relationship between philosophy, 
ethics and medicine from Antiquity to the present day, it will consider both such 
dialogue as has existed and the periods of silence which appear to have punctuated it. 
Has medicine changed? Has philosophy? Have both?
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A Genealogical Approach
Morrice has identified ‘an intellectual and historiographical problem’ which (he 
believes) lies at ‘the heart of any endeavour to write the history of medical ethics’. As 
he sees it, this problem tends to ensure such accounts are divided into three kinds of 
approaches, a possible reason for which lies in the differing academic backgrounds of 
those who attempt to write such histories (with social historians, who account for two 
of the approaches, on the one hand and those concerned with ‘the current discipline 
and philosophical basis of medical ethics’ on the other4). Authors in the latter tradition 
are seen to favour viewing medical ethics simply as a collection of ethical problems. 
Morrice contends that this produces (in the words of R. French) ‘a history of practice, 
not of [the] ethical [problems]’ themselves5. Authors in the former tradition instead 
aim to consider why certain problems are considered ethical at given times and why 
some are not. In doing so, Morrice contends, they adopt one of the two further 
approaches he describes: those that argue ‘that the content of medical ethics has 
simply changed as the social context and day to day work of doctors has changed’ and 
those that argue ‘that beneath this apparent shift lies a more profound continuity of 
social function’6.
Our own enquiry will consider, alongside evidence of ethics in the sense of ‘scholarly 
effort to articulate and analyze... rules, customs, and beliefs’7, a parallel history of 
moral thought revealed through the attitudes expressed in the actions of groups and 
individuals, and seek to explore the relationship of explicitly ethical works to the 
social and historical context in which they were produced. At its simplest, our 
approach will conflate Morrice’s description of the ‘content of medical ethics’ with 
scholarly traditions of ethics, and consider this against an ‘underlying continuity’ 
made up of the ongoing concerns which underpin these differing expressions of moral 
thought and practice. In doing so, it will enable us to enquire as to how and why 
certain forms of ethical thought with certain concerns arose at different times.
Through doing so, we will attempt to ensure these issues concerns are considered in 
the widest possible context and thus provide both a history of practice and of ethical 
problems. Beyond this, our account will also seek to demonstrate that the ‘underlying 
continuity’ of medical ethics is itself malleable, and that the concrete products of this 
continuity expressed under one particular set of historical circumstances themselves
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effect how it goes on to be expressed in another. Furthermore, our account will seek 
not only to examine the history of one aspect o f both ethics and morality, but to 
consider how this account may relate to the general nature of ethics and morality as a 
whole.
Our approach may be termed genealogical in that, like Foucault, it does not examine 
morality in terms of some abstract quality, but rather through examining how moral 
concepts have, historically, been ‘put to work’8. Moreover, it does not, as Foucault 
argued was the case with the thought of Paul Ree, ‘follow the English tendency in 
describing the history of morality [through] reducing its entire history and genesis to 
an exclusive [physical, metaphysical or linguistic] concern’9. Whilst we will argue 
that medical ethics has developed over time, it has done so for a variety of different 
reasons and in a variety of different ways. Our account is also genealogical in that, 
whilst seeking to uncover what lies behind the record o f ethical thought preserved in 
laws, codes and systems, it will also consider how they may be related: in attending to 
‘the details and accidents that accompany every beginning’10 it will consider how 
particular expressions of any ‘underlying continuity’ may, depending on how they 
have been understood, come to constitute the ‘details and accidents’ comprising the 
birth of each subsequent expression. Where Foucault’s conception of genealogy, 
however, primarily considers morality solely as the expression of non-moral elements, 
our own is concerned with the relationships between moral elements and non-moral 
elements, and moral elements and each other.
Clarification of Terms
Before proceeding with our enquiry, it is worth taking a moment to clarify some of 
the terms we will use in it. Many of the these, both general (such as ‘morality’ and 
‘ethics’) and specific (such as ‘moral dilemmas’, ‘ethical situations’ or even ‘medical 
ethics’ itself) are often contentious, perhaps unavoidably so, and require clarification. 
Some cases are less problematic than others: the word ‘doctor’ may carry with it 
certain connotations with regards to matters of social status (or as to why certain 
figures such as chiropractors may or may not use the title) which should not be 
ignored, but is worth keeping to avoid the necessity o f unwieldy formulations such as 
‘physician and/or surgeon’. Similarly, ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ are notoriously difficult
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to pin down to universally agreed meanings: some thinkers, such as Singer, elect to 
use the terms interchangeably11 whilst others prefer to distinguish between the two. 
For the sake of clarity, it is adequate to say that, for the purposes of this work,
‘morals’ and ‘morality’ will generally be used in a wide sense to describe the whole 
sphere of situations and ideas commonly under discussion. ‘Ethics’ will be used more 
narrowly: firstly, to describe the articulation and systematic organisation of positions 
taken in such discussions (for example in codes of behaviour or philosophical ethical 
systems), and secondly in the discussion of the reasoning (and other) processes 
through which such positions are reached and/or defended (for example in 
philosophical or religious debate).
A related and yet more vexed question is that o f what constitutes a ‘moral’ situation 
or dilemma in the first place. Beyond this, even on those occasions where agreement 
on this first question can be reached, there often remains debate on which aspects of 
such a situation can be considered morally relevant. An instructive example may be 
that of ‘sexual morality’. To again take Singer as an example, he argues that ‘sex 
raises no unique moral issues at all’ as ‘considerations of honesty, concern for others, 
prudence, and so on’ are also raised (perhaps to a greater degree) by everyday
12
activities (his chosen example being driving a car) . On the other hand, other thinkers 
have contended that particular sexual practices may in fact engender moral debate 
around similar issues to those involved in ethical discussions o f ‘family life,
I ^
contraception and abortion’ . It should be noted that it is also perfectly possible to 
disagree with both points of view (either entirely or in part) and still concede that they 
might tell us something about our conception of morality in a wider sense (for 
example, one could point out in Singer’s case that the very fact he feels compelled to 
explicitly distance himself from the discussion of matters of so-called ‘sexual 
morality’ demonstrates that they at least raise moral issues in the sense of discussions 
pertaining to what is to count as moral and why).
If it is difficult to decide what is meant by a ‘moral’ or ‘ethical’ debate in the wider 
sense, then deciding what is meant by a medical ethical situation may prove harder 
still. The above examples contain some areas of moral and ethical discussion which 
most people would agree to be the preserve o f medical ethics (contraception and 
abortion, for example). But why is this? Should the term medical ethics cover only
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those situations in which a medical practitioner faces what are felt to be ethical 
dilemmas in the course of their professional life? Could this be extended to cover the 
conduct of such individuals outside their profession or away from their patients, or to 
influence concerns which are not the direct preserve of medical science (for example, 
sexuality)? What of the responsibilities and conduct of those patients themselves, or 
o f individuals whose behaviour or environment may adversely affect their health or 
that o f others (for example, those who drive needlessly polluting vehicles)? With 
regards to these more difficult cases, even simple definitions have a habit of raising 
questions as to why some areas (often deeply contentious ones to others) have been 
excluded. It will better suit our purposes, then, to try to arrive at an understanding of 
what is meant by these terms by trying to understand what kinds of things have been 
understood by them in the past.
If this last point may be seen to further clarify just why we have chosen the method 
that we have, this can be further demonstrated by turning to an even more problematic 
definition: that ofphilosophical medical ethics. In part, our enquiry will consider this 
term in the narrower sense of that branch of ethics commonly referred to as 
‘philosophy’ in academic circles. However, there are also wider issues to consider in 
terms of how philosophers (and moral philosophy) have engaged with ethical issues in 
regard to medical practice. To return to Foucault, we should not take it for granted 
that ‘words [have] kept their meaning, that desires still [point] in a single direction 
[or] that ideas [retain] their logic’14. We should not assume that ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ 
consist only of what philosophers (and others) have chosen to call ethics and morality, 
either at the time or with the benefit of hindsight. Nor should we assume that 
‘philosophy’ consists only of what philosophers have chosen to call ‘philosophy’. In 
order to determine what ethical philosophy should do we must also examine what it 
has been asked to do, what it has tried to do, and what it has done already. We must 
also examine why.
It will be necessary, then, to examine not only those topics on which moral and ethical 
philosophers have held forth but also (perhaps most importantly) those on which they 
have chosen to keep silent, and to investigate their reasons for doing so. In the first 
instance this will involve examining what role philosophers have felt themselves 
suited (or compelled) to play in such discourse and to consider their declared or
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explicit intentions in producing works on the subject. This may not, however, be 
sufficient. To understand how philosophers have conceived of their role, it will also 
be necessary to examine how philosophers have linked their ideas to those of non­
philosophers (be they doctors, theologians, sociologists or ‘ordinary’ individuals who 
found themselves bound to comment on ‘medical’ matters) and how these individuals 
have responded to philosophers’ involvement. At this point in our enquiry, however, 
we have gone as far as we can without recourse to the detailed discussion of specific 
examples. For this reason we may turn now our attention away from matters of 
methodology and terminology, and towards the dawn of recorded history and the 
collection of cultures clustered around the shores of the eastern Mediterranean and the 
banks of the Tigris and Euphrates.
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Part One:
Historical Traditions of Medical Ethics
Chapter 1: Moral Concerns in Medicine in the Ancient Near East
There is a Greek legend which tells that Cadmus, founder of the city of Thebes, 
created the ancestors of the city’s noble families by sowing dragon’s teeth into the 
ground, from each of which a warrior sprang, fully-grown from the earth. One would 
be forgiven for thinking, following an account such as Grodin’s, that medicine and 
medical ethics had a similar genesis, and that the doctor and the Hippocratic Oath 
which (so it would seem) informed his conduct had no antecedent prior to the ancient 
Greeks. Intuition alone would argue that this is not the case; the Greeks were 
surrounded by cultures of comparable sophistication and in some cases greater 
antiquity to whom the healing arts were not unknown in some fashion. Indeed few, if 
any, scholars would now accept this ‘by their own bootstraps’ view of Hellenic 
culture. As Carrick notes in Medical Ethics in Antiquity, there is now little room for 
‘serious doubt’ as to the influence extended (in both directions) between the city- 
states and colonies of the Greeks and their neighbours south across the Mediterranean 
in Egypt and to the east in Mesopotamia.
Carrick is surely justified in contending that, in the context of a Near East which 
boasted civilisations of the stature of Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia and Persia, to 
‘overlook that the Greeks may have acquired useful ideas from their widespread 
commercial encounters... is to indulge an unaffordable provincialism’1. This is not to 
say that the medicine and ethics of the Greeks do not represent a distinct or original 
strain of thought and/or practice, but if this should prove to be the case they may be 
described as original in contradistinction to what had gone before and to what was 
going on elsewhere. This notwithstanding, an enquiry into medicine and medical 
ethics (in such forms as we may find) elsewhere in antiquity may also throw new light 
on our understanding of the Greeks. We may yet decide that medicine and medical 
ethics in such form as we can usefully relate to them began with the Greeks, but to 
assert this as a matter of course would, in such circumstances, be premature.
Any such enquiry into ancient thought presents two challenges. The first of these is 
lack of evidence; this is, of course, the case for any historian considering the period in 
question, but it is an especially acute problem for the philosopher or historian of ideas,
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who as a matter of necessity must rely primarily on written sources. Clearly there is a 
great deal of educated guesswork involved in reconstructing the image of a palace 
from its foundations, or a face from a skull, yet written sources (aside from being for 
the most part more fragile and perishable than masonry or bone) are particularly prone 
to distortion when viewed in an incomplete state. In the case of Egypt and the Near 
East (and, to a lesser extent, that of Greece as well) there is much that needs to be 
inferred and much that is simply not known. To take Carrick’s example, that we have 
no written record of whether the Babylonians or Assyrians conceived of an ‘ideal 
physician’ after the manner of the Persians or Greeks constitutes no argument one 
way or the other as to whether such a conception actually existed .
A second challenge relates to the absence amongst the cultures under discussion of 
modem distinctions between these disciplines and other areas of thought and practice. 
O f course, such distinctions can be fluid in our own time as well. The modem 
discipline o f Bioethics is itself founded on elements of (and the interaction between) 
several different fields (notably philosophy, law, medicine and theology), not to 
mention several disparate elements within those fields and some which bridge them 
(philosophy o/law, for example)3. The case of antiquity differs from this, however, in 
presenting us not with a number of recognised and differing areas of expertise in 
dialogue with each other but rather a set of emergent specialisations still enmeshed 
with one another to an extent that can render such distinctions confusing. In the case 
o f ethics, questions of morality are bound up almost entirely with matters of law. In 
the case o f medicine, rational and/or empirical methods are bound up with the magical 
and the supernatural. Furthermore, both law and magic are themselves hardly to be 
distinguished from religion.
Possible Moral Concerns regarding Magical and Religious Elements of Medicine 
in the Ancient Near East
Such fragmentary evidence as survives concerning ancient Near Eastern medicine 
(and such moral thought as seems to have been associated with it) generally reveals it 
to be primarily magical and/or religious. As Sigerist has it, in the case of Babylonian 
and Egyptian documents, although we may be ‘impressed by the accuracy of some of 
the observations they relate, or the amount o f accumulated empirical knowledge they
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reflect’ we may equally be struck ‘by the grandeur of some of their incantations’4. In 
both cultures, disease was primarily conceived as ‘caused by evil sprits or the anger of 
the gods’5. The Babylonian doctor employed treatments involving ‘ritual... sacrifice 
and incantation’6 and whilst Egyptian records document pharmacological 
prescriptions, these are ‘interspersed with magical spells... believed to impart 
efficacy’. Indeed, Longrigg has gone so far as to suggest that some of the more 
noxious ingredients of these prescriptions were included, not for any pharmacological 
effect, but specifically to be offensive to the demon or spirit causing the illness, as 
seems clearly to be the case from the incantation in the Hearst Papyrus intended to 
accompany therapeutic coprophagy7.
Jonsen advances, in The Birth o f  Bioethics, what may be thought of as an 
anthropological argument for the development of moral thought in such forms of 
medicine. This argument is based on two premises. Firstly, that the healer typically 
occupies a distinct cultural role: ‘[in] all cultures, individuals apply remedies and 
bring solace to their sick relatives’ and ‘[in] many [of these cultures] special practices 
o f healing are reserved for certain individuals who have learned particular skills and 
rituals’8. Secondly, that since magical and/or religious conceptions of disease view it 
‘as a consequence of a knowing or an unknowing transgression of the order and law 
of nature and society’ (that is, view the natural and moral order as more or less the 
same thing, or as aspects of the same thing), they demand the application of ‘remedies 
that restore order and reintegrate the sick person into conformity with [it]’9.
The result, Jonsen contends, is a widespread belief that ‘the work of the healer must 
not only be correct [but also] right and good’10. Such a view is certainly plausible. It 
can be seen to have echoes throughout history, not only in the Babylonian patient 
‘required to atone for their sins’ as a part o f their treatment1!, but in the works of 
healing attributed to individuals (such as prophets and saints) held up as the ideal of a 
particular religious morality and even in the selfless, upstanding physicians who are 
the heroes and heart-throbs of countless afternoon television soap-operas and Mills 
and Boon romances. But we may pause to ask whether such beliefs really describe the 
kind of moral behaviour under discussion when we speak of medical ethics. On first 
reflection it would appear that, in one sense at least, they do not. Though 
demonstrating how moral concerns can be connected with the practice of healing,
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they do not concern moral questions raised by the practice of medicine per se\ rather, 
illness and injury are subsumed into wider moral practice as one of the many possible 
consequences of transgression against a natural order itself imbued with moral force.
Of course, such thinking is not the preserve of antiquity. In recent times, one can point 
to the common if not widespread belief that the HIV virus is divine retribution for the 
sins of homosexuality and/or promiscuity. The line can sometimes be a fine one. If 
one views the maintenance of health as a moral duty (whether to oneself or to the 
wider community that shoulders the burden of one’s illness, whether emotionally in 
the case o f the family or financially as in the case of, in Britain at least, the state) then 
lung cancer, cirrhosis of the liver and heart disease can all seem fitting ‘punishments’ 
for a life o f smoking, drinking and gluttony. In the majority of these cases, however, 
‘punishment’ is unlikely to be a description with which many would agree in all but 
the most general sense. Sympathy may be limited, but illness is not commonly seen as 
the moral consequence of an individual’s actions.
There is, however, a second sense in which we may interpret such thought as, if not 
being an early form of medical ethics, then rather informing an early form of medical 
ethics. Such an interpretation depends, first of all, on our remembering that 
distinctions which come readily enough to the modem mind may not have been 
apparent or may even have seemed nonsensical to the ancients, and that in no 
medicine o f Near Eastern antiquity do we find unambiguous evidence of a sharp 
divide between magical and/or religious elements on the one hand and empirical 
and/or rational elements on the other12. Even in Egypt, where naturalistic elements of 
medicine developed further than in any culture prior to the Greeks, the approving (and 
seemingly empirical and/or rational) formula ‘really excellent, proved many times’ 
[my emphasis] is more often found appended to spells than it is to pharmacological 
prescriptions13.
For healers in such cultures, in which a distinction between the ‘natural’ and 
‘supernatural’ has not yet been drawn, there is no reason not to count knowledge of 
incantations and right conduct as at least the equal of knowledge of pharmacology 
and anatomy in terms of the practical measures available for treating one’s patient. 
Indeed, in the case of Persia at least, there is some evidence that the former were
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counted as superior to the latter. In differentiating certain kinds of healer along lines 
common to many early cultures, the Videvdad or Vendidad notes that ‘one who heals 
with the holy word’ (that is, the incantation priest) and not ‘one who heals with the 
knife [or] one who heals with herbs... will best drive away sickness from the body of 
the faithful’14. Given such a state o f affairs, we may wish to consider whether (to 
borrow Jonsen’s phrasing) what is ‘right’ and ‘good’ abut a doctor’s practice can be 
conceived of as separate from what is ‘correct’.
In other words, questions of the doctor’s moral conduct may be seen to be intertwined 
with questions of competence: a healer must know and abide by proper forms of 
behaviour not only for their own sake but because doing so is important for 
successfully restoring the health of his patient. Again, in the case of Persia at least, 
circumstantial evidence for this view can be found in the description of the ‘ideal 
physician’ found in the Dinkard. Just as modem codes such as that of the American 
Medical Association compel doctors to ‘be dedicated to providing competent medical 
service’15 so the Dinkard describes how the doctor ‘should know the limbs of the 
body... remedies for disease... [and be] skilled to prepare heath-giving plants 
medically’16. Yet the description also contains several elements explicitly related to 
character and conduct (‘respecting modesty, protecting good reputation, ready to 
listen; not acting for gain, but for a spiritual reward’17).
It is of course perfectly possible that this part of the Dinkard is simply concerned with 
a different set of qualities that were expected from a healer in addition to practical 
competence; the qualities Jonsen has termed ‘bedside manners’. However, as with the 
strikingly similar section of the Hippocratic Oath (‘remaining free of all intentional 
injustice... [whatever] I may see or hear in the course o f the treatment or even outside 
of the treatment... which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep to 
m yself18) their presence in such a solemn context appears to suggest that they are 
‘more grave matters’ at least co-equal in importance with knowledge of anatomy and 
pharmacology. Additionally, the doctor so described would have been not only a 
rational and/or empirical healer but also a Zoroastrian magician-priest19 and, as we 
have seen, it was in this aspect that his abilities were (sometimes, at the very least) 
conceived of as at their most potent.
13
Even if we are wrong to make such an inference in this case (although, as we shall see 
in Chapter 3, there may be other reasons why right conduct constitutes for the doctor a 
matter o f practical competency) it remains difficult to dispute that, as soon as the 
healer is defined as an individual possessed of specialised skills and attributes, his 
competence in applying these for the benefit of the sick or injured becomes a moral 
issue. O f course, the nature of these skills and attributes, and of the benefits they 
confer, may (as we shall explore further in Chapter 2) themselves be open to question. 
Nevertheless, what list of virtues that the doctor should possess would not involve an 
aptitude for and conscientious development of applied medicine? Who could claim 
that competence is not a doctor’s moral duty? And what greater sum total of good 
could be achieved by even the luckiest of unskilled doctors that could not be at least 
equalled by a skilled counterpart equally fortunate?
Possible Moral Concerns regarding Experimental and Surgical Elements of 
Medicine in the Ancient Near East
More concrete examples of concerns regarding doctors’ competence can be found 
when we consider those elements of ancient medicine in which firstly, rational and/or 
empirical elements are present to a greater degree than the magical and/or religious 
and secondly, where there is a clear risk of the doctor causing direct harm to the 
patient. In Egypt, for example, we may note that pharmacological prescriptions 
become noticeably more exact when indicating the proportions of mineral ingredients
50that are likely to have been toxic . In Assyria, there is some indication from state 
letters that drugs were tested on slaves before being used to treat members of the royal 
family21. In Egypt, it seems from other ancient sources that doctors were discouraged 
from pursuing experimental treatment. Diodorus Siculus, writing in the 1st Century 
BC, claimed that if the Egyptian doctor lost a patient having ‘deviated from the 
traditional practices and methods in any way’ he was put to death; Aristotle, in the 
Politics, allows for slightly more leeway, claiming that this sanction did not apply to 
doctors who had followed traditional methods during the first four days of 
treatment22.
It is in surgical medicine, however, that these concerns are most in evidence. In 
Babylonia as early as the 17th Century BC, the Code o f Hammurabi contained what
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Carrick has described as a ‘comprehensive system of legislative sanctions 
[concerning] surgical medicine’. Interestingly, considering Grodin’s contention that 
concerns regarding the doctor’s fee rose to prominence only in the Middle Ages, the 
Code also sets out a sliding scale of ‘differential medical fees for surgery based on the 
socio-economic status of each patient’. More importantly for our current purpose, it 
also contained the ‘first recorded attempt by any culture to protect patients from 
incompetent doctors’. With reference to surgery on the eye, the Code lays out several 
punishments for the doctor who causes the loss of either the affected organ, or his 
patient’s life. In the case of a nobleman, the state is to punish either eventuality by 
cutting off the doctor’s hand; in the case of a slave, loss of life is to be compensated 
by the doctor replacing the slave with one of equal value, and loss of an eye with 
payment equivalent to half the value of the slave23.
There are several plausible reasons why surgery should be singled out for regulation. 
First of all, such interventions were, as Carrick has noted, ‘perceived to carry more 
immediate and permanent risks to the patient compared to other forms of medicine...
*)A(including magic)’ . Moreover, risks and responsibilities would be easier to quantify. 
Whereas the causes of ‘a stroke, or epilepsy... would be quite mysterious and their 
effect regarded as due to the patient’s being possessed by some demon or other’25 the 
cause of injuries requiring surgical treatment (or injuries inflicted as a result of such 
treatment) would in most cases be immediately obvious. For example, in what is far 
and away the most rational and empirical o f the surviving Egyptian medical texts, the 
Edwin Smith Papyrus, the prevalence of head wounds that appear to have been caused 
by weapons seems to indicate that the anonymous author had at some point ‘acted as 
an army surgeon’ . It seems reasonable to conclude that, where the responsibility for 
an ailment is situated in human agency, responsibility for the success of a remedy is 
likewise shifted. It is much harder for a doctor to believe the failure of a treatment is 
the result (or blame the failure of a treatment on) the strength of a demon or divine 
displeasure when he is evidently responsible for inflicting fresh injuries as part of an 
intended cure.
Again, it is important to caution against drawing any but the most general conclusions 
and impressions from such cases. It is tempting to read Egyptian regulations that new 
treatments should not be tried until those which had been ‘proved many times’ had
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been exhausted, or Babylonian punishments for botched surgery, primarily or
exclusively in terms of a concern for patient welfare. However (and without claiming
that what follows definitively excludes the possibility of such concerns also being
present) we should remember that Egyptian medicine was ‘extraordinarily static’27
and heavily prejudiced against the possibility of improving on older forms of 
28knowledge . In Babylonia, in the case of slaves, we are reminded that these are laws 
concerned with damage to property at least as much as with harm to human beings. 
Likewise, the sliding scale of payments outlined in the Code o f Hammurabi may be a 
way of ensuring wide access to medical treatment, yet it is equally possible that they 
are a literal expression of the relative value placed on the lives of different classes of 
people.
Possible Moral Concerns regarding Euthanasia and Abortion in the Ancient 
Near East
If moral concerns were raised, in some cases at least, by those situations in which a 
doctor might inadvertently hasten the end of life, what of those in which he might be 
seen to intentionally cause this to happen? In the case of moral positions surrounding 
what we would now understand as euthanasia, the evidence is, at best, ambiguous. It 
is known that the Egyptians, Persians, Assyrians and Babylonians all viewed suicide 
as taboo, an act which ‘irrevocably cut [the perpetrator] off from the Gods’. However, 
suicide is not necessarily analogous with euthanasia to the modem mind and there is 
no reason to suppose that this was always the case in the ancient world either. 
Similarly, although the religious elements of the doctor’s role in these cultures may be 
seen as likely to prohibit either assisting in or actively causing a patient’s death there 
is, as Carrick has suggested, no reason why we should suppose religious judgement 
may not have been in some cases tempered with religious compassion and mercy29.
The Edwin Smith Papyrus suggests that the Egyptians gave serious thought to what 
the doctor should do when faced with seemingly hopeless cases. In the list of injuries 
and ailments, we find a threefold division of cases into those where the prognosis is 
good (‘an ailment which I will treat’), uncertain (‘an ailment with which I will 
contend’) or poor (‘an ailment not to be treated’)30 which is echoed in another work, 
the Ebers Papyrus31. What the doctor might do in cases of the third type is not always
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clear. In the case of the Edwin Smith Papyrus, Sigerist contends ‘that hopeless cases 
were not to be touched’ as part of which he rules out ‘endeavours to alleviate
32symptoms’ . With regards to the Ebers Papyrus, he is more inclined to agree with 
Carrick that ‘some of the cases explicitly reveal... steps to at least relieve... 
suffering’33, allowing that the latter work provides examples of clearly hopeless cases 
in which incantations are prescribed to at least ‘relieve or cheer the sick man’34. 
Nevertheless, even if we accept Carrick’s stronger contention, which can plausibly be 
extended to cover inducing a comfortable death, it remains the case that we have no 
explicit evidence of Egyptian doctors doing so.
In the case of abortion, on the other hand, there is clear evidence that abortive 
procedures were known in the ancient Near East and that, in Egypt at least, it is 
plausible to suggest that the survival of relevant prescriptions indicates that doctors 
were permitted to terminate pregnancies; there is, however, nothing to indicate when 
this was considered morally appropriate and/or medically necessary35. Similarly, in 
Persia and Assyria, where there is evidence that some abortions were forbidden, it is 
far from conclusive that any restriction or taboo applied to all possible cases. Assyrian 
law, for example, mentions only the woman who procures an abortion for herself, 
remaining silent on abortions procured by her relatives or the social group to which 
she belonged36. Similarly, whilst the Persian Videvdad does provide for anyone who 
helps a woman in procuring an abortion to be punished, along with the doctor or nurse 
who carries out the procedure , this still raises the possibility of permitting medical 
abortions prescribed or required by the doctor in cases o f non-viable offspring, or 
where the life of the mother was threatened.
Carrick is surely right in noting that the severity of the Assyrian punishment for 
procuring an abortion (impalement on a stake, with the remains left unburied) 
constitutes plausible grounds for believing it to be considered morally repugnant . 
However, it is by no means certain that this repugnance means that abortion was here 
thought of as wrong because it constituted killing (it is, by contrast, explicitly 
described as such in the Videvdad). Certainly in some parts of ancient Mesopotamia, 
the killing or exposure of newborn children appears to have been considered 
acceptable39 and, as we shall see in Chapter 2, abortion has been considered wrong for 
quite different reasons (principal among them matters of sexual and social control) in
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cultures where this practice is widespread. It may be noteworthy in this context that in 
one later Mesopotamian law-code, that of the Hittites, murder, manslaughter and other 
crimes against the person were punishable by fines; sexual intercourse with cattle, 
however, was punishable by death40.
Nevertheless, whether abortion was forbidden amongst the Assyrians as analogous to 
murder or manslaughter, or as a crime against the social order, and regardless of 
whether Egyptian doctors sometimes hastened the death of patients when they 
believed their position to be helpless, it is clear that not only the correct execution but 
also the proper use of the doctor’s skills was at least in part a matter for regulation. 
Whatever the motivation, in the Egyptian prognosis ‘an ailment not to be treated’ 
there is a suggestion that there are times when the doctor should refrain from 
performing surgery; in Assyria it is clear that, in some cases at least, neither surgical 
(or more likely, pharmacological) means were to be used to terminate a pregnancy. 
From these examples, it seems reasonable to conclude that there existed in these 
cultures a recognition that, just as magical and/or religious powers bring with them 
the possibility of black magic or the ‘evil eye’, so the skills acquired by the doctor as 
medicine developed to include rational and/or empirical methods brought with them 
the potential for misuse.
Conclusions
Despite the limitations noted at the start of this chapter, then, we may draw several 
tentative conclusions regarding moral thought and medicine in the ancient Near East 
from the examples above. The first of these is that the emergence of the healer as a 
figure with a distinct social role raises moral questions as to their competence to carry 
out this role and that, for reasons anthropological or otherwise, this is bound up with 
concerns regarding the moral character o f the healer themselves. The second is that 
these moral questions later extend to cover the mastery of a body of practical 
knowledge, especially those parts of it that involve practices such as surgery which 
(contrary to the intuitive role o f the healer) risk or require causing harm to the patient. 
Finally, there is at least the possibility that moral questions eventually extend to the 
degree to which such skills can be employed, especially when there is the potential for 
them to be used to carry out actions which are morally prohibited or otherwise taboo.
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However, whilst there is much in Egyptian, Assyrian and other ancient Near-Eastern 
medicine which seems familiar to the modem mind, it should also be emphasised that 
there remain significant differences. The first is that, as yet, we have not encountered 
a ‘medicine’ which is recognisably like our own: naturalistic, based wholly on 
rational argument and empirical evidence as opposed to supernatural intervention, and 
(perhaps) conceived of as a progressive struggle against disease. More importantly, 
though we have evidence of much that is ethical in the first sense in which we have 
elected to use the term (the codification and exposition of moral action-guides) we are 
left with little but speculation when considering the second (analysis of and debate 
about the reasoning which produces them). For the emergence of both these key 
elements, then, we must now look towards the Greeks.
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Chapter 2: Medicine and Ethics in Ancient Greece
Such evidence that exists as to the earliest forms of Greek medicine, in the form of 
references in the Homeric epics and the poetry of Hesiod, suggests that it was similar 
in form and content to that found elsewhere in the ancient world. Disease was seen as 
the result of divine displeasure: Apollo and Artemis in particular were believed to 
cause epidemic disease ‘by shooting their arrows at mortals’1 (there is no doubt 
amongst the army besieging Troy at the start o f the Iliad, for example, that the plague 
ravaging their camp has been sent by Apollo2). As Longrigg has noted, whilst less 
‘heroic’ illnesses do not appear in the epics as the direct result of divine agency (as 
when Odysseus asks the shade of his mother the cause of her death in Book XI of the 
Odyssey3)  it seems likely they were nevertheless ascribed an origin that was 
ultimately divine4. Hesiod, for example, portrays disease (the ‘[thousands] of troubles 
wandering the earth’) as Zeus’ punishment upon mankind for receiving Prometheus’ 
gift of fire5. Unsurprisingly, practices concerning the healing of illness and injury that 
appear in these sources are still bound up with magical and/or religious methods: in 
the Iliad, the obvious course of action to end the plague is to send for a soothsayer to 
discover what will placate the angry god6.
Despite Edelstein’s claims to the contrary7, rational and/or empirical elements do not 
appear in Homer as wholly distinct from magic and/or religion. It is true that, where 
the healing of battlefield injuries is not carried out by divine intervention, it takes the
form of binding and cleansing wounds before applying healing drugs (‘a surgeon...
8  *can cut out an arrow and heal the wound with his ointments’ ). Moreover, skilled 
surgeons could win renown for mastery of these arts (Machaon, son of Asclepius, is 
said to be ‘worth a regiment’9) suggesting that success or failure was seen as at least 
in part within the healer’s own compass rather than simply in the hands of the gods. 
However, such skills are explicitly identified as semi-divine in origin, ultimately 
derived from the centaur Chiron (whom Homer identifies as the teacher of both 
Achilles10 and Asclepius11). Nor are they employed separately from magical and/or 
religious remedies: in the Odyssey, Odysseus’ hunting wounds are treated with both 
bandages and incantations12 (much later, in the late 6th or early 5th Century, Pindar 
still describes Asclepius as having tended ‘some... with soft incantations [and] some
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[with] the knife’13). Additionally, as Sigerist points out, the word used by Homer to 
describe drugs (pharmakon) is also used to denote any ‘vegetable substance that had 
magic powers’ (including that of turning men into pigs)14.
Yet Greek medicine, unlike that of surrounding cultures, did not remain static. Whilst 
the Egyptians may have developed many of the most strikingly rational and/or 
empirical elements of their medicine by the beginning of the 3rd millennium BC, they 
failed to ever fully divorce medicine from magic15. In Greece, by contrast, the 
conception of disease present in Hesiod’s poetry, written in the 8th Century BC, had 
by the 5th been superseded by ‘an approach to the problems of health and disease and, 
in general, a type of medicine such as the world had never seen before’16. The 
contents of the earliest surviving Greek medical texts, grouped together as the 
Hippocratic Corpus, are notable not only for the amount o f medical knowledge (in 
terms of techniques, observations and evaluations) they record, but also for the 
repeated insistence that ‘disease is... a natural process’ and that there exists ‘the 
possibility of understanding and controlling [it] through the art of medicine’17.
It is of course possible that the scope and pace o f the changes in Greek attitudes to 
nature from the 6th Century onwards came about simply because the Greeks were 
lucky enough to be in some way innately intellectually superior to their neighbours, or 
to be blessed with a remarkable and inexplicable surfeit o f individuals of genius. 
However, it is also clear that several factors existed which were likely either to drive 
such change or at least to enable such genii as undoubtedly did exist to flourish. First 
of all, the Greeks lacked the centralised political authority found in Egypt and 
Mesopotamia (perhaps since, unlike those regions, cultivation was possible without 
extensive irrigation and the ‘strong power [and] disciplined population’ required for
1 Q
it); even the form  of governance varied from city-state to city-state . Consequently, 
there was also a lack of strong religious authority to restrict inquiry: ‘no professional 
priesthood jealous to preserve a dogmatic religious orthodoxy [or] inviolable 
dogmatic code’19. Miletus, the home of Thales20 and Anaximander21, was also 
cosmopolitan, wealthy enough to support a population with enough leisure-time to 
engage in reflection and debate, and could boast recent achievements which were ‘too 
obviously the product of human energy and initiative for there to be any need to 
acknowledge an indebtedness to the gods’22.
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Longrigg has noted that the ‘emancipation of (some) medicine from magic and 
superstition was the outcome of precisely the same attitude of mind which the 
Milesian natural philosophers were the first to apply to the world about them’23. The 
absence o f written medical records from the time of the first presocratic philosophers 
make it hard to quantify the exact relationship between the two 24. However, it seems 
unlikely that the impetus towards a wholly naturalistic medicine came entirely from 
healers themselves, in the main itinerant craftsmen who most likely passed on their 
skills through oral instruction from father to son and/or master to apprentice without 
the aid o f written records . It is true that, unlike his counterpart elsewhere, the 
ancient Greek doctor was largely free from organised religious influence. Temple 
healing associated with the cult of Asclepius, once thought of as the wellspring of 
Hippocratic medicine, appears to have been a separate, contemporary development: 
archaeological evidence, for example, indicates that the temple of Asclepius on the 
island of Cos was constructed only after the island was ‘already famous for its secular 
healers’26. Nevertheless, and even allowing for Sigerist’s suggestion that the Greeks 
inherited from Crete a world-view in which (compared to that of their Near Eastern 
contemporaries) gods, ghosts and demons were less likely to take a direct role in 
human affairs27, the Greek doctor of the 8th to 6th Centuries most probably practised a 
folk-medicine ‘not so different from that of their Egyptian and Babylonian 
colleagues’28.
The Hippocratic doctor, however, was far closer to the philosopher than the folk 
healer. As both Longrigg29 and Sigerist30 point out, the texts of the Hippocratic 
Corpus are written, not in the Dorian dialect spoken in Cos and Cnidus, where they 
were most likely produced, but in the Ionian dialect that was the language of the cities 
o f Asia Minor (of which Miletus was one) and thus of early Greek philosophy and 
science. Furthermore, just as the Ionian natural philosophers replaced Homeric 
descriptions of Poseidon and Zeus causing earthquakes and lightning with accounts in 
which ‘rational causation supplanted supernatural explanation’31 so we may compare 
the account of epilepsy in the Babylonian Sakikku with that found in the Hippocratic 
The Sacred Disease. The empirical record of physical symptoms that may be present 
in a seizure are in each case strikingly similar. In the former text, however, differing 
symptoms are taken to indicate differing causes such as ‘an [unfulfilled] vow made by 
[the patient’s] father’, ‘hand of ghost’ or ‘hand of ghost who has died in a mass
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killing’32. In the latter, by contrast, the author explicitly states that epilepsy ‘is not in 
the least more divine than any other [disease], but has the same nature... and a similar 
cause’33.
As this quotation illustrates, there was still room for the religious to co-exist with the 
naturalistic: after all, the writer does not argue that epilepsy is in no way divine, 
simply that it is not more divine than other illnesses. Especially in the case of plagues 
and epidemics for which there was neither a readily apparent natural cause nor any 
form of natural remedy it remained possible to ascribe illness to divine disfavour. The 
plague that struck Athens between 430-426 ‘led to some disillusionment with 
conventional religion’ as it seemed to strike the devout as often as anyone else; 
nevertheless, it also led to the introduction of the cult of Asclepius34. Ancient writers 
themselves do not seem to have seen religious and naturalistic viewpoints as mutually 
exclusive: as Longrigg points out, Diodorus was happy to follow Thucydides in 
viewing the Athenian plague as the result o f ‘breathing of corrupted air caused by 
overcrowded conditions’ whilst attributing others to punishment for, for example, the 
sacking of temples35. On the other hand, such a conception does not necessarily rule 
out naturalistic diagnosis and/or treatment of individuals; moreover, it is consistent 
with maintaining a separation between medical and religious approaches to illness, 
with the doctor attempting the former whilst leaving the latter to the priest.
Moral Concerns regarding Practical Competence in Naturalistic Medicine
The insights into the physical world that the Ionian natural philosophers hoped to gain 
do not seem to have been of interest to them merely as the subject of leisurely 
reflection, but rather as a source of practical knowledge. Whilst one apocryphal story 
mentioned by Plato has an unworldly Thales jeered at by a servant-girl for having 
fallen into a well whilst gazing at the stars36, Herodotus describes him as an ingenious 
and practical thinker, able to plan and construct a culvert in order to divert the flow of 
a river and thus reduce it to a suitable level for an army to ford and active in the 
political life of the city38. Similarly, the author o f The Sacred Disease is not interested 
in defending a naturalistic account of epilepsy for its own sake. Rather, in striving to 
understand the illness to be ‘not in the least more divine than any other’ he raises the 
possibility that ‘it can be cured no less than other diseases [my emphasis]’. Equally,
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such understanding makes it clear that certain treatments (notably magical remedies 
such as ‘ [charms] buried in the ground, thrown into the sea, or carried off into the 
mountains where no-one may touch or tread on them’) have next to no chance of 
working39 (although, as we might expect from the previous section, religious cures 
were less controversial, especially when conceived of as a last resort ‘when all human 
skills proved unavailing’40).
The naturalistic turn taken by Hippocratic medicine thus had clear moral implications 
in terms of redefining and expanding the nature o f what it meant for a doctor to be 
competent, something of which the author o f The Sacred Disease, with his scathing 
attack on ‘witch-doctors, faith-healers, quacks and charlatans’41, seems well aware. 
Removing the supernatural elements from the doctor’s role did not lead to a 
concomitant reduction in the doctor’s responsibilities in this respect; far from it. 
Instead, to knowledge of anatomy and pharmacology was added that of dietetics and 
of the patient’s environment. The author of the treatise Airs, Waters, Places, for 
example, notes that only the doctor who has made a study of climate, situation and 
water-supply will ‘not be at a loss to treat diseases [in a new environment, nor] make 
mistakes as he would certainly do had he not thought about these things 
beforehand’42. An expanded body of knowledge, too large to pass on through an oral 
tradition alone, also requires that discoveries are correctly recorded so that they may 
be communicated to others, as attested by the surviving volumes of the Epidemics. 
Even concerns regarding the character of the doctor take on a new form, as indicated 
in the Canon, in which the most important elements o f the prospective doctor’s nature 
are described as a ‘natural disposition’ for, and ‘prolonged industry’ in, study43.
The extent to which those who chose not to pursue this naturalistic turn can be judged 
morally culpable for doing so is difficult to establish. Certainly, we may be tempted to 
agree with the author of The Sacred Disease when he castigates those who wilfully 
exploit superstition for personal gain and to escape responsibility for their actions (‘if 
the patient be cured, their reputation... is enhanced... if  he dies, they can excuse 
themselves by explaining that the gods are to blame’44). On the other hand, it should 
not be forgotten that the specific details of Hippocratic medicine were often every bit 
as wrong as an assumption of divine or demoniacal influence (epilepsy is not caused, 
as the author of The Sacred Disease asserted, by the blood-vessels that supply air to
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the brain being shut off by the accumulation of phlegm45). Also, whilst the belief that 
all diseases had a natural cause turned out to be the correct one, there was no way of 
knowing ahead of time that this was the case, that the progress it promised was indeed 
possible, or if  a naturalistic turn was in fact the best way to go about it if so. The 
caution that rendered Egyptian medicine so static for so long is as explicable in terms 
of an evidently moral concern for the patient as it is o f xenophobic prejudice or 
religious dogmatism (more probably, it was a combination of all three).
Eventually, however, the evidence in favour of Hippocratic medicine must have 
grown to the extent that refusal to adopt its naturalistic approach becomes difficult to 
explain in terms of anything other than dishonesty or (more charitably) either 
foolishness or wilful ignorance. Exactly when this change happened is impossible to 
say; nevertheless, it does not appear to have gone unnoticed, as the following story 
from Herodotus attests. Darius, the king of Persia, had dislocated his ankle whilst 
hunting and the staff of Egyptian doctors he kept on hand due to their ‘reputation for 
the highest eminence in their profession’ were unable to reduce the injury46. However, 
it came to Darius’ attention that the Greek doctor Democedes (‘the most distinguished
A *7physician of his day’ ) was amongst the slaves of Oroetes, a nobleman he had 
recently had executed48. Darius sent for Democedes, who ‘by using Greek methods 
and substituting milder remedies for the rough-and-ready treatments of the Egyptian 
doctors, enabled the king to get some sleep, and very soon cured him completely’49. 
Democedes was appointed Darius’ court doctor, and interceded with the king to spare 
his Egyptian predecessors, who had been ordered to suffer death by impalement50.
Whether Herodotus’ story recounts literal history is not particularly important for our 
purposes here, although it is known that the Persians, like the Greeks, held Egyptian 
medicine in high regard: records indicate that Darius provided for the restoration of 
the House of Life, an Egyptian medical school51, and his predecessor Cyrus is also 
reputed to have surrounded himself with Egyptian physicians . Even if Herodotus is 
repeating or embellishing a folk-tale, however, we may see it as one which records 
either a contemporary or remembered realisation that Greek medicine at some point 
began to outstrip its forbears. Certainly, any employment of Egyptian doctors in the 
Persian court would suggest that the VidevdacT s claim that Zoroastrian incantation- 
priests made for the best healers was known (by some, at least) to be untrue. Their
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own cultural influences notwithstanding, it is clear that at some point it became 
possible for the Persians to judge first Egyptian, then Greek medicine as superior to 
their own, and where judgement is shown to have become possible, so individuals 
become culpable for errors in exercising it.
Ethical Reflection in Ancient Greece
As we noted at the end of the previous chapter, such ethical codes and rule-systems as 
we have encountered so far have been presented as a fa it accompli. On encountering 
the Code o f  Hammurabi or the Videvdad, one is put in mind of Nietzsche’s 
description of the ‘law-book [which] never tells o f the utility of law, of the reason for 
it, o f the casuistry which preceded it’ . We have yet to encounter ethics in the sense 
of reflection, interpretation and debate: in such law-books, morality takes the form of 
imperatives and, prior to the Greeks, we have yet to encounter morality understood as 
a problem. We should, of course, be cautious o f counting the absence of evidence for 
ethical debate in the ancient Near East as evidence of its absence. Indeed, it can be 
reasonably inferred (ruling out the possibility o f divine inspiration or revelation) that 
such debate (or something like it) occurred in said cultures at some stage in order to 
provide the content of their moralities, laws, religions and so on. Nevertheless, not 
only are the ‘reasons and casuistry’ through which (some) Greeks interrogated their 
morality preserved for us in a form which remains sufficiently complete to render 
them intelligible, they also appear to have been prized as contributing to the force of 
moral imperatives. This role is quite incompatible with their being hidden or 
neglected, arguing that (as with the naturalistic turn in medicine) this attitude was a 
Greek innovation.
Given that knowledge of the physical world, as conceived in the ancient Near East 
and in Homeric Greece, was bound up with knowledge of the spiritual world and thus 
with morality we might expect that philosophers should eventually expand their 
concerns from the physical to the moral sphere. If thunderbolts and earthquakes (and, 
lest we forget, epidemic disease) are no longer thought of as the arbitrary whim of the 
gods, but rather as the result of some other process inherent in the world, then it is not 
too far an imaginative leap to begin to consider whether moral imperatives and 
prohibitions might not also have a similar origin. To some extent, the two remain
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inextricably connected: Anaximander, perhaps metaphorically, gave an account of 
physical change in terms of a universal moral law (‘according to necessity [things] 
pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice’54) which seems to at least 
raise the possibility that there exists a moral law which is binding even on the gods. It 
is perhaps of interest to compare this insight with the contrasting portrayal of the 
plagues that afflict the Greek army in Book 1 of the Iliad and Thebes in Sophocles’ 
Oedipus the King: both are manifestations of Apollo’s wrath, but the first is sent to 
avenge a more-or-less personal slight against him55 whilst in the second instance he is 
acting in accordance with the requirements o f a universal moral taboo56.
Fragments suggest that other philosophers may also have begun to ground positions 
regarding human conduct in their physical accounts of the world. Democritus, for 
example, appears to make reference to atomic theory when noting that a lack of 
moderation ‘[gives] rise to large movements within the soul’57 although it is possible 
his meaning is metaphorical58. Earlier, Heraclitus had described ‘all the laws of men 
[as] nourished by one law, the divine law’59, which as Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 
have noted, refers not to divine commands but rather ‘the Logos [understood in this 
sense as] the formulaic constituent of the cosmos’ and thus an understanding of ‘the 
proper relation of men to the world’60. That there were known examples of human 
law-givers (although both Lycurgus in Sparta and Solon in Athens were traditionally 
accorded reverence consistent with a belief they were divinely inspired61) and that
f/ylaws and customs were known to vary between different peoples may also be seen to 
have prompted a realisation that, if a universal law did exist, it remained to be 
discovered.
In Plato’s Euthyphro, for example, Socrates interrogation of Euthyphro’s conception 
of piety and his conclusion (that what is holy is what is approved of by all the gods, 
and that this cannot simply be because it is holy in itself but must be for some other 
reason, namely that it is just)63 may be seen to place a moral principle above the gods 
in the same way that the Ionian presocratics placed a physical principle above them. 
The mention of legal proceedings also brings out another element of Greek culture 
which fostered the development of moral enquiry, what McKirahan has termed ‘the 
beginnings of the practice of reaching decisions through public debate’64, a process 
which reached an unprecedented level o f sophistication in 5th Century Athens65. Law
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made in an Assembly and justice meted out by a jury are likely to require some form 
of moral argument; moreover they are likely to bring into focus questions regarding 
the potential for and/or nature of difference between human and ‘divine’ or ‘natural’ 
laws. Socrates may also be seen to underline the importance of rational enquiry in 
upholding piety through establishing its meaning (Socrates recognises that Euthyphro 
must be particularly sure that his actions will be approved by the gods since taking his 
own father to court would, conventionally, also be impious)66.
As we noted above, the naturalistic turn in Greek medicine (though scathing of 
magical remedies) does not seem to have been antagonistic to religious healing. 
Similarly, any naturalistic turn in physics and ethics should not necessarily be seen to 
result in philosophers doing away with gods or with religion altogether. In some 
cases, as with Heraclitus’ apparent equivalence of ‘divine law’ with the ‘constituent 
of the cosmos’, the Ionian presocratics tended to apply terminology previously 
reserved for the Olympian gods to the underlying causes of the natural world: 
Anaximander, for example, is described by Aristotle as regarding ‘the infinite [as] the 
divine; for it [alone] is immortal and indestructible’67. Other philosophers, including 
Empedocles and the Pythagoreans, remained religious in a way that we (although not
z o
the Greeks) may regard as more conventional . Nevertheless, as we shall explore in 
more detail below, from the 6th through to the 5th Centuries BC we find in Greece a 
move away from a morality known and willed through divine revelation and 
command to one established or uncovered through rational enquiry and argument.
As such, the Greeks preserved a record not only of different moral positions but of the 
arguments used to reach them, and thus provide us for the first time with evidence, 
not of moral differences between cultures, but of both an awareness of these 
differences and of moral debate within their own. The question of whether this 
increase in the quantity of moral debate in Greece in the 5th Century is also indicative 
of increase in the moral quality (or otherwise) of Greek culture is a rather more vexed 
one, as is the extent to which the conclusions of this debate could be regarded as 
applicable in other cultures and at other times. Plato himself, in the city where such 
debate was more prominent than anywhere else, appears to have doubted whether an 
increase in moral deliberation per se was sufficient to achieve moral understanding or 
ensure moral conduct: in the Gorgias, for example, Socrates takes pains not to be
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mistaken for someone who engages in debate ‘not so much to elucidate the subject as 
to gain a verbal victory’69. As McKirahan notes70, this concern -  that Athenians might 
become more concerned with (rhetorically) impressive arguments than (morally) 
correct judgements -  is echoed in Aristophanes’ The Clouds (in which ‘Wrong’
71trumps ‘Right’ in a mock-Sophistic debate ).
These criticisms however, together with the success of the Sophists in finding gainful 
employment and their (sincere or otherwise) deployment of provocative philosophical 
questions in doing so72, nevertheless point towards the extraordinary seriousness with 
which moral concerns and debates were taken in Athenian culture in general. 
Moreover, this seriousness is displayed throughout the public sphere as a whole:
‘from the theatre, Assembly and law courts to the great festival of Olympia... the 
general public was exposed to and presumably understood and entered into... 
debate’ . Sophocles’ Antigone for example, as Knox has perceptively argued, is a 
play which appears first to suggest its audience sympathise with both sides of a moral 
argument (both Antigone and Creon’s cases are persuasively put) and then 
deconstructs these arguments and their motivations in a way that resists endorsing 
either position as definitively stronger than the other74. In other words it is a work 
which is both morally sophisticated (we may contrast the dispute with the more 
straightforward squabble between Agamemnon and Achilles in Book 1 of the Iliad, 
for example) and morally challenging, not in terms of inviting the audience to come to 
a judgement on who is right and who is wrong, but in inviting them to consider how 
such judgements may be made and whether they are possible.
Given the growth in moral debate throughout Greek culture as a whole we should not 
be surprised to find that this was accompanied by increased moral reflection regarding 
medicine and related matters. A further consequence is that such reflection is often 
intelligible to us in a way that is only possible with regards to earlier cultures by 
employing a certain amount of conjecture. For example, we may consider the case of 
abortion. As we saw in Chapter 1, this was certainly legally prohibited in Assyria and 
appears to have been considered morally repugnant, but it is difficult to establish why. 
On the other hand, with regards to (for example) the Pythagoreans, Edelstein argues 
that there are two reasonably clear grounds for their moral disapproval of the
75practice . Firstly, their (admittedly speculative) understanding of human physiology
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with regards to how the soul was formed in terms of a zygote’s physical development 
led them to believe that this must occur at the moment of conception (‘The germ is a 
clot o f brain containing hot vapour within i t . .. when brought to the womb... soul and
•  7 f%sense come from the vapour within’ ). Secondly, their religious beliefs held that the 
only permissible form of sexual intercourse was that in which the production of 
offspring was the intended consequence (‘ [they] forbade entirely intercourse that was 
unnatural, or resulting from wanton insolence, allowing only the natural and 
temperate forms, which occur in the course o f chaste and recognised procreation of
•  77children’ ). The second part of Edelstein’s argument has been echoed more recently 
by Gaca, whose own translation (‘[intercourse] for the purpose of... reproduction [my 
emphasis]’) underlines that this is not simply a reference to, for example, 
autoeroticism or homosexuality78.
As a consequence it is possible, in contrast to the Assyrian position, both to identify 
on what grounds the Pythagoreans claimed abortion to be wrong and to engage with 
their argument by examining the premises on which it is based: we could, for 
example, challenge their views regarding souls, or the gods, or the duties humans owe 
them. Moreover, we have clear evidence in Greece where we do not in Assyria of 
both dissenting opinion and dissenting argument. So, for example, Aristotle did not 
accept Pythagorean views regarding the moment at which the zygote became 
‘besouled’, holding that abortion was morally permissible (for some reasons) ‘before 
the embryo has acquired life and sensation; the presence [of which] will be the mark 
of division between right and wrong’79 (as Carrick notes, Aristotle does not specify 
exactly when this is supposed to occur, but within 40 days of conception seems likely 
given his position in the History o f Animals*0). Plato, by contrast, mentions the 
embryonic soul not at all when advocating both abortion and infanticide. Rather, in 
the Republic81 (and perhaps in the reference to ‘measures to check propagation’ in the 
Laws*2) his arguments concentrate on what Aristotle kept as a defensible reason for 
the former83: both practices are deemed necessary to keep the state optimally stocked 
with optimal individuals. Philip V of Macedon, by contrast, ‘worried about his 
country’s depopulation’, would in later times use this same justification to outlaw 
‘wilful limitation of the family by contraception, abortion or infanticide’84.
31
Again, it is possible that such engagement is not necessarily conducive to moral 
conduct. If one believes that, for example, abortion is always morally wrong because 
it is equivalent to murder, then it may be tempting to allow that Assyria, where (at 
least some) abortions were forbidden was (perhaps inadvertently) morally preferable 
to Greece and certainly superior to any state run along the lines suggested by Plato or 
Aristotle in which (at least some) abortions would be mandatory. On the other hand, 
one might also reflect that, just as the naturalistic turn in Greek medicine allowed for 
new possibilities to do both good (in terms of, for example, mastering and applying an 
increased range of knowledge in treatment o f the sick and injured) and bad (in terms 
of being negligent in one’s learning of these skills, of refusing to accept them because 
of some cultural prejudice, and so on) so an increase in moral debate allows for at 
least an increased possibility of moral progress (presumably exemplified, in the 
example above, in the position of the Pythagoreans) together with an increased risk of 
moral error (in this case, Plato and Aristotle). Furthermore, even if one did not accept 
this possibility, in the examples above all the positions appear to be in some way the 
consequence of scientific progress and social change; as such, it would seem that 
some engagement with them was inescapable.
The Relationship between Philosophy and Medicine in Ancient Greece
So far, we have shown that the ancient Greek philosopher could be concerned with 
medicine in two different respects which may both, in different ways, be seen to 
develop the moral concerns identified in Chapter 1. Firstly, medicine could be seen as 
a practical application of natural philosophy in which, as Carrick puts it, the 
philosopher ‘sought... to plumb nature for some lasting insights into her universal 
laws [and] to explain phenomena through these laws’ whilst the doctor sought ‘to use 
the practical consequences’85. As a result, natural philosophy called into question the 
possible effectiveness of some treatments (notably magical remedies such as charms 
and incantations) and thus began to redefine the nature of medical competence. 
Secondly, medical practices, which had in earlier cultures been subject to moral 
judgement, now became the object of moral reflection. From this, we should perhaps 
expect that it does not seem to have gone unnoticed that this shared ‘attitude of mind’ 
with regard to the natural world meant that doctor and philosopher could each draw
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conclusions that affected what the other was accustomed to thinking of as their own 
sphere of expertise.
In some respects this meant that philosophy and medicine were, amongst the Greeks, 
complementary activities. As Edelstein notes (quoting Burnet’s opinion that ‘it is 
impossible... to understand the development of philosophy without keeping the 
development of medicine constantly in view’86) it has been suggested that the impetus 
towards naturalism in Greek thought was itself provided by medicine. Certainly, Plato 
appears to have borrowed certain concepts from Hippocratic works: in Phaedrus, his 
Socrates compares the knowledge of the underlying nature of the body that ‘the 
Asclepiad doctor Hippocrates’ insisted was essential to medicine with the knowledge 
of the underlying nature of the soul that is essential to rhetoric87. Edelstein inverts this 
position, claiming instead that ‘philosophy influenced medicine rather than being 
influenced by it’ and that the itinerant Greek craftsman who ‘knew medicine... was 
not a ‘scientist’ applying theoretical knowledge to the case at hand... biological and 
physiological enquiries were neither presupposed, nor were they actually made’88. He 
also contends that, in so far as those few doctors who ‘aspired to overcome the narrow
O Q
limits of their craft’ were concerned, they either adapted existing philosophical 
positions90 or, where they did ‘contradict specific philosophical doctrines and... 
evolve new theories’, did so as philosophers and not as doctors91.
Regardless o f how much influence extended in either direction, Edelstein appears to 
be correct insofar as the application of theory was not, in general, a major part of 
widespread medical practice. Aristotle makes a passing reference in Book 3 of the 
Politics to doctors being divided between ‘the ordinary practitioner and the master- 
craftsman’92 which Carrick interprets as elevating ‘as masters of their craft [those 
who] could explain why their treatments worked’ in contrast to those ‘who acquired 
their skills mostly by imitation and rote’93. This interpretation draws on a similar 
distinction, made by Plato in the Laws, between the ‘free doctor’ whose ‘method is to 
construct an empirical case-history [and] in this way... learns something from the 
sick’94 and the slave, ‘innocent of theory’95, who ‘prescribes what he thinks best... as 
i f  he had precise knowledge’ [my emphasis]96. Likewise, it is apparent that those 
doctors who not only understood theories of nature but attempted to themselves 
develop these in distinctive and original ways were in doing so considered to be
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engaged in philosophical work, at least by other philosophers. As Longrigg has noted, 
the earliest known Greek medical theories, those of Alcmaeon, were preserved by 
Theophrastus in his history of philosophy, not by Meno in his history of medicine97. 
On the other hand, it is also clear that at least one of the works Edelstein treats as 
‘philosophical’, the Hippocratic treatise Tradition in Medicine (or On Ancient 
Medicine) was conceived as a primarily medical tex t.
We may allow that Tradition in Medicine is also a philosophical text given that 
Edelstein is indisputably right that it is concerned with philosophical ideas: the author 
contrasts his own views with those o f ‘doctors [whose] discourse... tends to 
philosophy’ and specifically with the influence of Empedocles ‘and all the others who
AO
have ever written about nature’ . Equally, in opposing those who ‘have introduced 
arbitrary postulates into their arguments’99 Edelstein is likely correct that the author 
was himself making use of philosophical scepticism100. As Longrigg points out, he 
may be seen to employ in ‘his [own] theory o f health a conception which can be 
traced back to Alcmaeon and ultimately to Anaximander’101. However, unlike 
Alcmaeon’s work, the inclusion of Tradition in Medicine in the Corpus suggests that 
it was regarded as a medical text in antiquity. More importantly, it is clearly primarily 
medical insofar as the arguments employed are intended to have relevance to 
medicine at least as much as they are to philosophy: in suggesting that medicine has 
grown to a science through empirical trial and error rather than rational deduction 
from ‘arbitrary postulates’102 the author’s purpose is not to use medical examples to 
advance a theory o f knowledge in general, but rather to argue that this form of
i / \^
acquiring knowledge is proper to medicine in particular . Importantly, for our 
purposes, the author identifies his arguments as containing moral elements: doctors 
working from ‘arbitrary postulates’ not only deceive both themselves and their 
patients about the true (empirical) basis for their knowledge with ‘technical 
gibberish’104 but do so in a ‘science... which all employ in a matter of the greatest 
importance’105.
From this example we can see that, whilst medicine and natural philosophy could be 
considered a common enterprise in terms of an interest in what Longrigg describes as 
‘[rational] modes of explanation... sought to account for the phenomena in an ordered 
world whose laws were discoverable’106 this also brought them into competition with
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each other. Furthermore, as the emphasis of the philosopher’s role progressed from 
the study of nature to incorporate the study of how man should live his life (that is, 
from natural to moral philosophy) this competition became more pronounced. 
Medicine was useful to philosophers as a source of both knowledge about the 
(physical) nature of man and of analogies about proper human conduct (Aristotle 
provides us with a characteristic example in noting that ‘ [as] both eating and drinking 
too much or too little destroy health... [thus] temperance and courage are destroyed 
by excess and deficiency’107). Yet it was also antagonistic to philosophy in that, as 
Carrick has it, ‘both sought to suggest right ways to live’108.
We have noted already that, even in Homeric times, the doctor was accorded the 
status o f an exceptionally skilled craftsman; nevertheless, this still saw him ranked 
behind ‘musicians, mathematicians, poets and philosophers’ [my emphasis] in terms 
o f social standing109. Given the emphasis which Greek culture placed on physical 
health, however, the ‘more famous and successful physicians could wield significant 
power and authority... [when they] spoke, people were inclined to listen’110. 
Moreover, Greek medicine, with its emphasis on dietetics and ‘health... considered 
[as] a balance of the various constituents of the human body, at every moment upset 
by man’s actions... at every moment to be restored consciously’ could through its 
very methodology and practice quickly become concerned with the totality of an 
individual life, leading to regimes to be followed ‘not only [by] those who were ill, 
but [by] those who were healthy... in order to remain [so]’111. Plato appears to have 
been well aware of this: in the Republic, Socrates describes the supposed inventor of 
dietetic medicine, Herodicus, as having ‘proceeded to make... himself, and then many 
others after him, miserable by a combination of medicine and physical training... too 
busy to do anything other but doctor himself and... made wretched by any departure 
from his routine treatment’112.
All this should be borne in mind when considering the recommendation of Plato’s 
Socrates that, firstly, only emergency medical treatment should be allowed (and then 
only for those who are ordinarily of sound mind and body) and secondly that no 
doctor should be allowed to instruct his patient as to what course of action to take, 
restricting himself only to advising on what the outcome of such courses of action are 
likely to be113. It may be tempting to read a certain condescending professional
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jealousy into Plato’s cautionary note that the skilled doctor who operates scientifically 
is ‘almost like a philosopher [my emphasis]’114, however, his argument that a 
preoccupation with physical health as an end in itself is both limiting (in that it leaves 
little time for anything else) and self-defeating (in that it is likely to make one a 
hypochondriac) 1,5 is both cogent and perceptive. It is, as Edelstein notes, ‘an odd way 
of achieving health and longevity’116; in fact, it does not seem a very ‘healthy’ 
existence at all.
Conclusions
From the examples above, we may draw several conclusions about the ways in which 
the elements of moral thought in medicine we encountered in Chapter 1 were further 
developed in ancient Greece. First of all, and most likely as the result of certain socio- 
historical factors not present in the Near East, Greek medicine took what we have 
described as a ‘naturalistic turn’ away from magical and/or religious methods towards 
the rational and/or empirical. This not only carried moral implications in its own right, 
in terms of expanding and redefining the practical competencies proper to the role of 
the doctor (which could, as in the case o f Persia and Egypt, subsequently apply in 
cultures where this had not yet happened), it was also the product of an outlook of 
mind which itself led to an expansion of ethical thought into reflection and reasoned 
debate, including moral philosophy. The latter was applied to moral concerns in 
medicine, with the result that we encounter medical ethics for the first time in the 
sense of intelligible arguments with which we are able to engage.
Furthermore, the continued interaction of medicine and philosophy may be seen to 
lead to moral questions regarding practical competence being supplemented by 
similar questions regarding epistemology. Simply put, its having a direct bearing on 
the progress towards an effective medicine that the naturalistic turn seemed to offer 
meant that developing a method for obtaining the correct insights, and drawing the 
correct conclusions from them, itself became in some sense a moral matter. Equally, 
the possible consequence of this progress raised moral questions as to the proper goals 
of medicine, the proper authority of the doctor and, perhaps, the need to expand and 
redefine conceptions o f ‘health’ itself. In addition to these, and perhaps not 
surprisingly when we consider the seriousness with which moral debate appears to
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have been taken, it is in ancient Greece that we also find for the first time literature 
specifically devoted to the subject of medical ethics in the form of both some of the 
treatises found in the Hippocratic Corpus, and of the Hippocratic Oath. In the 
subsequent chapter, then, we will move on to consider how our understanding of these 
texts may be influenced by the general trends we have identified thus far.
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Chapter 3: ‘Outward Show’, ‘Inward Duty’ and the Hippocratic Oath
Given our discussion in the previous chapter of the growth of moral reflection and 
debate amongst the Greeks it may seem surprising that the most well-known work of 
ancient Greek medical ethics contains no explicit evidence of these whatsoever. The 
Hippocratic Oath does not devote itself to the reasons behind the rules it lays down 
for governing doctors’ conduct; moreover, as Edelstein points out, ‘most of the 
statements contained in the document are worded in rather general terms [and contain] 
concepts which in themselves do not imply any distinct meaning but may be 
understood in various ways’1. In addition, what apparently unambiguous guidance it 
does offer (regarding dietetics, use of the knife, and the provision of ‘deadly drugs’ to 
anyone and ‘abortive remedies’ to women) seems quite out of place with prevailing 
moral and medical opinion in Greece during the period (between the 6th and 3rd
a
Centuries BC ) it was most likely written, which held, for example, that ‘aiding a 
patient in suicide [and] abortion... were basically acceptable... neither religious nor 
legal sanctions, nor moral disapprobation typically forbade such conduct’ .
Several different explanations have been offered to account for the Oath's eventual 
standing given its departure from mainstream Greek medical practice, attempting in 
some cases to ‘explain away various troublesome and otherwise irreconcilable 
features of the Oath\ in others to show it to be wholly ‘atypical of Greek medical 
literature’ and the work of a group outside the mainstream4. This chapter will consider 
two of these explanations in particular. The first, Edelstein’s, attempts to locate the 
Oath specifically within a (perhaps marginal) reformatory Pythagorean religious- 
philosophical sect. The second, Carrick’s, places the Oath less precisely at the centre 
o f a network of related social and ethical concerns surrounding the practice of 
medicine in Greece at the time it was written (although Carrick agrees that it was at 
least ‘the product of a religiously-minded person with a particular fondness for cult 
rules and institutions’)5. Though our argument is generally sympathetic to Carrick’s 
more cautious and inclusive approach (and in some cases goes beyond it) it lies 
outside the scope of our present enquiry to definitively settle debate on the Oath's 
origins one way or the other. Nevertheless, if  the Oaths conclusions are ‘atypical’ of
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Greek medicine, it can be shown to be reasonably likely that its concerns are anything 
but.
The Hippocratic Oath: Text and Structure
Edelstein divides the Oath into two parts, with the first (PI-2) ‘[specifying] the duties 
of the pupil towards his teacher and his teacher’s family and... obligations in 
transmitting medical knowledge’ and the second (P3-8) ‘rules to be observed in... 
treatment... medical ethics as it were’6. Carrick, following this lead, divides it into 
four: ‘thepreamble (PI)... the covenant (P2)... the ethical code (P3-P7)... and the
•j
peroration (P8)’ , although PI and P8, concerning the invocation of the appropriate 
gods and goddesses to witness the oath and the appropriate rewards and punishments 
for the observance or breaking thereof, need not concern us here. The full text is as 
follows:
The Hippocratic Oath
PI I swear by Apollo Physician and Asclepius and Hygieia and Panacea and all 
the gods and goddesses, making them my witnesses, that I will fulfil according to my 
ability and judgment this oath and this covenant.
P2 To hold him who has taught me this art as equal to my parents and to live my 
life in partnership with him, and if he is in need of money to give him a share of mine, 
and to regard his offspring as equal to my brothers in male lineage and to teach them 
this art -  if they desire to learn it -  without fee and covenant; to give a share of 
precepts and oral instruction and all the other learning to my sons and to the sons of 
him that has instructed me and to pupils who have signed the covenant and have taken 
an oath according to the medical law, but to no one else.
P3 I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my 
ability and judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice.
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P4 I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if  asked for it, nor will I make a 
suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy. In 
purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art.
P5 I will not use the knife, not even on sufferers from stone, but will withdraw in
favour of such men as are engaged in this work.
P6 Whatever houses I may visit, I will come for the benefit of the sick, remaining
free o f all intentional injustice, of all mischief and in particular of sexual relations 
with both female and male persons, be they free or slaves.
P7 Whatever I hear in the course of my treatment or even outside of the treatment
in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep 
to myself holding such things to be shameful to be spoken about.
P8 If I fulfil this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted to me to enjoy life 
and art, being honoured with fame among all men for all time to come; if I transgress 
it and swear falsely, may the opposite of all this be my lot.
Though Edelstein is most likely correct that the first half of the Oath is not ‘[merely] 
superficially connected’ to the whole9, he is also (as we shall see) most likely correct 
that this connection is best revealed by considering first the possible origins of the 
second. Initially, then, our enquiry will focus on the third of Carrick’s sections (P3-7). 
For the sake of clarity, we will divide this into three further categories: the rules 
concerning drugs (P4), or more specifically the giving of ‘deadly drugs and abortive 
remedies’ (literally, ‘poisonous pessaries’10) to those who request them; the rules 
concerning practice (P3 and P5), that is, those concerning the methods it is considered 
appropriate or permissible for the doctor to employ in the course of treatment; and the 
rules concerning conduct (P6 and P7), particularly with regards to secrecy and sexual 
probity.
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The Rules Concerning Drugs
Edelstein’s case for the Pythagorean origins of the Oath rest largely on his 
interpretation of the rules contained in P4 and in particular on three conclusions that 
he draws regarding them. First of all, that they can only represent straightforward
prohibitions of two traditionally controversial acts, physician-assisted suicide11 and
• 12 • •  * abortion , and are of a religious nature (‘ [in] purity and holiness I will guard my life
and my art’) admitting no exceptions13. Secondly, that in ancient Greece (and for
several centuries after in the wider Mediterranean) these acts not only fell within the
scope of the doctor’s role but were regarded as a normal and morally uncontroversial
part of his practice: ‘[suicide] was not censured in antiquity... [and abortion] in Greek
times no less than in the Roman era.. .was resorted to without scruple’14. Finally, he
argues that in the period in which the Oath was written it is in Pythagorean thought
alone that we can find a ‘philosophical dogma that can possibly account for [these
attitudes]’15. With regards to all three o f these arguments, however, his interpretation
is open to objection.
It is true that Pythagorean thought not only condemned abortion (as noted in Chapter 
2) but also viewed suicide as an unacceptable transgression of divine law (as Plato has 
it in the Phaedo: ‘mystics... say that we men are put in a sort of lock-up, from which 
one must not release oneself or run away’16). However, we may agree with Carrick 
that the fact that ‘the Greeks... were generally sympathetic provided that the deed was
I
done for the right sorts o f reasons' also indicates neither suicide nor abortion carried 
unqualified acceptance. In the Laws, for example, Plato outlines legal penalties to 
apply to any suicide whose act is not motivated by either ‘any legal decision of his 
state’, ‘the pressure of some excruciating and unavoidable misfortune’ or ‘some 
irredeemable disgrace that he cannot live with’18. Remembering Plato’s views on how 
far it is proper for a doctor to instruct his patient as discussed in Chapter 2 we may 
also question whether he would view this as a proper thing for a doctor to ‘suggest’.
In cases o f abortion, too, it hardly fair to say that the Greeks acted ‘without scruple’ 
no matter how common abortion and infanticide may have been (we may think of the 
shepherd in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King who finds himself unable to fatally expose 
the infant Oedipus19). Furthermore, Sigerist suggests that, in Athens and Sparta at 
least, abortion was illegal without the consent o f the father20.
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As to whether this part of the Oath is intended to impose to a blanket ban on all cases 
o f physician-assisted suicide and on all abortions, its phrasing, as we found to be the 
case in Chapter 1 with regards to the Assyrian prohibition of abortion, does not seem 
to unambiguously rule out all instances o f either practice. The Oath does not make 
explicit the context of the purpose for which ‘deadly drugs’ are sought, and the doctor 
is forbidden only to ‘give’ them to an individual; furthermore, he is only specifically 
forbidden from ‘giving’ abortive remedies to women. In each instance ‘give’ can be 
read in one of two senses. Edelstein’s case is strengthened if we read it (as he seems 
to think we should21) as ‘administer’. However, it is clear the ambiguity is also 
present in the Greek: Chadwick and Mann render the second part of the prohibition 
‘[neither] will I give a woman the means to procure an abortion [my emphasis]’22 
which would once more allow for the doctor to perform medical abortions or for 
abortions to be carried out at the behest of, or in conjunction with, a woman’s family.
As the second translation suggests, even if ‘give’ is intended to mean ‘administer’ in
the first part of the prohibition it would not necessarily follow that it is in the second.
Edelstein is insistent that it is used in the same sense in both parts, which he argues
strengthens his case that it refers in both cases to drugs the doctor prescribes rather
than those he merely dispenses . However, even if  we were to accept this, it can in
fact be used in just the opposite way, to argue for a conclusion that he emphatically
rejects: if  a doctor will not ‘give a deadly drug to anybody if asked’ in the same sense
that he will not help a woman ‘procure an abortion’ then the first part may refer (as
Carrick suggests) not to physician-assisted suicide but to the doctor’s possible
‘involvement in any murder plot as the supplier o f effective poisons’24. Edelstein
presents two objections to this suggestion, the first being that to insert such a clause
•  •  •into a medical Oath would prove ‘a useless duplication of the existing laws’ and the 
second that ‘[there] is no evidence... that the Oath refers to anybody except patient
and physician’ (clearly, ‘the patient himself certainly would not ask the doctor for the
26poison with which he is to be murdered’) .
To deal with these objections in reverse order, whilst it is clear that the Oath's ethical 
code deals with conduct towards the layman (as opposed to the covenant, which 
concerns conduct towards other doctors) it is far from clear that it refers only to 
patients: P7, in particular, makes reference to things heard ‘outside of the treatment’.
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Indeed, P4 may itself make reference to someone other than the patient (women 
seeking to procure abortions); since it is the meaning of this part of the Oath that is 
under discussion Edelstein can hardly cite this as supporting evidence. In terms of 
‘useless duplication’, we may suggest this would also be the case were a Pythagorean 
to swear an oath to refrain from practices he already found to be morally 
objectionable to the highest degree. Moreover, as Carrick points out, there did exist a 
widespread prejudice amongst the Greeks that ‘the physician who is skilful at curing 
was, in virtue of this knowledge, also peculiarly well suited to kill’27: in Book 1 of the 
Republic for example, the correct answer to Socrates’ question ‘who then is best able 
to benefit his friends and harm his enemies in matters of health? [my emphasis]’ is ‘a 
doctor’ . Furthermore, in the Laws Plato does in fact suggest that the criminal 
sanction regarding poisoning (even in non-fatal cases) be supplemented in the case of 
the doctor: unlike the layman, the doctor, if  found guilty of such an offence, ‘must be 
punished by death [my emphasis]’ since, unlike the layman, he does not ‘act in 
ignorance of the effect he will have on the body’29.
This need to address popular prejudices also argues for an interpretation of the second 
part of the prohibition as referring to supplying women with the means to procure an 
abortion. For just as doctors may fall under suspicion of acting as the purveyors of 
murderous poisons, so midwives (who, as both Carrick30 and Sigerist31 note, were in 
the ancient world the primary care-giver during pregnancy and childbirth) could (and 
we may note that is the word used in the Oath itself to link the prohibitions together) 
similarly find themselves suspected of selling abortive remedies (in the words of 
Soranus) ‘wickedly [that is, in cases of the sort described above] for payment’32. 
Moreover, it is lent further plausibility by the particular position occupied by the 
doctor in Greek society. As we noted in Chapter 2, the doctor was generally regarded 
as a craftsman and his craft as an entirely secular, naturalistic one. This meant, 
however, that unlike his predecessors and contemporaries in the Near East he was 
neither licensed nor endorsed by a religious tradition. Equally, the Greek doctor was 
free from state regulation in the manner of his Egyptian counterpart: as Carrick puts it 
‘[anyone] could practice medicine, and many who did were quacks and charlatans’33.
Whatever dividends this may have paid in terms of allowing the Greek doctor latitude 
in developing experimental treatments, it also meant that his reputation was of
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extraordinary importance, not least in terms of securing a living, something reflected 
in several works of the Corpus: Prognosis, for example, notes that the doctor who 
‘[increases] his reputation as a medical practitioner [will find] people will have no 
qualms about putting themselves in his care’34. It may be that this seems too 
mercenary a motive for a solemn oath undertaken in ‘purity and holiness’, in which 
case we may also remember that it is likely any doctor who swore the Oath would be 
at least as disapproving of these practices as society in general. Indeed, it is highly 
likely that he would be more disapproving, since it was his own conduct that the 
behaviour of quacks, charlatans and poison-peddlers called into question. In the 
Corpus, we may note that the author of the Canon blames ‘ignorant professors’ of 
medicine as much as its ‘rash critics’ as the cause of medicine’s poor reputation, 
something he clearly intends to work towards repairing (he also uses ‘holiness’ to 
refer to the importance of bestowing medical knowledge only on those properly suited 
to it35). Beyond this, it is also possible that reputation might have been of further 
importance to the ancient Greek doctor for other reasons; something we shall consider 
in more detail below.
The Rules Concerning Practice
The Oath contains both two rules explicitly governing the methods by which those 
swearing it may practice medicine. The first is positive: the doctor is sworn to use 
‘dietetic measures’ to treat his patients. The second is negative: the doctor is to 
abstain from ‘use of the knife’ (that is, from surgical measures) under all 
circumstances, although he may refer his patients to other doctors not similarly sworn. 
Historically, it is the second of these rules which has drawn the most attention for, as 
with physician-assisted suicide and abortion, surgery with the knife (as opposed to 
cautery) was not an uncommon practice in ancient Greece. From the Renaissance 
onwards, it was supposed that the Oath was intended to ‘draw a line between the 
practice of internal medicine and that of surgery’36; however, as both Carrick37 and 
Edelstein38 attest, the ancient Greek doctor is now commonly accepted to have 
typically acted as both physician and surgeon. The Corpus contains several works 
dealing with surgery, and these ‘are generally regarded to be the most medically 
precise and useful parts of the Collection’39. If surgery were widely proscribed it is 
difficult to see how this could be the case: one cannot become expert in such a
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complex and dangerous area of medicine without engaging in a fair degree of 
practical experience.
Thus, those wishing to reconcile the Oath with mainstream Greek medical practice 
have sought to find a way of interpreting the prohibition so as to exclude the majority 
of surgical procedures where the knife was very much involved. Some early 20th 
Century attempts to effect such a reconciliation contended that ‘the knife’ in this 
sense is in fact an oblique reference not to surgery in general but to either intentional 
castration40 or to lithotomies (hence ‘sufferers from stone’) in which castration was a 
possible unintentional side-effect, an outcome which, it is argued, doctors felt to be 
morally repugnant41. There are two main problems with this view. First of all, 
lithotomies seem to have been a common and by most accounts fairly successful form 
of surgical procedure at the time42. Furthermore, if  doctors were morally repulsed by 
such use of the knife it is difficult to explain why they would ‘withdraw in favour of 
such men as are engaged in this work’. Nittis attempted to avoid this issue by 
translating the passage to read "keep apart from such men... ’ but this is dependant on 
reading the original Greek in a speculative and unusual sense43 evidence for which is 
lacking elsewhere44.
Edelstein, by contrast, is free to hold to a more usual interpretation since he makes no 
such claim for the Oath's adherence to values and practices common in mainstream 
Greek medicine. Rather, he links the prohibition o f surgery to the positive rule to treat 
the sick with dietetic measures and argues that both are characteristic of Pythagorean 
approaches to medicine45. For example, he notes that Plato does not mention surgery 
(or cautery) at all when giving an outline o f medicine in the Timaeus46, and that 
Aristoxenus attests that the Pythagoreans ranked dietetic methods ahead of 
pharmacology and surgery (in that order) as a result of their account of the causation 
of disease, which interpreted most illness as the result of immoderate living47. 
Furthermore, Edelstein allows that this is consistent with ‘withdrawing in favour’ of 
another as ‘the Pythagoreans recognised that men in general could not observe any 
elaborate rules of purity’ and would thus have no objection to patients seeking out 
another doctor for such purposes48. Edelstein concedes that none of the above 
explains why Pythagoreans should refrain from surgery entirely, but defends his 
‘conjecture’ that the prohibition developed from an abhorrence of blood sacrifice by
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arguing that it is "only in connection with Pythagorean medicine that the injunction 
acquires any meaning and plausibility at alV [my emphasis]49.
As Carrick points out, however, this last claim is highly questionable50. For one, the 
Pythagoreans were hardly unique amongst the Greeks in viewing dietetic remedies as 
the principal treatment to be employed by the doctor. Plato, for example, presupposes 
that the work of the doctor is primarily of this nature in the passages from the 
Republic dealing with medicine referred to in Chapter 2 and the author of Tradition in 
Medicine deals exclusively with dietetics when describing medical practice51. 
Tradition in Medicine also espouses a causal theory of disease which would suggest 
dietetics as the most promising method of treatment: ‘[each] one of the substances of 
a man’s diet acts upon his body and changes it in some way and upon these changes 
his whole life depends’52. Similar views are also found elsewhere in the Corpus, for 
example in the Book 3 of the Epidemics in which a young man’s fever is identified as 
the result o f ‘sexual indulgence and drinking’53. Moreover, as Carrick points out, the 
Aphorisms suggest that surgery was ‘not resorted to as a treatment of first choice’54: 
‘[what] drugs will not cure, the knife will; what the knife will not cure, the cautery 
will; what the cautery will not cure must be considered incurable’55.
Plato’s views in the Republic notwithstanding, it is clear that Greek thought in general 
regarded surgery as the least preferable form of treatment available, something of 
which Edelstein is well aware (‘in antiquity popular opposition to ‘cutting and 
cauterisation’ was strong indeed’56). Indeed, as Carrick goes on to argue, surgery (as 
the most dramatic, dangerous and painful recourse open to the ancient doctor) was 
widely feared and mistrusted and ‘it is possible that the [Oath's] prohibition 
represents a reaction on the part of some non-Pythagorean physicians against [this] 
[my emphasis]’57. Once more, we should not forget the extraordinary sway that 
reputation, and hence wider opinion, held over the doctor in the unregulated world of 
ancient Greek medicine. Carrick is right to commend Edelstein for the comprehensive 
nature of his account58; unlike Nittis’ arguments regarding surgery, for example, it can 
offer a clear explanation of why dietetic measures are endorsed. However, an account 
based on the need to uphold the reputation of the doctor in the face of popular 
prejudice appears plausible: the doctor who swears the Oath will employ in the first 
instance what seems to have been generally regarded as the most appropriate and
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effective form of medicine; he will use his knowledge to benefit the sick, not to enrich 
himself by selling poisons and abortive remedies; and he is not, as Heraclitus put it, 
amongst those ‘physicians who cut and bum [and then] demand pay, but deserve 
nothing, since they do these things’59.
The Rules Concerning Conduct
The rules concerning conduct, prohibiting ‘mischief and sexual congress with 
patients or members of their household, and committing the doctor to secrecy about 
what ‘no-one must spread abroad’ (and not only, as we noted above, about such things 
that are learnt of during the execution of his duties) are obviously the least 
controversial of the Oath's strictures. Unlike the rules concerning drugs and practice, 
they are not contradicted by any part of the Hippocratic Corpus or what is known of 
doctors’ general conduct at the time; indeed, it is difficult to imagine how they could 
be: the idea that anyone recommend a doctor pursue a career filled with mischief- 
making, sexual impropriety and indiscretion seems frankly absurd. Equally, however, 
they do not seem to concern such weighty matters as the rules that come before them: 
Carrick is happy to term them ‘medical etiquette’60 and, indeed, they do seem to fit 
more naturally into what Jonsen terms ‘bedside manners’ than into the ‘more grave’ 
morality he sees as typified by the Oath as a whole61.
Given these circumstances, we may wish to ask how such concerns could move from 
the former sense to the latter and become the matter of such a solemn undertaking as 
the swearing of an oath. Further, we may also ask (much like Edelstein does when 
questioning the prohibition against the giving of a deadly drug in the light of pre­
existing laws) why the Oath would formally prescribe what seems to be obvious 
common-sense on the part of the doctor. Edelstein, of course, has a ready-made 
answer to this: the Oath includes these elements alongside its other rules because, for 
the Pythagoreans, such matters were regarded as part of a ‘more grave’ morality. We 
mentioned in Chapter 2 his contention that sexual intercourse was viewed by them as 
permissible only the context of procreation. To this, he adds a preoccupation with 
justice as a primary virtue present in all social relations beyond mere adherence to 
social, political or legal norms, explaining its presence alongside chastity at this 
point62. With regards to the entreaty to silence, he notes that this too was of
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importance to the Pythagoreans more so than to other groups63 (Porphyrius’ Life o f  
Pythagoras, for example, notes that ‘silence with them was of no ordinary kind’)64.
Yet this is not the only plausible explanation for how these rules may have gained the 
moral weight that seems required for their presence in as solemn a document as the 
Oath. As both Edelstein and Carrick are aware, similar pronouncements can be found 
elsewhere in the Corpus: the treatise known as The Physician, for example, contains a 
similar injunction against the sexual exploitation of those (notably women and 
maidens) who the doctor is likely to encounter in the execution of his duties65 whilst 
in the Decorum, the ideal doctor is praised for his ‘reserve’66. Of course, as Edelstein 
argues, it may be that their presence is accounted for by such rules being both ‘self- 
evident’ and ‘compatible with any ethical standard to which a doctor may 
subscribe’ . This does not necessarily mean that they hold the same moral force as 
the rules found in the Oath: indeed, he concludes that they do not68. Carrick concurs 
with this judgement, arguing that where the Oath is concerned with an ‘inward duty’ 
in regard to the doctor’s conduct (the Greek ethika), the treatises in the Corpus appear 
instead to be concerned with the ‘outward show’ of right conduct (the Greek 
euchemosyne) which bears little regards to the doctors’ actual motives, character or 
intentions69.
An account of the Oath which attempts to explain the entirety of the ethical code in 
terms of the doctor’s reputation may be seen to be attempting the reverse of the task 
that Edelstein sets himself. His account seeks to find elsewhere in Greek thought an 
account of chastity, justice and reticence as inward duties to match the more 
obviously ‘grave’ concerns he identifies elsewhere, and finds what he is looking for in 
Pythagoreanism. In contrast, an emphasis on the importance to the Greek doctor of his 
reputation may seem to argue that we should interpret these ‘grave’ concerns simply 
as an expedient ‘outward show’ of conduct liable to enrich the itinerant craftsman 
who professes them. This would, however, be a mistake, for it discounts the 
possibility, quite evident in the works of the Hippocratic Corpus, that an adherence to 
the ‘outward show’ of etiquette can be demanded by the ‘inward duty’ of ethics.
First of all, as Carrick notes, the Greeks were aware to some degree at least of the 
placebo effect, in that a patient’s recovery was often greatly helped by his trust in the
50
doctor; similarly, a good reputation would encourage the patient to confide the truth to 
his doctor on medical matters, to hold nothing back and be prepared to follow his 
instructions70. Secondly, there is the question of the reputation not only of the 
individual, but of medicine as a whole, a question that recurs throughout the Corpus 
(for example in The Science o f  Medicine71) and is clearly of importance in ensuring 
that patients come to Hippocratic doctors for advice rather than consulting ‘witch­
doctors, faith-healers, quacks and charlatans’. The author of the Canon, for example, 
does not appear to bemoan the poor reputation of medicine simply because it is 
preventing him making a decent living. Rather, he shows evident concern for what he 
considers both ‘holy’ and ‘the most noble of all the arts’ (we may note that this kind 
of language, also echoed in the closing remarks o f the Decorum72 is, contrary to 
Edelstein and Carrick’s contentions, redolent of the solemn language of the Oath). 
Arguing that this is the result of medicine being ‘the only science for which states 
have laid down no penalties for malpractice’, the Canon's author appears to be putting 
the case for self-regulation73 (given which we may also consider how such concerns 
are addressed in the Oath's covenant, and in the doctor’s promise to ‘guard my life 
and my art [my emphasis]’).
Conclusions
In assessing what particular developments (if any) are displayed in such treatises on 
medical ethics as the Greeks produced, we may return for a moment to consider 
Jonsen’s tripartite division of the discipline in The Birth o f  Bioethics which (we may 
recall from the introduction to this thesis) is as follows. Firstly arise questions as to 
the doctor’s behaviour when attending upon his patient, or ‘bedside manners’ as 
Jonsen puts it. Second are the matters of ‘more grave morality’ of which the Oath 
(even allowing for its disputed and controversial status within the ancient world, as 
Jonsen does74) is held up as the ‘paradigm’ example. Finally, there are the ‘social 
ethics’ Jonsen contends emerged in the Middle Ages, when doctors were called upon 
to justify their social standing, the legal recognition of their monopoly over healing 
(and consequently their control of the licensure o f new doctors) and their right to 
charge a fee for their services (not to mention, of course, how large or small said fee 
should be). To begin with, we may now pause to question in the light of our own 
interpretation the status given by Jonsen to the Oath.
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First of all, the Oath may be considered ‘paradigmatic’ in at least one, weak sense of 
the word in that subsequent codes and declarations have consciously or otherwise 
aped its form, language and (to a degree) its content. We may instructively compare 
the Oath's second clause (‘[to] hold him who has taught me this art as equal to my 
parents and to live my life in partnership with him’) with its counterpart in the 
Declaration of Geneva (‘I will give my teachers the respect and gratitude which is 
their due’). Similarly, we may note that the latter also shares with the Oath a solemn 
injunction against breaking a patient’s confidence which is limited neither to medical 
matters nor only to things disclosed during the course of treatment75. As we have 
noted above, however, the second of these clauses can easily be conflated with 
concerns of the type Jonsen groups under ‘bedside manners’, whilst the former seems 
to be more a matter of professional regulation and thus part of the ‘social ethics’ to 
which Jonsen contends ‘scant attention’ was paid in the ancient world76.
Yet we may reclaim for the Oath the standing Jonsen accords it, not by examining its 
form, its content or indeed its standing in Greek society but instead by considering the 
degree of emphasis it places on the moral content of the doctor’s entire behaviour and 
methodology. For the Oath does not only instruct those doctors who swear it to 
uphold a particular religious and/or philosophical cult morality (which is not to say it 
does not do that as well). It can also be seen, when read against the context of wider 
Greek culture, as a first tentative step towards formally recognising the ‘more grave’ 
moral aspects of both ‘bedside manners’ and ‘social ethics’ or, to coin a phrase, to 
recognise that medicine is morally saturated. On this reading, the ethical code of the 
Oath and its analogues elsewhere in the Corpus (for example in the Decorum) 
represent moral concerns in medicine coming full circle: once again, conduct is 
recognised as a therapeutic tool available to the doctor along with dietetics, 
pharmacology and surgery, albeit for very different reasons than was the case in the 
Near East as described in Chapter 1. Moreover, in the covenant and its analogues (for 
example the Canon) we can discern a growing recognition that these concerns extend 
not only to the conduct, epistemology and practical competence of the individual 
doctor, but also to the nature and organisation of medicine as a discipline.
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Chapter 4: Moral Concerns in Medicine from Galen to Percival
The reader of many histories of medical ethics could be forgiven for assuming that the 
Middle Ages, Renaissance and Enlightenment were periods of little importance in 
human affairs. For Jonsen the Medieval period is notable mainly as a time during 
which medicine once more came under religious authority, with the obscure 
prohibitions of the Oath specified and made explicit through its adoption by the 
Christian religious tradition1. Similarly, Grodin highlights the importance of 
Christian, Jewish and Islamic traditions in which the goal of the ‘ideal physician... 
was to serve the sick under God’2. Histories o f medicine as a whole tend to regard the 
Middle Ages as moribund: ‘the Church arrested medical progress, for instance, by 
supposedly banning dissection’3 whilst learned doctors were preoccupied with 
‘abstract disputation topics’4 and ‘hindered by the quibbles of scholasticism’5 . Whilst 
such histories may devote more space to the Renaissance and Enlightenment, histories 
of medical ethics, on the whole, do not: Grodin ignores them entirely6 whilst Jonsen 
covers the several hundred years from the first establishment of medicine in 
‘universities, guilds and colleges’ to 1803 (and the publication of Percival’s Medical 
Ethics) in three and half sentences7.
Nor would it seem, at first glance, that philosophers throughout these periods took 
very much interest in medicine, and certainly not from an ethical point of view. In this 
respect, a browse through the index of one representative work on the history of 
medicine (Porter’s The Greatest Benefit to Mankind) paints an interesting picture. For 
the five chapters covering the Middle Ages, Renaissance and Enlightenment (191
a  Q
pages) ‘ethics’ is referenced once and ‘philosophy’ six times . By contrast, 
‘philosophy’ is referenced nine times in the chapter concerning antiquity (38 pages)10 
and ‘ethics’ ten times over the two chapters covering medicine in the late 20th and 
early 21st Centuries (41 pages)11. A similar picture exists with regard to the interest of 
philosophers in specific ethical problems. To take abortion as an example, in contrast 
to some of the positions we have examined in Chapters 2 and 3, moral philosophers 
from the Renaissance onwards seem, as Jonsen notes, to have paid little attention to 
the issue, regarding it instead as a theological or legal matter12: ‘detailed analysis of
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problems [were] rare and the elaborate reasoning of moral philosophy almost 
nonexistent’13.
This apparent gap may be seen to be o f interest for two reasons. First of all, there is 
the puzzle of why it should be there at all: as we have seen, moral thought in medicine 
had deepened and broadened throughout antiquity, and medicine was itself of great 
interest to philosophers. Why then should this (apparently) cease for several centuries 
to be the case? Secondly, there is the matter o f Percival’s Medical Ethics itself. For 
Grodin, this ‘first modem code of medical ethics’ ushered in a new era (exemplified 
by works such as the American Medical Association’s Code o f Medical Ethics, 
published in 1848) that lasted nearly a century and a half until the dawn of modem 
bioethics in the mid-20th Century14. However, as we have attempted to demonstrate in 
the previous three chapters, the moral concerns faced by Hippocratic medicine (and 
the manner in which it attempted to deal with them) were shaped by social and 
historical factors: again, it seems at least possible that that our understanding of this 
‘new era’ of ‘modem medical ethics’ can be illuminated through comparison with 
what had gone before.
The Recovery of Hippocrates and Galen: Moral Concerns Regarding Theory 
and Practice in Medicine in the Medieval West
At the beginning of the Christian era in the West, neither the doctor nor any element 
of the Hippocratic tradition (the Oath included) were held in high regard by Christian 
writers. At best, Christian attitudes displayed a degree of ambiguity towards doctors; 
often, the relationship was antagonistic: as Nutton has pointed out: ‘the average 
doctor and all that he stands for is a stock opponent in a variety of lives of the 
saints’15. It is possible this attitude stems in part from a confusion of secular non- 
Christian doctors with the practitioners o f pagan rites at the temples of deities such as 
Asclepius and Isis, who were in direct competition at a religious level with Christian 
miracle cures16. Equally, it appears to have been fed by a more subtle opposition 
provided by secular doctors such as Galen who, after the fashion of Hippocratic 
treatises such as The Sacred Disease, frowned upon the use of ritual practices in 
medicine. Such views could plausibly be extended to regard Christian faith in 
miraculous healing as logically deficient: indeed, in late antiquity, students of
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Christian theology at Nisibis in Syria were forbidden from associating with secular 
doctors17.
Whilst it is true that anti-medical attitudes persisted amongst some Church authorities 
well into the Middle Ages (in the 11th Century AD, for example, St. Bernard of 
Clairvaux remained of the declared opinion that consulting doctors and taking 
medicine was contrary to religious purity18) by the time learned medicine was revived 
in Europe at the school of Salerno19, it was in the form of a ‘Christianised Galenism’20 
and both Galen and Hippocrates eventually came to be regarded as virtuous pagans 
and paradigms of the healer’s art21. In spite o f initial tensions it proved possible to 
reconcile both figures with Christian teaching. In Galen’s case, this was thanks in part 
to his account of the natural world, heavily indebted to the natural philosophy of Plato 
and Aristotle that had already been subsumed into the doctrine of the Roman 
Church . In addition to his endorsement of a physiology and cosmology which 
formed the basis of established dogma, his repeated insistence that medicine provided 
irrefutable evidence of the Creator’s hand in the natural world helped to ensure his 
emergence as the pre-eminent doctor of antiquity in the eyes of the medieval religious 
and scholarly community24.
Hippocrates’ status was enhanced by Galen’s high regard for his Athenian 
predecessor (he ‘claimed always to be the most faithful and scrupulous interpreter of 
Hippocrates’25) and through the Oath's apparent condemnation of abortion and 
euthanasia, and its emphasis on the doctor’s chastity. As Jonsen notes, Christian 
attitudes to sexuality from St. Paul to St. Augustine had included the implication 
that sexual congress was an inherently sinful activity redeemed only by the prospect 
of conception, and that one of the chief purposes of marriage was to direct and limit 
such behaviour as far as possible given the inherent weaknesses of the flesh (in these 
respects, their views were similar to those Edelstein ascribes to the Pythagoreans, as 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3). Equally, Christianity had, from Augustine onwards, 
subjected any form of suicide, for any reason, to ‘a powerful and exceptionless 
condemnation’: in the 13th Century, Thomas Aquinas held that suicide should be 
considered the most serious of mortal sins as it precludes the possibility of repentance 
(and thus of any possibility of redemption)28.
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The views ascribed to Hippocrates through this reading of the Oath, however, were 
not the main focus of moral concern in medieval medicine. Whilst the Church was 
undoubtedly concerned with the possibility of medical knowledge being misused 
(often insisting on the ecclesiastical licensure of midwives, for example, ‘on the 
grounds that their morals needed to be impeccable’29) the chief moral concern facing 
medicine in the medieval West was the need to recover the medical knowledge that 
had been lost through ‘[barbarian] invasions, the collapse of the western Roman 
empire, and the rise of warrior fiefdoms [that had] spelt catastrophe for civilisation’30. 
The Church was in the forefront of this recovery: ‘medical manuscripts were... 
copied, preserved and studied [within] abbeys and cathedral schools’31. To the 
fragmentary records preserved in the abbeys and cathedrals were added further 
translations into Latin from Greek, Hebrew and Arabic authors, first of all at Salerno 
and again a century later throughout Spain and Italy . Indeed, Jacquart has argued 
that the pace of translating showed ‘no break... between the 11th and 14th Centuries’33. 
At Salerno, debates took place as to the proper classification of medicine amongst 
other spheres of learning, and as to what methods of teaching were appropriate, with 
the result that medicine became organised around a set ‘of authoritative texts... that 
could be subjected to exegesis and discussion’34.
It is of course possible to view the Church’s adoption of Galenism as motivated by 
either necessity or self-interest. For Christianity to hold the dominant position over 
European thought that it came to during the period, it would seem important for it to 
find a way to accommodate such important practical information. Moreover, as 
Hippocrates, the Oath and Galen gained authority and legitimacy through their 
compatibility with Church doctrine, so Church doctrine was able to call upon the two 
most famed figures of ancient medicine (Galen’s achievements, for example, were 
popularly regarded as approaching the miraculous ) for intellectual support. Such a 
reading, however, may seem to be overly cynical given the moral obligation many 
Christians felt to care for the sick: already in late antiquity wealthy Christians had 
provided for charitable hospitals unlike any previously found in the West36. In the 
Middle Ages, the Benedictine rule held attending to the infirm a direct service to 
Christ37 and hospitals were invariably religious institutions38. Generally the Church 
was sympathetic to medicine and the need for medical advancement: as both Porter39 
and Jacquart40 have pointed out, the Church did not in fact at any time prohibit the
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dissection of human corpses and by 1482 Pope Sixtus IV explicitly endorsed the 
practice, provided the corpses were those of executed criminals and were afforded 
Christian burial afterwards41.
That figures such as Grodin and Jonsen see an apparent absence of moral and/or 
ethical thought in medicine throughout the Middle Ages, then, appears due to their 
failure to identify the moral concerns we have shown to accompany matters of 
practical competence, especially since (as we have previously argued) other kinds of 
moral concern in medicine tend to arise either as a corollary or consequence of these. 
Medieval scholars in the West, on the other hand, appear to have realised this and as it 
happens were quite right to focus their attention on repairing the state of medical 
knowledge: throughout the Dark Ages ‘ [the] medical thread’ may have remained 
‘unbroken [but] it [had] frayed and threatened to snap’ and the medicine that the 
monasteries and cathedral schools had ‘kept alive was... a shadow of its brilliance in 
Galen’s day’42. The chief moral concern of learned medicine under such conditions 
was to recover or rediscover such knowledge as had been lost: questions regarding the 
proper conduct of doctors and organisation of medicine are of little importance if 
there is no medicine to organise and no doctors to ask them of.
As we saw in Chapter 2, however, the Hippocratic tradition was concerned not only 
with establishing practical competence but also with epistemology; that is, with 
establishing the best way to go about obtaining and organising medical knowledge. A 
perceived overreliance on a set of authoritative works and on scholastic techniques of 
logical argumentation has led to the learned medicine of the Middle Ages being 
castigated by historians from the Renaissance onwards for what Porter has termed 
‘Galenolatry’: a slavish adherence to a small canon of ancient texts whose authority 
was considered to be beyond question43. On this view, for example, Mondino de’ 
Liuzzi (an early pioneer of human dissection for teaching purposes at the University 
of Bologna44) was ‘blinkered by limitless faith in the observations of Galen [and thus] 
saw nothing’, failing to realise that the master had his anatomy wrong45. This would 
seem to establish the medieval doctor as akin to those of his Persian and Egyptian 
counterparts in the ancient world who persisted with the chanting of incantations and 
ancient wisdom rather than adopting naturalistic Greek methods after it became 
apparent that the latter were demonstrably more effective.
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Such criticism is manifestly unfair. It is true that the 9th Century Persian doctor al- 
Razi had drawn from his reading of Galen the need to criticise and improve upon 
earlier works: in his Doubts About Galen he declared himself the Roman’s disciple, 
but he also emphasised that this meant ‘neither [renouncing] criticism nor... 
worshipping the dead’ and extolled the possibility of the progress of scientific 
knowledge46. Al-Razi, however, had access to sources his Western counterparts did 
not (we may note that the Ancient Egyptian doctors who had held it hard to improve 
on earlier wisdom could at least be sure, where the medieval doctor in many cases 
could not, what that earlier wisdom was). Doctors in the medieval West did 
sometimes tend to frame medical questions in terms, not of asking what was the case, 
but o f which of Galen or Aristotle was right about the case47 and records of the 
medical debates of the period sometimes show an ‘excessive penchant for logical 
argumentation’ . On the other hand, these debates also led, as Jacquart points out, to 
‘an increased depth in Western epistemological thought’49.
First o f all, disagreements between the two ancient authorities gave doctors ‘an 
opportunity to redefine the meaning that they attributed to their art’ for example by 
considering whether the chief concern of learned medicine was to be found in 
therapeutic measures or in natural philosophy50. Establishing a logical framework was 
necessary in ‘adapting [medicine] to the university context’ (Roger Bacon’s criticisms 
of medical learning on these grounds, for example, were made at the time this process 
was taking place in Paris, a city in which he had lived more than once); at other times, 
learned doctors wrote ‘extensively’ on the importance of experience51. Moreover, it 
was not simply a question of overcoming theoretical barriers: a far greater 
impediment than any ‘Galenic ‘dogma” was the ‘real obstacle’ posed by the lack of 
accurate methods for obtaining and organising data: from the 14th to the 15th Century 
‘physicians declared, on countless occasions, that it was impossible to obtain [the] 
reliable and accurate measurements’52 on which experienced-based learned medicine 
(as opposed to ‘blind empirical procedure’53) could hope to build.
If medicine in the medieval West can be excused for not building further on the 
epistemological concerns advanced by Hippocratic medicine, however, it may be seen 
to be more culpable (and the influence of the Church as more pernicious) in failing to 
continue the tradition of moral reflection so evident in ancient Greece. Of course, as
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we have noted above, such reflection depends to an extent on the state to which 
medicine has been advanced and we should not expect this to have been a matter of 
primary concern. Nevertheless, it is clear that medieval scholarship produced and 
recovered works that challenged the assumptions on which certain doctrinal moral 
positions were based. For example, building on the Galenic assumption that the 
regulation of sexual ‘evacuations’ was necessary for health54 some medieval doctors 
articulated the idea of the need for sexual pleasure being a natural and proper element 
of the human condition55, whilst Pseudo-Aristotle’s Problems was known to explore 
the possibility of a natural causes for homosexuality56. Such positions were, of course, 
expressly contrary to the views of Ss. Paul and Augustine as noted above.
Moreover, it is clear that there existed in addition to contrary evidence some (at least) 
implicit arguments against certain of the Church’s moral positions. Abortion, for 
example, was condemned in all cases by the early church authorities57 (and in the 
Middle Ages, following Aristotle, past the point of ‘quickening’ at which the soul was 
supposed to enter the body ) as an excommunicable offence analogous to murder. 
However, what evidence we have suggests that those found guilty of helping to 
procure abortions were not regarded as murderers in the eyes of the law. Jacquart and 
Thomasset, for example, note the case o f a German woman convicted in Selestat of 
inducing miscarriages: her sentence was three years exile, which could be revoked 
under ‘special authorisation’, a punishment they describe as ‘extremely lenient’59.
The Church and Church scholars, however, did not attempt to refute positions 
contrary to official doctrine; their response was a mixture of suppression and self­
censorship. Medieval doctors writing on homosexuality, for example, were careful to 
do so only within the moral boundaries established by religion60. ‘Quickening’ 
remained the chief focus of debates concerning abortion until the 17th Century (and, in 
the case o f the Catholic Church, until the second half of t h e l ^ 61), whilst a 
‘personalist’ view of sexual activity as possessing a natural good aside from the 
possibility of conception was not considered (and formally rejected) by the Church 
until 196862.
We may illuminate this account of the lack of ethical debate in the medieval West as 
something that can be judged at least in part an error rather than an unavoidable 
limitation imposed on (in this case) moral (rather than medical) thought by social and
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historical circumstances by considering Rachel’s account of what he sees to be a 
similar error in ancient philosophy, namely Aristotle’s defence of the institution of 
slavery. On this account, the ‘bare outline’ of arguments against slavery is as follows: 
‘it is unjust to set some people apart for different treatment unless there is a relevant 
difference between them that justifies the difference in treatment’, a view that Rachels 
contends Aristotle ‘plainly’ accepted. Aristotle thus attempts to justify slavery by 
offering the argument that some people are by nature slavish (in that they lack 
rationality) and are thus suited to a corresponding station in life. However, this is an 
argument that runs contrary to Aristotle’s own actions: he provided in his will for the 
manumission of his slaves, something which (Rachels argues) would not make sense 
if his ‘slaves [were] fitted for their station by nature itself. In other words, this 
account allows for the possibility of Aristotle having made the judgement that slavery 
was wrong without our ‘transporting our [20th Century] standards of rationality back 
into a culture that was ‘different’’63.
What Rachels wishes to demonstrate is that Aristotle’s claim about the nature of 
slaves ‘can be shown to be false by evidence that should be counted as evidence as 
much by Aristotle as by us’64 and, whether he is right in this particular instance or not 
(we should note that Aristotle’s arguments need not mean that all people who 
currently are slaves should be, nor that all people currently free might not be better off 
enslaved) a similar argument can be applied to the examples above. Church doctrine 
held that moral questions could be answered from a proper study of God’s creation 
insofar as the proper (moral) purpose of the human body could be defined ‘in terms of 
the apparent physical structure and purpose of [its] functions’. So, for example, the 
position of Ss. Paul and Augustine was justified by the “ natural orientation’ of the 
sexual act to effect reproduction’65. Yet contemporary medical scholarship suggested 
that God’s creation might ‘naturally’ include homosexuality, that homosexuality 
might in some cases have a purpose (the Muslim doctor Avicenna held that female 
homosexuality increased fertility66, although we should note that this has historically 
met with less moral opprobrium than male homosexuality) and that the natural 
orientation of the sexual act might also be to help maintain the body in healthy 
equilibrium67. Whether or not such scholarship was correct (and clearly in some cases 
it was not) it was no more speculative than that which the Church was happy to 
endorse; as such, it surely merited detailed attention, if not assent.
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Moral Concerns Regarding Epistemology, Organisation and Conduct from the 
Renaissance to Enlightenment
Notwithstanding the above, it remains the case that consideration of those measures 
available to the doctor that he or others might feel qualms about his employing was 
simply not as important as securing effective medical knowledge. Whilst it is clear 
that abortions were performed in the Middle Ages, that concerns regarding physician- 
assisted suicide were laid to one side may be as much the result of the era hardly 
having been conducive either to long life or to survival in a state of serious chronic 
illness as of a religious taboo on suicide. Medicine must, in general, be useful before 
the potential arises for its possible misuse and, as the Middle Ages gave way to the 
Renaissance, it became clear that there were three main obstacles to establishing 
medicine on a sound practical footing. First of all, it was becoming increasingly 
apparent that even the recovered wisdom of the ancients had its limitations. In the 
mid-14th Century, ‘[a] Europe which had been relatively epidemic-free turned into a
z o
crucible of pestilences’ with the onset of the Black Death, which learned doctors 
found impossible to incorporate into the scholastic structures of learned medicine69.
The Black Death was followed by further outbreaks of bubonic plague and, in the late 
15th Century, by the first recorded outbreak of the ‘French Disease’ (syphilis), 
possibly returned from the New World with Columbus’ sailors and ‘typical of the new 
plagues of an age of conquest and turbulence... spread by international warfare, rising 
population density, changed lifestyles and sexual behaviour... migrations of 
soldiers... traders... refugees and peasants’70. Through the spread of these ‘two great 
epidemics’ it became apparent that the ‘approach [of a disease] could be charted, from 
city to city’ and that it could be ‘spread from person to person... by clothes or 
merchandise’ as well as direct contact; this undermined a medicine ‘centred on the 
individual and his constitution and circumstances’ and ‘traditional elementary
71qualities, which were part of an individual’s environment and acted directly on him’ . 
Moreover, neither disease could be found in the ancient texts: they eluded 
classification, without which learned doctors could not agree on even a possible 
course of treatment72. Galenism was not abandoned entirely: ‘[the] dream of 
Renaissance humanists was to restore medicine to its Greek purity’73 (many blamed 
‘the barbarity of the Middle Ages for the loss of the name and description of
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74[syphilis]’ ) and it remained the basis of accepted medical theory in Spanish 
universities into the 18th Century75, but learned medicine ‘was not quite the same 
afterwards’76. By the 17th Century, some medical theorists began to advance the view 
that ‘medicine could thrive only if the deadweight of the past were cast o f f77.
If we remember that this concern is as much a moral as it is a scientific one, then 
philosophers’ apparent lack of interest in moral concerns in medicine throughout this 
period (especially puzzling given its gradual re-emergence as an endeavour distinct
n o
from theology ) can be seen as an error brought about by a reliance on foreground 
evaluations. The most pressing questions were ones we are no longer accustomed to 
thinking of as moral at all and continued to be centred, not on the conduct of the 
doctor, but on matters of natural philosophy. In this respect it is clear that 
philosophers of the time did in fact take a great deal of interest in medicine. Francis 
Bacon cited medicine as one example of a science which was ‘professed’ more than 
‘laboured’, and ‘laboured’ more than ‘advanced’79 in order to underline the 
importance of adopting a new method of natural philosophy in order to develop
on
practical knowledge . Descartes regarded medicine as ‘a key to the natural world’ 
and was a keen dissector of animals. He wrote extensively on the nervous system and 
anatomy, and was heavily involved in promoting a mechanistic view of both human 
and animal bodies81. In his Discourse on Method, he both defended and enlisted as 
support for his own natural philosophy Harvey’s account of the circulation of the 
blood82 in what French has described as an ‘unusually confident and forthright’83 
manner.
As Bacon himself realised, however, in insisting that the new science must be 
composed of ‘tribes not hostile to each other, but bound together through mutual 
services’84, there was a second barrier to establishing an effective medicine in 
addition to the inadequacy of current theory: the lack of any form of centralised 
professional organisation. The collapse o f a more or less universally accepted system 
of natural philosophy had been hastened in part by the Reformation: Martin Luther 
himself had voiced concerns that the medical departments of universities in Germany 
were ‘dominated by Aristotelian scholasticism and therefore... opposed to true 
Scripture-based knowledge’85. Catholic theologians and doctors tended to view any 
criticism of Galenism as an attack on the Church itself86 and attacked ideas such as
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Harvey’s as ‘modem nonsense’ . The problems that could result did not go unnoticed 
even by those proposing radical revisions of doctrine: Harvey, whose model of
o o
circulation undermined several key tenets of Galenic medicine was unperturbed by 
attacks from the Continent, accepting that his detractors were officially obliged to do 
so and acknowledging that it was ‘fitting... to keep Galen’s medicine in good
QQ
repair’ . In 1678, when the viceroy of Naples asked the profession for advice
following the accidental poisoning of a favourite by his (Galenic) doctor, they were
forced to admit that theory had become so ‘confused ‘ as to make the regulation of
00medicine essentially impossible .
Learned medicine was not only divided, but also under pressure from without. 
University-educated doctors were in competition with a range of craft practitioners 
whose medicine was rooted in experience rather than theory: ‘surgeons, apothecaries, 
empirics and irregulars’ many of whom began to draw support from the medical 
chemistry pioneered by Paracelsus91. Learned doctors tended to be scathing of such 
practitioners (Harvey, according to one account, habitually referred to them as ‘shitt- 
breeches’ ). Nevertheless, they gained governmental support: ‘[in] England, 
monarchs from Elizabeth to Charles II supported unlicensed practitioners against the 
College of Physicians, while in France the court afforded shelter to [Paracelsans]... 
against the hidebound Paris faculty’93. Eventually, many traditional institutions came 
to incorporate new ideas. Daniel Sennert, appointed professor of medicine at 
Wittenberg in 1602, drew inspiration from Paracelsus94 and the London College of 
Physicians formally repudiated Galenism around 168095. Nevertheless, well into the 
18th Century, ‘[rival] camps proliferated’ and ‘traditional... centres of excellence were 
challenged by Halle, Leiden, London, Edinburgh, Vienna and Philadelphia, each with 
its own school’96.
If the unity that had been offered by Galenism was increasingly broken, with the 
Roman now an ‘arch-enemy... supposed to have sterilized medicine with his 
sophistry’ his Greek predecessor remained an inspiration: ‘Hippocrates maintained his 
Olympian status as the champion of bedside experience’97. Gabrielle de Zerbi, a 16th 
Century Paduan doctor, wrote works on medical ethics which explicitly dealt with 
many of the concerns we have previously identified in the Hippocratic Corpus. French 
has dismissed de Zerbi’s work as ‘rules designed as much for the benefit of doctors as
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of the patient’, although he concedes that they are ‘not wholly cynical’98. Certainly, 
some of his suggestions (for example, that the doctor should avoid going shopping or 
playing games) can seem somewhat frivolous. On the other hand his injunction that 
theoretical disagreements be aired in private seems to have derived from his realising, 
like Harvey, that ‘the vulgar and the plebeians... could cause immense damage to the 
reputation of all properly trained physicians by showing that, since they disagreed in 
their learning [they] could not be trusted’ and from realising, like his ancient Greek 
counterparts, that this trust was an important part of his treatments’ effectiveness99. 
Even his superficially self-interested insistence on ‘expensive remedies’ was 
prompted at least in part by a belief that they ‘acted more surely than cheap ones’.
Regaining some sense of unity was important since, aside from the growing 
theoretical divisions amongst themselves, all sincerely naturalistic doctors (whether 
craft- or theory-driven) faced a second difficulty: competition from religious, 
superstitious and/or traditional remedies and, increasing, the products peddled as part 
of what has been termed ‘the golden age of quackery’100. Since the dawn of the 
Christian era, the Church had maintained alongside a Christianised natural medicine 
versions of the old pagan healing cults reattributed to particular saints101. Following 
the Reformation the Catholic Church ‘upheld familiar healing rituals: holy water and 
wells, shrines [and] saints’ relics’; in Protestant nations ‘seventh sons of seventh sons 
and ‘strokers’ might claim ‘miracle’ cures’102. Various cultish practices abounded, 
such as the belief that the royal touch could cure scrofula: in France this continued 
until the reign of Charles X in the mid- 19th Century (although whether it was still 
widely believed in by then is debatable)103 whilst Frazer reports that William III of 
England was forced to bribe the subjects gathered outside his palace, begging him to 
exercise healing powers he did not believe in, to get them to go away (he also relates 
the story that, when finally unable to avoid the entreaties of one such supplicant, the 
king laid hands upon him with the benediction: ‘God give you better health and more 
sense’104).
The popularity of such remedies depended to a large extent on the third obstacle 
facing the establishment of an effective medicine: widespread public ignorance of 
medical matters. In the 17th Century, ‘[magic] still underlay much vernacular healing’ 
and, as with medicine in the ancient Near East, it can sometimes be hard to
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distinguish the rational and/or empirical cure from the product of superstition. For 
example, a chicken or pigeon butchered live and applied to the forehead was 
commonly recommended for ‘inflammation of the brain’: as Porter asks, ‘was this a 
medical therapy drawing upon the virtue of heat, or did its efficacy lie in the blood 
sacrifice’105? By the 18th Century, some doctors appear to have recognised the need to 
address the situation, leading to the publication of several populist works. Wesley’s 
Primitive Physick of 1747 ‘taught common folks how to treat their ills with the aid of 
simple kitchen ingredients’ whilst Buchan’s Domestic Medicine of 1769 attempted to 
‘lay open’ medicine to the general public (the latter would later espouse ideas of 
‘medical democracy’ under which access to proper medical knowledge, especially 
simple practices of ‘diet, hygiene and temperance’ was a natural right o f man 
analogous to those proclaimed by the French Revolution106).
The Birth o f the Clinic and the Politicisation of Medicine in the 18th Century
From the 14th Century onwards, Europe continued to be beset by epidemics: ‘plague 
bounced from the Balkans to Britain, malaria was on the increase, smallpox grew 
more virulent, while typhus and [dysentery] became camp-followers of every 
army’107. Beyond the vast death tolls they exacted, these various plagues served not 
only to loosen the hold of scholastic thought on learned medicine but to tighten the 
grip of civic authorities on public health. Prior to the 15th Century, ‘[public] health 
boards, composed of nobles and officials, were ad hoc creations’; in 1410, however, 
Milan established a permanent board, followed by Venice in 1486, Florence in 1527 
and Lucca in 1549, with northern Europe gradually catching up over the course of the 
following century108. As Porter notes, doctors did not act ‘as full members of such 
boards but as advisers’; nevertheless, they became ‘more involved in public 
administration’109. Doctors and midwives were called on to provide the state with 
information (for example, by registering births)110 and by the 18th Century works such 
as Hoffman’s The State Doctor appeared in an attempt ‘define the role of medicine 
within legal procedures’111.
The relationship between medicine and politics worked in both directions. In the case 
of syphilis, as French points out, that ‘there was little [he] could do in the case of the 
French Disease... detracted from the authority of the learned doctor’; after all ‘[it]
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was religious charity that built hospitals [and] the city authorities who organised 
quarantine or turned people from the walls’112. Learned medicine in universities 
depended on civic recognition ‘that their philosophical medicine was the best and 
deserved a monopoly’113, and in the face of epidemic disease, civic authorities 
expected learned medicine to make good on its obligations. When Galenic medicine 
could not, and ‘civil administrations ultimately came to see plague as an entity that 
travelled from town to town, often along trade routes’ this weakened its authority ‘and 
opened further opportunities for... the empirics’114. On the other hand, as ‘the 
devastating effects of plague, epidemics and social unrest heightened the problem of 
the management of the urban masses’, any medicine which could win the backing of 
civic authorities stood to gain along with it significant political influence.
To illustrate this relationship more clearly, we may consider the example offered by 
Foucault in The Birth o f the Clinic with regards to the period in French history from 
the late 18th Century onwards when the ‘botanical model’ of disease115 (a ‘medicine of 
species’ defined by a ‘classificatory rule [that dominated] medical theory in practice’, 
dated ‘from the Nosologie of Sauvages (1761) to the Nosographie of Pinel (1798)’116)
11 nwas eventually supplanted by a new ‘medicine of epidemics’ . For Foucault, each of 
these ‘medicines’ is based on a different set of ontological claims regarding the nature 
of disease, ‘opposed [to one another] at every point’118. The ‘medicine of species’ 
placed its emphasis on disease as the result o f discrete entities with their own ‘natural 
histories’. By contrast, the ‘medicine of epidemics’ placed emphasis on ‘a sort of 
historical individuality’ which, like Hippocratic and Galenic medicine, takes into 
account particular temporal and geographical features119. In this respect, The Birth o f  
the Clinic paints a picture in which the continuity of medical practice is an illusion, 
with the continued use of the term obscuring a fundamental shift in the content, not 
only of medicine, but o f related terms such as ‘health’. Equally important for 
Foucault, however, is that the dominance enjoyed by one conception over the other is 
not a simple matter of truth and/or ‘progress’ (in which a simpler and less accurate 
conception of disease is succeeded by a more complex and more accurate one) but is 
intimately associated with economic, social and political pressures.
Foucault explicitly associates the growth of the new ‘medicine of epidemics’ with 
political intervention, namely the establishment ‘of the Societe Royale de Medicine...
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for the study of epidemic and epizootic phenomena that had increased considerably in 
recent years’, in particular an outbreak of ‘disease affecting livestock’ which had 
caused ‘fairly serious’ economic disruption in the affected region120. Additionally, 
however, this new medicine itself called for the nature of political intervention to be 
modified. Its effectiveness was dependent on control over temporal and geographical 
elements and as such it gradually arrogated to itself the power to do so: ‘medical 
space can coincide with social space, or, rather, traverse it and wholly penetrate it’121. 
Furthermore, it necessitated ‘a complex method of observation’ achievable only 
through a collective response which ultimately sanctions or requires intervention in 
public health at the level of the state122. On such a reading, Buchan’s comparison 
between medicine and the rights enshrined in the French Revolution is no mere 
analogy; rather, they are parts of the same totalising whole. ‘Medicine’ enshrines a 
particular view of how the world is and how human beings should act in accordance 
with it: ‘the struggle against disease must begin with a struggle against bad 
government’123.
In addition, the adoption of a ‘medicine of epidemics’ brought about a change in the 
relationship between patient and doctor: unlike Hippocratic and Galenic medicine it 
did not have at its centre the individual patient, or at least, an individual person. Under 
the ‘medicine of species’, ‘[in] order to know the truth of the pathological fact, the 
doctor must abstract the patient... in relation to that which he is suffering ffom, the 
patient is only an external fact; the medical reading must take him into account only 
to place him in parentheses’124. Under the ‘medicine of epidemics’, the abstraction of 
disease from the patient is supplanted by the elimination of the patient as a separate 
entity; as particular historical and geographical circumstances become incorporated 
into a disease, so the patient disappears entirely: ‘not so much a sick person, as the 
endlessly reproducible pathological fact’125. The individual is reduced to the body 
over which medicine exercises power, and the economic, social and political nature of 
this power is concealed behind the veil o f ‘objective’ fact: ‘the clinician’s gaze 
becomes the... equivalent of fire in chemical combustion... the separating agent of 
truths’126.
Such an account is both revealing and limiting. Revealing, because it lays bare forces 
which were undeniably in operation on the theory, practice and organisation of
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medicine during the late 18th Century. Limiting, first of all, because if one ‘medicine’ 
is adopted because it achieves certain ends better than another, then the dislocation in 
methodology Foucault describes may itself be a distraction ffom recognising a 
continuity, not of method, but of the objective of a method (that is, the effective care 
of the patient through the proper study of disease). Moreover, Foucault’s approach 
also fails to acknowledge that such interpretations may be useful for reasons other 
than those which lead to their widespread adoption, or perhaps that this adoption 
occurs for reasons other than (or in addition to) those that he describes. First of all, we 
may note that the ‘medicine of epidemics’ having a higher use-value than that of the 
‘medicine of species’ is not necessarily a bar to the former also being a ‘truer’ account 
(perhaps, indeed, it was more useful because it was more ‘true’). Secondly, we may 
note that the economic benefits brought by a medicine’s being able to deal with 
epidemic outbreaks is not necessarily a bar to it bringing other benefits as well, 
especially when those ‘economic’ benefits are often ultimately calculated in human 
lives.
What was wrong with both the ‘medicine of species’ and the ‘medicine of epidemics’ 
was not that they were ‘incorrect’ but that both held ontological pretensions to which 
they had no right. As long as their status as abstractions was remembered then both 
could remain useful and objections to them, trivial (we should also note that their use- 
value seems to rely on their having some kind of relationship with how things ‘really 
are’). However, as Foucault’s account makes clear, this tended to be obscured. 
Increasingly in the 18th Century ‘Enlightenment thinkers looked to science for 
their.. .models of social order’127. Doctors, in the vanguard of the triumphant march 
towards ‘a better future [in which] science and technology... would enhance man’s 
control over Nature [and] the conquest of disease would follow’128, were to become 
‘anatomists and doctors of society itse lf129. Yet the route this march would take 
concealed traps for the unwary, and hidden though they may have been, many had 
already been sprung by the time Foucault uncovered them in the 1970s. As we shall 
see in Chapter 6, this had not gone unnoticed. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that it could 
have been missed.
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Conclusions
The underlying moral concerns associated with medicine during the Middle Ages, 
Renaissance and Enlightenment are familiar ffom our previous three chapters, given 
new shape by the historical and social context of the times. Primarily, the chief focus 
of medical thought (and of philosophical thought regarding medicine) lay in making 
medicine effective, firstly through recovering knowledge lost following the collapse 
o f the Roman Empire in the West and, subsequently and in the wake of devastating 
outbreaks of epidemic disease, in forging ahead with the attempted discovery of new 
knowledge and new cures. To these may be added, as the centuries wore on, fresh 
questions regarding the organisation of medicine as a discipline and with regards to 
the political and social order. On the other hand, partly as a result of the urgent need 
to address these concerns, but partly also as a result of religious restrictions on the 
scope of moral reflection, questions as to the doctor’s conduct and as to those 
practices which ran counter to received morality were neglected. It is in the light of 
this state of affairs that we will now turn our attention towards specific works 
produced in response to it: Percival’s Medical Ethics and the first Code of the 
American Medical Association.
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Chapter 5: Percival, the BMA and the AMA: ‘Professional Ethics’ or 
‘Medical Etiquette’?
Given the challenges described in the previous chapter, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the ethical literature produced by 19th Century medicine should both proceed from 
and focus on the new social and institutional settings within which doctors were 
beginning to operate. Thomas Percival’s Medical Ethics, for example, was begun not 
from a desire to reform medicine as a whole but from the need to establish a 
regulatory framework in hospitals, which in Britain had from the 18th Century 
onwards taken on a growing role not only in caring for the sick but in educating 
professional doctors1. Specifically, it was written in response to a request from the 
Manchester Infirmary, and the first chapter came to form ‘the code of laws, by which 
the practice of this comprehensive institution [was] governed’2. The work itself, 
however, went beyond this original intention and attempted to extend these 
regulations into a framework for professional medicine in general (three of its four 
chapters have titles beginning ‘Of Professional Conduct...’; two make reference to 
specific areas of practice: ‘hospitals, or other medical charities’3 and ‘private or 
general practice’4) with the aim of what Jonsen has described as establishing 
‘professional cohesion around the goal of an effective medicine’5.
The American Medical Association Code of 1848 (although, as we shall see below, 
drawing heavily upon Percival’s work of nearly five decades before) was, by contrast, 
designed to fulfil this role from the start: it explicitly identifies the establishment of a 
unified professional standard of proper practice as the chief and most important goal 
of medical ethics: ‘[by] union alone can medical men hope to sustain the dignity and 
extend the usefulness of their profession’6. These concerns would dominate medical 
ethics for the following century: the ethical committee structure and Central Ethical 
Committee established in 1902 by the British Medical Association concerned itself 
almost entirely with maintaining accepted standards o f professional behaviour7 and 
was ‘responsible for presenting cases for expulsion from the Association, under the 
general rubric of conduct ‘contrary’ or ‘detrimental to the honour and interests of the 
medical profession” 8. In all three cases, the chief content of 19th Century medical 
ethics as conceived by 19th Century medical men consisted of describing the proper
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behaviour expected of them in their social and professional dealings, grouped together 
under the umbrella term ‘consultation ethics’.
‘Consultation’ in this sense refers to three different sets of rules covering three 
different kinds of interaction. First of all are the rules concerning doctors’ interaction 
with each other in a clinical setting, between more and less experienced doctors and 
(in the case of Percival at least) between different branches of the profession (chiefly 
between physicians and surgeons). We may refer to these as the rules concerning 
clinical consultation. Next come the rules concerning those cases in which a patient 
usually treated by one doctor either chooses to employ or is forced by circumstances 
to consult another. Following the terminology of the time, we may refer to these as 
the rules concerning interference. Finally, there are those rules that attempt to 
regulate the relationship between doctors on the one hand and, on the other, those 
providers of healthcare situated outside the immediate profession, whether ‘medical’ 
in some recognisably modem sense (such as apothecaries, dentists and opticians) or 
not (for example, homeopaths, bonesetters and chiropractors). These may be grouped 
together as the rules concerning consultation with non-professional practitioners. We 
may now move on to consider examples of each of these categories in more detail.
Rules Concerning Clinical Consultation
For Percival, the purpose of clinical consultation between doctors was twofold. First 
of all, it was often necessary for resolving difficult cases; moreover, it also helped to 
ensure the widest possible dissemination of skills throughout the profession. 
Consultation with one’s more experienced colleagues when faced with a problematic 
case and offering advice in turn to more junior colleagues can thus be seen in his work 
as an ethical duty in itself: ‘[giving] rise to confidence, energy and more enlarged 
views in practice’9, words echoed almost verbatim by the 1848 AMA Code]0. Yet 
Percival was also aware of the potential difficulties attendant on such a process. These 
ranged ffom the personal (he cautions that ‘ [on] such occasions no rivalship or 
jealousy should be indulged’11) to the straightforwardly practical (for example, in 
deciding where the consultation should take place, and how it should proceed). 
Unsurprisingly, much of both Medical Ethics_and the Code are given over to 
delineating a framework within which such consultations are to take place.
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Some of these rules seem to be simple extensions of common courtesy. For example, 
Percival stresses the importance of timekeeping for those involved in consultation12; 
the Code, in slightly stronger terms, states that ‘[the] utmost punctuality should be 
observed’ (we may note, however, that in the same passage the Code seems to 
indicate these responsibilities are rather weightier than simple good manners, and 
reminds doctors that their obligation to the profession overrides all other claims: 
leaving a prior social engagement to ensure prompt arrival at a consultation ‘is 
generally practicable, for society has been considerate enough to allow the plea of a 
professional engagement to take precedence of all others’13). Both works give 
instructions for ensuring the primary doctor is treated with a degree of politeness in 
front of his patients by those called in. The Code, for example, instructs that the 
attending doctor still be the first to question the patient in all cases14 and whilst 
Percival, by contrast, recommends that the most senior doctor fulfil this role, he 
arguably goes further to ensure the continuing esteem of the attending doctor in the 
patient’s eyes by instructing that they be the one to inform the patient as to the course 
of action decided upon15.
Other rules are more directly concerned with particular aspects of consultation and 
may be divided into two further groups. The first type outline the framework within 
which a consultation progresses and the roles which each participant is to take. For 
example, both works give a clear order in which the individuals involved are to state 
their opinion prior to discussion: in both cases it is recommended the attending doctor 
give their opinion first, with others following either in the order in which they were 
called into consultation (according to the Code16) or of seniority, with the most junior 
going first (according to Percival17). Percival calls for a simple majority vote between 
those in attendance to decide upon which course of action is to be followed, although 
he also allows for the attending doctor to make amendments to the treatment as the
1 ftcircumstances of the case may dictate . The Code follows Percival’s wording almost 
to the letter, further recommending that any changes to treatment are scrupulously 
recorded for discussion in any subsequent consultation19.
The second type of rules are found in those parts of both Medical Ethics and the Code 
which govern the interaction between doctors involved in consultation and the 
patients whose cases form the basis of their deliberations. We have already noted
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above that both works recommend that the majority of contact with the patient be 
restricted to one practitioner (either the attending doctor in the case of the AMA, or 
the most senior in the case of Percival). Beyond this, both works require consultations 
to be held away ffom patients: Percival plainly states that ‘no discussion concerning 
the nature of the case should be entered into before the patients’20 whilst the Code 
recommends that ‘physicians [involved] should... retire to a private place for
o ideliberation’ . Also, it is recommended that theoretical discussion is avoided 
wherever possible; the language employed by the Code on this point differs in 
punctuation only ffom that used by Percival23.
Rules Concerning Interference
Dealings with another doctor’s patients outside of the consultation process defined 
above are generally discouraged by both Percival and the Code. Percival couches this 
primarily in terms of ensuring the continuing respect of patients towards their usual 
doctor: ‘[no] meddling enquiries should be made concerning the patient, no 
unnecessary hints given relative to the nature or treatment of his disorder... that may 
directly or indirectly tend to diminish the trust reposed in the Physician or Surgeon 
employed’24. The Code again borrows Percival’s language in proscribing such 
behaviour, prefacing it with an injunction to ‘observe the strictest caution and reserve’ 
when dealing with ‘a patient under the care of another physician’25 and discouraging 
taking on cases where the patient has recently been under the care of another doctor26. 
Furthermore, the Code also places a responsibility upon the patient to avoid 
discussion of medical matters with those doctors they have dealings with in other 
capacities, warning to ‘avoid even the friendly visits o f  a physician who is not 
attending them [my emphasis]’ in case conversation with such a visitor inadvertently
onresults in a loss o f confidence in the treatment prescribed .
The Code goes in to more detail than Percival when considering those situations in 
which interference is unavoidable or may otherwise be considered permissible. 
Chiefly, these may occur when a patient’s usual doctor is unavailable, most obviously 
‘in cases of sudden emergency’ and ‘in cases of sickness or absence’. At such times, 
caution is to be exercised by the attending doctor: in emergency situations, although 
the first to attend should take charge of the patient, they should also send for the usual
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doctor if this has not already been done and ‘resign the care of the patient to the latter 
immediately upon his arrival’ (the importance of this is underlined by the fact that an 
extremely similar form of words is repeated twice within the space of two 
paragraphs). Even where a patient has discharged one doctor from his service and 
employed another, the new doctor is reminded to refrain from ‘unjust and illiberal 
insinuations... in relation to the conduct or practice previously pursued’28.
As with the rules concerning clinical consultation, which established clear roles and 
procedures to be followed by those involved, the Code also provides guidance for 
how to act in cases where some permissible degree of interference has taken place. 
These extend to cover what treatment can be given: for example, in a case where a 
patient with a pre-existing condition’s symptoms have suddenly changed or worsened, 
the ‘interfering’ party is to follow treatments that as far as possible fit those already 
prescribed, and to avoid discussing what treatment may be followed in future. They 
also establish when a case is to be passed back to the usual doctor: for example, where 
a doctor engaged to deliver a baby is not available, another who performs the delivery 
in their stead is not to take over the care of the mother and her newborn infant. 
Generally speaking, the ‘interfering’ party is to perform only such care as is 
absolutely necessary before the arrival of the latter, who again is in all cases to be sent 
for as soon as possible and to whom the case is to be resigned .
Rules Concerning Consultation With Non-Professional Practitioners
The rules we have examined so far were to be followed by all members of the medical 
profession (or professions, in the case of Percival, where the distinction between 
physician30 and surgeon31 is still rigorously made). Yet the business of healthcare in 
the 19th Century was not restricted to the clinical sphere; medical men did not operate 
in a vacuum. Competing theories or professions may have been fraudulent (as in the 
case of quacks and snake-oil salesmen), deluded or quasi-scientific (as in the case of 
homeopaths) or recognisably ‘medical’ in the modem sense of the word (for example, 
opticians or dentists). Establishing ‘professional cohesion’ amongst doctors also 
meant establishing where the profession was to stand in relation to these others, and, 
given professional doctors’ pursuit of ‘a professional monopoly over healthcare’ this 
relationship was often antagonistic.
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The Code not only expressly bars from the profession any individual not in possession 
of a ‘regular medical education’ but also notes that ‘no-one can be considered... a fit 
associate in consultation, whose practice is based on an exclusive dogma, to the 
rejection of the accumulated experience of the profession’33. To be a part of the 
profession was not only to embrace a certain standard of scientific medicine in its 
entirety but to refrain from consulting those who rejected all or part of i t : Jonsen cites 
as examples homeopaths, naturopaths and hydropaths34. In Britain, the GMC was 
prohibited from ‘[enforcing] any particular theory of medicine or system of 
therapeutics’. However, the Central Ethical Committee of the BMA could remove 
doctors from the statutory Register o f  Medical Practitioners for associating with those 
outside the profession: Morrice gives as an example the case of Dr. Axham: ‘erased... 
for anaesthetising patients for the famous bonesetter Herbert Barker’35.
This prohibition was not restricted to non- or quasi-medical practitioners. Removal 
from the Register could occur for a variety of reasons, initially left unspecified under 
the catch-all term of ‘infamous conduct in a professional respect’ . This did not 
necessarily prevent an individual from practising medicine: those in possession of a 
university doctorate could still describe themselves as a doctor and could continue to 
practice provided they did not claim to be registered. However, by the mid-20th 
century ‘new laws and statutes allowed only registered practitioners to do certain 
things, and occasionally prevented unregistered practitioners from doing others’.
More importantly, unregistered surgeons and physicians were cut off from the 
profession, as registered practitioners were forbidden from including them in 
consultation37. As a result, such measures effectively excluded these individuals from 
‘professional’ status and reduced the unregistered practitioner to the same status as 
bonesetters and homeopaths.
Whilst ‘infamous conduct’ could include behaviour which would be recognisably 
unethical to present-day eyes (‘crimes or felonies’, for example ) doctors could find 
themselves removed from the profession for other reasons. Aside from association 
with non-medical practitioners, individuals could be sanctioned for failing to 
recognise the authority of the BMA in taking up posts where the local Division had 
made a decision to withdraw medical services. Individuals refusing to comply with 
the ‘Warning Notice’ listing such disputed posts in the British Medical Journal ‘were
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reclassified as outsiders and excluded from professional and social intercourse’, with 
the ‘Notice’ being ‘legally appraised as a ‘black list” 39. Such official sanctions 
reinforced existing practice: even prior to the creation of the ‘Warning Notice’ in 
1903 those who ‘broke ranks’ with the profession (for example by taking up contract 
positions boycotted by local colleagues) ‘were often ostracised by their fellows’40.
Contemporary Criticism of Professional Ethics in Medicine
The ‘professional cohesion’ which Percival, the Code and the Central Ethics 
Committee attempted to establish and enforce was not universally popular from the 
viewpoint of either medical practitioners or the general public. Morrice has described 
the purpose of such an ethic as twofold: ‘to strengthen and patrol the boundary of the 
profession (stating who could and could not join in ‘the game’) [and to regulate] the 
space within it (the way the game was played)’41. By the early 20th Century, in 
Britain and America, the way in which the ‘medical ethics’ established by the 
profession attempted to achieve its goals had come under criticism on several fronts 
and from varied sources. An ethic which was seen to be focused on the ‘honour and 
interests’ of the medical profession ‘increasingly came to be seen to have failed to pay
AOenough attention to what the patient’s interests may be’ . Certainly, by the beginning 
of the 20th Century it was felt both within and without the profession that works such 
as Medical Ethics and the Code had given rise to a situation in which ‘ethics’ had 
become synonymous with a closed, inward looking medical establishment pursuing, 
sometimes aggressively, the interests of its members above all else.
In Britain, both unregistered and unorthodox practitioners remained popular with the 
public. For example, the Dr. Axham whose removal from the Register was mentioned 
in the previous section was the subject of a popular campaign for his reinstatement, 
led by George Bernard Shaw, which characterised the BMA as ‘self-interested and 
anti-social’43. The public were also wary of the profession’s motives in regulating 
consultation between registered practitioners. By the early 20th Century, strict rules 
covering a patient’s freedom to approach other practitioners were responsible for 
creating a situation in which ‘patients often complained that their choice was being 
restricted, and suspected they were being exploited’44. Within the medical sphere
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itself the damages for ‘libel, slander and conspiracy’ awarded to a group of doctors 
‘blacklisted’ by the BMA for taking up disputed positions can be seen as an implicit 
criticism of those ‘ethical’ rules relating to the organisation of the profession45.
In America ‘two unconventional figures’ were, as Jonsen has it, to ‘[introduce] 
novelty into [the] traditional patterns of medical ethics’46 from within the profession 
itself. The first of these was Dr. Richard Cabot who, unconcerned with whether ‘the 
practitioner went to church on Sunday, knew the “Star Spangled Banner”, swore the 
Hippocratic Oath, or adhered to... the AMA Code of Ethics’47 sought instead to 
establish (as Jonsen puts it) ‘clinical competence... [as] the centre of medical 
education and even of medical ethics’ . This clinical competence was to embrace 
mastery of both scientific medicine and of the more ‘humanistic’ aspects of the 
medical profession: an ‘appreciation of the personal and social needs of a patient’49. 
Jonsen argues this ‘ethic of competence’ is a ‘particularly modem view of medical 
ethics’50 and claims its very absence, following Cabot’s work, from official rules and 
codes as evidence that it had become wholly subsumed into the ethos of medicine as a 
whole, with ‘physicians [assuming] a professional persona that was shaped by 
scientifically dictated duties’51.
The second of these ‘unconventional figures’ was Dr. Chauncey Leake who, in 
preparing a new edition of Percival’s Medical Ethics, came to consider the established 
approach as ‘misconceived... from the beginning’52. Leake was one of the first to 
offer the now commonplace criticism that Percival and the Code were not, in fact, 
‘ethical’ works at all but rather ‘rules of etiquette developed in the profession to 
regulate the professional contacts of its members with each other’ . By way of 
contrast, he proposed a three-tiered system of ethical education for doctors of 
medicine, beginning with a course in moral philosophy, followed by ‘a historical 
survey of ethics in medicine’ and concluding with the discussion of actual, ethically 
problematic, cases with more experienced colleagues54. The aim of this education 
would be to create an ethic ‘concerned with the ultimate consequences of the conduct 
of physicians toward their individual patients and toward society as a whole’55.
Again, for Jonsen, Leake is an early forerunner of later trends; the ‘perplexity before 
moral dilemmas’ he sees in Leake’s work is for him the key distinction between 
traditional and modem works of medical ethics56.
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Professional Ethics in Medicine Reconsidered
Despite Jonsen’s contentions, it is far from clear that Cabot and Leake’s arguments 
(though certainly valid in themselves) were either entirely novel or opposed to the 
aims of professional ethics as envisaged by Percival and the Code. We have already 
seen these aims characterised as unifying medicine around a common goal, and of 
determining who was to be allowed (in Morrice’s terms) to ‘play the game’. Yet we 
may ask whether these aims were ends in themselves, or (much like the Hippocratic 
works such as Decorum) themselves means in pursuit of other goals. On a closer 
reading, and bearing in mind the social and scientific context in which both Medical 
Ethics and the Code were written, it becomes clear that neither Percival nor the AMA 
can truly be accused of prioritising the needs o f the medical establishment over those 
of the patient, nor of being ignorant of the deeper ethical concerns involved in 
medical practice. Percival, for example, seems to have been aware that what he 
proposed could seem to be more an organisational than ethical framework; he very 
nearly entitled his work Medical Jurisprudence . That he did not reflects an 
understanding that the rules contained within the work were an expression of 
underlying moral concerns: in the author’s own terms, ‘according to the definition of 
Justinian... Jurisprudence may be understood to include moral injunctions [my 
emphasis]’58.
Indeed, to borrow Leake’s phrasing, a concern for the ultimate consequences of the 
conduct of physicians toward their individual patients and toward society as a whole 
runs continuously through both works. Similarly, Cabot’s description of a medical 
ethic driven by competence in both the scientific and personal spheres is strikingly 
similar to the very first paragraph of the very first chapter of Medical Ethics in which 
doctors are entreated to:
.. .minister to the sick with due impressions of the importance of their 
office; reflecting that... the lives of those committed to their charge 
depend on their skill... They should study, also, in their deportment, so 
to unite tenderness with steadiness, and condescension with authority, as 
to inspire the minds of their patients with gratitude, respect and 
confidence.59
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In attempting to codify the requirements of the medical profession Percival, the Code 
and many of the actions of the Central Medical Committee can be seen to share in the 
aims of Cabot and Leake. What should not be forgotten is that they were often 
operating in very different circumstances. This can be shown through an examination 
of several of the stated aims behind the kinds of rules we have already discussed.
With regards to the primacy of consultation ethics, the frequent references in both 
Medical Ethics and the Code to courteous behaviour with regards to ones colleagues 
and injunctions to refrain from ‘rivalship’, ‘jealousy’ and ‘meddling enquiries’ can be 
seen to serve a twofold purpose. First of all, they are essential in encouraging doctors 
to engage in consultation in the first place. The importance both works place on 
consultation as an essential element o f ‘good medicine’ (both in specific instances and 
in order to share knowledge and best practice in general) has already been noted. For 
an individual practitioner still reliant in many cases on his reputation to earn a living, 
it is not difficult to see the value of some guarantee that one’s skills would not be 
publicly called into question in cases where the assistance of a more experienced 
colleague was required. Secondly, there is the question of maintaining confidence in 
the medical profession as a whole. We have already mentioned parallels with the 
status of Hippocratic medicine in antiquity; again, the need to ensure patients’ 
continued faith in scientific medicine here has a deeper ethical dimension. Loss of 
such faith could lead to patients seeking out non-professional practitioners, something 
that members of the medical establishment would have felt detrimental to their 
welfare.
This dual concern for the immediate welfare of the individual patient and for the 
wider need to both advance medical science and ‘win patients over’ to it can be seen 
in other aspects of consultation ethics. That discussions as to possible diagnoses or 
courses of treatment are to be held away from patients is explicitly identified with the 
former by Percival in terms (‘misapprehension may magnify real evils, or create 
imaginary ones’60) which echo the ancient Greeks’ understanding that confidence in 
one’s doctor is itself an important element of medical care. The Code, in noting why 
discussions of theory should be avoided, seems to give examples of both concerns. 
First of all, it is noted that such discussions may delay effective treatment; secondly,
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they may in any case be redundant in terms of bringing about a successful resolution 
since ‘experience and observation’ are as important as ‘hypothesis’ in determining a 
course of treatment61. When, regardless of apparent differences in theory, an effective 
treatment can be decided upon it is not difficult to see (as de Zerbi had noted) how the 
layperson may come to the conclusion that doctors do not understand what they are 
doing.
The rules governing relationships with other practitioners may also share these 
underlying concerns. That, in Britain, the GMC was not allowed to endorse a 
particular theory of medicine does not mean that such an endorsement was not 
necessary. This is not to imply that all alternative practitioners were charlatans: it is 
unlikely that homeopaths, for example, agreed with the BMA’s judgement of their 
‘uselessness’ . Nor does it mean that all such remedies were immediately harmful. 
For example, during an outbreak of cholera in London in 1854, patients at the London 
Homeopathic Hospital had a survival rate nearly 40% higher than those at the 
Middlesex Hospital nearby . As scientific medicine advanced, however, it was able 
to grow in effectiveness where homeopathy, tied to mistaken premises, was not. This 
growth did not only take the form of new treatments: a great number of the deaths at 
the Middlesex Hospital are likely to have been due to poor hospital hygiene and/or 
poor initial health amongst impoverished patients who could not afford expensive (if 
specious) homeopathic remedies64. The eventual recognition of the importance of 
both immediate and social environment to patient health (for example with regards to 
cholera) was made possible by scientific medicine, not homeopathy, which made no 
contribution to the growing understanding of the causes of disease throughout the 19th 
Century65.
In addition, were traditional medical ethics motivated by any self-interest on behalf of 
the profession it would be difficult to account for those cases where work with 
individuals other than physicians and surgeons was recommended, or even required. 
Percival, to take one example, devotes a whole chapter to the subject of dealing with 
Apothecaries, in which he is quick to emphasise their importance to patient welfare, 
and to raise the importance of consulting with them to the level of a ‘moral duty’ (on 
the grounds, it should be noted, that ‘when health or life are at stake’ expediency 
becomes such). The injunction to consult with Apothecaries is a result of both their
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close relationship with many patients (which makes them ‘in almost every instance 
the precursor of the Physician’) and their own level of professional skill and its 
relation to successful diagnosis and treatment: ‘on the knowledge, skill and fidelity of 
the Apothecary depend in a very considerable degree the reputation, the success and 
the usefulness of the physician’66. There seems to be little question of professional 
jealousy here. Rather, it was ethical to associate with and even endorse certain kinds 
of practitioner (and unethical to associate with others) because their work was 
conducive to the health of the patient.
The response of the Central Ethical Committee (though, as noted, unpopular) can also 
be seen as a necessary response to a void left by legislation. Rules concerning 
interference and the Central Ethics Committee’s actions in ostracising those who took 
up disputed positions can also be seen to have a bearing on the wider needs of the 
profession as a whole. For it should not be forgotten that, for the profession to 
continue in existence, doctors had to be able to make a living. Although (in the 
Western world at least) it has become customary to think of doctors as well-off 
financially, it should be remembered that this was not always the case. In the 17th 
Century, it was not unknown for learned doctors to die in debtors’ prisons having 
failed to attract and/or retain patients67 and Cabot, writing in the early 20th Century, 
still saw fit to warn his audience that while he had ‘known few physicians fail to get a
/O
living in medicine... the number who make comfortable incomes is equally few’ . 
Under such circumstances, the Code's injunction for wealthy physicians not to 
deprive more junior colleagues of income by offering free advice to their social 
peers69 or the BMA’s concern that wealthy patients could avoid paying fees by 
joining mutual-aid ‘Friendly Societies’70 can be seen as having vital importance to the 
preservation of organised medicine itself.
In a similar vein, rules designed to protect the reputation of the medical profession 
can be seen as necessary to protect continued confidence in medicine as a whole, 
rather than the more singular interests of individual doctors. It is true that when Cabot 
brought to public attention high error rates in diagnosis at the Massachusetts General 
Hospital by comparing the pathological findings of autopsies with clinical judgements 
made before the patients’ deaths71, his actions were regarded as a betrayal by many of 
his peers72, but it is also true that this does not necessarily reflect a desire to privilege
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the standing of the doctor over the needs of the patient; indeed, any such desire is 
noticeably absent ffom the works we have discussed. When offering various 
injunctions against interference in the cases of another, Percival makes quite clear that 
this does not extend to tolerating negligence or incompetence: on the contrary, in such 
cases the physician should ‘justly regard interference as his duty’. That Percival 
recommends for the ‘interfering’ party to begin by consulting the patient’s present 
doctor seems more a question of caution than anything else73. The potential in such 
cases for causing undue distress to the patient and their family, or undue damage to 
the reputation of an individual colleague or the profession as a whole is plain to see.
That establishing professional medicine on a sure footing has important moral 
implications can also be illustrated by returning to the criticisms offered by Cabot and 
Leake. The latter, as we have seen, proposed a new way for educating doctors in 
ethical matters; the former insisted on establishing standards of clinical competence. 
In some cases, their ideas are based on evidence and advances not available to 
Percival or the founders of the AMA: Cabot’s work, for example, was based on 
advances in statistical analysis unknown at the start of the 19th Century74. More often, 
they depend for their implementation on the state of affairs that professional ethics 
made possible. It is worth asking where Cabot’s statistics would have come from, and 
where and from whom Leake’s doctors would receive their education, in the absence 
of a professional medical establishment and/or a cohesive, effective medical science. 
Certainly implementing such ideas would not have been possible given the state of 
medical knowledge and organisation in the late 18th Century. It is also worth asking 
what the point of such an establishment would be if  its members were unable to make 
a living, or content to allow or encourage their patients to see their work as no more 
effective than that of homeopaths, witch-doctors or faith healers.
Conclusions
Medical Ethics, the Code and the work of bodies such as the Central Ethical 
Committee shaped medicine and medical ethics in accordance with the social and 
scientific status of medicine at the time; in their concern with epistemology, practical 
competence and the social and professional structures required to develop these they 
can also be seen as a revival (or, perhaps, culmination) of the primary aims of the
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Hippocratic tradition as described in Chapter 3. This is not to say that professional 
medical ethics was a complete success, that the 19th Century profession was 
universally to be admired, or that the achievement of these aims should be regarded as 
the completion of medical ethics as a whole. As Cabot’s work demonstrated, even 
advances in such apparently unconnected fields as statistics could bring fresh moral 
challenges for the nascent medical profession. Over the 20th Century, pressure from 
both social changes outside medicine and, in some respects, the very success of 
scientific medicine itself would pose further questions, and it is to an examination of 
such challenges that our attention will now turn.
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Part Two:
Medical Ethics in the 20th Century
Chapter 6: New Medicine, New Ethics? The Changing Face of Medicine 
and Medical Ethics in the 20th Century
In the preceding chapters, we established that initial moral concerns regarding 
medicine ultimately derive from questions regarding practical competence. Prior to 
the 19th Century, there had been three main obstacles to overcome in addressing these 
concerns and establishing an effective medicine. Firstly, there was the lack of 
scientific knowledge with regards to the causes and nature of disease. Secondly was 
the general absence of any centralised regulation (state-sanctioned or otherwise) of 
doctors’ abilities and conduct and/or structures for the systematic dissemination and 
enlargement of knowledge. Finally, there was the preponderance of superstitious or 
(increasingly) pseudoscientific alternatives allowed to compete with ‘scientific’ or 
professional medicine on a more or less level footing. As we have seen, by the end of 
the 19th Century, the cohesion provided by bodies such as the BMA and AMA had 
begun to address all of these concerns. Whether, once these goals had been achieved, 
doctors would face other moral challenges seems not to have been considered (we 
may consider Dewey and Leake as possible exceptions to this). By the 1960s, 
however, it was becoming increasingly clear that social changes and the rapid 
advance of the science of medicine were raising difficult moral questions for which 
‘professional ethics’ had no clear answers.
The following chapter will seek to examine five different ways in which the creation 
of a medical establishment, effective medical science and changing social conditions 
presented fresh moral concerns for medical ethics in the mid-20th Century. Firstly, we 
will consider the effect of advances in scientific medicine on traditional conceptions 
of health and the ‘good’ of the patient. We will then move on to consider two 
important elements of scientific medicine in particular: the use of human trials for 
experimentation, and the effect of the increasingly scientific nature of medicine on 
conceptions of the doctor-patient relationship. Following that, we will consider one 
further important area of social change: the emerging social and political debate as to 
how an increasingly expensive scientifically-based system of healthcare should be 
provided and paid for. Finally, we will examine perceptions of the doctor as a 
paternalistic or coercive figure and the growth of the ‘patients’ rights’ movement. In 
doing so, we will hope to achieve three aims: to illuminate the key questions with
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which mid-lO* Century medical ethics was faced, to explore the ways in which these 
questions reflect an ongoing response to underlying concerns, and to consider why 
traditional medical ethics found them so difficult to cope with.
Moral Concerns Regarding Advances in Medical Knowledge and Life-Sustaining 
Treatments
At the time Percival was writing Medical Ethics, the pathology of disease was still far 
from understood; over the course of the 18th and 19th Centuries, however, rapid 
advances were being made. In 1750, techniques were established for mass inoculation 
against smallpox with cowpox (the effect had been popularly known for some time 
prior to this), laying the groundwork for widespread vaccination programs1. In post­
revolutionary France, the study of particular tissues began to supersede that of the 
organs in importance; at the same time, increasing study of the body post-mortem 
provided an impetus towards explaining internal disease, leading to the invention of 
the stethoscope . In Germany, advances in lens-making technology enabled the 
development of cell theory, which was applied to a range of biological and medical 
fields such as embryology3. Similar technical progress allowed for greater accuracy in 
monitoring patients’ physical states and importance began to be accorded to 
comparing the effects of disease on such states with ‘normal function’4. Study of the 
pharmacopeia was brought into the scientific sphere, allowing for advances in the 
effectiveness of drug treatment5. Chloroform and cocaine were developed for general 
and local anaesthesia during surgery . Beginning with Semmelweiss in Austria and 
continuing with Lister in Scotland8, recognition of the importance of hygiene in 
preventing the transmission of disease started to reduce the rate of post-operative and 
obstetric infections (although at first it was believed that dirt or ‘putrid matter’ itself 
was the problem, rather than any pathological agent9, a position maintained by some 
doctors well into the 1880s10).
In the wake of such dramatic and rapid successes throughout the 19th Century 
there came to exist ‘a virtually utopian belief in the possibilities of applying scientific 
discoveries to medicine1 *. As the 20th Century passed its halfway point, there seemed 
little reason to doubt such optimism and the 1950s ‘revelled in the progress of 
medicine’. The Second World War had ‘spurred [an] effort to improve military
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medicine’, an effort which had ‘spilled over’ into peacetime. In the twenty years from 
1945 to 1965 the advances for the doctor were the most dramatic yet: streptomycin 
was introduced to treat tuberculosis; penicillin had been synthesised and its use in 
treating infections became more widespread; and other drugs were developed for a 
wide range of physical and mental health problems. These were paralleled by the 
development of new surgical techniques such as open-heart surgery and organ 
transplantation, and new technologies such as the cardiac pacemaker and 
haemodialysis. Vaccines were developed for illnesses such as polio, raising the 
possibility that infectious disease could be wiped out altogether12. Yet beneath this 
widespread confidence lay growing concerns.
As we saw in Chapter 1, from the Egyptians onward healers had always recognised in 
their prognoses the existence of certain diseases which simply could not be treated 
and accepted this as a part of their duties. As scientific medicine progressed 
throughout the 19th Century, attitudes began to shift: death was no longer ‘seen... as 
the Hippocratics taught, [as] a natural terminus’ but as the failure of life13. Medicine 
became a struggle against death and, in the utopian climate of the day, a struggle that 
it seemed might some day be won. Yet as Plato’s Socrates had noted with regards to 
Herodicus, the very efforts involved in an attempt to prevail in such a struggle may 
mean that it is not one worth winning. The populist writer M. Scott Peck recounts 
how, in 1965, as a junior doctor at a San Francisco hospital, he became responsible 
for the care of an Air Force sergeant who had developed an inoperable brain tumour. 
The man’s condition had deteriorated rapidly to the point at which he had passed into 
a coma and been placed on a respirator. As the tumour began to affect the part of his 
brain controlling blood pressure, Peck had, in line with accepted practice, resuscitated 
him. The patient’s life was saved (an act of which Peck’s supervisor approved) but to 
no apparent end: he did not regain consciousness and his body began to rot.
Since the patient was not ‘dead’, Peck was not permitted to cease administering 
treatment or life support. Privately, and against the express instructions of his Chief 
of Medicine, he nevertheless ended the patient’s life by twisting the line intravenously 
supplying him with fluids. In doing so he defied both accepted practice and the 
instructions of a superior; yet he also felt he was ‘halting an abomination’14. His 
dilemma was not unique. Jonsen, in describing one of the encounters that drew him to
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be involved in medical ethics, offers another example. In 1967, a colleague offered to 
show him a ‘real ethical problem’ and introduced him to certain haemodialysis 
patients who wished to be allowed to ‘turn off the machine’ and die. Nothing in this 
colleague’s medical education had prepared him for such a dilemma. Would the 
patients’ actions be suicide? Would he, as a physician, be considered an 
accomplice15? The established medical profession, as with many of the issues we will 
examine in this chapter, was accustomed to keeping discussion of such matters ‘in 
house’16. Throughout the 1960s, however, it was becoming increasingly apparent that 
medical advances were leading to doctors being placed in situations where the 
obligation to prolong life enshrined in both professional ethics and the law could seem 
inhumane, and that this was placing a great strain on both doctors and their patients.
Moral Concerns Regarding Human Experimentation
As we have already seen in Chapter 1, moral problems associated with subjecting 
patients to untried and possibly harmful practices had been recognised since before 
the naturalistic turn in Greek medicine. From antiquity onwards the incomplete state 
of medical knowledge also meant that it was sometimes difficult to distinguish 
medicine from experimentation. The Hippocratic tradition had established that ‘[the] 
untried and the unusual always had to be placed within a therapeutic attempt’ (that is, 
experimentation was only to be pursued in the context o f a course of treatment, 
preferably where other methods had proved ineffective). In the Middle Ages, both 
Avicenna and Maimonides advanced a similar position and cautioned against the use 
of patients as a ‘mere means for learning’17. Additionally, whilst there is evidence that 
certain individuals may have pursued non-therapeutic research at certain times (under 
the Ptolemies, Alexandrian physicians were ‘permitted... to perform vivisection on 
criminals’) the medical value of such experimentation was also a matter of debate. 
Galen, for example, maintained that experimentation on human subjects was not only 
unethical due to the risks involved but of little value ‘because the precise cause of 
[effects] cannot be isolated with certainty’18.
With the growth of scientific medicine from the 18th Century onwards, however, the 
use of human subjects to test potentially dangerous techniques became more common. 
King George II, whilst still Prince of Wales, only had his daughters inoculated against
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smallpox following ‘[experiments]... with condemned felons’19; later in the century, 
Queen Caroline, wife of George IV had the vaccination ‘tested’ on orphan children 
before allowing it to be given to her own (Queen Victoria, by contrast, took a more 
personal lead with her use of chloroform during childbirth in 185321). The use of 
condemned felons or terminally ill patients for the testing of new cures or to observe 
the effects of parasites or infections became more widespread in the 19th Century. The 
French physiologist Claude Bernard approvingly notes an experiment in which a 
condemned woman was, without her knowledge, given worm larvae to swallow in 
order to see if they would develop in her intestines post mortem. His justification for 
this (that it would cause the woman no additional harm given her impending 
execution) may well have been true (although it was perhaps fortunate for her doctor 
that the woman was not granted clemency at the last minute). As Jonsen notes, 
however, such an attitude represents a significant shift away from a conception of the 
doctor as acting only in the individual patient’s interests: the worms may not have 
been in a position to cause harm, but they were of no possible benefit to the woman 
herself22.
Such activities were not uncontroversial within the profession. By the early 20th 
Century the Russian doctor V.V. Smidovich felt compelled to pseudonymously attack 
19th Century practices including deliberately infecting patients (some hopelessly ill, 
others merely chronically so or ‘unfortunate enough to find themselves confined to a 
medical institution’) with biological agents relating to gonorrhoea and syphilis. Yet 
later, successful, experiments in determining the cause of yellow fever carried out in 
Cuba seemed to prove the value of non-therapeutic research. The American doctor 
William Osier, who wrote defending the practice, justified such experiments before 
both Congress in the United States and a Royal Commission in Britain by citing the 
consent given by the healthy test subjects, which he viewed as the chief moral issue at 
stake23. Other doctors emphasised the importance o f obtaining consent even in 
therapeutic research, especially where the treatment might prove painful or 
distressing: the pioneering American gynaecologist J Marion Sims insisted on 
obtaining it not only from slave-owners but from slave women themselves when 
developing invasive and painful techniques for curing a particular urinary problem24. 
The first steps towards enshrining this importance in law were taken in Germany, 
where from 1900 research was only permitted in cases where the test subject had
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given consent based on a thorough understanding of the risks involved in the 
experiment25.
As Jonsen notes, history has rendered this development grimly ironic26. The Nazi 
death camps of the Second World War numbered among their myriad horrors a whole 
catalogue of ‘research experiments’ carried out on unwilling subjects. Some of these 
were driven by an effort to improve military medicine: ‘[camp] doctors used inmates 
to study the effects of mustard gas, gangrene, freezing, and typhus... [children] were 
injected with petrol, frozen to death, drowned or simply slain for dissection 
purposes’27. Others bore a eugenic stamp or reflected doctors’ own interests. Josef 
Mengele, for example, carried out a range of experiments on twins: he ‘performed 
cross-transfusions... [and] used his twin collection for comparative studies, infecting 
one child and then killing both for autopsy’. He also made his own ‘artificial’ 
conjoined twins28. When the doctors involved in the Nazi camps were brought to trial 
at Nuremberg in 1947, charges were brought under ‘standards that their prosecutors 
had devised precisely to try them’. Whilst such ex post facto standards are usually 
considered ‘a legal impropriety’ it was felt that they were justified in this case as an
9Qexpression of ‘moral imperatives that should be known to all civilised humans’ . 
These imperatives were collected into the Nuremberg Code with the intention of 
governing all future human research:
Nuremberg Code:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that 
the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated 
as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without 
the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, 
or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient 
knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to 
enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This 
latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the
experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, 
duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be 
conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be expected; and the effects 
upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the 
experiment. The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent 
rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a 
personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with
impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, 
unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in
nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal 
experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other 
problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the
experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and
mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is a prior reason to believe that 
death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the
experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the 
humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the 
experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.
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8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The 
highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the 
experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring 
the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where 
continuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to 
terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the 
exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful judgment required of him that a 
continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the
experimental subject.
The Nuremberg Code was largely formulated by a medical man, Dr. Andrew C. Ivy, 
who believed that the principles it embodied represented what had long been 
established through the tradition of professional ethics (although, unlike many others,
-a
he was not entirely confident that these were widely known or reflected on ). It is 
certainly worth noting that the profession identified a distinction not made in the 
Nuremberg Code when, in 1964, the World Medical Association’s Helsinki 
Declaration distinguished between research that is expected to benefit a patient 
(‘clinical research’) and research that is not (‘nonclinical research’)32. Given the 
almost unspeakably vile nature of wartime atrocities, it was perhaps a comfort to think 
that they were an aberration, a temporary blip caused by a tragic lapse in professional 
rectitude. And perhaps they were, if only in terms of the sheer gory horror of their 
extent. However, it was soon to be apparent that they were not as atypical as the 
medical establishment may have liked to think.
Germany had not been alone in carrying out experiments in biological warfare during 
the Second World War. Japan carried out research on prisoners of war at Pingfan in 
Manchuria to test the effectiveness of biological weapons ; The United States,
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working on the assumption that Nazi Germany would develop such weapons, had 
manufactured anthrax and botulin bombs; and Great Britain carried out military 
testing of anthrax in both Scotland and Dorset34. During the Cold War, under the 
looming prospect of having to deal with the consequences of a nuclear exchange35, 
members of the United States armed forces were subjected to secret radiation tests. As 
Porter argues, it is possible that the physicians involved believed they were acting in 
highly exceptional circumstances36. Jonsen notes that the use of unwitting subjects 
may even have been the result of administrative error: in a grim irony, a declaration 
from the Secretary of Defence stating that such trials should be subjected to the 
Nuremberg Code remained classified as Top Secret until 1975, long after the tests had 
finished . What he fails to acknowledge is the damage this does to the widespread 
contention that the Code merely expressed what the ‘good’ doctor already knew38: 
were this the case, such an error would have been merely a humorous irrelevance as 
those involved would presumably, whether guided by their own consciences or 
professional ethics, have followed the protocols anyway.
If such experiments can be excused as having taken place under the shadow of the 
atomic bomb (and it is by no means certain that this is the case) others were even 
harder to justify. The infamous Tuskegee Experiment, in which 600 black men from 
the eponymous town in Alabama who had been diagnosed with syphilis were 
unwillingly used as guinea-pigs to observe the effect o f the disease was one. 400 of 
the subjects were left untreated (the remaining subjects formed the control group). All 
were instructed, on false premises, to report for periodic medical examination. Begun 
in 1932, the study was not shut down until forty years later, following revelations in 
The New York Times, and long after effective treatment had become available in the 
form of penicillin. There was an obvious racial element to the experiment, but perhaps 
more damning for the medical profession as a whole was that it ‘had not been kept a 
secret within the Public Health Service nor within the wider scientific and medical 
community, since many articles reporting its data were published’. It was not until 
1966 that a Public Health Service employee began pressing for attention to be paid to 
the moral aspects of the study. Even then, his efforts were initially ignored: when the 
Service did finally examine the case, they did not find it problematic39.
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In cases where the likely harm to patients was minimal and effective therapies were 
produced, the medical profession as a whole appears to have been divided as to the 
relevance of consent, especially in cases where the patient was incapable of giving it. 
In researching a vaccine for infectious hepatitis, two doctors deliberately infected 
handicapped children admitted to New York’s Willowbrook State Hospital. Under the 
Helsinki declaration, hospitals had the power to give consent on behalf of 
‘incompetents’, but how far this consent allowed for them to place patients at risk had 
not been defined. The test subjects were not in significant danger: in children the 
illness ‘is a mild, flu-like condition... [besides,] almost all children eventually 
contracted hepatitis in... the institution and... the induced infection would 
subsequently immunise them’. Although the doctors were able to synthesise a 
vaccine, when their work was published in 1958 the result was public outcry and they 
were equated with Nazis. Though the Journal o f  the American Medical Association 
defended them, correspondents to and the editors o f the British journal The Lancet 
were strongly critical40.
Though the profession largely remained wary o f outside regulation of research41, it 
was becoming apparent that the moral issues involved were too complex to be left to 
the investigator alone. Some doctors began to express concerns that work as a 
researcher was incompatible with the traditional role of the doctor as healer. The 
German doctor Otto Guttentag, who had emigrated to the United States in 1935 and 
returned with the American Army following the Second World War, had noted that in 
the case of research the traditional physician-patient relationship had been 
fundamentally altered. He drew a distinction between the traditional concept of 
‘physician-ffiend’ and the emerging ‘physician-researcher’, which, though influential 
amongst some medical researchers, was not translated into regulation42. Moreover, it 
was not only with regards to research that some doctors and patients began to wonder 
if a key part of the medical profession’s ethos was being lost.
Moral Concerns Regarding Advances in Medical Technology and Changing 
Perceptions of the Doctor
As we saw with regards to Avicenna and Maimonides’ thoughts on experimental 
treatments, the fear that doctors could become concerned more with medicine as an
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academic science than with medicine as the care of individual patients was not new to 
the 20th Century. Nevertheless, the ‘utopian’ view of medicine as a ‘miracle of 
science’ owed much to advances, not only in the biological sciences, but also in 
medical technology (better quality lenses for microscopes are one example we have 
already encountered). There was, of course much more to medical science than this: 
John Snow’s epidemiological work on cholera in 1854 (which had shown that the 
disease spread through contaminated water) highlighted the impact of environment on 
public health and prompted the British government to address the squalid, poverty- 
stricken environment of the industrialised urban poor through ‘massive improvements 
in drainage and sewerage’43. Yet such works, however impressive as feats of 
engineering, were not noticeably medical in character and as such it is hardly 
surprising that, as Blume has argued, more eye-catching devices such as the X-Ray 
machine (introduced in 1896) inspired the public to think of medicine as miraculous 
and technological rather than a matter of ‘hygiene and social improvement’44.
To begin with, the X-Ray had not been thought of as a primarily medical device, 
although surgeons with suitable cases (a needle lodged in a patient’s hand or foot, for 
example) would sometimes seek out those in possession of X-Ray machines45. Its 
acceptance as a medical technology was driven in part by manufacturers seeking to 
market the practical applications of technology46 and in part by the experience of its 
utility by army doctors in the trenches of the First World War47. The profession was 
initially resistant to the idea of doctors specialising in the use of X-Ray technology: in 
the United States, the ‘roentgenologist’ was seldom a trained medical professional and 
although ‘in the larger [British] hospitals, a medical man was in charge of X-Ray 
work’ they were typically regarded as a technician and not accepted as a consultant. 
As Blume suggests, it is possible that doctors felt such advances called into question 
their clinical judgement48. By the mid-20th Century, however, further developments 
such as the electrocardiogram (a prototype o f which was loaned to the eminent 
London cardiologist Sir Thomas Lewis49) shifted medicine further toward the 
technical and technological.
The ‘technological successes of the Second World War’50 and the search for ‘new 
applications... for the technical and scientific skills [that had been] developed’51 
during it accelerated this process. In some cases the utopian spirit of the 19th Century
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lingered on: in the 1950s, the chairman of the Radio Corporation of America 
speculated excitedly on the prospect of building miniaturised electronic organs and 
publicly declared that the creation of a ‘bionic man’ living on with several artificial
c*y
parts was no longer a remote possibility . But this optimism was not universally 
shared: the 19th Century public had often viewed the medical profession with 
suspicion, sometimes regarding the doctor as a figure more concerned with himself 
than the patient. Public faith in the medical profession, already shaken by the 
discovery of Nazi experiments and about to be shaken further by the exposure of 
Tuskegee and Willowbrook, was coming to fear that the increasingly scientific and 
technical nature of medicine was making the doctor a cold and impersonal figure53.
As Porter notes, as ‘doctors became therapeutically more potent, in large measure 
they ceased to give the patients what they wanted... they tended to forget the 
significance and benefit of the doctor-patient relationship’54; in the United States there 
was growing disquiet at the possibility that the need for doctors trained in increasingly 
technical specialisations was to the detriment of general practice and that ‘the family 
doctor was becoming extinct’55. Moreover, as medical successes drove a change in 
disease patterns from acute to chronic conditions56, it became apparent that these were 
much harder to treat; it seems unlikely that the haemodialysis patients encountered by 
Jonsen would regard the prospect of a ‘bionic man’ with any great enthusiasm.
Medicine was increasingly the subject of public unease, something we may illustrate 
by considering some fictional examples of the practitioners and ‘beneficiaries’ of 
technological medicine produced in the late 20th Century. First of all, one may think 
of the stereotypical ‘Nazi doctor’ such as the fictionalised version of Josef Mengele 
plotting to clone Adolf Hitler in The Boys From Brazil or his close analogue Dr. 
Hans Glaub, creator of the blond-haired and blue-eyed ‘Aryan superman’ Max Zorin 
in the James Bond film A View To A Kill . Whilst this stereotype was undeniably 
linked to a wider association in the public mind between Nazi Germany and eugenics, 
it is also one that connects both Nazism and eugenics with a certain kind of medical 
thought and a certain kind of medical man. Such a doctor is a twisted inversion of the 
‘ideal physician’: ‘scientific’ rather than ‘humane’, prepared to sacrifice the interests 
of the individual patient in pursuit of some ‘higher’ goal (we may note that other 
fictional Nazi medical men, for example the Auschwitz camp dentist who is the chief
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antagonist of Marathon Man59, share these latter traits whilst displaying no explicit 
attachment to eugenic ideals).
With regards to examples regarding the patient a few, for example the ‘bionic’ hero of 
the television series The Six Million Dollar Man, are positive60 whilst others, such as 
the superhero Iron Man61 or the protagonist of the 1987 film Robocop, are satirical or 
ambivalent62. Many more, however, are negative or even terrifying. The villain of the 
Star Wars films, Darth Vader, wears a suit of armour that doubles as a walking life 
support machine. This alone is cited as a reason for the futility of appealing to any 
remaining traces of his moral sensibility: he is described as ‘more machine than 
man... twisted and evil’ as though the very measures taken to preserve his life have 
themselves robbed him of his humanity . The 1939 novel Johnny Got His Gun 
describes the nightmarish experience of a soldier kept alive by machines: a ‘new 
curiosity’ confined to his bed, unable to see, hear or communicate64. The novel and its 
1971 film adaptation formed the basis for the 1989 single and music video One by the 
American heavy metal group Metallica, sung from the soldier’s perspective as he tries 
to commit suicide by holding his breath65. Both novel and song are often felt to 
represent an attack on the horrors of war; it may perhaps be more accurate to say they 
represent a fear of the horrors of medicine.
Moral Concerns Regarding Social and Economic Issues in the Provision of 
Healthcare
In the early part of the 20th Century, the organisation of medical services in Great 
Britain might charitably be described as haphazard. As Webster has noted, in the 
1930s there existed ‘two rival hospital systems, the public sector and the voluntary 
hospitals’. The latter, numbering around 1,000 institutions, jealously guarded their 
independence and were only loosely associated with each other; the former, 
numbering around 3,000, were nominally governed by ‘hundreds of local authorities 
only remotely regulated by the health departments’66. In the United States, by 
contrast, medicine had taken on the guise of a slickly-run private business. Individual 
practitioners ‘discovered the benefits of behaving like lawyers or businessmen, setting 
up offices in downtown medical buildings [and were] forward-looking in the use of 
secretaries’. Hospitals, meanwhile, which had been set up by ‘doctors [as well as]
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religious, ethnic and other groups’ were being transformed ‘from refuges for the poor 
into institutions for all’. As Porter notes, the predominant attitude was one in which 
‘[medicine] seemed good for business and business good for medicine’67. Throughout 
the 20th Century medical, socio-historical and economic changes were to call both 
systems into question.
In Britain by the 1920s it had become apparent that ‘[in] comparison with many other 
advanced Western economies, including the white dominions, the UK’s health 
services were falling behind, and these deficiencies showed up in the international 
league tables of health indices’68. Worse, the chaotic state of healthcare provision 
resulted in ‘dangerous lapses’, such as that which contributed to an outbreak of 
typhoid in Croydon in 193769. Some medical experts began to argue for the central 
organisation of medicine, not only to remedy such problems but also to provide
*70greater opportunities for training and consultation . This need became more urgent 
with the outbreak of war as government planners discovered that existing medical 
services were grossly inadequate to deal with the expected casualties. As a result, an 
Emergency Medical Service was established and with ‘remarkable speed and 
efficiency’ set about organising and reforming the whole structure of British 
medicine. A regional structure was set up which ‘supervised the training and 
distribution of professional personnel [and] organised for the first time a regional 
blood transfusion service, a national public laboratory service and regional special 
facilities for... rehabilitation, fractures, plastic surgery, neurology and psychiatry’. 
The system met with such success that there were calls for it to be permanently
n itransformed into a National Hospital Service .
Pragmatic arguments for a national service based on clinical need and convenience 
were supplemented with political arguments based on concerns of social justice. In 
1942, a Government report by civil servant Sir William Beveridge proposed as a post­
war aim the creation of ‘a new health service... available to everyone according to 
need, free at the point of service, without payment or insurance contributions’72. 
Beveridge’s proposal faced opposition on political grounds73 and from some sectors 
of the medical profession (doctors had already proved antagonistic to National 
Insurance, fearing that it would reduce their status to that of ‘petty civil servants’74, a
75fear now shared by workers in the voluntary sector ). Though enjoying widespread
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support amongst the public and securing the cautious backing of even the right-wing 
press76, skilful negotiation was required to put plans for a National Health Service into 
action. The voluntary sector was mollified by the service’s national character and
77‘relieved to have escaped control by local government’ . The BMA were brought 
round when concessions were granted in terms of increased compensation and the 
ruling out of salaried service78. Although the cost of the Health Service was far in 
excess of projected figures, it remained ‘by international standards, exceptionally 
cheap’79.
This last point highlights another factor that played a part in a trend throughout the 
West towards some form of social provision of healthcare: medicine was becoming 
increasing costly. The governments of France and West Germany, in adopting state 
control of medical development in the 1960s and 1970s respectively, were prompted 
at least in part by ‘skyrocketing’ levels of medical expenditure80. As Jonsen has noted, 
ongoing technical and scientific advances, whilst providing exciting possibilities for
8 1 , _,itreatment, were largely reliant on ever-more expensive technology and drugs . The 
changes to the structure of medicine demanded by its increasingly technical and 
scientific nature also contributed: one of the reasons that increased specialisation is 
attractive to the practitioner is, as Porter has pointed out, the opportunity it affords for 
increased remuneration whilst the ever-increasing amount of space required for 
technological devices ‘began to constrain the very architecture of the hospital’83. 
Although attention had been paid to the matter of the doctor’s fee since the 
Renaissance84 and professional ethics had sought to a degree to insulate the doctor 
from economic pressures, these traditions were badly in need of revision.
The situation was somewhat different in the United States, which in contrast to the 
majority of Western governments, ‘went its own way’. In the climate of an 
increasingly frosty Cold War, plans for Federal involvement in medicine mooted 
under the New Deal came to be regarded as unacceptably socialist. Furthermore, the 
AMA opposed them on grounds of efficiency, arguing that ‘the best form of medical 
insurance’ was not to provide ‘socialised’ medicine but to make government funding 
available for research85. The AMA’s position served to worsen further the popular 
perception of doctors, now seen as ‘uncaring, greedy and self-interested’86. Moreover, 
professional and political arguments against socialised medicine and in favour of
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alternative investment in research did not match up to economic reality. As a result 
‘the [Federal] Government became committed to shouldering a growing proportion of
q *7
health care’ through state-sponsored assistance for medical programs and insurance. 
The limited nature of these programs meant they were unable to exercise monopoly 
powers to drive down costs; instead, these escalated further, with healthcare becoming
DO
‘one of the major growth industries in America’ . To the increasingly common 
question ‘Who shall live? Who shall die?’ was added a further dilemma: ‘Who shall 
payT.
Moral Concerns Regarding Medical Paternalism
Morrice has argued that an emphasis on patient autonomy in late 20th Century medical 
ethics is a direct consequence of the legal monopoly that the professional doctor
OQ
established over medicine in the 19th . This is something of an oversimplification: 
whilst wealth and/or social standing had always allowed certain patients who did not 
like the treatments prescribed them to simply take their business elsewhere, a lack of 
either could result in patients being dictated to. Percival, for example, noted that a 
greater degree of authority could be exercised over poor patients in charity hospitals
AA
than was practical when attending the wealthy in general practice . It is probably 
more accurate to say that, as medicine changed over the course of the 19th and 20th 
Centuries, so the kinds of issue regarding patient autonomy that it presented changed 
with them or at least (as for example with regards to obtaining informed consent in 
experimentation) became more frequent. Whilst the greater social and legal authority 
afforded the doctor were probably a part of this, change in patients’ perceptions of 
medicine, of doctors and of themselves may be seen to have played the more decisive 
role.
Although, as we saw in the previous chapter, the early-20th Century public did not 
always have the highest opinion of the medical profession, patients had nevertheless 
on the whole been happy to trust that their doctors ‘knew best’ and acquiesce to their 
wishes91. By the mid-20th Century, however, this trust had been significantly eroded.
In part, this may have been the result of wider social change: as Grodin has noted, the 
decades following the Second World War were marked by better education, the 
growth of mass movements demanding a variety of individual rights (be they civil,
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womens’, consumers’ or disabled), leading eventually to ‘a decline in shared 
communal values and a general distrust of authority and institutions’92. However, it is 
also the case that doctors’ own behaviour both during this period and (especially) in 
the decades leading up to the War had done little to help. The ‘Nazi doctor’ stereotype 
discussed above was not, after all, entirely the product of writers’ imaginations: it had 
its real-world counterparts (the actual Dr. Josef Mengele being one example). 
Furthermore, the Tuskegee Experiment and others like it had further emphasised that 
doctors could not always be relied upon to police themselves.
The complicity of doctors in some American states’ eugenic sterilisation programs 
from 1907 onwards had also shown that doctors were far from infallible in deciding 
what was best for their patients. Although these programs were primarily targeted at 
the mentally ill, many of whom may rightly have been considered incompetent to 
determine what treatment was in their best interests, in California mental patients 
were sterilised ‘on their release from the asylum [my emphasis]’ at which point many 
were presumably considered capable enough of making their own decisions, whilst in 
Indiana the program extended to include criminals. It was also clear that supposedly 
‘clinical’ decisions had been tainted by doctors’ own prejudices. Foreign-born citizens 
were both more likely ‘to be admitted to state mental institutions and to be sterilised 
once there’: in California in 1930 around one-fifth of the population had been bom 
outside the United States, but this group accounted for around one-third of those 
sterilised93. In Germany during the 1930s and 1940s the situation had, unsurprisingly, 
been even worse: ‘in Kiel a girl who had cheated in school had been sterilised... 
zealots in Freiburg were going after ‘moral defectives’ as though they were 
psychopaths’ and there were calls for the program to be extended to include 
diabetics94.
The relationship between medicine and eugenics had never been a matter of 
straightforward acceptance: the British Medical Journal for example, maintained a 
‘consistent hostility to eugenics over a period of years’95 whilst the BMA refused to 
endorse proposals legalising even voluntary sterilisation96. Nevertheless, if one was, 
in the post-war era, to envision a society entrusted to medical science, recent history 
suggested it was likely to be eugenic and perhaps totalitarian (and, as we shall see in 
the subsequent chapter, if some scientists of the day had had their way, this would
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indeed have been the likely outcome). This played into increasing concerns about the 
new and increasingly technological medicine: with improved life-support, clinical 
decisions as to what could be done to keep patients alive were beginning to pose 
moral questions as to whether or not such action should be taken. That doctors were 
unaccustomed to discussing such matters in public probably did not help, nor did the 
widespread view that the doctor was becoming an ever more remote figure. Economic 
pressures, too, played a part: in America especially, critics o f ‘for-profit, free-market, 
fee-for-service medicine’ argued (correctly, as a 1974 Senate investigation would 
reveal) that ‘there were too many unnecessary procedures’97. By the 1960s medicine 
was increasingly seen as ‘out of control... driven not by the patient’s health needs but 
by collective professional ambition, corporate financial pressures, and deluded 
imperatives -  not least an itch to intervene’ (where such intervention was either 
unnecessary or counterproductive)98. The result, in the mid- to late-20th Century, was 
the growth of a ‘powerful patients’ rights movement’99.
The Limitations of Historical Traditions of Medical Ethics
It is possible to read the above examples as supporting the contention that the content 
of medical ethics has simply changed over time. On such a reading we would 
conclude that, where for the ancient doctor ‘medical ethics’ meant practising medicine 
in a certain way and upholding certain standards of behaviour for therapeutic reasons, 
and for the 18th and 19th Century doctor meant advancing medicine through the 
establishment of professional relationships and regulation, so for the 20th Century 
doctor ‘medical ethics’ became a matter of those ‘neglected’ areas identified by 
Beauchamp and Childress (to recap: ‘truthfulness, privacy, the distribution of health 
care resources, communal responsibility, the use of research subjects and the like’). 
Adopting such a reading does not necessarily mean agreeing that the ethical problems 
facing the 20th Century doctor replaced those facing his or her predecessors. It is 
perfectly possible to argue, as Jonsen does, that these new issues supplemented those 
that came before (so that, for example, for the 18th and 19th Century doctor ‘medical 
ethics’ meant practising medicine in a certain way, upholding certain standards of 
behaviour and establishing and maintaining professional relationships and regulation, 
and so on).
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Our own account suggests a more complex picture. First of all, it is clear that these 
‘neglected’ areas had been of concern to doctors prior to the 20th Century insofar as 
they had encountered them. In addition to examples mentioned above, in the case of 
research Percival had proscribed non-therapeutic investigation and instructed that 
such research as did take place should only be pursued after consultation with fellow 
professionals100, whilst the AM A condemned early research into yellow fever that 
involved deliberately injecting patients with the disease101. Similarly, in terms of 
medical costs, both Percival102 and the AMA Code103 devoted space to mentioning 
doctors’ moral obligation to offer their services charitably to the poor. But it was not 
only the case that changing social and historical circumstances placed new moral 
problems before the doctor, for the doctor and his professional ethics were themselves 
part o f those social and historical circumstances. In some respects the very success of 
Percival and those who followed him in reshaping medicine into a unified, scientific 
profession with a state-sanctioned monopoly over healing can be to seen to have 
played a part in shaping the moral challenges facing their successors. For example, 
human experimentation had itself become a necessary part of medicine, giving rise to 
concerns such as Guttentag’s regarding its effect on doctor/patient relationships; 
striving to keep patients alive could now (as in the case of the patients described to 
Jonsen by his colleague) itself raise new moral concerns.
Historical traditions of medical ethics can hardly be blamed for failing to anticipate 
these changes, but there is some evidence that a focus on the moral concerns already 
embodied in historical traditions and professional ethics left doctors unprepared for 
them. The involvement of doctors in debates regarding abortion is a case in point. By 
the 19th Century, English common law and state legislatures in the United States 
regarded most abortions carried out past the point of ‘quickening’ as criminal, 
sometimes with clauses excepting such cases where they were deemed necessary to 
save a woman’s life104. At this point the profession took society’s lead: Percival also 
allowed that terminations were ‘not always unlawful’ but noted that ‘when no moral 
or salutary end is in view [that is, the preservation of the mother’s life] the simple act 
itself... falls under the denomination of murder’. For the doctor, the chief ethical 
concern was to ensure that any danger to the mother was properly diagnosed and that 
care was taken not to harm her given the ‘drastic’ quality of the procedure105. The 
records o f the Central Ethical Committee suggest that the medical profession in
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Britain followed this early lead until well into the 20th Century. The BMA’s members 
do not seem to have regarded it as a medical ethical issue at all: between 1902 and 
1939 the Committee received only one enquiry regarding it106.
Across the Atlantic the AMA did become involved, from 1859 onwards, in efforts to 
reform the abortion laws to criminalise non-therapeutic terminations from the moment 
of conception onwards. Again, however, they do not appear to have seen this as an 
ethical issue per se; as Percival had noted with his reference to ‘the Father of Physic’ 
(Hippocrates), any ethical question was regarded as long-settled by ‘tradition’107. The 
AMA saw themselves as simply bringing this injunction into line with current medical 
thinking, which had come to regard ‘quickening’ as a mistaken throwback to 
outmoded medical concepts108. Despite this, their stance clearly involved tacit moral 
claims. First of all, as Luker has argued, they were claiming ‘that physicians [were] 
sufficiently trustworthy to be charged with the transcendent task of weighing the 
competing life-and-death rights of two parties’109. Secondly, it discounts the 
possibility of any form of moral argument in favour of abortion that does not depend 
on the foetus not being alive from the moment of conception; contrary to the AMA’s 
claims otherwise, prior to 1859 ‘women (and the general public) [already] knew that 
pregnancy was a continuous biological process... where they disagreed was upon the 
moral implications of such biological facts’110.
The position of American physicians served to obscure any debate as to these moral 
implications: Luker describes the period from the end of the 19th Century until the 
1960s as ‘the century of silence’111 when ‘abortion as a major social, political and 
ethical issue [disappeared] beneath the cloak of an emerging profession’s claims’112. 
For the most part, this appears to have gone unnoticed by doctors themselves: debates 
within the profession were framed, not in moral terms but, following Percival, as 
matters of ‘technical competence’113 and, as we have already noted above, 
professional ethics discouraged such debates from being held in public. In practice, 
very few (if any) of the medical profession actually held to the strong moral claim 
with which the profession found itself allied, namely that the foetus be regarded from 
the moment of conception as a full human being, the logical consequence of which 
would be to render almost all therapeutic abortions morally impermissible. The 
definition of what constituted medical grounds for abortion enabled the medical
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profession to incorporate two distinct views, perhaps deliberately so: the ‘strict 
constructionist’ view (that the foetus was a human being and its destruction was not 
permissible under any but the direst circumstances) and the ‘broad’ or ‘liberal 
constructionist’ view that the foetus had a limited right to life which nevertheless 
counted for less than the mother’s114.
Luker finds it ironic that American doctors were in the forefront of both the 
movement to restrict abortion in the 19th Century and the movement towards greater 
liberalisation in the 20th115. In fact, their repositioning of the debate in this way stored 
up tensions which made this almost inevitable. In the 19th and early 20th Centuries, 
professional discretion and the limited nature of medicine (which meant that 
tuberculosis, cardiovascular or renal disease, and pernicious vomiting could be taken 
as physical indications for terminating pregnancy116) all allowed for a great deal of 
latitude in interpretation. As medical science progressed, however, these physical 
indicators ceased to be relevant due to advances in obstetrical and gynaecological 
medicine, with the result that by the mid-20th century proportionally more abortions 
were being performed for social or psychiatric reasons. In a situation in which very 
few abortions were medically necessary in the strict constructionist sense, divisions 
within the medical profession (which had been deeper than either side had supposed) 
began to emerge117.
Another argument in favour of regarding the decision to abort as solely a medical one 
had been that the procedure was, in general, medically dangerous118 and should not be 
performed by laypersons. This may not, in fact, have been true when it was first 
advanced: there is some evidence that medical abortions were in fact more likely to be 
lethal than those offered by other practitioners119. By the early 20th century, however, 
the ‘back alley’ abortionist was likely to be both ‘disreputable and dangerous’120 when 
compared to their medical counterpart. Historical studies of 1950s Yorkshire mining 
towns suggest that ‘many female illnesses resulted from self-induced miscarriages’121. 
At the same time, financial pressures and the more secure social standing of the 
medical profession (which had made doctors more confident in turning down requests 
for terminations) led to an increase in the rate of ‘criminal’ abortion122. Many who 
favoured legal reform were able to argue that criminalising abortion ‘killed 
women’123. The broad constructionist, in asserting the primacy of the mother’s own
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health, could accept such an argument; the strict constructionist, committed to the 
view that abortion was murder, could not.
Unable to present a united front, the medical profession found it impossible to keep 
the debate ‘in house’. Moreover, it was becoming difficult and in some cases 
burdensome to maintain the position that the only ‘live’ questions regarding abortion 
were clinical ones. There is evidence that some medical professionals no longer felt 
comfortable with the responsibility placed on them: Jonsen recounts a conversation 
with an exasperated psychiatrist charged with assessing the rights or wrongs of 
potential terminations, who felt he was being presented not with questions regarding 
patients’ mental health but rather concerns about the emotional, social and economic 
problems faced by the women in question124. As it became clear that ‘tradition’ had 
not settled the ethical questions so finally as had been thought, it was clear that some 
form of help from outside the profession was necessary. This help was not 
forthcoming from further scientific advances: at least one scientist of the period noted 
that, whilst advances in embryology made it possible to show the existence of gill slits 
and a tail on the early embryo, the question as to whether this constituted evidence 
that the foetus should or should not at this stage be considered ‘human’ did not seem 
to be a scientific one but rather a matter for the law or, perhaps, philosophy .
Conclusions
The advances made by medicine in the late 20th Century brought with them fresh 
moral challenges that may be summarised as follows. Firstly, advances in life- 
sustaining treatments prompted questions of whether it is always right for the doctor 
to strive to prolong life (from which may follow, depending on the answers, questions 
as to whether it is ever right for the doctor to intentionally hasten death). Secondly, 
the need for large-scale trials to validate experimental methods and treatments raised 
questions both as to how such research can be conducted ethically (especially given 
that it would in most cases involve some risk to the patient) and as to how the 
relationship between doctor and research subject(s) may alter or conflict with the 
more traditional relationship between doctor and patient(s). Thirdly are concerns as to 
whether the increasingly technological nature of medicine, and the limitations of this 
technology in dealing with chronic conditions, might in some way dehumanise both
11 1
doctor and patient. Fourthly, given the increasing cost of medicine, are questions of 
how limited resources are to be justly allocated and, perhaps, of who is to pay for a 
treatment where a patient cannot. Finally, there are questions as to how far a doctor’s 
authority over his or her patient did, might or should extend.
It would be a mistake, however, to infer from the relative inability of historical 
traditions of medical ethics to deal with these problems that they had in some way 
‘failed’ the 20th Century doctor or to conclude (with Leake) that they dealt merely 
with problems of ‘etiquette’. As we have argued over the previous five chapters both 
the Hippocratic Corpus and the professional ethics of Percival and his successors 
dealt with issues relating to the doctor’s conduct, practical competency, epistemology, 
professional organisation and social standing that were pressing moral concerns in the 
social and historical context in which they were produced: they were not and were not 
intended to be exhaustive moral theories. These traditions were, however, unhelpful in 
two important respects. Firstly, the success of professional, scientific medicine in 
tackling the moral problems faced by medicine in the past had encouraged doctors to 
think that they were primarily technical or organisational even as new, specifically 
moral, concerns were emerging. Secondly, they had encouraged doctors to keep 
discussions of such problems to themselves, something which put strain on doctors, 
patients and their relationship with each other. As we shall see over the course of the 
next two chapters, progress in addressing the problems identified in this chapter over 
the subsequent decades was to depend firstly, on doctors accepting that these 
problems existed and secondly, on accepting that those outside the profession could 
help.
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Chapter 7: From Conferences to Committees: Responses to Moral 
Concerns in Medicine in the mid- to late 20th Century
From 1960 onwards, during what Jonsen has termed ‘The Decade of Conferences’1, 
prominent members of the scientific community began to meet together in efforts to 
address some of the growing moral concerns regarding the direction taken by 
medicine and medical science. Initially, these conferences were primarily scientific 
affairs: at the first, ‘Great Issues of Conscience in Modem Medicine’ at Dartmouth 
College in New Hampshire, the ‘humanities’ were represented en masse not by 
academics but by two novelists (the first o f whom was also a doctor): C.P. Snow and 
Aldous Huxley2. As the decade wore on, however, they would gradually come to 
incorporate other figures, from politicians and lawyers to (initially) theologians and 
(eventually) philosophers. In 1968, such discussion began to be incorporated into 
public decision-making when Senator Walter Mondale convened governmental 
hearings in the United States for the purpose of addressing concerns raised by ‘genetic 
engineering and heart transplantation’ and from the early 1970s onwards, there was a 
shift away from conferences and towards ‘a general framework of research fostered 
by several new permanent centres’4 in which interdisciplinary work on medical ethics 
could take place.
Philosophers’ initial absence from these discussions is commonly attributed to the 
discipline’s preoccupation at the time (in Britain and America at least) with 
metaethical concerns. Jonsen5, for example, cites Wamock’s argument that an 
emphasis on ‘treating ethics as the analysis of ethical language’ not only made 
academic moral philosophy ‘boring’ but led ‘to the increasing triviality of the 
subject’6. As we shall see below, this judgement is not entirely fair; nevertheless, we 
should note that by the time philosophers did become involved a broad structure for 
the academic discussion of moral concerns in medicine had already been established. 
In order to examine the role philosophy eventually came to play in interdisciplinary 
medical ethics, then, it would seem sensible to examine both what this structure was 
and how and why it had come about. For this reason, this chapter will examine the 
aims, intentions and achievements of four particular conferences: the aforementioned 
‘Great Issues of Conscience in Modem Medicine’; the CIBA Conference ‘Man and
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his Future’ held in London in 1962; the Nobel Conference ‘Genetics and the Future of 
Man’ held at Gustavus Adolphus College, Minnesota in 1965 and finally, ‘The 
Sanctity of Life’ at Reed College in Portland, Oregon, in 1966, together with the work 
of two key theological figures in mid-20th Century theological medical ethics: Joseph 
Fletcher and Paul Ramsey7.
Great Issues for Whose Conscience? Dartmouth, 1960 and London, 1962
In his opening address at Dartmouth, Dr. S. Marsh Tenney explicitly recognised that 
the problems faced by modem medicine and medical science were largely due to its 
increasingly technological nature. In doing so, he appeared to be making a case for 
medicine to pay renewed attention to the human needs of the patient. Describing the 
practice of medicine as ‘the welding of science and humanism’ he described the 
present climate as one in which ‘medicine has been forced to remind itself that it is 
often the human factors that are determinant’8. Yet the make-up of the conference 
attendees at both Dartmouth and the CIBA conference in London two years later may 
cause us to question whether the organisers were fully in agreement. Lectures at 
Dartmouth were given by an impressive array of distinguished scientists including a 
Nobel Prize winner and the head of the World Health Organisation; in London, of the 
twenty-seven participants, ‘five... were Nobel prize winners’9. By contrast, those with 
a serious background in ethical thought were noticeable by their absence: at 
Dartmouth, neither Snow nor Huxley was a specialised academic of the standing of 
the scientists involved; in London there was a single ‘ethical’ representative in the 
form of an Anglican priest, also a doctor, and not a distinguished theologian10.
In their deliberations, too, the conference attendees paid scant attention to ‘human’ 
matters in the manner we may expect, given Tenney’s opening address and the 
concerns we encountered in Chapter 6. Lecture subjects at Dartmouth included ‘the 
effects of ionizing radiation, the pollution of water and air, and chemical adulteration 
of food’1 \  At London, the opening address made no mention of the possibly 
dehumanising effects of technological progress, focussing instead on the problems of 
overpopulation and the supposedly dysgenic impact of medicine. ‘Man and his 
Future’ ‘replicated the style and themes of its Dartmouth predecessor’ with a program 
including discussion of issues such as ‘agricultural productivity, world resources, and
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environmental degradation’12. Both conferences were a curious mixture of the 
optimistic and the dystopian: the prospect of a cure for cancer or of any other disease, 
including mutations, was often discussed not as a possible result but rather as the 
inevitable outcome of scientific medicine. On the other hand, it was expected that 
these advances might ‘[bring] in their beneficial wake unintended problems’13.
The likely nature of these problems as described by attendees at both Dartmouth and 
London was however very different from those discussed in the previous chapter. 
Instead, the chief focus of discussions was the widespread assumption that medicine 
was contributing to both a ‘population explosion and the pollution of the gene pool’. 
The greatest ‘issue of conscience’ faced by medical science, to the minds of the 
attendees, had little to do with individual patients but instead concerned the supposed 
threat posed to the health of populations (or perhaps even the human species as a 
whole) by ‘antibiotics... insulin for diabetes and diet for phenelkytonuria’. At 
London, the microbiologist Rene Dubos did consider the plight of those individuals 
kept alive ‘who cannot derive either profit or pleasure from existence’14, yet did not 
mention unfortunates of the kind encountered by Peck or Jonsen as described in 
Chapter 6. Although mentioning the aged, and challenging the consensus that 
medicine (and in particular ‘the conquest of infectious disease’) was responsible for 
overpopulation in the world’s poorest countries, his lecture focused on children bom 
with genetic defects.
Perhaps mindful of Nazi atrocities, no-one present at either conference advocated a 
return to the idea of (voluntarily or otherwise) breeding out ‘unhealthy’ or 
‘undesirable’ traits; some, however, came perilously close. In Dartmouth, Aldous 
Huxley provided a dissenting voice to calls for measures similar to those he had 
satirised in his novel Brave New World, such as Hermann Muller’s proposal for the 
creation of a bank of ‘healthy’ sperm, by noting their ‘susceptibility to totalitarian 
manipulation’15. In London, some subjects engendered rancourous debate: ‘[sessions] 
devoted to genetics and brain sciences’ in particular ‘incited a turmoil... loud protests 
against totalitarianism were heard’16. Laudable though such protests may have been, 
however, they too failed to recognise that preventing ‘the otherwise inevitable 
degradation of the [human] race’17 was not, in fact, a particularly pressing concern 
and in some cases distracted from more immediate realties. Dubos, for example, in
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considering the social and financial ‘burden’ of caring for the aged and chronically ill 
began to raise questions as to the relationship between society and individual that may 
have helped illuminate such concerns in new and interesting ways. For the time being, 
however, these were matters with which the medical and scientific communities chose 
not to confront themselves.
It is against this backdrop that the absence of philosophers from these debates should 
be considered. On the one hand it is true that, in Anglophone philosophy, normative 
‘[first-order] moral discourse... comprising discussions and arguments about what 
kinds of actions or policies were morally right or wrong, or what characteristics of 
persons were good or evil’ was, put simply, out of fashion18. Instead, the real meat of 
postgraduate courses in moral philosophy was concerned with ‘second-order 
discourse... reflections about what people mean when they use words like ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’, ‘good’ or evil” 19. As Jonsen puts it, English and American philosophy 
graduates of the mid-20th Century could ‘pass an ethics course without wrestling with 
any dark angel of moral perplexity’ . Graduate seminars at Oxford during the period 
were given over to the discussion of propositions such as whether or not the colour of 
a tie could be considered morally offensive21, ‘grading fruit, or choosing fictitious 
games equipment’22. For some, this was how it should be: Ayer and Stevenson, for 
example, drew a distinction ‘between moral philosophers, who analyse the language 
of moral discourse, and moralists, who practice it’23. Philosophers were ‘first to show 
the propositions of morals are not scientific, that is, that they do not state empirical 
facts, and... then to analyse the terms which they do contain. When this [had] been 
done, [their] task [was] over’24. Others disagreed but, as we shall examine further in 
the following chapter, still believed that second-order concerns needed to be 
addressed before moving on to first-order work.
Nevertheless, even if philosophers had been interested in first-order work, their help 
had not been requested by a scientific and medical community that in some cases still 
failed to acknowledge that certain problems even existed. Jonsen has described the 
subject matter of the Dartmouth and London Conferences as ‘large questions’25 which 
they undoubtedly were and are. Unfortunately, given the changes affecting medicine 
at the time, we may conclude that they were not the ‘large questions’ that were 
actually being asked by anyone except the attendees themselves who, as Jonsen has
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noted, discussed ‘what their consciences told them were the great issues [my 
• 26emphasis]’ . At neither conference was any mention made of moral concerns 
regarding abortion, nor of research with human subjects, nor of changes in the 
relationship between physician and patient. Delegates were not concerned to any great 
extent with practical moral advice for individual doctors, nor did they believe they 
should be: in Dartmouth, C.P. Snow explicitly stated that such ‘private’ matters of 
ethics could be safely left to the medical profession at large27. The attendees did not 
seem to consider that these ‘private’ concerns could be linked to the issues they were 
discussing, that the population and species with which they were so concerned was 
made up of individual lives, and/or that any measures they proposed (for example, the 
proper collection and distribution of ‘healthy’ sperm) would most likely have to be 
administered by individual doctors.
Delegates and Dartmouth and London generally aired concerns without providing 
much by way of conclusions; many were not even sure how agreeing on the latter 
would be possible. In London, Jacob Bronowski offered the hopeful opinion that the 
‘search for truth’ embodied in science itself would help to inspire moral progress; Sir 
Peter Medawar, by contrast, expressed perplexity at how any progress would be 
possible in the face o f such a wide diversity of opinion . For others, that the 
conference had been convened at all was the most important thing; that the issues had 
been aired was enough. Dubos, for example, felt that the proper role of the scientists 
extended only to explaining the issues to the fullest possible extent, in order to allow 
‘society’ to pass moral judgement29. The problem with such a position, however, is 
that it itself involves at least two forms of moral judgement, firstly in terms of 
deciding upon which issues are moral and thus require further explanation, and 
secondly in terms of which parts o f those issues can and/or should be further 
explained (not to mention whether those parts can and/or should only be explained in 
scientific terms). We have encountered an example of how this kind of approach can 
be problematic in our discussion of changing attitudes to abortion in Chapter 6, in 
which focussing only on questions of ‘quickening’ obscured other concerns and 
arguments relating to the interests of the mother and the status of the foetus.
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‘Doing Better’: St. Peter, 1965 and Portland, 1966
An address by the Nobel Prize-winning physicist William Shockley at the inaugural 
Nobel Conference ‘Genetics and the Future of Man’ at Gustavus Adolphus College in 
St. Peter, Minnesota was to prove influential in pointing the way towards how 
conferences might, to borrow Jonsen’s paraphrase of Medawar’s expression ‘do 
better’ than Dartmouth and London. This had little to do with the content of the 
address itself, which explicitly advocated a return to the ideals of the 19th Century 
eugenics movement (and in doing so may be seen as an interesting counterpoint to 
Bronowski’s hope that the practice of ‘science’ in its broadest sense may itself make 
men more moral). Starting from the (discredited) premise that ‘intelligence was 
largely genetically determined’, Shockley suggested that society should go beyond 
measures such as Muller’s suggestion of creating a reserve o f ‘healthy’ sperm (which 
he praised) and move on to ‘serious efforts to improve human intelligence... by 
various methods, including sterilisation, cloning, and artificial insemination .
Shockley’s proposals were not uncontroversial: they were significantly more radical 
than Muller’s, which had not only been sharply criticised at Dartmouth by Huxley but 
also ‘stirred up a storm’ when read in absentia in London. Some, like Bronowski, had 
pointed out that deciding on how best to ‘improve’ humanity was beyond them and 
‘were willing to admit that not even they were competent to select the qualities for the 
future human’. Muller himself agreed that the 19th Century eugenics movement had
^ I
been hopelessly perverted by race and class prejudice, which he found repellent . 
Despite this, even those critical of such proposals held in common an attitude of 
‘genetic pessimism’: the view that the human species was coming under increasing 
‘genetic load’ through the preservation of harmful mutations. For Muller and others, 
the moral issues at hand were the ‘feasibility and consequences’ of the available 
methods for reducing the number of harmful mutations32. Indeed, one of Muller’s 
critics, Joshua Lederberg, found his proposals problematic because they would not 
counter this trend quickly enough and sought instead to pursue the possibility of direct
intervention at the genotypic level: ‘using our increasing mastery of DNA to improve
• • • 1 1  brain power, control immune response, and diminish senescence’ . In St. Peter,
however, Shockley was to encounter an entirely different kind of criticism, and one
for which he was entirely unprepared.
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The Protestant theologian Paul Ramsey, who had requested from Muller a list of 
suitable readings in genetics in order to prepare his case34, countered Shockley’s 
address with an ‘analytic refutation from a scholar trained in ethics’ the like of which 
had until this point been absent from the world of scientific conferences35. Ramsey 
chose to leave the geneticists to debate whether or not the ‘genetic load’ was in fact 
increasing36, and enumerated only briefly the ‘scientific and socio-psychological’ 
doubts as to whether a program such as Shockley’s was either practical37 or 
conceptually possible38 (although in doing so he was still arguably drawing attention 
to the paucity of settled evidence for embarking on such a project). Instead he chose 
to contrast the value judgements present in both Shockley and Muller’s work (which 
he saw as prioritising, respectively, capacity for thought and individual freedom) with 
his own view of human dignity in which ‘[there were] more elements in the nature of 
man which are deserving of respect and should be withheld from human handling and 
trespass’39. In particular he drew attention to the morally loaded nature of ‘regarding 
procreation as an aspect of biological nature to be subjected merely to the 
requirements of technical control’40.
Ramsey would go on to become, in Jonsen’s terms, a ‘[star] in the bioethical 
firmament’41. Had he done no further work in the field, however, his inaugural 
conference appearance would still merit discussion not for the specific content of his 
arguments against Shockley’s proposals, but rather for his managing to shift the 
ethical debate onto grounds where the scientists were no longer expert. In doing so, 
Ramsey was able to demonstrate just what scholarly ethicists could bring to the 
conference table. As he pointed out, whilst his own Christian ethic was not to be 
found ‘among the contents of natural science’, neither was Muller’s insistence on 
human freedom and voluntary choice: ‘[there] is no conflict here between religion and 
science, but... between two philosophies’42. The impact was profound: in Dartmouth 
and London, a previously reticent scientific and medical community had ‘[broken] 
their silence... [and] aired their qualms of conscience... before their colleagues and 
even lay audiences’43. Following the conference at St. Peter, ‘The Sanctity of Life’, 
held at Reed College in Portland, Oregon in March 1966, now saw scientific veterans 
of the earlier conferences such as Medawar joined by individuals from a wide range 
of backgrounds. Alongside Ramsey and the anaesthesiologist Henry Beecher were a
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sociologist (Edward Shils), a (British) barrister and Member of Parliament (Norman 
St. John-Stevas) and a philosopher (Abraham Kaplan).
Jonsen has argued that two principal factors account for what he sees as the success of 
the Portland conference: ‘[it] ‘did better’ because the issues were more closely 
defined and a proper philosopher and a proper theologian were invited to do some 
scholarly ethics [my emphasis]’44. Neither of these claims should be accepted without 
qualification. First of all, although the conference did concentrate on more ‘closely 
defined’ issues in the sense that most speakers offered a detailed discussion of a single 
topic (for example, ‘Ramsey spoke on the morality of abortion, Medawar on eugenics, 
and Beecher on research involving human subjects’) it was more open than 
Dartmouth, London and St. Peter in that the organisers had moved on from the earlier 
attitude that it was part of their role to determine what issues posed moral questions 
and to set the parameters within which they were discussed. In his opening address, 
conference chairman Daniel Labby argued that ‘The Sanctity of Life’ was an 
appropriate locus for discussion not because of any controversy within the scientific 
community, but because it seemed to reflect concerns amongst the wider public: ‘an 
unpopular war [in Vietnam] was threatening to escalate insanely... the wounds of the 
thalidomide tragedy were still unhealed, and contraception and abortion were 
troubling moral dilemmas’45.
Indeed, rather than offering a ‘closely defined’ set of questions, ‘The Sanctity of Life’ 
may be seen instead to have taken steps to further broaden the discussion of moral 
concerns facing mid-20th Century medicine. Even in the absence of a ‘proper’ 
philosopher and a ‘proper’ theologian, the contributions of the other speakers drawn 
from outside medicine and the natural sciences would have been valuable and 
noteworthy innovations. Just as Ramsey’s paper at ‘Genetics and the Future of Man’ 
had introduced his religiously derived perspective of the value of human life in 
contrast with what he saw as Shockley’s ‘science-based ethic’, so Shils considered 
whether (and if so, how) a secular basis could be found for similar values (something 
he believed possible through ‘the rediscovery of what it was that for so long gave 
such persuasive power to Chirstian thought’)46. Similarly, as Huxley had pointed out 
in Dartmouth, proposals requiring social or political intervention (such as Muller’s 
bank of ‘healthy’ sperm) had often failed to take into account the full impact of their
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implementation into public policy; the Portland conference avoided this by having the 
lawyer and politician St. John-Stevas lecture on the subject of ‘Law and Moral 
Consensus’ in which he argued that ‘[law] rests on the sentiment and the will of the 
governed... if correspondence ceases, the law can no longer be enforced’47. 
Furthermore, he concluded that it was not left to the ‘scientist or geneticist’ alone to 
‘moderate the tyranny of scientific techniques; such resistance could come from 
religious traditions or the values expressed in the common law48.
Moving on to the second part of Jonsen’s claim, then, there is the question of just 
what the ‘scholarly ethics’ done by the ‘proper’ philosopher present brought to these 
discussions. Jonsen has identified two main elements of Kaplan’s contribution at 
Portland. First of all, as part of his conference duties, he was responsible for the 
summarising of proceedings; more importantly for our purposes here, he delivered a 
paper in which he envisaged a role for the philosopher in future discussions as 
performing what Jonsen terms ‘the expose of ethical oversimplification’49, 
paraphrasing Russell to the effect that his purpose was ‘first, to make complicated 
things simple and, second, to make simple things complicated’50. Furthermore,
Kaplan also introduced the explication and introduction of the thought of canonical 
moral philosophers (in this case, Kant) into the realm of moral debate in medicine. It 
is important to note, however, that despite taking this latter step Kaplan (whose 
specialty as a philosopher was not ethics but logic51) still appears to have conceived of 
the philosopher’s role as primarily one of linguistic and logical analysis. He mentions 
Kant only briefly52 and emphasised that ‘[our] task... is not so much to offer 
solutions... but rather to raise these problems in an effective way’53. We will return to 
these themes in due course when further considering the role of philosophy in mid- to 
late^O111 Century medical ethics in Chapter 8.
Moral Theology and the Methodology of Interdisciplinary Medical Ethics in the 
mid- to late-20th Century
Despite the presence of a religious figure at the ‘Man and his Future’ conference in 
London, the biologist Francis Crick had expressed the opinion that moral debate in 
medicine would in the future be increasingly secular54. In the short term at least, he 
was to be proved wrong: a 1968 conference in Houston following the first successful
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human heart transplant, for example, was organised by a theologian and dominated by 
theological ethicists55, whilst book-length works o f scholarly medical ethics in the 
mid-20th Century were, when not written by doctors themselves, almost exclusively 
the province of the theologian. Moreover, the works produced by doctors (such as 
Beecher’s 1966 expose of ‘twenty-two examples of medical researchers who had 
conducted unethical human experimentation endangering the health or life of their 
subjects’56) were devoted mainly to drawing attention to particular moral concerns or 
problems; it was theologians who offered detailed analysis of such problems, coupled 
with conclusions or suggestions as to what would constitute ‘moral’ behaviour. The 
two ‘milestone’ works of medical ethics in this sense produced during the period were
cn
Ramsey’s The Patient as Person and Morals and Medicine by another Protestant 
theologian, Joseph Fletcher58.
Unlike philosophers of the time, theologians were expected to offer their professional 
opinion on moral questions. The sacrament o f confession made it imperative for 
Catholic theologians to respond to the needs of their congregations59; indeed, in the 
1960s, they came under vocal pressure to do so from ‘a perplexed and informed 
laity’60. Moreover, ‘Catholic moral theology concerned not only the personal morality 
of individuals but also the social morality of institutions’61 such as hospitals, 
governments or even medicine itself. The Church hierarchy had also given Catholic 
moral theologians the task of investigating the moral implications of scientific 
developments such as organ transplantation, life support and brain death (in the first 
case, well in advance of such treatment being possible) . In the late 1950s, Pope Pius 
XII had pronounced on all three matters, and declared that ‘extraordinary’ measures 
could be brought to an end in certain circumstances63; he also called for further 
scientific work to be done in order to better define ‘death’ (something which the 
medical establishment had shied away from doing)64. Similarly, their Protestant 
counterparts, especially in the United States, were concerned with providing for their 
flocks a practical expression of Christian doctrine65. As a result, ‘[both] traditions 
called for serious engagement in political, social and economic life’66. The result of 
this engagement would shape the initial direction of interdisciplinary medical ethics in 
three main ways.
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First of all, and perhaps unsurprisingly given the pressure placed on moral theologians 
by their congregations, much of their early work reflected public concerns similar to 
those explored in the previous chapter, especially with regards to patients’ rights. 
Although organised religion, much like medicine, was an institution whose authority 
was increasingly called into question throughout the 1960s, the emphasis that both 
Fletcher and Ramsey placed on the patient’s role as decision-maker was in tune with 
the mood of the times. Fletcher’s Morals and Medicine, written in 1956, was notable 
for exploring medical ethics from the point of view of the patient, and for its 
emphasis on ‘the importance of freely-exercised patient choice based in knowledge’. 
Similar to Ramsey at St. Peter, Fletcher argued that clinical practice could not be 
‘considered solely within the domain of the medical profession’ as it was ‘not 
exclusively technical in nature, but normative as well and thus within the realm of 
patient choice’ [my emphasis]67. Ramsey’s The Patient as Person, as may be 
surmised from the title, further developed these concerns, concentrating on 
establishing the position of the patient with regards to ‘definitions of life and death, 
personhood, abortion, and the foregoing of life-sustaining treatment’ .
Secondly, moral theologians ‘in contrast to philosophers [did not] speak about 
morality in the abstract’ and instead discussed moral issues through the detailed 
analysis of specific cases69. Catholics in particular outlined their views through a 
complex system of casuistry, that is, by exploring the application o f ‘fundamental 
moral principles derived from natural law and divine revelation’ to ‘specific topics 
[such as] abortion, contraception, sterilisation, euthanasia and various types of 
surgery’70. Protestant theologians, though in Jonsen’s eyes lacking ‘the detailed moral 
analysis found in Roman Catholic moral theology’, proceeded in a similar way, 
grounding their consideration of ‘the moral life’ in terms of principles drawn from 
‘large Biblical themes [such as] Justification and Covenant, Law and Grace, 
Providence and Freedom’71. Writing in 1978, Ramsey was able to describe ‘medical 
ethics to date’ in Ethics at the Edge o f  Life as ‘a concrete case of Christian ‘casuistry’ 
-  that is.. .the outlooks of the predominant Western religions brought down to cases
72and used to determine their resolution’ .
Prior to the mid-20th Century Catholic casuistry with regards to medicine had 
proceeded from two main suppositions. The first was physicalism, the variant of
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natural law that held that knowledge o f the proper purposes of the human body and its 
organs could settle moral questions regarding its and/or their use (for example with 
regards to abortion, contraception and homosexuality). The second was ecclesiastical 
positivism under which the final justification for any moral position is found in the 
approval of the Magisterium (‘the teaching authority of the Church, constituted by the 
bishops under the supreme authority o f the Pope’)73. Following the Second World 
War, however, Catholic moral thought was in turmoil. Physicalism had become a 
hotly debated topic: with regards to sexuality, for example, several thinkers 
encouraged instead the adoption of personalism ‘[which entailed] a fuller view of 
married sexuality’74. The Second Vatican Council (1962-5) set up by John XXIII 
seemed to move away from physicalism, only for Paul VI to reverse any such change 
and instead attempt close down discussion of the matter with an encyclical 
‘prohibiting artificial birth control’ in 196875.
The result, in some cases, was to cause Catholic theologians to reject the 
Magisterium’s claim to having the final say on all matters and place the demands of 
their consciences before the demands of their Church. Jonsen, who had been a Jesuit
* 7 f \priest , was one of many involved in medical ethics to depart the following the 
hardening of the traditional line77. He was not alone: two ‘non-tenured professors... at 
the Catholic University of America, Warren Reich and George Kanoti’ also left their 
positions. The former joined the Kennedy Institute of Bioethics at Georgetown 
University; the latter eventually became the first ‘bioethicist in residence’ at the 
Cleveland Clinic78. Yet whilst these thinkers were now ethicists by profession, and 
working within interdisciplinary centres where they were no longer answerable to the 
Church hierarchy, they remained Catholic moral theologians by training. In self- 
imposed exile from settled traditions the question arises of just how these newly- 
minted ethicists intended to justify the concepts, rules, and principles they were to 
apply to the cases brought before them. Both Ramsey and Fletcher offered an example 
of how this might be done.
For both Ramsey and Fletcher the grounding of their principles was not a matter of 
primary importance. Indeed, for the former, acceptance of conventionally religious 
elements of Christian thought such as the divinity of Christ or indeed the existence of 
God were not, strictly speaking, necessary for Christian moral ideas to have relevance
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(although there are no grounds for suggesting he did not himself believe in either of 
these things). Rather, Ramsey felt that the apocalypticism of Christ and the Old 
Testament prophets had allowed them to get at two basic moral insights that would 
remain important whether one shared in this apocalypticism or not and however one 
came to discover them. The first is that moral conduct is rooted in an unqualified, 
disinterested love for one’s neighbour motivated neither by preferential interest nor an 
expectation of punishment or reward {agape). The second is that morality is not 
concerned with ends or goals in the teleological sense but rather with shared duties 
arising from the covenants with our neighbour such love demands {hesed)19. 
Importantly, he felt these insights were ‘independent of [their] origin... and stood on
• on__
[their] own’ . Thus, although the basis for his thought was an ‘ultimate appeal to 
scripture or theology’81, he also allowed that the same principles could be derived 
from an alternative, humanist ethics (although it was a subject he himself had ‘no 
interest’ in pursuing further)82.
Fletcher also based his moral thought on a religious conception of agape (translated 
as ‘love’83); but like Ramsey was willing to admit the possibility of a secular ‘higher 
good or summum bonum‘ such as ‘self-realisation in the ethics of Aristotle’84. Also 
like Ramsey, he was less concerned with the origin and nature of concepts, rules, and 
principles than with the way in which such things were put to use when considering 
moral questions. In his 1966 work Situation Ethics, he characterised most (Judeo- 
Christian) theological approaches85, together with ‘classical ethics’, ‘jurisprudence’86
o<7
and (implicitly) Kantian moral philosophy as legalistic: that is, concerned primarily 
with establishing universal rules and principles which are to serve as a guide to action. 
These are ‘not merely guidelines or maxims to illuminate the situation; they are 
directives to be followed... [solutions] are preset, and you can ‘look them up’ in a 
book -  a Bible or a confessor’s manual’88. He contrasted this view with two others. 
The first was the antinomianism he found in ‘some Anabaptists, some sects of English 
Puritanism... some of Wesley’s followers... the Hellenistic Jew-Christians St. Paul 
addresses in his First Letter to the Corinthians’89 and the existentialism of Sartre and 
de Beauvoir90 that has ‘no principles or maxims whatsoever, to say nothing of 
rules'91. The second, and that which he advocated, was situationism: the view that 
concepts, rules, and principles are important, but may be set aside ‘if love seems 
better served by doing so’92.
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As a result, when, in 1975, James Gustafson summed up a growing consensus 
amongst those working in the field of medical ethics by publicly arguing that the 
ongoing contribution of theology was ‘likely to be of minimal importance, for the 
moral principles and values needed... can be grounded in other ways’93 he was some 
way behind the theologians themselves. This brings us to the third contribution of 
theologians to interdisciplinary discussions of medical ethics: the application and/or 
development of ethical theories. It is possible to argue, as Jonsen does, that Fletcher 
and Ramsey were, unencumbered by any need or desire to engage in meta-ethics, 
simply getting on with the business of first-order moral philosophy94. Certainly, 
Ramsey’s conception o f ‘disinterested neighbourly love’ is, as Hauerwas puts it, if 
‘not exactly Kant [then] at least in Kant’s ballpark’95. Similarly, Fletcher’s contention 
that the morality of an action is rooted solely in terms of its outcome or projected 
outcome (‘[for] example, ‘Almsgiving is a good thing never [just]...
‘Almsgiving is a good thing” 96) seems to fit Frankena’s description of him as an act-
07
utilitarian , and he clearly had deontological theories in mind when borrowing
Q Q
Constant’s criticism of Kant (without, as we have noted above, mentioning the 
Prussian philosopher) to describe a legalist as someone who would not lie even to a 
crazed killer ‘escaped from an asylum [and asking] where his intended victim is’99.
Such a reading, however, risks overemphasising the differences between the two 
thinkers when what is of most interest in terms of their wider contribution to medical 
ethics are the similarities between them. For one thing, it is clear that despite his 
willingness to be described as such, Fletcher is far from a perfect fit as a 
consequentialist. If one chooses only relatively unsophisticated examples and sticks to 
the shallow reading offered by Fletcher it is equally possible to portray 
consequentialist thought as leading to arguments that appear to commit his cardinal 
sin of thinking of morality only as ‘being able to justify [oneself] in terms of [a] 
rule’100. For example, we may consider the following, as put forward by ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ 
in Harris’ ‘The Survival Lottery’: ‘Y needs a new heart and Z new lungs [where no 
donor organs are currently available]... if just one healthy person were to be killed his 
organs could be removed and both of them saved’101; it seems unlikely that Fletcher 
would consider this the ‘most loving’ course of action available! His ethics are in fact, 
as Jonsen points out, ‘theoretically thin’ and do not contain any attempt to outline a 
comprehensive system of moral thought102. Quite the reverse, in fact: he mentions
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Kierkegaard approvingly as having been ‘correct... in his hatred for systems’103 in 
terms strongly reminiscent of Nietzsche (‘I mistrust all systematists and avoid them. 
The will to system is a lack of integrity’104). Despite this, Fletcher was clearly not 
opposed to systematic thought as a part o f moral reflection, provided such systems 
were used in the way he thought proper: although he sometimes described the detailed 
casuistry of his Catholic colleagues with wry amusement (‘an elaborate system of 
exceptions and compromise... rules for breaking the rules!’105) he also admired it as a 
bulwark against the ‘punishing and sadistic use of law to hurt people instead of 
helping them’106.
Fletcher agreed with Dewey, for whom he held a professed admiration, that whilst the 
proper aim of ethical thought was to devise a method for approaching moral problems 
rather than a fixed set of systematic rules and concepts107, such systems could be a 
useful part of such a method. In fact, they may even be necessary, with the proviso 
that ‘principles or maxims or general rules’ (he prefers the first term over the others)
10Rare regarded as ‘illuminators [rather than] directors' . Principles, so understood, are 
like the ‘rules of thumb’ taught to novices at (American) football, baseball and bridge 
that it is necessary to follow in order to learn the game properly, that is, to learn when 
it is appropriate to break them109. As such, Fletcher seems to have held that detailed 
moral reflection of the type in which Ramsey engaged is itself a valuable practice: an 
attempt to enumerate yet more sophisticated ‘rules of thumb’ to apply in all but the 
most problematic moral cases110. Ramsey also held that currently existing rules and 
principles were not to be obeyed without question (arguing as he did that his use of 
hesed and agape represented a ‘radical revision’ of the norm111). As such, where he 
sought to follow Catholic theology in building an ever more rigorous and intricate set 
of concepts, rules and principles to apply to individual cases112, he was performing 
what Fletcher would regard as necessary work.
Both Fletcher and Ramsey have been criticised for the perceived limitations of their 
ethical thought. Jonsen has described Morals and Medicine as ‘a book which ends the 
past [rather] than one that opens the future’ arguing that Fletcher is too reluctant to 
criticise doctors, regard ‘physician paternalism as an offence to patient autonomy’ or 
oppose ‘the imperialism of medical technology’113. Similarly, Hauerwas had argued 
that Ramsey’s approach is unable to deal with moral concerns regarding ‘the aims of
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medicine, what health or illness means or how they are determined... the meaning and 
place of pain and suffering [and] issues such as the economic and political 
presumptions that do or should sustain medicine’114 since ‘like a doctor who is more 
likely to find the diseases she has been trained to find, Ramsey made the primary 
moral issue in medicine the issue for which his ethics was designed’115. We may 
argue, however, that such criticisms are fundamentally misplaced.
First of all, in Ramsey’s case especially, one may say that several of the most pressing 
moral concerns were already issues for which his ethics were designed: questions 
concerning the subordination of the individual to teleological demands (for example 
Shockley’s plans to ‘improve’ the human race), immediate moral relationships (such 
as that between doctor and patient he described as a shared duty explicable through 
obligations derived from hesed and agape) and whether a doctor’s ‘vocation to cure 
[can end] without relaxing [his or her] duty to care for the dying’116. Moreover, both 
Fletcher and Ramsey’s specific conclusions and choice of subject matter, together 
with their differences over theory, were to prove of less significance in the long term 
than their shared beliefs concerning how moral thought should be conducted and 
(more importantly) applied. Both held a firm belief in the importance of dialogue in 
terms of resolving moral issues one way or the other. Both sought to build or use a 
system of principles to aid in moral practice. Both also held an equally firm belief that 
ethics was primarily a practical rather than a theoretical activity and should involve 
detailed discussion and analysis of real-world situations as well as that of concepts, 
rules and principles.
Conclusions
Despite their doubtless good intentions, the first efforts of the wider scientific 
community to engage with the moral questions brought about by social and scientific 
changes in medicine during the 20th Century must be regarded as a failure. Although 
overpopulation, pollution and contamination or exhaustion of food supplies were and 
remain important issues, they have little to do with ‘the welding of science and 
humanism’ to which the first conferences aspired. Moreover, the solutions proposed 
were often either morally problematic and/or fanciful (at London, J.B.S. Haldane had 
delivered a speech outlining a possible future in which, for example, children destined
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to be astronauts could be bred without legs to cut down on food requirements and 
muscle wastage in zero gravity; it is quite possible the speech was intended to be a 
parody, although, if so, not all of the audience appear to have realised117). They were, 
however, a step in the right direction.
Attempts to overcomes these failings during the ‘Decade of Conferences’ reshaped 
the discussion of medical ethics in the following ways. First of all, such discussion 
was to become interdisciplinary. Neither the moral questions raised by medicine nor 
the likely answers to them were exclusively clinical. In some cases they contained 
value judgements dependant on everyday terms (such as ‘the sanctity of life’) which 
in reality covered a wide variety of possible opinions and arguments that themselves 
required further investigation and explication by social scientists such as Shils. In 
others, proposed solutions (such as Muller’s bank of ‘healthy’ sperm or Shockley’s 
program of sterilisation) would require sweeping changes not only in terms of public 
policy but in the relationship between individual and state that raised political and 
legal questions such as those tackled by St. John-Stevas in Portland.
Furthermore, all of these clinical, sociological, legal and political elements were 
bound together in moral and ethical arguments that could be further examined, 
critiqued and challenged by those with a background in ethical theory and 
argumentation. With the exception of Kaplan’s lecture at ‘The Sanctity of Life’, the 
relative absence o f philosophers from interdisciplinary discussions at this time meant 
that this work was done, in the main, by theologians, with three main consequences. 
First of all, in line with other social changes, the agenda for discussion was moved 
further in the direction of those moral questions and dilemmas that patients and the 
wider public found most immediate or perplexing. Secondly and thirdly, that the 
format of these discussions generally followed established theological norms led to an 
emphasis on the discussion of specific cases and attempts to articulate a system of 
rules and principles that could be used in analysis of them. As the 1960s came to a 
close, however, widespread philosophical interest in first-order work was to be 
rekindled, and it is to the initial encounter between philosophers and 20th Century 
medical ethics that out attention will now turn.
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Chapter 8: Initial Contributions of Philosophy to Interdisciplinary 
Medical Ethics in the mid- to late 20th Century
As the 1960s drew to a close there were signs that ‘a new vitality was stirring in moral 
philosophy’ led by a new generation of ‘moral philosophers [who] were determined to 
show the relevance of their discipline’1. Both Jonsen and Singer credit this change to 
the growing civil rights movement in the United States and especially to the ‘public 
disaster [of escalating] American military involvement in Southeast Asia’2. Certainly, 
philosophers found themselves subject to public rebuke for a perceived refusal to 
engage with wider social issues, of which the Vietnam War was one. Such rebukes 
ranged from the protests organised by students ‘demanding that their courses be 
relevant to the larger social issues of the day’ recalled by Singer3 to the ‘stinging 
attack’ launched on the Vietnam War by the linguist Noam Chomsky at a 1968 
meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association that, for 
Jonsen, ‘[let] the genie out of the bottle’. Chomsky did not save all his ire for generals 
or politicians: he concluded by suggesting that the problems posed by the war were 
(or should be) typical of moral philosophy and that, through not engaging with them, 
moral philosophers were evading their responsibilities4.
Jonsen and Singer may be overstating the case in claiming that social pressures alone 
drove philosophers back towards first-order work in normative moral philosophy. The 
Vietnam War, though perhaps a unique American crisis at the time, was not a unique 
human crisis. Insofar as any war may be described as ethical, it would still be a 
considerable stretch to say that it was the first to be fought with dubious methods and 
for dubious reasons (although we may concede that the dubiousness of the motives 
and methods were, through the mass media, visible to the general public in a way that 
would not have been possible earlier in the century). If ‘public disasters’ are required 
to stimulate philosophical interest in moral matters then the first half of the 20th 
Century had surely provided more than enough: tens of millions of human beings 
enslaved, gassed, butchered in the name o f perverted ‘science’, maimed or slain in 
battles and bombing raids, deliberately infected, needlessly left untreated or marched 
through clouds of radiation. It is perhaps more fitting to say that wider events (of 
which the Vietnam War was just one) may simply (or also) have served to shift public
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and academic opinion towards those who were already engaged or interested in such 
work.
Although the general preoccupation with second-order work had begun largely in 
response to Moore’s 1903 Principia Ethica5, it is reasonably clear (and should not be 
forgotten) that Moore himself had had no desire to close off the possibility of 
philosophical work in normative ethics. For all that he branded casuistry as ‘less 
respectable’ than his own work, he conceded that first-order work remained the 
proper final goal o f the moral philosopher6. As noted in the previous chapter, there 
were those who had remained interested in attempting to tackle the perceived 
problems o f ethical language with a view to informing normative moral philosophy 
and, in Jonsen’s terms, ‘[refurbish] the objective grounds for ethical judgments’7; one, 
whose particular contribution to medical ethics we will discuss in more detail below, 
was R.M. Hare. Others had attempted to sidestep meta-ethical concerns altogether. 
Although 1971 saw the launch of the journal Philosophy and Public Affairs with a 
focus on contemporary concerns such as Vietnam (which would appear to support 
Jonsen’s contention)8; it also saw the publication of a major book-length work of 
normative ethics from a philosopher with a professed lack of interest in analysis of 
language or meaning9 that had been gestating for at least twenty years: Rawls’ A 
Theory o f  Justice10.
Both Hare’s and Rawls’ work demonstrate how concerns less concrete and immediate 
than the war in Southeast Asia could push philosophy back in the direction of first- 
order work. In Hare’s case, the nature of moral language as he understood it suggested 
that we adopt a form of preference utilitarianism. For him, a hallmark of moral 
statements was that they were prescriptive; in other words, intended to compel us to 
perform actions11. Moreover, ‘specifically moral prescriptions must be capable of 
being universalised [as] a moral principle,12 which, Hare argued, is one that all other 
relevantly similar actors would assent to under relevantly similar conditions. In order 
to be moral, for Hare, statements must therefore accord with what are (to the best of 
our knowledge) the rational preferences of all those involved13: as Wamock puts it 
(somewhat crudely) the ‘test question’ for moral debate becomes ‘how would you like 
it if someone did this to you?’14. In Rawls’ case, since he saw ‘all morality as social 
morality’15 A Theory o f  Justice and the works that emerged to criticise it (such as
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Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia) could not help but become involved in matters 
of law, politics, sociology and education. As Wamock has pointed out they were all 
‘pretty clearly [either] right-wing or left-wing theories... not only political 
philosophy... come to mingle with moral philosophy [but] politics itse lf16. Insofar as 
some of the moral problems that were emerging in medicine in the 20th Century were 
related to these issues (for example in terms of social justice) it seems philosophers 
engaged in such work could not help but become concerned with them also.
Regardless o f philosophers’ readiness to involve themselves with ethical problems in 
medicine, the growth of medical ethics as an interdisciplinary activity continued to be 
resisted by a significant proportion of the medical profession. When, in 1968, Senator 
Walter Mondale convened governmental hearings in the United States for the purpose 
of discussing concerns raised by ‘genetic engineering and heart transplantation’, 
medical reaction ranged from the ‘lukewarm’ to the outright hostile. Some doctors, 
such as Christiaan Barnard (who had performed the first human heart transplant a year 
earlier), felt that any kind of extra-medical regulation was largely unnecessary in 
terms o f clinical decision making and/or might slow the pace of medical research. 
Owen Wangensteen, Professor Emeritus of Surgery at the University of Minnesota, 
went further and rejected the view that that theologians, philosophers and others had
1 7anything to offer in moral debates concerning medicine . Others disagreed: the Nobel 
prize-winning biologist Joshua Lederberg not only welcomed the Mondale hearings 
but suggested that they be expanded from a one-year fixed term inquiry into a 
permanent standing body, whilst Beecher advocated the involvement of other
1 5 2academics and professionals in multidisciplinary ethical committees .
Antagonistic medical attitudes persisted well into the mid-1970s. In 1975, the 
psychiatrist Dr. Jay Katz was so sure of his colleagues’ ire that he asked Jonsen (as 
noted in the previous chapter, a former Jesuit priest) to administer the last rites before 
delivering a conference paper outlining the conflict o f interest he perceived when 
doctors acted as both researcher and caregiver in clinical trials19. Wider public, 
governmental and academic opinion, however, continued to move towards favouring 
interdisciplinary work: although Katz’s 1966 Yale seminars on the ethics of research 
had been received poorly by medical students, they were enthusiastically welcomed 
by those studying law20. Interdisciplinary research centres such as the Hastings
137
Centre21 and the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University22 were 
established, and 1975 saw the launch of the Journal o f  Medical Ethics, with its stated 
aim ‘to provide a forum for the reasoned discussion of moral issues arising from the 
provision of medical care’ by ‘[calling] on the resources of the disciplines of law, 
philosophy, and theology as well as on the whole range of medical and paramedical 
specialties’ . Over the course of the decade philosophers were able to demonstrate 
their worth in both deepening and, in some cases, attempting to resolve moral debates 
in medicine.
Not all philosophers, however, saw this return to first-order work as the hallmark of a 
‘new vitality’: John Silber, for example, had offered an immediate response to 
Chomsky’s criticisms in which he emphatically rejected that philosophers had any 
wider responsibility to influence first-order decisions at all and instead reaffirmed that 
their role in public policy began and ended with distinguishing competing kinds of 
ethical theories from each other24. Indeed, some viewed the efforts of those who did 
choose to become involved in first-order work as a ‘cheap purveying of proper 
philosophy’ . Although many philosophers initially had a hard time taking them 
seriously, theologians working in medical ethics could at least draw on a tradition 
which had few if any qualms over asserting its authority in moral affairs and an 
established way of working. By contrast, the majority of philosophers were, in a 
sense, pioneers who had set off into territory that many in their academic background 
had left uncharted for some time. They lacked an ‘overarching philosophical theory’, 
had little in the way of ‘orthodoxy or a common methodology’ beyond ‘a method of 
analysis to be applied to other disciplines and activities’ and were unaccustomed to 
regarding themselves as moral authorities26. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many felt ‘at 
pains to represent themselves [as] professionals with their own particular brand of 
expertise’27; the nature of this ‘expertise’, however, and its role in wider discussions, 
was yet to be defined.
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Establishing a Role for Philosophy in Interdisciplinary Medical Ethics: Hare’s 
‘Medical Ethics: Can the Moral Philosopher Help?’ and Rawls’ ‘Outline of a 
Decision Procedure for Ethics’
Building on a 1975 conference address, Hare’s ‘Medical Ethics: Can the Moral 
Philosopher Help?’ offered an outline for the role of philosophy in medical ethics 
which both acknowledged Chomsky’s criticisms and built on that envisioned by 
Kaplan at Portland in 1966. According to Hare, ‘[if] the moral philosopher cannot 
help with the problems of medical ethics, he ought to shut up shop’; for him ‘[the] 
problems of medical ethics [were] so typical of the moral problems that moral 
philosophy is supposed to help with, that a failure [to do so] would be a sign either 
o f... uselessness [or] incompetence’28. But what was the nature of the help that the 
philosopher was to offer? Hare identified three separate, yet related, strands. The first 
o f these dealt with conceptual analysis and the assessment of both the language and 
structure of arguments involved in a given moral debate : the philosopher was to 
evaluate arguments and the language used to make them using certain ‘general 
standards of rigour’ including but not limited to ‘knowing, and being able to explain, 
exactly what one means when one says something... being able to say what follows 
logically from it and what does not [and] what it is logically consistent with’30. In 
other words, the philosopher was to examine different moral positions with a critical 
eye in order to weed out inconsistency by clarifying ‘tricky words’ and establishing 
‘canons of valid argument’31.
Both Jonsen and Winkler appear to have mistaken this part of Hare’s proposal (what 
the former terms ‘only a philosophical instrument ) for the whole. Indeed, Winkler 
goes so far as to describe Hare’s position as ‘optimistic’ in terms that suggest he 
believed moral debate would be a thing o f the past once philosophers had helped to 
‘order our understanding of practical issues and... overcome various confusions and 
fallacies’33. In doing so he misrepresents both Hare’s view of the practical difficulties 
involved (which he felt ‘[were] likely to remain serious’34, something Jonsen at least 
acknowledges35) and his stated position on the ability of philosophy to resolve moral 
debate. Although Hare thought that ‘once the issues are thoroughly clarified... 
problems will not seem so perplexing as they did at first’36 he also argued that 
‘[philosophers] cannot give their patients pills which the patients can just swallow’37.
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Hare seems to have envisaged conceptual analysis as serving to reduce to their most 
basic elements the theoretical and practical issues that are the object of debate. The 
closest to any resolution such analysis might achieve by itself lies in the identification 
of arguments that are unlikely to ever succeed by showing that their premises stand 
little change of being established one way or the other (Hare gives arguments against 
abortion that describe it as the ‘intentional killing of an innocent human being’ as an 
example, arguing that too many of the words involved are resistant to precise 
definition38).
This aspect o f Hare’s proposal is, in fact, concerned less with the immediate 
resolution of moral problems than it is with achieving clarity about just what is at 
stake, something that can be drawn out by considering another example he gives of 
how to apply this kind of philosophical analysis to one sort of argument regarding a 
problem in medical ethics, namely those against euthanasia that appeal either to a 
general moral principle against killing or to a more specific principle that doctors 
should strive always to preserve the life of their patient39. Hare offers utilitarian 
arguments both for and against such principles: ‘it will be argued on the one side that 
the cases calling for euthanasia... are very numerous and that [we should] change our 
attitudes... on the other side that these cases are relatively few, and can be looked 
after in other ways’40. What is important, for him, is that such questions can be 
investigated ‘with some hope of discovering the answer’: for example, we might 
undertake to discover how many such cases there are, or to ‘ask what it would be like, 
in hospitals and in the homes of dying patients, if  one attitude or the other were 
adopted’. The process would end, not with a decision having been made, but with the 
philosopher ‘returning the problem to the non-philosopher for further investigation’ 
[my emphasis]41.
This example also introduces the second element of the ‘help’ Hare envisages the 
philosopher offering when tackling problems of medical ethics. Along with their 
analytical and evaluative skills, philosophers also brought with them knowledge of 
‘classical theories of ethics’42 which could be applied to real or projected scenarios of 
moral controversy (we have already encountered one example of this in the previous 
chapter with Kaplan’s invocation of Kant). Yet although Hare’s own work in meta­
ethics had convinced him of the rightness of his own conception of preference
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utilitarianism, he acknowledged elsewhere that no such theory is universally 
accepted43. This was, however, not an especially serious problem for him since he 
argued that in practice different theoretical approaches such as the Christian ‘golden 
rule’, Kantian deontology and Rawlsian contractarianism were likely to lead to similar 
conclusions to his own in the form of general universal moral principles (for example, 
against killing)44: he was perfectly at ease employing contractarian45 or Kantian46 
arguments elsewhere in his work. Hare sometimes seems to suggest that this practical 
agreement might itself help to resolve theoretical disputes47; at others (‘[the 
philosopher] will have to start from some general theory [my emphasis]’48) he comes 
close to arguing it is necessary for the proper development of ethical theory. 
Significantly, he contends that it is the practical elements of deontological arguments 
that need to be accommodated through the sophistications he sought to introduce to 
utilitarian theory49.
The third part of the role Hare envisaged for philosophy in medical ethics builds on 
elements of the first two and is concerned with working out how the fruits of these 
activities can be put to use in concrete settings. What Hare contends he has described 
so far is the second ‘kind of thinking’ we do about moral matters: the sort ‘we ought 
to do when we are not faced immediately with a particular problem’. At such times 
‘we can take [problems] at our leisure, including what happened after [any] crucial 
decision was made’. We can also ‘invent details to illustrate particular points’ and 
‘consider hypothetical, even fantastic, cases’50. Although this thinking will, for Hare, 
necessitate establishing certain principles he accepts that these are likely to be too 
specific to be o f immediate practical use in the majority of situations51. We should not 
forget, argues Hare, the first kind of moral thinking: the sort we engage in when 
confronting a particular case52. Most of the time ‘doctors and others... are not going 
to be able to give the cases in which they find themselves involved nearly so much 
thought, because they will not have the time or the information’. What Hare argues 
are needed are ‘general [principles] which give the best guidance in the ordinary run 
of cases’; principles that ‘doctors [should] adopt almost as second nature’53. These 
everyday principles are quite different to those established dunng the first kind of 
thinking, since although they are binding in the majority of circumstances ‘in very 
particular cases [doctors] may find themselves constrained to depart from them’54.
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These three aspects of the role that Hare envisaged for philosophy in medical ethics 
carry with them two further implications. First of all, they seem to presuppose or at 
least strongly recommend further interdisciplinary work beyond the encounter 
between doctor and philosopher. Social scientists, for example, would presumably be 
able to furnish the arguments and attitudes already present in debates, or to examine 
whether (if at all) a change in doctors’ attitudes towards keeping their patients alive 
when terminally ill fundamentally altered (as it was argued it might55) their attitude 
towards attempting to save those only gravely ill. Similarly, the input of lawyers 
would seem to be required to help work out if, when and how best to adapt or apply 
rules into legislation. Secondly, Hare describes moral thought regarding medicine as a 
necessarily ongoing process; what we might term a continuous moral engagement 
with medicine. Much as we have argued was the case with the rules and guidelines of 
Hippocratic and professional ethics, the general principles Hare envisages would be 
dependent to an extent on information and/or circumstances (from the general, such as 
just what constitutes ‘the ordinary run of cases’ to the specific, such as ‘the number of 
people who die in agony of terminal cancer’56) that are subject to change.
Given the nature of the problems facing medicine in the 20th Century as described in 
Chapter 6, Hare’s proposal has several attractions. It offers, or appears to offer, a 
method for philosophy to contribute to reducing and/or negotiating a wide range of 
complex ethical problems even in the absence of any universally agreed ethical 
theory, and even allows for the use of existing ethical theories to illuminate problems 
without any requirement they be proved universally correct. Furthermore, Hare 
appears to account for both how and why moral change of the type we have described 
with regards to Hippocratic and professional medical ethics takes place due to 
ongoing practical and theoretical developments. In the former case, for example, Hare 
notes elsewhere that the development o f an over-the-counter abortifacient pill would 
alter at least one aspect of the abortion debate in that doctors’ consciences would no 
longer be involved (although he forgets that pharmacists’ consciences might)57; in the 
latter it seems that it might always be possible to think up new hypothetical cases 
which illuminate our understanding of moral problems in new ways and lead us to 
revise our principles. Moreover, his account seems to suggest that doctors, 
philosophers and others should be alive to the likelihood of such change taking place 
(after all, we ought to be thinking about hypothetical moral problems even when not
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faced with them, and/or reflecting on how we dealt with real-world problems after the 
fact) and considering how any new insights developed might be applied in practice.
Other than in his description of conceptual analysis, Hare’s proposal in fact comes 
close to approximating a method suggested by Rawls over two decades earlier in his 
1951 paper ‘Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics’. The aim of this paper was, 
given the existence of ethical propositions, to discover if ‘there [exists] a reasonable 
method for validating and invalidating given or proposed moral rules and those 
decisions made on the basis of them’58. Rawls divided his paper into six parts, with 
the bulk o f his proposed method occupying the second, third and fourth. These can be 
broadly categorised as follows. Initially, there is the question of defining ‘first, a class 
of competent moral judges and second, a class of considered judgements’59. Once 
these have been established, there is a second task: ‘to discover and formulate a 
satisfactory explication of the total range of these judgements’60. Finally, there 
remains ‘the principal aim of ethics... the formulation [from such judgements] of 
justifiable principles which may be used in cases wherein there are conflicting 
interests to determine which one should be given preference’61.
The first element required for such a process, Rawls’ proposed class of ‘competent 
moral judges’, are defined as needing to be no more than averagely intelligent, with a 
knowledge o f the world, the likely consequences of frequently performed actions and 
the specific features of individual cases that might reasonably be expected of such an 
individual. They should be willing to use ‘inductive logic to establish what is 
proper... to believe’, to try to find reasons for and against different courses of action 
when confronted with a moral situation, and to be aware of and attempt to take into 
account questions of prejudice and bias, without being fatalistic as to their influence 
in determining decisions. They should be able to display imagination when confronted 
with situations they have not themselves directly experienced62. In making their 
considered moral judgements, they should be free from all foreseeable consequences 
of the judgement (for example, they should not be punished forjudging one way or 
the other, nor should they stand to gain anything from doing so), have as much 
information as possible about the case before them, and sufficient time to reflect upon 
it. Judgements should be made with a degree of certitude, and be stable (that is, likely 
to be made by other competent judges at other times with regards to similar cases)63.
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Once a set of moral judgements has been arrived at, the next step is to use these to 
create (or perhaps, discover) ‘reasonable principles’ by which we could determine 
whether a given course of action was ‘just and right’64 through a process Rawls terms 
‘explication’. The goal of this process is to produce ‘a set of principles, such that, if 
any competent man were to apply them intelligently and consistently to the same 
cases under review, his judgements, made systematically nonintuitive by the explicit 
and consistent use of principles, would be, nevertheless, identical, case by case, with 
the considered judgements of the group of competent judges’65. Broadly speaking, 
principles represent ‘the invariant in what we call ‘moral insight” , with their 
formulation from a collection of individual judgements filtering out ‘[individual] 
predilections’66. The only judge of a principle lies in its ability to resolve existing and 
likely cases of moral complexity, and its ability to ‘hold its own’ against considered 
judgements (that is, produce an intuitive response in cases of conflict that the 
judgement is at least as likely to be in error as the principle); the judgement or 
principle may then be revised as necessary67.
Rawls’ method is of course open to objection. Notably, there is a great deal of 
assumption going on in his initial selection of ‘competent moral judges’ for which he 
is initially able to offer only the contentious argument that ‘it is men of their character 
whom we would want to decide any case in which our interests are at stake’68. Yet 
Rawls accepted that the method he proposed was in a sense, experimental and needed 
to be tried to see what results, if any, it was capable of yielding69. He did not know 
(and did not believe it possible to know) ‘ahead of time’ whether his method was the 
correct one or, indeed, whether any principles of the type he described even existed at 
all; as such, there will be ‘in all probability, instances in which we could not decide 
whether a person is a competent moral judge or not’70. He thus meets with more 
success when moving away from a positive definition of such individuals and instead 
considering criteria which should not be used for selecting them: claims for ‘a 
monopoly o f the knowledge o f truth and justice for some particular race, or social 
class, or institutional group [in which] competence is defined in terms of racial and/or 
sociological characteristics’71. Since it is not possible to pre-judge what will constitute 
the content of moral principles (should any exist) prior to the application of this 
method it seems reasonable to start by removing such prejudices as it is possible or 
practical to remove from consideration.
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These objections aside, the work of Rawls’ ‘competent moral judges’ seems very 
much like the second kind of moral reflection identified by Hare, and the process of 
‘explication’ very much like the creation of general principles for use in the first. On 
such a view, we would identify Rawls’ ‘considered moral judgements’ of particular 
cases with principles in the first sense Hare uses the word, and Rawls’ principles with 
the second. Such an approach has the advantages of drawing a clear line between the 
two senses of the word principle (which, on Hare’s account, seem very distinct from 
one another) and of firming up the status of principles in the second sense. A set of 
rules, guidelines and/or attitudes that have the effect of causing us to question our 
intuitive judgements seems to correspond very well with Hare’s requirements for 
general principles: ‘even if [a case] is peculiar -  even if in this case we ought to break 
the good general principle -  we shall do so with the greatest misgiving [and that] does 
not... mean that the good general principles are no good’72. Before adopting such a 
reading, however, there appear to be three significant points of difference between the 
two accounts that need to be dealt with. Firstly, Rawls’ judges should not undertake 
conceptual analysis, either of ‘o f the meaning of the ethical terms used in the 
judgements’ or ‘what people intend to assert when they use ethical expressions’73. 
Secondly, judges should consider only cases in which there are actual conflicts of
HAinterests (so not, for example, hypothetical cases) . Finally, although judges may 
make use o f intuition (including reflection and common-sense rules) they should not 
use in the first instance detailed ethical theories or principles derived from them .
None o f these three differences are insurmountable; indeed, it is possible to argue that 
Rawls’ account is in fact improved in this respect by adopting elements of Hare’s. 
First o f all, whilst it makes sense that, if  we cannot know for certain what any 
invariant in moral judgement (should there be one) is we should not rule out any 
sincerely held judgements straight off the bat, it does not seem possible that 
explication would be possible without further analysing whether our competent moral 
judges have always said quite what they mean, of if they (perhaps subconsciously) 
mean more that they say. Secondly, whilst it seems right that the object of moral 
deliberation be real-world cases of moral debate (and not, for example, choosing ties 
or grading fruit) that need not rule out the use of hypothetical examples or thought 
experiments to demonstrate and/or explore the practical or logical consequences of a 
particular principle or course of action. Finally, it is hard to see what objection Rawls
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could have to the use of ethical theories or principles provided one accepted the 
possibility that these theories or principles could be revised by considered moral 
judgements (as Hare seems to) given his example of a typical ‘common-sense rule’ 
that would be acceptable (‘promises ought to be kept’76). After all, key elements of 
many philosophical theories of ethics (‘secure the greatest good for the greatest 
number’, ‘treat people as ends not means’) are also (or have become internalised as) 
common-sense rules, albeit less specific ones.
Much like Ramsey and Fletcher, the influence o f Hare and Rawls lay in assuming the 
basic correctness of some kind of moral insight underpinning the major traditions of 
moral philosophy that meant they could, even in the absence of a universally-accepted 
theory, be employed to carefully consider particular examples (be they real-world 
cases or thought-experiments) in an attempt to move forwards. The early involvement 
of philosophers in interdisciplinary medical ethics generally reflected their approach. 
In 1976, for example, The Project on Moral Problems in Medicine at Case-Western 
Reserve University, established in 1970 in order to ‘educate philosophers about the 
questions raised in science and medicine’ published an anthology entitled Moral 
Problems in Medicine11. The purpose of the anthology was to provide a collection of 
material ‘of value both to students training for the health-care professions and to those 
studying the humanities’78; it contained ‘a mixture of philosophical and medical 
materials’ organised around various categories such as paternalism, truth and social 
justice79. Rather than providing a ‘pill that could just be taken’ the philosophical 
content juxtaposed appropriate selections from ‘the reflections of classical 
philosophers’ with descriptions of concrete ethical dilemmas in clinical decision 
making, with the dual purpose of attempting to inform philosophers about medical 
matters and deepen doctors’ moral reflection80. The ultimate goal of the project was 
to ‘develop a set of principles or perhaps a single principle that will enable us to make 
morally correct decisions and perform morally correct actions’81. In the United States, 
the National Commission for the Protection o f Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioural Research suggested what three o f these principles might be in the 1978 
Belmont Report concerning biomedical and behavioural research: ‘respect for persons, 
beneficence and justice’82.
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Early Examples of Philosophical Reflection in Late 20th Century Medical Ethics: 
the President’s Commission’s Defining Death, Thomson’s ‘A Defense of 
Abortion’ and Hare’s ‘Abortion and the Golden Rule’
In the previous chapter we noted that early efforts to address the moral questions 
posed by changes in 20th Century medicine had been frustrated by three main factors. 
Firstly, as the content of the earliest conferences made clear, the scientific and 
medical establishment had proven unable or unwilling to recognise the moral issues 
actually before them. Secondly, doctors still tended either to mistake ethical problems 
for clinical problems or to neglect the ethical elements o f  clinical problems (hence, for 
example, the frosty reception to Katz’s 1975 presentation on research ethics). Finally, 
as Ramsey’s response to Shockley had demonstrated, these failings had been 
compounded by an inability to fully envisage the consequences o f any conclusions 
reached if  applied in practice. Societal pressure and the work of pioneering 
interdisciplinary conferences had gradually forced the medical profession to begin to 
face up to the problems identified in Chapter 6; it remained to be seen whether the 
philosophical tools identified above (the critical analysis of language and argument, 
the use o f thought experiments, and the application of traditional ethical theories) 
could move things forward.
For one example of how the first o f these tools could be applied to concrete situations, 
with results that showed Wan gen steen had been flatly wrong in asserting that 
philosophers had ‘nothing to offer’, we may consider the outcome of the first enquiry 
undertaken between 1980 and 1981 by a new United States government body: The 
President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research’s attempt to create ‘a uniform legal definition of 
death’83. Demand for a revision of the standard legal definition (which had focused on 
the cessation of respiration, circulation and heartbeat) had been steadily growing since 
the invention of the modem ventilator in 1952. It had become apparent that some 
patients placed on the apparatus ‘failed ever to breath again on their own and... 
slipped into deep unconsciousness, kept alive only by the [machine]’. Debates arose
Oi
as to whether such patients should be allowed to die or were, in fact, already dead ; 
By the 1960s, French neurologists began to develop the concept of coma depasse (or 
‘ultra-coma’) that allowed for death to be recognised as a neurological state separate
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from respiratory and/or cardiopulmonary function. Although this criterion had been 
warmly accepted by some of those attending the 1966 CIB A Conference, others had 
voiced concerns as to the likelihood of its acceptance amongst both the medical 
profession and the general public. The result was a medical literature suffused with 
confusing terms such as ‘immanently’ or ‘virtually dead’85.
An early American attempt to clarify the situation, the so-called ‘Harvard Definition’, 
introduced the concept of ‘brain death’ and allowed for legal statutes to be passed to 
recognise it86. Despite swift acceptance, however, the report which outlined the 
Harvard Definition was (as Jonsen puts it) ‘odd in many ways’. It had been drafted by 
an ad hoc committee assembled by Beecher at Harvard Medical School whose final 
report ‘[stitched] together some medical information, a legal opinion and a theological 
statement’ (the theologian involved, Ralph Potter, could not remember in later years 
making any contribution of his own: he had deferred uncritically to Pope Pius XII, 
who had commented on the matter of artificial respiration in 1957). Crucially, with 
regard to several important elements, the ‘definition’ it provided was anything but.
The concept of ‘irreversible coma’, for example, was not properly distinguished from 
either cessation of function in the brain stem or indeed ‘brain death’ itself, nor was it 
made clear whether turning off a ventilator constituted allowing a terminally ill 
patient to die through ceasing life support or withdrawing respiratory support from the 
body o f the deceased. Despite a plethora of similar statements in subsequent years, 
two basic questions remained: to borrow Jonsen’s formulation: ‘what are the human 
functions that define human life and how are their presence and absence 
recognised?’87
It is perhaps unsurprising that Jonsen describes these questions as philosophical ; 
indeed, the debate surrounding them was filled with the kind of imprecise language 
and argumentation that was ideally suited to resolution through the ‘clarification of 
tricky words and establishment of canons of valid argument’. The President’s 
Commission appear to have agreed, asking the two staff philosophers to clarify the 
various positions involved as a preliminary step before debating the issues. The first, 
Daniel Wikler, ‘sorted out three distinct arguments: loss of an essential characteristic 
of personhood, such as rationality, loss o f personal identity, and loss of the value of 
being alive’89 whilst the second, Robert Veatch, examined ‘the policy issues
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associated with social decisions to treat a person as dead’90 and argued against use of 
the term ‘brain death’, having identified the term as ambiguous (it could refer ‘either 
to cessation of brain functions or to the death of a person based upon that 
cessation’)91. Following this, the Commission held a round-table discussion of these 
issues involving ‘religious scholars, lawyers and neuroscientists’ with a view to 
examining whether an appropriate legal definition could or should be reached92.
The result was a report {Defining Death: A Report on the Medical, Legal and Ethical 
Issues in the Definition o f  Death) which contained a recommendation for the 
enactment o f a Uniform Determination of Death Act, described in the following 
terms:
Recommended Uniform Determination of Death Act
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and 
respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in 
accordance with accepted medical standards93.
Defining Death marked a notable success not only for the Commission itself, but for 
the two philosophers involved and the methodology they had employed. Despite ‘a 
spirited Talmudic debate’ between two Rabbis (which Jonsen recalls involving a great 
deal of quotation in Hebrew ‘much to the dismay of the recording stenographer’) 
agreement on the proposed definition of death was reached with a speed that surprised 
the commissioners. Hare’s hope that, following conceptual analysis, problems might 
not seem so ‘perplexing’ now appeared to have been a prophetic insight: this success 
was possible largely as a result of the analysis performed by Wilder and Veatch, 
which identified the key stumbling-block that had ‘plagued’ efforts to resolve the 
debate since the Harvard Definition had been arrived at, namely the failure to sort out 
‘the confusion between permanent coma and total organic death’94. Moreover, the 
same care with language was employed with regards to the recommended Uniform
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Determination o f Death Act itself: having identified as a ‘major problem’ amongst 
various “‘model laws” and state variations [the] overly complex or inexact wording 
that characterises many of them’95 every part of the definition had been worded 
specifically to address practical concerns over how it might be interpreted and/or 
implemented.
Cessation o f cardiopulmonary function, for example, was identified as the primary 
indicator since ‘in the vast majority of cases [it] will be the obvious and sufficient 
basis for diagnosing death... when a patient is not supported on a respirator, the need 
to evaluate brain functions does not arise [and] the basic statute in this area should set 
forth the basis on which death is determined in such cases’; to use this cessation as an 
indicator of loss of function in the brain, whilst ‘conceptually acceptable’, seemed an 
unnecessary break with tradition96. The phrase ‘irreversible cessation offunctions' 
was preferred to ‘loss of activity’ since ‘[bodily] parts, and the subparts that make 
them up, are important for the functions they perform’; undirected metabolic activity 
‘cannot contribute to the operation of the organism as a whole’ and is thus ‘irrelevant
07in judging whether the organism, as opposed to its components, is “dead”’ . It was
also chosen ahead of ‘destruction of the organ’, which ran the risk on the one hand of
confusing death with decomposition and on the other of not taking into account that
one day ‘new clinical capabilities’ might mean that ‘even destruction of an organ
[would] not prevent its functions from being restored’98. ‘Is dead’ was preferred to the
‘will [or shall] be considered dead’ found in several model statutes since the latter
‘might be read to indicate that the law will consider someone dead who by some
other, perhaps wiser, standard is not dead’99, whilst ‘in accordance with reasonable
medical standards’ was preferred to ‘in accordance with accepted medical standards’
since ‘lay jurors [might] conclude that a medical practice, although generally adopted,
was “unreasonable”... [even] the prospect of [which] would unnecessarily disrupt
100orderly decision-making in this field’ .
For an example of how such critical analysis o f language and argument might be 
further supplemented through the discussion of thought-experiments, we may turn our 
attention to an earlier philosophical work: Judith Jarvis Thomson’s 1971 article ‘A 
Defense of Abortion’. The article begins by considering the most common argument
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against abortion (discounting, for example, those that view the foetus as the property 
of a woman’s male relatives), one she summarises as follows:
Every person has a right to life. So the foetus has a right to life. No 
doubt the mother has a right to decide what shall happen in and to her 
body; everyone would grant that. But surely a person's right to life is 
stronger and more stringent than the mother's right to decide what 
happens in and to her body, and so outweighs it. So the foetus may not 
be killed; an abortion may not be performed101.
Certainly, this reflects almost exactly the stated views of both the Catholic Church 
and, in the United States at least, part of the medical profession for much of the 19th 
and early 20th Centuries. As Thomson notes, discussions of this argument have 
generally involved attempting to demonstrate that the foetus is or is not a person (a 
question that, as we noted in Chapter 6, medical science had found frustratingly 
difficult to answer). Although Thomson was of the view ‘that the foetus is not a 
person from the moment of conception’ she nevertheless agreed with Hare that this 
question was unlikely to be answered: ‘the prospects for ‘drawing a line’ in the 
development of the foetus look dim’102.
For this reason Thomson instead allows, for the sake of argument, the first premise 
(that the foetus is a person). Since the position she has described is, broadly speaking, 
syllogistic, she is therefore committed in trying to argue against it to addressing the 
second (that every person has a right to life that outweighs all others). She proceeds to 
consider whether this is, in fact, the case by offering several examples, restated in 
different iterations over the course of the article, of which we may consider the 
following three. Firstly:
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with 
an unconscious violinist... He has been found to have a fatal kidney 
ailment, and the Society of Music Lowers [have] kidnapped you, and last 
night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that 
your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as 
your own. The director of the hospital now tells you... ‘To unplug you 
would be to kill him. But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then 
he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged 
from you.’ Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation?103
Secondly:
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There you are, in bed with the violinist, and the director of the hospital 
says to you ‘It’s all most distressing, and I deeply sympathise, but you 
see this is putting an additional strain on your kidneys, and you’ll be 
dead within the month. But you have to stay where you are all the same.
Because unplugging you would be directly killing the violinist, and 
that’s murder, and that’s impermissible.’1
And finally:
[Suppose] it were like this: people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, 
and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your 
carpets or upholstery. You don’t want children, so you fix up your 
windows with fine mesh screens... [however] one of the screens is 
defective; and a seed drifts in and takes root. Does the person-plant who 
now develops have a right to the use of your house?105
From these three thought-experiments, Thomson argues that abortion is permissible in 
cases o f pregnancy resulting from rape106, in cases where the health of the mother is 
threatened107, and that the foetus does not have a ‘right’ to reside in a woman’s womb
1 Afisimply because she has consented to intercourse
Whether one agrees either with these positions or with Thomson’s arguments for them 
is perhaps less important for our current purposes than acknowledging the value of 
her methods. Through examining the structure of an argument against abortion, 
Thomson was able not only to identify that agreement was unlikely to be reached on 
the first premise but that the second premise was based on a moral judgement. 
Secondly, through her use o f thought experiments like those above, she was able to 
show this judgement (though compelling when taken at face-value) is problematic. In 
doing so, she demonstrated how tools common to philosophy could resist the 
presentation o f complex moral issues simply as matters of clinical judgement (and, we 
should not forget, in doing so gave voice to the arguments of many women -  and 
some doctors109 -  that the traditional argument had left ‘shouting into the wind’110). 
Moreover, her examples are not simply rhetorical flights of fancy; they are used to 
demonstrate how taking even a relatively unproblematic moral judgement at face 
value can misrepresent the complexity o f real-world cases. For example, Thomson 
argues that the traditional argument sees no compelling moral difference between ‘a 
sick and desperately frightened fourteen-year-old schoolgirl, pregnant due to rape’
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and a woman who ‘[requests] an abortion... in her seventh month... just to avoid the 
nuisance of postponing a trip abroad’111.
As Hare noted in his own exploration of similar issues in ‘Abortion and the Golden
Rule’, Thomson’s argument is noticeably theory-light, something that could prove to
be a drawback: ‘[the article] has been justly praised for the ingenuity and liveliness of
her examples [but she] simply parades [them] before us and asks what we would say
about them... how do we know whether what we feel inclined to say has any secure
ground?’. As Hare points out, Thomson’s subsequent dialogue with an opponent of
abortion, Finnis, whose ‘intuitions... differ from hers... in the wildest fashion’, was
every bit as unproductive as the wrangling over whether or not the foetus was a
person since we ‘do not know how to tell whether [either] is on safe ground’ in
110making their respective claims . Hare agrees with Thomson that it is unlikely that 
the issue can be resolved through attempts to establish whether or not the foetus is a 
‘person’, although for different reasons: for him, asking ‘physicians [or] 
metaphysicians’ to determine whether or not the foetus is a person is an attempt to 
evade responsibility for doing moral thinking of our own. He argues instead that we 
already have the information required for moral deliberation of the relevant question 
(namely ‘How ought a creature, about whose properties, circumstances, and probable 
future we are quite adequately informed, be treated?’) and that ‘the word “person” is 
doing no work here (other than that of bemusing us)’113. However, he also argues that 
the issue is unlikely to be settled by ‘claims that women have a right to do what they 
like with their own bodies’ since the term ‘right’ is too ambiguous to provide clear 
guidance: ‘[does] it... mean that it is not wrong for them to terminate their own 
pregnancies, or that it is wrong to stop them doing it, or that it is wrong not to assist 
them [?]’" 4.
For Hare, rather, the only way for philosophers to help ‘contribute to the solution of 
this and similar practical problems’ is to attempt to establish ‘a theory of moral 
reasoning that will determine which arguments we ought to accept’115. As in ‘Medical 
Ethics: Can the Moral Philosopher Help?’, he notes that he believes his ‘own 
universal prescriptivism’ to be the most promising candidate, but he also reaffirms 
that this approach is underpinned by ‘a type of argument which... has been the basis 
o f almost all theories of moral reasoning that have contributed much that is
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worthwhile to our understanding’. O f these approaches (including ‘the Christian (and 
indeed pre-Christian) “Golden Rule”, the Kantian Categorical Imperative, the ideal 
observer theory, the rational contractor theory [and] various kinds of utilitarianism’) 
Hare elects to consider the problem in light o f the first, noting firstly that ‘the problem 
is discussed as often as not from a Christian standpoint’ and secondly that ‘do to 
others as we wish them to do unto us’ (rephrased as ‘do to others what we are glad 
was done to us’) should be acceptable not only in terms of his own moral theory but 
to all disputants in debates regarding abortion116. The application of this rule to the 
debate is deceptively straightforward: since, ‘if not terminated... pregnancy is highly 
likely to result in the birth and growth to maturity o f a person just like the rest of 
us’117 it seems to follow that ‘[if] we are glad that nobody terminated the pregnancy 
that resulted in our birth, then we are enjoined... not to terminate any pregnancy 
which will result in... a person having a life like ours’118.
Despite this, Hare does not think that the application of this approach to the problem 
does in fact ‘[render] impregnable the extreme conservative position’ that no 
abortions are morally permissible whatsoever. Rather, it ‘creates a rebuttable or 
defeasible presumption against abortion, which is fairly easily rebutted if there are 
good indications’. First of all, as Hare points out, if  we are obliged to take into 
account the potential for the foetus to eventually have a life for which it is glad, we 
are also obliged to take into account other potential beings, for example ‘the next 
child that the mother will have if this pregnancy is terminated but will not have if the 
pregnancy is allowed to continue [for example if  she] would die or be rendered sterile 
[as a result]’119. Although we may assign potential foetuses less moral weight than 
actual foetuses (due to their -  at present -  correspondingly lower chances of at some 
point being glad of their lives) this may vary in accordance with what is known about 
the life-chances of the actual foetus: for example, if  the actual foetus is likely to grow 
into a ‘miserably handicapped’ child but a potential foetus is not (as may happen 
should the mother contract Rubella) ‘there would be reason to abort this foetus and... 
bring to birth the next child, in that the next child will be much gladder to be alive’120. 
Moreover, ‘[the] interests of the mother may well, in many cases, provide such good 
indications [as may justify an abortion], although, because hers is not the only 
interest, we have also to consider the others’121. So whilst Hare concludes that 
‘abortion is prima facie and in general wrong in default of sufficient countervailing
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reasons’ he also argues that ‘countervailing reasons are not too hard to find in many 
cases’122; indeed, he contends that his arguments grants liberals ‘all that they could 
reasonably demand’123.
It is important to note that Hare’s argument does not, despite his acerbic closing 
comment that ‘it is such a pity that so many people — even philosophers -  think that 
they can discuss abortion without making up their minds on the fundamental problems 
of moral philosophy’124, relegate Thomson’s examples and others like them to 
uselessness. As we have already noted, Hare himself saw the value of employing 
thought experiments and ‘fantastic cases’ when undertaking second-level moral 
thinking (which is the kind that he thinks the problem of abortion necessitates125) and 
he concedes that ‘[her] examples are entertaining, and help to show up our 
prejudices’. Instead, his argument demonstrates firstly that such examples are best 
understood as one part of philosophical reflection to be supplemented by others and 
that secondly, once our prejudices and intuitions have been revealed, moral theory 
may (even in the absence of universal agreement on just what that theory should be) 
be able to play a role in attempting to decide ‘which prejudices ought to be 
abandoned’126.
Conclusions
If the examples above offer some illustration o f just what philosophers could 
contribute to interdisciplinary discussions of the moral problems posed or encountered 
in mid- to late-20th Century medicine, we should not forget that these problems 
themselves contributed to giving philosophers a context (similar to that described by 
Rawls) in which to exercise their skills (of a type similar to that outlined by Hare).
The ‘expertise’ that philosophers offered in such discussions may therefore be seen, 
not simply as something they brought with them from their own discipline, but as 
something that arose from the interaction between several separate technical skills or 
areas o f knowledge that they possessed (for example, analysis of language and/or 
argument, familiarity with traditional theories o f ethics) on the one hand and the needs 
of others in tackling a range o f different problems (for example, the recognition of 
arguments and/or the clarification o f concepts used in them) on the other. The initial 
impact o f philosophers’ involvement may be seen to have been a qualified success;
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however, there remained those who would dispute whether this was in fact the case, 
or if so, whether it could be sustained.
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Chapter 9: Criticisms o f Moral Philosophy in Interdisciplinary Medical 
Ethics in the late 20th Century
As we saw in the previous chapter, the initial encounter between philosophy and 
interdisciplinary medical ethics in the late 20th Century appeared to lead to some 
progress in tackling the issues at hand: cases were examined, arguments clarified and, 
in the United States at least, the ideas expressed over the course of various debates 
passed into both public consciousness and, occasionally, the statute books. 
Philosophers had, as Winkler puts it:
contributed to the reduction of traditional forms of paternalism in 
medicine, to a general strengthening o f the rights of patients and 
research subjects, and to improved conceptions of the appropriate use of 
medical technology and of the proper goals o f medicine
and their involvement in bodies such as the President’s Commission had proved a 
‘powerful counterpoint to the precious conceit o f  the ancien regime that “philosophy 
boils no cabbages’” Nevertheless, some within the medical profession believed that 
a focus on theoretical and intellectual matters was distracting attention away from the 
realities of clinical practice, something that (it was felt) philosophers and other moral 
theorists did not acknowledge or understand.
On the basis that ‘only the physician is in a position to really understand and address 
moral problems in medicine’, these critics advocated the adoption of what they 
termed clinical ethics: ‘dominated by people from the medical scientific community 
[and] centred in the clinic... informed by the realities of actual professional practice’2. 
Certainly it is hard to argue against the view that a knowledge of and appreciation for 
the realities of medical practice is o f value to anyone who intends to reflect on moral 
issues in medicine. Similarly, it is doubtless important for moral theorists to 
remember that it is doctors and not theorists themselves who will most often bear 
responsibility for such moral decisions as are taken in the course of medical practice. 
On the other hand, we may remember from earlier chapters that ‘the medical scientific 
community’ had, when entrusted with sole responsibility for deciding on moral 
matters in medicine, not proved particularly adept at dealing with them. Moreover, the
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literature produced by the clinical ethics movement tended to differ in language only 
from work already being done: ‘an increase in clinical data [and] a decrease in 
philosophical jargon’ nevertheless ended up leading to ‘recommendations... 
otherwise indistinguishable from what one would expect’ from their intended targets3. 
It was not only the medical profession, however, who criticised philosophers’ 
involvement in medical ethics; by the mid-1980s, dissenting voices could be found 
amongst lawyers, social scientists, politicians and within the discipline of philosophy 
itself.
Surveying criticism of his and his colleagues’ work during this period, Gorovitz was 
able to identify ten main criticisms from a variety o f sources that he grouped into four 
main strands: those that ‘[reflected] misgivings about... methods and foundations’
(for example, claims that ‘unlike work in the sciences [ethics] consists of assertions 
without prospect o f verification’)4; those ‘[centred] on pedagogical matters’ (for 
example, claims that ‘ethics in general can't be taught but is a matter of character that 
depends on nonacademic influences for its development’)5; those ‘[focused] more 
generally on utility’ (for example claims that philosophers’ involvement ‘makes 
practical matters worse... confuses health care providers, heightens the anxiety of 
patients, complicates the work of planners and policymakers, and promotes 
regulations that impede clinical practice’)6; and those concerned with ‘moral integrity’ 
(for example claims that philosophers either ‘[promote] unwholesome relativism... or 
systematically [overemphasise] certain social values, such as liberal individualism’) . 
Gorovitz allows that ‘each o f these criticisms has some merit, yet each is somewhat 
misguided’ and, as we shall see over the course o f the following chapter, his 
assessment is probably about right. Yet, as he also points out, ‘even criticisms that are 
untenable as stated may point to prospects for improvement in what they criticize’8; as 
Lesser has argued with respect to one o f the specific works we will consider below, 
they are unfair mainly in what they leave out9. For this reason, the following 
examination of several o f these criticisms can be seen to contribute to our 
understanding o f several important aspects o f philosophical moral thought in 
medicine.
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‘Moral Experts* or ‘Moral Options Brokers*?
The philosophically-trained lawyer Cheryl Noble’s ‘Ethics and Experts’ was penned 
in 1980, just as proceedings at the President’s Commission were getting underway, 
and later reprinted in the Hastings Center Report together with responses from a 
doctor and three philosophers. The article was strongly critical of what Noble saw as 
philosophers’ ‘pretensions’ in the field o f applied ethics (including medical ethics and 
the use of philosophy in ethical discussions regarding other areas of public life such as 
business10) and in particular of what she saw as their claim to ‘a special competence 
to resolve matters of right and wrong’1 *. Furthermore, she argued that the pre­
eminence of philosophy in interdisciplinary medical ethics was not the result of its 
usefulness in addressing the issues at hand but rather of a mixture of opportunism and 
historical accident. Whilst allowing that ‘not even philosophy’ could remain 
indifferent to the social upheavals o f the late 20th Century, Noble characterises applied 
ethics chiefly as an attempt by academics to secure students and funding, helped by a 
social climate ‘fed up with its own scepticism and relativism’ and eager to see ‘moral 
problems [as] the cause rather than an integral part o f other social conditions’, and the 
fact that ‘something called ethics has been taught in philosophy departments for as 
long as philosophy has had a department [my emphasis]’12.
In effect, Noble claims, the practice o f philosophical applied ethics amounts to little 
more than a confidence trick. Philosophers (on this view) simply dress up 
‘conclusions... drawn from a preexisting range o f alternatives’ in technical language 
that privileges the philosopher over the layperson and gives rise to the idea of a 
‘philosophical expert’ who can be consulted in moral matters ‘just as there are experts 
to deal with environmental and engineering problems’. Noble argues that, far from 
contemporary philosophy having been ‘broadened to encompass moral reflection [it 
had rather] narrowed the field o f moral reflection [in line with the] technician’s 
skills’13. Philosophers remain ‘indifferent to history, sociology, and psychology and... 
inevitably [produce] a kind of moral criticism that is conventional, comfortable and 
tame’14; they do not explore, for example, the social context in which something is 
considered to be moral or otherwise: ‘the ‘facts’ apparently do not extend to an 
understanding of historical or economic context’15. As examples, she points to two 
essays by Nagel, one on the morality o f war and one on the justice of income
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differentials between ‘professionals’ and ‘blue collar workers’, in which she saw little 
more than ‘highly abstract descriptions of norms already embodied in those 
practices’16.
When Noble’s article was reprinted in the Hastings Center Report all four 
respondents flatly rejected her claim that philosophers’ needlessly complicate 
everyday moral issues, instead stressing the opposite view that philosophy ‘[clarifies] 
our thinking about moral issues through the analysis of important concepts and by 
organizing and rectifying arguments and points of view’17. The doctor, Jerry Avom, 
argued that -  far from having taken issues out o f his hands -  he was more than happy 
to be able to turn to philosophers in order to ‘utilise their expertise to sharpen the 
focus of [moral] issues’18 (which is of course quite different to resolving them for 
him). Beauchamp helped to outline just how philosophy could do this, noting that the 
critical analysis of language Noble called for with regards to Nagel’s supposedly 
uncritical use of the word ‘fight’ in his article on war is in fact typical of rather than 
antithetical to philosophy19 (somewhat confusedly, Noble had also criticised Dworkin 
for offering too many accounts o f what ‘equality’ and ‘justice’ can mean in an article 
on positive discrimination she dismissed as ‘tedious and complex’20); we may also 
recall from the previous chapter that philosophers did in fact perform this role with 
great success in the compilation of Defining Death. Beauchamp also noted that this 
analysis could be extended to arguments as a whole, revealing contradictions or 
unexpected consequences o f commonly-held positions that would call for them to be 
revised21.
With regards to just what these revisions might be, Singer believed that, given his 
own views, he should ‘be allowed a chuckle’ at Noble’s claim that philosophers only 
arrived at conventional conclusions22 (Noble’s own response to this -  that they were 
typical of any ‘garden variety liberal’23 -  scarcely accommodated the examples he 
gave: ‘[a] defective human being has no more right to life than a dog, or a pig at a
OAsimilar mental level’ and ‘[infanticide] is often justifiable’ ). Moreover, philosophers 
working in interdisciplinary bodies did in fact come to conclusions that proved 
unacceptable to their colleagues: the President’s Commission’s ‘essentially 
conservative’ definition of death as cessation o f all (rather than higher) brain 
functions was adopted against the advice of the philosophers involved25. Noble’s
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argument also overlooked two further points. Firstly, as we have argued was the case 
with Thomson’s ‘A Defense o f Abortion’, a philosophical argument that concludes by 
lending support to a pre-existing viewpoint can be still be valuable should that 
viewpoint have been unfairly marginalised or neglected. Secondly, novelty in moral 
theory is not always a recommendation: whilst we should expect that moral 
philosophy should in some cases be ‘subversive’ (that is, retain the ability to 
‘undermine [the] assumptions o f ordinary morality’26) it is more-or-less self-evidently 
absurd that we should expect it to do so in all cases. Indeed, were a moral theory to 
suggest that even the majority of our previous conceptions of moral conduct were 
wrong, that would be reason enough to approach said theory with a degree of 
scepticism.
Beauchamp and Singer also repudiated Noble’s claim that they saw ‘the resolution of 
moral problems’ as the ‘special province of philosophy’, and denied that they wanted 
‘to have moral problems of all kinds handed over to them as the appropriate 
experts’27. Instead, two o f Beauchamp’s four examples o f the use of philosophy in 
medical ethics involve dialogue with members o f other disciplines with regards to 
policy and case decision (which is not the same as instructing them in what to do) . 
Noble responded by contending that philosophers still presented themselves in such 
discussions as ‘the sole professionally competent ethicists’, possessors of special 
knowledge beyond that o f the layperson29. Yet this criticism could only be sustained 
were philosophers to claim this ‘special knowledge’ was specifically related to 
morality (after all, all professionals have special knowledge beyond that of the 
layperson). It is quite clear that the philosophers who responded did not believe this to 
be the case: with regards to Singer, for example, the ‘advantages that [he believes] 
philosophers may have over others when it comes to discussing moral problems [my 
emphases]’30 are concerned with ‘powers o f analysis and clarification [and] skill in... 
reasoning and argument’ rather than any claim to a specifically moral skill or 
knowledge.
As Winkler has pointed out, however, this kind of rejection of the notion that 
philosophers possess moral expertise is ‘consistent with the possibility that on many, 
or most, or difficult and complex moral issues, factual understanding together with 
philosophical analysis and moral argument... can at best only partially reduce the
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range of what survives as defensible or justifiable moral options’31. Indeed, by the 
early 1980s it was becoming apparent that, despite its undoubted usefulness, 
philosophical work in medical ethics seemed in some cases to be coming close to its 
practical limits. For example, although Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment 
had (by concluding that ‘phrases like “right to die,” “right to life,” “death with 
dignity,” “quality of life,” and “euthanasia” [had] been used in such conflicting ways 
that their meanings [had] become hopelessly blurred’32) been able to arrive at several 
definite conclusions regarding ‘resuscitation policy... care of the permanently 
unconscious patient, and the ill newborn’ it was unable to prevent the emergence 
(contrary to the Commission’s expectations) of a ‘vigorous, even rancorous, debate 
over assisted suicide’33. The philosopher was becoming what Winkler has termed the 
‘moral options broker’, doing little more than ‘[clarifying] alternative positions and 
[relating] them to central aspects of moral theory’34: ‘after problematic cases were 
trotted out, initial positions taken, facts and values clarified, and positions rectified 
and systematised, everyone tended to wind up with more elaborate versions of the 
views they had started with’35.
Must Philosophers Claim to be ‘Moral Experts’?
For some, this state of affairs was in keeping with the proper role of the philosopher 
in moral debate. Like Noble, Maclean’s The Elimination o f  Morality: Reflections on 
Utilitarianism and Bioethics argues that philosophers involved in interdisciplinary 
medical ethics have pretended to a moral expertise that they have no right to claim. 
Similarly, just as Noble saw the involvement o f philosophers in medical ethics as the 
result o f a mixture of opportunism and historical accident, so Maclean attributes the 
late-20th Century growth of interest in first-order ethical work amongst philosophers, 
not to the new and perplexing moral challenges offered by (for example) the rapid 
growth and unprecedented success o f technological and scientific medicine, but to 
philosophers’ personal weaknesses and socio-economic changes in what was expected 
from academics and academic institutions. First o f all, she argues, ‘[it] flatters [the 
philosopher’s] self-esteem to see himself as a moral expert, an authority on moral 
matters called in to advise and assist important people like the doctor’; secondly, the 
materialist political climate of the 1980s had led to a need to show philosophy to be 
relevant and of ‘use’ that was at worst greedy and at best somewhat craven36. Unlike
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Noble, however, Maclean has a clear conception of what philosophers might instead 
contribute to the field.
Perhaps surprisingly, Maclean describes what she thinks philosophers should be doing 
in terms that recall both the respondents to Noble’s article and (at least part of) our 
own arguments in the previous chapter. For Maclean, the proper task of the 
philosopher in medical ethics is to help health professionals and others undertake 
critical analysis of their own values and moral judgements. First of all, philosophers 
should pose questions regarding moral judgements of particular situations: ‘[why] is it 
a moral issue at all for us? How does it connect up with other issues? What values 
does it put at stake?’. Following this, they can further analyse answers to these 
questions, since the answers, questions, and the situations that prompt the questions 
tend to be ‘exceedingly complex [and] it is easy to confuse considerations relevant to 
one o f these issues with considerations relevant to another, or to misunderstand the 
character o f a particular claim or a particular objection’. In doing so, philosophers can 
help to identify logical fallacies and confusions between different sorts of issues (for 
example, empirical and conceptual issues), and analyse concepts (such as ‘quality of 
life’) that are ‘vague, ambiguous, or even incoherent’37. In summary (Maclean 
argues), the philosopher’s task in medical ethics is ‘primarily one of clarification: the 
clarification of issues, types of issue, assumptions, arguments and concepts’38.
For Maclean, however, many philosophers (no matter how much they may protest 
otherwise) have given into the temptation to go beyond this role and are in fact 
committed by their methodology to doing so. Despite her title and her focus on 
utilitarian philosophers Maclean’s book is not, in fact, an attack on consequentialist 
thinking per se but ‘on a particular form of rationalism in ethics, to which she claims 
these writers subscribe’39. And not only these writers: Maclean defines ‘bioethics’ as 
‘medical ethics as conceived and practised by philosophers working in the utilitarian 
tradition’40, so for her ‘all bioethicists are utilitarians’, albeit ‘invariably of an impure 
sort’41 (and presumably whether they agree with this judgement or not!). Maclean 
illustrates the commitment of philosophers working in medical ethics to this view via 
the following quotation from Harris:
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[Our] interest in all these problems and dilemmas will be an interest in 
their resolution... just as the proper business of medicine is not merely 
to understand the nature and cause o f illness but to try to prevent or cure 
it, so the proper business of medical ethics is not merely to understand 
the nature of the moral problems raised by medical practice but to try to 
resolve them42
According to Maclean, this analogy {"if carried far enough [my emphasis]’43) entails 
the view that it is the task of the philosopher to discover "the right answers to ... moral 
questions’ and that these will be like ‘the right answers to certain other sorts of 
questions -  mathematical questions... or technical questions’44. In other words, it is to 
find ‘the answers it is rational to give’45: those justified by a ‘reason (or principle) 
[that] it is demonstrably rational to select’46. This description is, in fact, very close to 
what Winkler describes as the deductivist “‘applied ethics” model of moral 
reasoning47’. Under this model, ‘[one] justifies a particular judgement by showing that 
it falls under a rule’, the rule under a principle, and the principle under ‘the most 
abstract level of theory’, with the final aim or ‘Holy Grail’ of moral thinking a ‘single, 
comprehensive and coherent theory... based in universal, basic principles’48.
We may of course simply object that this analogy should not be carried as far as 
Maclean chooses to: it may be that it is not only, as she thinks, a bad analogy for what 
philosophers can or should do in medical ethics, but a bad analogy for what they 
actually do and/or have done. Certainly, as noted in the previous chapter, Hare (who 
Maclean criticises at length later in the book49) employed very similar language while 
still flatly denying that the philosopher could produce answers in this sense (‘pills 
which the patient can just swallow’). Moreover, far from asserting the philosopher’s 
special competence to resolve moral problems, we may also recall that Hare’s 
proposals appeared to presuppose the philosopher working with others as part of an 
interdisciplinary effort and that (for example in the case of the President’s 
Commission) this was in fact exactly what many philosophers ended up doing. 
Certainly, as Lesser has noted, with the possible exception of Singer, ‘even utilitarian 
bioethicists... do not in fact believe [that they are moral experts in this sense]’50 
something attested to by the responses to Noble’s criticisms considered above. On the 
other hand, Maclean advances ‘a plausible argument that logically they should: if you 
believe that it is possible to discover the basis of ethics by the correct use of reason,
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and also that you are using reason correctly in order to discover this basis, surely you 
must draw the conclusion that you are now a moral expert!’51.
Lesser has offered three reasons why this argument ‘though plausible, is unsound’. 
First of all, even were philosophers to believe that they ‘have reached the truly 
rational conclusion’ regarding moral matters they are also likely, given the difficulty 
of the task and the historical ‘lack of success [encountered] over many centuries [by] 
many great minds’ in attempting it, to accept that it is ‘close to certain... that they are 
partly wrong, and more likely than not they are seriously wrong’. Philosophers are 
therefore likely to accept that: ‘there are no moral experts... because there is no point 
at which we can claim immunity from further philosophical scrutiny’52. Secondly, 
although ‘[attempting] to work toward what is best supported rationally and may at 
the moment be taken as what is most likely to be true’ is a philosophical exercise, it 
does not follow that an academic training in philosophy is either necessary or 
sufficient to undertake it: ‘Socrates and Plato had no [such] training [whilst] Frege, 
though a brilliant logician, remained a rabid anti-semite’53. Finally, whilst working 
out fundamental principles of ethics may be ‘useful’ it is, again, neither necessary nor 
sufficient for moral conduct: it is not ‘necessary, because in practice... subsidiary 
principles [such as ‘it is wrong to cheat’] may serve as better guides to action’; it is 
‘not sufficient, because we can still make mistakes in applying the principles [and] 
may be deflected... by all kinds of temptations and self-deceptions’54. As such, ‘the 
rational search for basic moral principles... can be carried out without... the arrogant 
assumption that we are moral experts’55.
Further Criticisms of the ‘Applied Ethics’ Model: ‘The Unbearable Lightness of 
Principle’
Maclean, however, does not simply wish to make the case that there are no 
(philosophical) moral experts in practice; she wishes to advance the stronger claim 
that in principle there can be no such thing or, to put it another way, that rational 
investigation into the fundamental principles o f ethics is ultimately a fruitless 
enterprise that cannot get philosophers beyond the position of ‘moral options broker’ 
even if they would like it to: ‘disagreements [will] remain, and health carers and their 
patients will have no option but to live with them’56. If philosophers remain
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committed to the rationalist position she describes, then (she argues) such 
investigation must consist of an attempt to ‘[strip] away from our moral lives all the 
irrational elements, leaving behind only what can be defended on rational grounds’57. 
This would result, she argues, in arguments such as the following, that she attributes 
to Harris:
Foetuses and infants... lack self-consciousness, and it follows from that 
that their lives are valueless; they are not lives that, other things being 
equal, it would be seriously wrong to end. On this account there are no 
rational grounds for moral qualms about either abortion or infanticide; 
for we may kill foetuses and infants if it suits us to do so... That... is the 
rational conclusion; if it proves repugnant to our feelings it is these we 
must disregard, and not what reason dictates58
Maclean accepts that ‘[these] are not Harris’s words’ but asserts that ‘they are a fair 
summary of what his argument implies’59; furthermore, she contends that this is a 
typical example of bioethical arguments and has all the features that are generally 
admired by philosophers working in the field of applied ethics60. Such arguments are, 
Maclean contends, open to objection on three main grounds. First of all, they are 
(indeed, needs must be) circular. Secondly, they result in ‘reasons or principles’ (for 
example regarding the value of life) that she regards as fundamentally unintelligible in 
the context o f actual moral practice. Finally (as her remark regarding ‘our feelings’ 
emphasises) they take insufficient account of our emotional response to moral 
situations.
Maclean concludes that such arguments are inevitably circular since philosophers 
‘argue backwards; and... have no alternative but to do so’61. They must work by 
starting out with those beliefs on which there is general agreement, and from there 
attempt to ‘extract from them a theory which can be used to bring about agreement 
(among rational people at any rate) where there is presently contention and 
conflict’62. Maclean accepts that it may be possible, by so discovering that (for 
example) some o f the things that we value about adult human life are linked to self- 
consciousness, to establish a sufficient condition (‘value must be attached to the life of 
any creature that is rational and self-conscious’). But it is not possible to establish a 
necessary condition (‘it is only the lives o f rational, self-conscious creatures that have 
value’) without first assuming that creatures that do not have these capacities do not
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have value in some other sense. Nor would it be enough to argue that any ‘other 
sense’ chosen was simply an assumption and therefore irrational, since the process 
itself begins with such an assumption (namely, that adult human life is in some sense 
valuable)63. In other words, such an argument starts, not from the standpoint o f 
‘reason’, but from the standpoint of other values.
Secondly, for Maclean ‘statements justifying what is to be done... take place in a 
certain context... and require no reference to anything outside that context’64; indeed, 
for her, reference to anything outside that context is likely to be highly misleading.
For Maclean, our moral practices do not proceed from decisions or judgements made 
for a reason or in accordance with a fundamental principle or principles, but rather 
from attitudes that are expressed in, and justified through, the practices themselves65:
We are not of the opinion that it is generally wrong to kill babies. Our 
thinking this is a matter of what we do, as a matter o f  course and 
without question... We treat babies in some ways and not in others; not, 
for example, as if their lives were at our disposal... there is no reason 
[for our doing so] -  or, to put the same point differently, their being 
babies is the reason, all the reason in the world.66
On this view, any attempt to extract reasons and/or principles from these practices that 
can be applied in other situations inevitably involves presupposing the existence of 
questions and answers that are not, in fact, present in the situations themselves. For 
example, in the kind of argument Maclean attributes to Harris, ‘day-to-day decisions’ 
concerning the end of life in a medical context ‘tacitly presuppose an answer to the 
question of what makes life (or a life) valuable’67. For Maclean, however, this is not 
the case; indeed, for her, the question ‘what makes life valuable?’ refers to the ‘value 
of life’ in a ‘metaphysical sense (non-sense)’68 that she argues does not have any clear 
meaning at all69.
To illustrate this, Maclean considers some specific examples of situations in which 
this sense of the ‘value of life’ should play a deciding role; for her, it is simply not 
present. Instead, questions of the ‘value of life’ are posed with specific reference to 
concrete qualities linked to individual lives in the situations themselves rather than 
‘life’ in general. So, for example, when a doctor concludes that it is not in the best 
interests of a ninety-year old patient whose heart has stopped to attempt resuscitation
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by administering drugs or making use of a defibrillator it is not because he has 
referred to an external standard and found her life to be ‘less valuable, less worthy of 
preservation’70 than another’s when weighed against an absolute reason or principle 
that determines when life is and is not valuable; rather it is from a ‘concern with [the] 
value [of her life] to her'11. Similarly, if a doctor agrees to carry out the abortion of ‘a 
foetus on the grounds that it is handicapped, physically or mentally or both’ because 
he believes the family will be unable to cope, then it is that inability to cope that is the 
important factor: ‘the child’s entitlement to life, or lack of it, does not enter into the 
matter’72. Again, were the doctor to agree on the grounds that the child would lead a 
miserable life, then it is that quality of life that is at issue and not ‘its failure to pass 
some test which would have secured it the prize of an entitlement to life’73.
Maclean is not alone in arguing that the principles employed by ‘applied moral 
philosophy [are] too general and vague to apply to concrete situations’74. Just as her 
view o f rationalism in ethics was similar to Winkler’s description of a ‘top-down’ 
deductivist model of applied ethics, so her discussion of what she claims to be Harris’ 
account of the ‘value of life’ recalls Winkler’s discussion of another principle, one on 
which a ‘heavy emphasis’75 was placed in early philosophical discussions of medical 
ethics: autonomy. Winkler offers for consideration the example of a man suffering 
from Multiple Sclerosis who is admitted to hospital having contracted ‘spinal 
meningitis with a bacterial origin’. Although the patient has historically responded 
well to having MS (‘he has various interests, hobbies and so forth’) and this ‘has not 
worsened’, he asks not to be treated76. The patient seems to be acting autonomously, 
but is this in fact the case? On this occasion, further investigation reveals that ‘the 
patient has been very withdrawn and depressed recently’ and ‘has been deprived of 
the usual... support of other family members’. It thus seems probable that the 
patient’s decision is the result o f a temporary situation. Antibiotics are administered, 
family counselling arranged ‘and everything turns out fine’. Cases of this type did, in 
fact, lead the principle of autonomy to be revised: ‘[particularly] when the stakes are 
high, it is not enough merely to be competent and rational... [it] can also be critical 
whether the choice is authentic’77.
We may draw from the above example the conclusion that an overly-simplistic 
principle of autonomy (‘do whatever the patient wants at the time’) has been replaced
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with a more nuanced version (‘consider the patient’s wishes, but also the 
circumstances under which their decisions are made’). But is this the right conclusion 
to draw? Winkler thinks not, and offers a second case, that of a motorcyclist left 
paraplegic after a crash who, depressed and ‘embittered’ by his injuries, makes the 
decision to refuse food, thus ‘endangering his life’. Such a decision is clearly 
inauthentic: there is no reason to suppose that the patient will not be able to eventually 
come to terms with his condition in the same way as the patient with MS has, and so it 
would seem the patient should be kept alive. But force-feeding a patient (even 
intravenously) is not the same as administering antibiotics or arranging for family 
counselling. We may wish (we may even be morally required) to entreat with the 
patient to eat, and to inform him of the quality of life others in his condition have been 
able to attain, but coercive treatment, in Winkler’s terms, ‘would be perfectly brutal 
and without foreseeable end’. For Winkler, it is not at all clear whether the 
conclusions about autonomy drawn from the previous case still hold in this context ; 
indeed, it is not certain that ‘autonomy’ means anything at all outside of a specific 
context.
Hoffmaster has argued that attempts to extract principles from concrete situations 
encounter these problems because philosophers employ an ‘approach that creates and 
sustains the impression that moral theory and moral practice are discrete’79. This 
approach, he argues, attempts to fit actual situations into a conceptual framework of 
abstract principles rather than considering the complexities of the situations 
themselves and does ‘not take adequate account of the complexities of interplay
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between our understanding of practical issues [and] principles’ . For Hoffmaster, 
terms such as ‘value of life’ or ‘autonomy’ are ‘essentially contested’: though 
conceptual analysis may distinguish ‘a number o f different senses these concepts can 
have, and [expose] ambiguity and equivocation’81 it can never fully determine what a 
concept really ‘means’. As an example, he identifies four senses of autonomy (as free 
action, as authenticity, as effective deliberation and as moral reflection) and contends 
that no one of them provides a reliable guide for action. The senses are not ranked 
hierarchically, so how are we to know how to proceed should a patient’s decision 
satisfy one (or two, or three) o f the criteria but not the others? Hoffmaster does not 
believe we can; instead ‘the answer... must turn on an assessment of the underlying 
substantive considerations, not further refinement of the concept’82.
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Did Philosophers Ever Really Subscribe to the ‘Applied Ethics’ Model?
In attempting to illustrate the pernicious influence of the kind of philosophical thought 
she sees as suffusing the teaching of late^O* Century medical ethics, Maclean asks us 
to consider the following scenario:
Seven sailors are cast away on a barren island, with a plentiful supply of 
water... but no food at all... The ship’s captain... says that all they can 
do in these circumstances is resign themselves to their fate; but the 
ship’s doctor is far from agreeing with him. Fortified by his newly 
acquired knowledge of the value of life, he proposes to the captain that 
one of the sailors -  the fattest -  should be killed and eaten... The captain 
is shocked by this proposal [but the] doctor... proceeds to argue he is in 
a muddle. The captain, he says... values the lives of individual people...
Why allow seven deaths when only one is necessary? .. .Consequently, 
the suspicion enters the captain’s mind that courses in bioethics are not 
all they are cracked up to be83.
Given that the ship’s captain is ‘entirely innocent of moral philosophy’ and 
encounters someone claiming to be expert in it only in the person of the ship’s doctor, 
it is hardly surprising that he is suspicious (he is, on the available evidence, probably 
quite right to be); whether this is true for Maclean herself is another matter. The 
comparison of a (fictional) student of philosophical medical ethics advancing a 
shallow and poorly-thought-through argument with a (fictional) layman who is a 
deeper, if  less eloquent, moral thinker hardly qualifies as evidence that rational 
enquiry into the fundamental principles o f ethics is either fruitless or (as the example 
seems to imply) morally questionable; if anything, it is evidence for Lesser’s point 
that a philosophical education might not necessarily offer protection from making bad 
arguments or having a morally questionable character.
That the scenario, in order to emphasise philosophers’ supposed oversimplification of 
complex moral issues, presents as typical an argument so crude that its relevance to 
any actually held position is highly questionable is in fact rather typical of The 
Elimination o f  Morality as a whole. Elsewhere, for example, Maclean states that 
Harris implicitly argues (with regards to foetuses and neonates in the example above) 
that anything that is not a rational, self-aware ‘person’ does not have ‘moral status’84 
despite acknowledging (perhaps revealingly) in a footnote that Harris’ argument is
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both more complex and explicitly argues for something quite different85. Similarly, in 
the example mentioned above, a quotation from Harris describing the decision not to 
resuscitate a patient as an implicit judgement that their life is ‘less valuable, less 
worth saving’ is followed by discussion of an actual case in which Maclean asks 
whether the doctor involved considers his patient’s life as ‘not worth saving... without 
value [my emphases]’86. This tendency is especially damaging for Maclean’s third 
criticism (that it presupposes we entirely disregard our emotions in making moral 
judgements) for, as Lesser has pointed out, far from applying to all forms of 
consequentialist rationalism it ‘fails against any subtle form of consequentialism’ 
since it is likely the cultivation of emotional attachments, familiar relationships and 
friendships will contribute to ‘human happiness and the reduction of suffering’ in 
general ‘even if on particular occasions this fails to produce the best short-term
o*7
results’ . Maclean at times appears to be criticising a parody of her targets rather than 
the targets themselves (a tendency carried to quite unfortunate lengths in her 
discussion of Harris’ ‘The Survival Lottery’, which we will consider in more detail 
below).
Such oversimplification is not unique to Maclean. Although Winkler concedes that 
there were, by the last decade o f the 20th Century ‘very few [philosophers] left in 
bioethics’ who would subscribe to what he terms the ‘applied ethics’ model of moral 
reasoning ‘and probably none at all who have had any experience with moral 
problems in clinical settings’88, we may in fact question whether this model was -  in 
practice -  ever applied at all in the way that Maclean, Winkler and Hoffmaster appear 
to suggest. To illustrate this we may, initially, consider the above example in light of 
the kind of approach we identified with Hare and Rawls in the previous chapter, 
especially with reference to their concepts o f ‘principles’. We may remember that 
principles in Rawls’ sense, and in the second sense used by Hare, are not principles in 
the sense Maclean or Winkler describe (that is, supposedly universally binding rules 
grounded in the higher reaches o f abstract moral theory). For the former, they 
represent the ‘invariant’ elements established (as far as is possible) from careful 
examination of such considered moral judgements as we have made so far, and need 
do no more than cause us to carefully question our judgements of new situations. For 
the latter, they represent those attitudes and habits that serve to guide us in the
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majority of less-problematic moral situations, but may be broken (and this is 
important to note) with regret in certain very unusual circumstances.
Returning to the barren island and the unfortunate seven stranded thereon, Maclean 
argues that the ship’s doctor is following his training and applying what she regards as 
a key ‘bioethical’ principle, that of maximising lives, which she defines via another 
quotation from Harris: ‘in cases where we have to choose between lives when we 
cannot save all at risk, we should choose to save as many lives as we can’89.
Moreover, the doctor is, in doing so, arguing that this is the only morally acceptable 
decision: he is not arguing that although killing and eating the fattest sailor ‘will be a 
terrible thing to do’ it may be justified ‘by the extremity of the circumstances’ 
(Maclean explicitly rules this out)90. Given this, it is quite clear that the doctor is not 
applying a principle in either of the senses described above: he is not making a 
‘considered moral judgement’ and if he were, he might consider whether this self- 
evidently very unusual situation is one in which said principle applies. It is, in fact, 
the captain who appears to come closest to approaching the situation in the sense that 
Rawls and Hare suggest. He is not denying that the principle involved is a good one in 
general; he is denying -  with some regret, since to do so is a death sentence for his 
sailors -  that it is applicable in this very unusual case. Moreover he is, in fact, making 
a more principled decision than the doctor: for example in taking into account other 
general principles regarding his duty as captain to care for and protect individual 
crewmembers, the general moral impermissibility of killing, and the almost total 
moral impermissibility o f cannibalism.
When we consider the actual work o f philosophers in medical ethics in the latter 
decades of the 20th Century in both teaching and research, and moreover when we 
consider such work in terms o f historical context, it in fact bears little resemblance to 
Maclean’s examples or to Winkler and Hoffmaster’s more synoptic accounts. For 
example, it is difficult to see how the ship’s doctor would have come away from his 
‘course in bioethics’ thinking as he did were it to have been run by the philosopher 
Ruth Macklin, whose work in hospital setting in the early 1980s was described in the 
New York Times as follows:
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Doctors come to her with questions, and she gives them questions back.
They come with gut reactions and she hacks away at the reactions with 
analytic cleavers. It is not her role, she said, to decide matters but rather 
to place them in a moral context.... "They're not expecting answers from 
me," said Dr. Macklin..., "They're looking for guidance. Legal 
precedents. How to think about a problem. I give arguments on both 
sides."91
Similarly, as Gorovitz points out, philosophers were not insensitive to the demands 
placed on individuals by pre-existing social obligations, quoting Caplan’s contention 
that ‘[different principles] may be relevant in thinking through a case depending upon 
the presence or absence of such relationships as friendship, kinship, [and] leadership’. 
This is hardly a view that privileges ‘abstract’ principles over ‘underlying substantive 
concerns’; indeed, in the same article Caplan also emphasises how this sensitivity 
requires scrupulous attention be paid to the specific context in which a given moral 
problem occurs: ‘the more knowledge one has about the various kinds of relationships 
and roles that exist among individuals in everyday life the better skilled one will be in 
the exercise of practical judgment with regard to normative matters’92.
The importance o f considering historical context when approaching the work of 
philosophers in late 20th Century medical ethics is important for two further reasons. 
First of all, we may recall Maclean’s criticism that philosophers attempt to consider in 
terms o f ‘reasons’ and ‘values’ things that are better expressed as ‘attitudes embodied 
in practices’. As Lesser has pointed out, there are two main drawbacks to this 
argument. First o f all, since practices are apparently self-justifying it appears to 
commit us to a form o f relativism, for (as we saw in Chapter 2) there have, in fact, 
been cultures in which the lives of babies were ‘as a matter of course and without 
question’ at the disposal of their parents, and sometimes of the state as well, and 
‘[there] appears to be no way of saying that “this is what we do” settles the matter 
when what we do is nice and not when it is nasty’93. Moreover, it is simply not the 
case that reasons cannot be given for practices, ‘[indeed], the reverse is true: practices 
imply certain assumptions, both factual and evaluative [and that] it is often -  though 
not always -  unnecessary to refer to them does not mean that they are not there’. For 
instance, in the abortion example above ‘the child’s entitlement to life, whether 
mentioned or not, does very much enter into the matter [since to] consider abortion at 
all is to presuppose... that the entitlement is not absolute’94. Similarly, as Hare
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pointed out, a general principle (for which we may fairly read practice) will have to 
take into account judgements of fact; for example, our principle(s) regarding the care 
of patients with terminal cancer will depend on how many such patients ‘die in 
agony’, something that may be subject to change as a result of, for example, advances 
in techniques and technologies for pain management.
This last point is o f particular importance as the majority of philosophical work in 
medical ethics in the mid- to late 20th Century took place precisely because, as we 
have argued earlier in this thesis, such changes were taking place. As Gorovitz noted 
in answering the criticism that philosophers placed too great an emphasis on patient 
autonomy, changes in society and in medicine itself had meant that ‘historically 
grounded conventions o f practice... no longer [fitted] the changing contexts of 
modem medical care... the development of new medical capacities... invited 
divergence between the values of the physician and those of the patient [and it] 
became crucial to emphasise the role of independent judgment by patients in the 
making o f medical decisions’95. Maclean also appears to have failed to consider just 
what it is that we are supposed to do, as a matter o f  course and without question when 
‘new kinds o f questions -  for example, what the limits should be on the use of high- 
technology reproductive techniques, such as frozen-embryo transfer, or how decisions 
should be made about foetal surgery -  find no ready answer in appeals to traditional 
values’ . Indeed, our traditional values may themselves sometimes lead us into 
difficult areas; we may recall from Chapter 6, for example, Jonsen’s colleagues 
haemodialysis patients. One sensible answer would seem to be that, as Gorovotz 
suggests, when faced with ‘unprecedented, morally troubling situations, when the 
appeal to traditional values provides no unequivocal answer’ we should critically
97explore what we ordinarily do and/or value without question .
An appreciation for historical context is also important if we are to fairly evaluate 
individual examples of this critical reflection (perhaps more so if we are to take these 
as paradigmatic examples). To illustrate the problems that can occur when such 
examples are considered in isolation, we may examine Maclean’s criticism of Harris’ 
‘The Survival Lottery’, which we first encountered in our discussion of Fletcher’s 
situationism in Chapter 7. We may recall that Harris’ article begins with a proposal to 
their doctors from two individuals identified as Y and Z that another, healthy,
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individual (‘A’) be killed so as to provide them with the heart and lungs they 
respectively need to survive. This is, in fact only the first step in their argument, 
which in its fullest form reads as follows:
Y and Z ... propose that everyone be given a lottery number. Whenever 
doctors have two or more dying patients who could be saved by 
transplants, and no suitable organs have come to hand through ‘natural’ 
deaths, they can ask a central computer to pick the number of a suitable 
donor at random and he will be killed so the lives of two or more others 
will be saved98
Further possible modifications to the plan include referring to the killing of donors as 
their being ‘called to ‘give life’ to others’, adjusting the computer programme to 
ensure ‘whatever is considered to be an optimum age distribution throughout the 
population’ and refusing to give donor organs obtained in this way to ‘people who 
have brought their misfortune on themselves’ so that ‘the abstemious B’ will not have 
to give up his lungs to the smoker W and/or his liver to the drunkard X. The end result 
is that ‘everyone’s chances of living to a ripe old age might be increased... lives 
might well be more secure under such a scheme’99.
Note that we have attributed this argument to Y and Z, not to Harris himself, and for 
good reason: for, as we shall see in a moment, it is by no means certain that their 
position is his. Maclean, however, does not agree. For her, Y and Z are Harris’ 
mouthpieces and ‘The Survival Lottery’ is his ‘proposal intended to remedy the 
chronic shortfall in the number o f vital organs that presently become available to 
physicians for use in transplant surgery’100. This reading -  in effect, treating a 
philosophical article as the equivalent of a Government White Paper -  is, quite 
frankly, bizarre and only becomes more so when one considers both the contents of 
the article itself and the context in which it was produced. First of all, Y and Z are 
clearly not making their proposal in the 1975 of ‘chronic shortfalls’ during which the 
article was published; indeed, ‘The Survival Lottery’ begins '[let] us suppose that 
organ transplant procedures have been perfected... [my emphasis]’101. Moreover, 
Harris accepts that even if someone were to make such a proposal in earnest it would 
be ‘unlikely’ that their doctors would feel obliged to consider it102. A more likely 
purpose is to critically examine some common arguments regarding death and dying, 
in particular the traditional distinction between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’.
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Such a reading is supported when we consider that the validity and usefulness of this 
distinction was at the time increasingly being called into question by advances in life- 
sustaining technology. In the same year that ‘The Survival Lottery’ was published, for 
example, Rachels’ had challenged it in his article ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia’ in 
the New England Journal o f  Medicine103 and the President’s Commission would go 
on to identify it as needing to be ‘rehabilitated’ in ‘Deciding to Forego Life- 
Sustaining Treatment’, with the recommendation that a distinction between action and 
omission be used to identify rather than decide morally complex situations104. That 
Maclean describes Y and Z’s use of the doctrine of double-effect to absolve 
themselves of any malevolent intentions towards A (‘they merely wish to use a couple 
o f his organs, and if  he cannot live without them... tant pisV105) as ‘nothing more than 
an attempt to satirise’ this position106 seems manifestly unfair; Harris is, quite 
properly, exploring possible consequences o f this position in a new and unfamiliar 
context. Nor does it seem that Harris is making a straightforward claim that we are 
obliged to engineer ‘a society in which saintliness would be mandatory’107 because it 
is the rational thing to do, no matter what our feelings tell us. Although he appears to 
concede that the proposal should be accepted -  if  possible to implement -  by both
1 HRutilitarians and deontologists and that it may only be possible to answer Y and Z 
‘by relying on moral intuition, on the insistence that we do feel there is something 
wrong... and our confidence that this feeling is prompted by some morally relevant 
difference between bringing about the death of A and... of Y and Z’109, he does not 
necessarily suggest that this answer would be invalid.
More Sophisticated Approaches to Applied Ethics: Wide Reflective Equilibrium 
and The Web of Ideas
That the ‘applied ethics’ model was not a good ‘fit’ for the actual work being done by 
philosophers in the field did not go unnoticed; as Winkler points out, by the final 
decade of the 20th Century ‘most current work in bioethics [was] sensitive to the need 
for a Rawlsian kind of “reflective equilibrium” between principles and concrete 
judgements’110. This kind of method was developed from that proposed in ‘Outline of 
a Decision Procedure for Ethics’, as discussed in the previous chapter, and had been 
further revised in Rawls’ later works such as ‘The Independence of Moral Theory’ in 
which he had drawn out a distinction between ‘narrow’ and ‘wide reflective
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equilibrium’111. The latter method, as further developed by Daniels, seeks to address 
problems of theory acceptance in ethics by rejecting the ‘widely-held... two-tiered 
view of moral theories’ as consisting ‘of a set of moral judgements plus a set of 
principles that account for or generate them’112. For Daniels, this view has led to 
theoretical disputes in ethics becoming ‘intractable, unless... one is willing to grant 
privileged epistemological status to the moral judgments (calling them “intuitions”) or 
to the moral principles (calling them “self-evident” or otherwise a prioriy neither of 
which he finds an attractive option. Similarly, while appeals to ‘elementary 
coherence... constraints between principles and judgments sometimes allows us to 
clarify our moral views or to make progress in moral argument’, they do not seem to 
do enough to justify either judgements or principles ‘especially in the face of the 
many plausible bases for rejecting moral judgments; e.g., the judgments may only 
reflect class or cultural background, self-interest, or historical accident’113. Instead, 
Daniels advances a method that seeks to ‘produce coherence in an ordered triple of 
sets of beliefs held by a particular person, namely, (a) a set of considered moral 
judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background theories 
[my emphasis]’114.
As with ‘Outline of a Decision Procedure’, Daniels’ proposed method begins by 
collecting an individual’s initial moral judgements, and then proceeding to ‘filter them 
to include only those of which he is relatively confident and which have been made 
under conditions conducive to avoiding errors of judgment’115. As with Rawls’ 
conditions for selecting competent moral judges, Daniels appears to accept that these 
conditions cannot be precisely established straight away. Certainly, it seems likely 
that we should generally be more confident about judgements made when ‘the person 
is calm and has adequate information about cases being judged’116. On the other hand, 
Daniels allows for the possibility that ‘[sometimes] anger or (moral) indignation may 
lead to morally better actions and judgments than “calm”’ and acknowledges that, 
moving forwards, the method will need to ‘correct for divergence between stated 
beliefs and beliefs revealed in action’117. Once the process of filtering is complete, the 
following step is to ‘propose alternative sets o f moral principles that have varying 
degrees of “fit” with the moral judgments’. It is at this point that that the third part of 
Daniels’ ‘ordered triple’ becomes important, for the aim is not to ‘simply settle for the 
best fit of principles with judgments... which would give us only a narrow
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• • • 118equilibrium’ ; ‘[instead], we advance philosophical arguments intended to bring out 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the alternative sets of principles (or 
competing moral conceptions)’119. The end result is a complex collection of 
judgements, theories and principles, with the latter providing a structure of 
‘provisional fixed points’: as Winkler puts it, ‘principles [and theories] may be 
modified or rejected under the pressure of considered moral judgements [whilst] 
judgements remain open to revision under the pressure of theory-based principles’120.
This last element helps to distinguish wide reflective equilibrium from ‘a
[sophisticated] form of... subjective intuitionism’ (that is, from an attempt to grant
1^1privileged epistemological status to our moral judgements) , a charge Hare had 
levelled at Rawls’ A Theory O f Justice . Although, as Daniels points out, this may 
well be the case with narrow reflective equilibrium (in which our moral judgements 
are ‘fitted to’ a set of principles without scope for further revision), that wide 
reflective equilibrium starts with a set of individual moral judgements should not be 
taken to ‘mean that this represents an order of epistemic priority or a natural sequence 
in the genesis o f theories’123. The ‘Level III’ considered judgements contained in the 
‘ordered triple’ should not, in fact, be the same as the ‘Level I’ judgements we started 
out with124 and both types of judgement can continue to be revised in one of several 
ways:
Feasibility testing o f the background theory may lead us to reject it and 
therefore to revise the considered judgment. The judgment may be part 
of one background theory that is rendered implausible because of its 
failure to cohere with other, more plausible background theories, and so 
the considered judgment may have to be changed. The considered 
judgment may be part o f a system of background theories that would 
lead us to accept principles, and consequently some other level I 
considered judgments, which we cannot accept. If [however] we can 
trace the source of our difficulty back to a level III considered judgment 
that we can give up more easily than we can accept the new level I 
judgment, then we would probably revise the level III judgment125
The purpose of wide reflective equilibrium is not to ‘merely systematize some 
determinate set of judgments’126; rather we are, as Daniels puts it, to ‘imagine the 
[moral] agent working back and forth, making adjustments to his considered 
judgments, his moral principles, and his background theories’127.
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It appears to be the case that wide reflective equilibrium not only allows for what
Winkler describes as a more 'adequate account of the complexities of interplay
between our understanding of practical issues and our understanding of principles’128,
but also enables us to address some of the criticisms of philosophical enquiry that
depend on the assumption that philosophers adhere to the ‘applied ethics’ model; in
this respect, it appears to be a better ‘fit’ for what work was already being done. First
of all, we may consider Maclean’s criticism that philosophers depend on circular
reasoning in order to establish supposedly ‘objective’ values and principles. If we
consider the example she offered as ‘typical’ of bioethical thinking in the context of
wide reflective equilibrium, this criticism clearly does not apply. The proposed Level
III judgement that the lives of foetuses and neonates are utterly without value would
have to contend with the strong Level I judgement that they are valuable in some
sense; in this case it seems reasonably clear that it is easier to revise the Level III
judgement by adopting a more sophisticated theoretical position (for example that
value may be attached to sentience, interests and/or potential) than to give up the
Level I judgement entirely (indeed, that this is probably a better account of how
arguments regarding moral status historically ended up proceeding is something
100Maclean appears to accept ). Moreover, this process places us in the position of 
having to think carefully about what it is we do value about the lives of foetuses and 
neonates, which again seems to be a necessary element of the kind of analysis that 
Maclean thinks philosophers should undertake.
This example also addresses Hoffmaster’s criticisms that philosophical applied ethics 
finds it difficult to cope with ‘crucial moral issues [that] challenge assumptions upon 
which the theoretical edifice of applied ethics is based’, in particular questions 
regarding the moral status of non-rational beings , and that it cannot account for 
moral change (for example, why issues of animal rights and welfare are now 
considered important, when in the past it was ‘self-evident’ that the were not131). 
Reflection of the sort that Rawls and Daniels propose (and that, we have argued, 
philosophers were collectively already engaged in) can (in some cases) reveal both 
that we do not value things in the way we thought we did, and that we should value 
things we thought we did not. For example, as Beauchamp noted in his response to 
Noble, philosophical analysis of one definition o f ‘persons’ adopted by the United 
States Supreme Court showed it to be so broad as to apply to ‘infants and animals as
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1well as human foetuses’ , an analysis that does not only raise questions about what 
we value in human life. For example, it is a short step from this realisation to the 
argument that we should not perform vivisection on certain of the great apes because 
we would not do so on humans with a similar level of mental capacity. Hoffmaster’s 
criticism that such conclusions are ‘inadvertent [and] not [the result] of attending to 
the particular moral controversy in question’133 is somewhat puzzling; after all, if 
moral enquiry produces moral insights, what is so ‘inadvertent’ about that?
Furthermore, just as Hare’s approach depended to an extent on factual information 
concerning the context in which particular decisions are to be made, so Daniels’ 
approach here appears to suggest that Hoffmaster is correct in suggesting 
ethnographic study can ‘give content to the vague notion of “putting moral problems 
into context’” 134. One possible advantage o f considering the theoretical approaches 
used to justify competing principles is that it may reveal that disagreements over 
moral judgements may ‘rest on other, nonmoral disagreements’135 found in the 
‘relevant background theories’. As an example, Daniels offers Parfit’s proposed 
explanation of differences between utilitarians and contractarians over matters of 
distributive justice, in which:
the utilitarian, perhaps supported by evidence from the philosophy of 
mind, uses a weaker criterion of personal identity than that presupposed 
by, say, Rawls’s account of life plans. Accordingly, he treats 
interpersonal boundaries as metaphysically less deep and morally less 
important. The problem between the utilitarian and the contractarian 
thus becomes the (possibly) more manageable problem of determining 
the acceptability of competing theories o f the person136
So, Daniels would most likely agree with Hoffmaster that Anspach’s study into how 
the differences between doctors’ and nurses’ interpretation of cases in a neonatal 
intensive care unit were related to each profession’s conception of the proper function 
of medicine made a valuable contribution to the understanding and, possibly, 
resolution of such differences (for example, by revealing how it may be possible to 
negotiate a mutually acceptable definition); he might even agree that it is a 
contribution that could not be made by a philosopher lacking the expertise to conduct 
such studies137. However, given that Daniels’ article predates Hoffinaster’s by thirteen 
years, he would in doing so most likely disagree with the latter’s conclusion that
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philosophers are interested only in ‘whatever moral problems are brought before 
[them], assuming... that moral problems can be dealt with independently of the 
contexts in which they arise’138.
Daniels himself accepted that his work needed further development; in particular, he 
felt that ‘some story about moral practice and what we can leam from it, and not just 
about moral thought experiments, seems to be needed’139. In order to consider one 
way in which this might be possible, it may be instructive to compare Daniels’ ideas 
with Rachel’s adaptation into moral philosophy of Quine’s account o f ‘the web of 
belief (which, in its original form, had been intended to express the relationship 
between observation, theory, and logic in the material sciences). Whereas in the 
‘applied ethics’ model justification moves downwards from theory to principles to 
judgements, and in Daniels’ model up and down from judgements through principles 
to theory and back again, Rachels instead suggests we imagine ‘a network of beliefs 
which are connected to each other in various ways’140. At the centre of this ‘web of 
ideas’ are those elements of our moral thought and practice we hold most strongly, or 
in which we have most confidence. These can include particular moral judgements 
(Rachels gives as an example that the deeds o f the Manson family were wrong) and 
more wide-ranging principles (for example, that causing pain is wrong)141; there 
seems to be no reason why they need not include certain theoretical intuitions as well 
(for example, that the consequences of our actions are of moral importance). Moving 
outwards, we encounter those elements about which we are less certain (Rachels’ 
examples are the judgement that the behaviour o f the Reagan administration in the 
arms-for-hostages affair was wrong, and the idea that there is a difference between
i  A*ycausing harm and allowing it to happen ).
As with Daniels’ account, ‘no belief, theoretical or practical, is absolutely insulated
141from revision, whatever its position in the web may be at any given time’ ; however, 
these revisions, like the positions of the elements themselves, may be derived from 
more than one kind of source: practical and/or theoretical, moral and/or nonmoral. So, 
for example, Rachels suggests that the idea that animals had moral status was pushed 
closer to the centre of the ‘web’ by Darwin’s demonstration that humans share a 
common origin with other species in the 19th Century, and again by the philosophical 
arguments of Singer in the 20th144. Indeed, just as in Daniels’ account, where “‘It is
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wrong to inflict pain gratuitously on another person” is [revisable, but] so hard to 
imagine not accepting... that some treat it as a necessary moral truth’ since ‘to 
imagine revising such a provisional fixed point we must imagine a vastly altered wide 
reflective equilibrium that nevertheless is much more acceptable than our own’, so on 
Rachels’ those items closest to the centre of the ‘web’ are likely to be, to an extent, 
self-reinforcing. It is also worth noting that, rather than moving other elements 
outwards, new elements may instead reflect a deepening or broadening of elements 
already close to the centre; so, for example, we may interpret Rachels’ example 
regarding animals as a broadening of the already strongly-held belief that some kinds 
of thing have moral status (a belief that in the past was in all likelihood not extended 
to cover all human beings).
We should note that adopting Rachels’ model does not preclude the importance of the 
kind of philosophical work we introduced in the previous chapter. Not only will 
analysis o f language and argument play a part in moving different elements around 
the web of ideas, ‘it might’ as he points out ‘still be possible, when surveying the web 
at any given time, to systematise what one finds there in the traditional way’145. As 
Winkler accepts in his criticism of the ‘applied ethics’ model, in non-problematic 
cases (which of course make up the vast majority), we can and often do employ a 
simple ‘top-down’ deductive method, not from the level of a perfect ‘holy-grail’ 
theory, but from a ‘mid-level’ theory and/or our own web of ideas (which may of 
course be ‘implicit and inchoate’). When encountering those cases in which moral 
choices are ‘clear and straightforward... certain values or principles can be seen to 
apply normatively without difficulty or hesitation [and] we can always construct a 
deductive, or quasi-deductive, syllogism that derives our moral conclusion from the 
principle we then see it as upholding’146. Moreover, even in difficult cases, they will 
form part o f the ‘framework of central cultural values and guiding norms’ which 
enable us to make a ‘reasonable, well-justified, considered judgement’; indeed, it will 
be ‘the tensional structure of values and principles that shape and contour the basic 
nature of the problem itse lf147. Although Winkler believes that this precludes any 
approach that accepts that moral theories or principles may ‘override considered 
moral judgement’148, it appears to be the case that any truly ‘considered moral 
judgement’ needs must take into account theoretical and principled concerns.
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To illustrate this point further, we may consider the examples offered by Winkler in 
his discussion o f autonomy, in particular that of the paraplegic patient’s refusal of 
food. Where the ‘applied ethics’ model would describe this situation as a ‘conflict’ 
between principles in which we need to determine to which principle our theory 
assigns the most moral weight, we may instead see various values and principles 
‘shaping’ the problem: the debate is taking place over the issues in their broadest 
sense. So, the authenticity of the patient’s decision may rightly be considered an 
important issue were the procedure he would be forced to undergo short and relatively 
painless (say, an injection of antibiotics). But, where the procedure will be ‘brutal and 
without foreseeable end’, the authenticity o f his decision seems less important than a 
consideration o f the suffering that might result. Differences between principles 
concerned with obligations to help and to refrain from causing harm give form to, and 
are given form by, differences within a principle or principles regarding how far we 
may, or are obliged to, override another’s decisions regarding their own life and/or 
body. We are not left with an easy decision (and, where someone is likely to either 
starve to death or to live on feeling that, at the very least, their wishes and/or bodily 
integrity have been violated, it is entirely proper that we should not be) but we are 
likely to have a broader and deeper understanding o f what this decision involves. Far 
from ‘eliminating’ morality, philosophical enquiry will have helped to enrich our 
moral understanding.
Conclusions
We may instructively compare Rachels’ account o f the ‘web of ideas’ with our 
exploration thus far of the history of moral thought in medicine. To recap, from its 
very earliest beginnings, the practice of healing understood as a specialist skill has 
laid a moral obligation on its practitioners to be competent (we may think of this as 
one of the central points on our web, without which, as we argued in Chapter 1, it is 
difficult to see how we can meaningfully discuss medical ethics at all). As this 
obligation led to the development of practical skills, so these skills began to pose 
moral questions regarding the uses to which they could be put. Over time, the 
naturalistic turn in Greek thought and medicine further deepened and broadened 
moral concerns regarding the doctor’s methodology, concerns that continued to 
develop throughout the Middle Ages. At the same time, these concerns were
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paralleled by, and sometimes entwined with, questions regarding the organisation of 
medical men and the social and legal status o f medicine itself. Furthermore the 
growth, in response to these questions, of a scientific medical establishment in the 19th 
and 20th Centuries brought about medical advances that posed fresh variations on 
them as described in Chapter 6.
Beyond this, adopting a model similar to Rachels’ seems likely to bring with it certain 
practical advantages. First of all, in addition to accounting for the way in which our 
moral ideas can change and grow over time, it also allows us to marshal our collective 
moral thinking regarding earlier controversies when faced with new and difficult 
situations. Moreover, it allows for the tools o f moral philosophy, such as critical 
analysis o f language, concepts and arguments, the use of thought-experiments and the 
application o f ethical theories to be brought to bear upon them, together with the 
resources of the medical and social sciences. Furthermore, although neither our own 
enquiry or the adoption of the ‘web of ideas’ is sufficient to disprove entirely the 
existence of a ‘holy grail’ theory of applied ethics, they nevertheless serve to remind 
us of the likelihood that, even were we to establish such a theory, we would most 
likely be faced with new problems in deciding just how to apply it, especially 
following new and perhaps unexpected medical or social developments. As such, it 
reminds us to guard against moral complacency (and in any case, as Daniels has 
argued, if there are objective moral facts, this may be the best way to discover what 
they are and what kind of fact they are149). In order to demonstrate these advantages 
further, we will now move on to consider one possible example of a way that one set 
of ‘provisional fixed points’ may help to both deepen our understanding of moral 
problems in medicine and offer practical guidance in negotiating them: Beauchamp 
and Childress’ ‘four principles’ of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and 
justice.
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Part Three:
Beauchamp and Childress’ Four Principles 
Approach to Medical Ethics
Chapter 10: Criticism and Development of Beauchamp and Childress’ 
Principles o f  Biomedical Ethics from 1st to 6th Editions
As we saw in Chapter 8, the work of developing a principle or set of principles for 
moral guidance in specifically medical situations had begun in 1970 with Gorovitz’ 
Project on Moral Problems in Medicine at Case-Western Reserve University and 
continued through the publication of the first two editions of Moral Problems in 
Medicine and the specification of three principles (respect for persons, beneficence 
and justice) in the Belmont Report. In 1979 this project came to fruition with the 
publication of a ‘a thorough and systematic development’ of these principles1 by two 
members of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics2, the 1st edition of Beauchamp and 
Childress’ Principles o f  Biomedical Ethics (henceforth Principles). By combining ‘a 
commitment to the centrality of principles in moral reasoning, with a respect for the 
exigencies of circumstance and a liberating pluralism’3, Principles appeared to hold 
the ‘promise of overcoming the impasse of undecidability which was bedevilling the 
encounter between philosopher and physician and the clinic’4: as Winkler puts it ‘the 
mid-level... principles [appeared] to provide enough substance to guide practice’ yet 
also ‘[keep] faith with the ideal of comprehensive justification because each 
[principle] is linked with... our central traditions on normative theory’5. In the United 
States especially, the book ‘received a hearty welcome... when first it appeared’6; it 
would, over the course of the next decade, go on to become the ‘most widely used 
textbook on medical ethics’ and, in Winkler’s terms, ‘achieve the status of a standard 
or genuine paradigm of the field’8. Despite their widespread early acceptance (they 
are, as Erin puts it, ‘almost impossible for anyone with even a passing interest in the 
subject to avoid’9) however, the ‘Georgetown Mantra’, as the four principles are 
sometimes (and sometimes ‘contemptuously’10) referred to have been the focus of 
much criticism
Principles' genesis was in many ways a microcosm of bioethics as a whole, with the 
authors coming from different academic and theoretical backgrounds: Beauchamp, a 
philosopher and consequentialist; Childress, a theologian and deontologist11. The 
purpose of the 1st edition of Principles seems, at first glance, to have been clear and 
unambiguous: an attempt to offer ‘a systematic analysis of the moral principles that
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1 0should apply to biomedicine’ . Broadly speaking, the authors’ goal was to ‘sort out’ 
work already done and ‘bring some order and coherence to the discussion of [such] 
problems’. Through ‘examining moral principles and determining how they apply to 
cases and how they conflict’ Beauchamp and Childress hoped to rectify a situation in 
which ‘moral judgements involved in one dilemma [appeared] to be unconnected to 
the moral judgements in others’13. Despite this apparent simplicity of purpose, 
however, there has been little subsequent consensus from its critics on just what 
approach the 1 * edition of Principles and its five subsequent revisions have 
advocated:
Some... concerns have included that the four concepts have too little 
content (that they can mean anything, depending on the person using 
them); that they have too much content (that people using them are 
forced to buy into an exclusively American system of values); that there 
are too many principles (that, for instance, nonmaleficence and 
beneficence should be fused together as a principle of utility); and that 
there are too few  o f them (that, for instance, the virtues of care, 
friendliness and charity, crucially important in good health care 
provision, are not addressed of all, or at least they are not included in the 
list)14
For this reason, the following chapter will attempt to address these criticisms through 
an exploration, firstly o f how Beauchamp and Childress’ approach to philosophical 
reflection developed from the 1st through to the (current) 6th edition of Principles and 
secondly, of the intended meaning and use o f the principles themselves.
Moral Theory in Principles from l 8t to 6th Editions
Despite our argument in the previous chapter that few, if any, philosophers working in 
the field of medical ethics actually subscribed to the simplistic ‘top-down’ deductivist 
method that Winkler terms the ‘applied ethics’ model, we must nevertheless concede 
that his description is closely paralleled by the 1st edition of Principles' account of 
justification in moral thinking, which is described as follows:
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1st Edition Model of Ethical Justification
4. Ethical Theories
A
3. Principles
A
2. Rules
A
1. Judgements and Actions
As an example o f how such a model may be seen to operate in practice, Beauchamp 
and Childress offer the case of a doctor who 1. refuses to perform amniocentesis (a 
prenatal test for congenital defects or the sex of the foetus which may lead to the 
decision to terminate a pregnancy) citing 2. a ‘moral rule against killing innocent 
human beings’, grounded in 3. ‘a principle of the sanctity of human life’ justified by
4. ‘an ethical theory’. It appears to be reasonably clear from this example that the 
authors intend for the model to apply both to scholarly ethics and to everyday moral 
decision-making, but they allow that the (unspecified) ethical theory followed by the 
hypothetical doctor and indeed in the majority o f real-life cases is likely to be 
‘implicit or inchoate’; they also suggest that it is likely this model greatly 
oversimplifies what is actually going on15. Despite the similarity between this model 
and the one which both Winkler and (to a greater extent) Maclean assert most or some 
philosophers did or do follow when working in applied ethics, it is clear that, even in 
the 1st edition, Beauchamp and Childress did not intend the four principles to provide 
an explicit and coherent level 4 theory, nor did they believe that one existed at 
present. The 151 edition of Principles does discuss two main candidates (or kinds of 
candidate) for the role offered by traditional ethical thought: deontology and 
consequentialism (or in their terms, utilitarianism), but although each author offers 
qualified support (as noted above) for one o f these approaches, both are willing to 
concede that ‘[neither] theory is fully satisfactory on all...tests’16.
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In fact, Beauchamp and Childress appear to envision work in philosophical medical 
ethics as following something far closer to the method of Wide Reflective 
Equilibrium described by Rawls and Daniels (or, to some extend, the second kind of 
moral thinking described by Hare); we should remember that, in the above model, 
whilst the process o f justification works only one way, the process offormulating an 
ethical theory is dialectical. As with Rawls, an ethical theory is arrived at by 
systematising individual judgements and actions, and this theory is then tested, when 
confronted with new situations, by applying it back ‘down the chain’ and considering 
the judgements it suggests. When an unacceptable judgement is suggested, rules and 
principles should then be revised in such a way as to cause the smallest disruption to 
the theory as a whole, which can then be tested again in new situations and further 
revised if  necessary17. As the authors note, despite the relative novelty of ‘systematic 
work in biomedical ethics’, many of the issues have been debated ‘for decades and, in 
some cases, for centuries’ by philosophers, theologians and in the formulation of 
professional codes of ethics and research18. The analysis undertaken in Principles can 
be seen as an attempt to make explicit the task of gathering all of these ‘considered 
moral judgements’ together with the theories involved and attempting to sort them in 
such a way as to properly fit this model as far as level 3.
Beauchamp and Childress argue that this is possible because ‘the [practical] 
differences [between different philosophical approaches] can easily be 
overemphasised’ and that they can (after a fashion) be used in conjunction. Winkler 
has suggested that this agreement is largely brought about merely by calling different 
theoretical approaches ‘principles’:
The principle of autonomy, for example, is an expression of the rights 
and dignity of the person that forms the foundations for Kantianism and 
modem forms of deontological theory generally. The principle of 
beneficence [conflated with nonmaleficence], obviously, has its heritage 
in classical utilitarianism. And the principle of justice is most naturally 
connected with contractarian traditions in moral theory19
This is, however, clearly not the case. Rather, citing the work of the utilitarian R.B. 
Brandt and the deontologist W.D. Ross, Beauchamp and Childress argue that, 
regardless which theory one adopts ‘it is possible from both... standpoints to defend 
the same rules. .. and to assign them roughly the same weight’20 (that each principle is
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rooted in and/or explored through different approaches to moral theory is something 
we will consider in more detail below). In Winkler’s terms, each appears to have had 
‘some share of the truth’21: whilst neither may lay claim to have discovered the 
absolute moral truth both appear to have produced outcomes which are both true and 
moral. We may think at this point of Ramsey’s contention (as discussed in Chapter 7) 
that, divine or otherwise, Christ had been able to ‘get at’ something which was 
inherently moral regardless o f the validity o f the particular world view that got him 
there and o f principles as described by Hare (in his first sense) and Rawls, as 
discussed in Chapter 8. On this reading, the four principles describe what is already 
generally agreed to be the case and comprise ‘the points on which the major traditions 
[are] able to agree... and the ‘deal breakers’ which any future universal moral 
theory... needs must satisfy’22. On matters of dispute, philosophers are free to pursue 
further enquiry on deontological, consequentialist or other lines. However, should any 
o f these approaches ultimately provide a complete and final theory, the principles 
represent those provisional fixed points which experience suggests would not have to 
be reconsidered to any great extent (at least with regards to medical matters).
Whether or not Beauchamp and Childress believed it possible that this process might 
eventually establish a deductivist theory that should occupy the fourth tier of their 
model by reaching a point where it was no longer dialectical (that is, where no further 
judgement or action could cause theory, principles or rules to be revised) is not 
immediately clear from the 1st edition of Principles. Certainly there is some evidence 
to suggest that they might, not least in the space left for a Level 4 theory on their 
model o f moral justification itself. Moreover, their account of what might constitute a 
moral claim includes the Hare-esque stipulation that such claims be universalisable 
(that is, ‘[require] that all relevantly similar cases be treated in a similar way’) in 
addition to being ‘supreme, final, or overriding in judgements about actions’, not 
based on ‘self interest or personal inclination’23 and (possibly) having ‘some direct 
relevance to the welfare o f  others' (although this is assumed to always, or almost 
always, be the case with any specific claim regarding medical matters) . If we can 
identify moral claims in this way, then all moral dilemmas should come down to our 
being able to identify which of two competing claims is truly moral; as Hare puts it: 
‘in the words of a wayside pulpit reported to me by Mr. Anthony Kenny, “if you have 
conflicting duties, one of them isn’t your duty’” 25. At most, according to Hare, we
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may have a conflict between either a general principle, which may ‘regretfully’ be 
broken, and a truly universal one.
This view of moral decision-making is open to objection. We may consider, for 
example, Nussbaum’s account of the dilemma faced by the Greek king Agamemnon 
between offering his daughter Iphigenia as a sacrifice to the goddess Artemis, or of 
leaving his fleet becalmed at sea, with the result that all aboard (including Iphigenia 
herself) will die o f thirst and/or starvation26. In such a case, whilst we may accept that 
saving the lives of the fleet is morally right, saying that Agamemnon kills Iphigenia 
(as he eventually decided to) for moral reasons does not seem to make the murder 
itself a moral thing to do (which, on Hare’s account, it would have to, since it is an 
action Agamemnon feels compelled to carry out, and one which he seems to believe 
anyone should feel compelled to carry out under the circumstances). Nor does it seem 
to mean that his reluctance to sacrifice his daughter was solely grounded in something 
other than a sense of moral obligation not to do so such as, for example, his personal 
attachment to Iphigenia. Even were we to allow that this reluctance was not a moral 
impulse (which is by no means certain) the fate which eventually befalls him as a 
result of his actions seems grounded in another universalisable rule (that is: ‘fathers 
should not kill their own daughters’).
If we allow that this example suggests that some of the gravest moral dilemmas are 
those that are choices between two ‘goods’ (or perhaps, two ‘evils’), it is quite clear 
that Beauchamp and Childress’ account o f the nature of moral dilemmas in the 1st 
edition of Principles favours Nussbaum’s view over Hare’s. For, although one sort of 
moral dilemma occurs when ‘[some] evidence indicates that act X is morally right, 
and some evidence indicates that act X is morally wrong, but the evidence on both 
sides is inconclusive’ (and may thus be satisfactorily resolved through further analysis 
or by gathering ffesh evidence) another, more serious kind occurs when ‘[it] is clear 
to the agent that on moral grounds he or she both ought and ought not to perform act 
X’27. In such cases Beauchamp and Childress note that a moral decision will need to 
be made but, with reference to Nozick’s conception of ‘moral traces’, note that part of 
that decision will involve the moral agent ‘not only [approaching] his decision 
conscientiously, but... also [experiencing] regret and, perhaps, even remorse at 
having to neglect or violate’ a moral obligation28. We may note that this differs from
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Hare’s account in according full moral status to the broken principle: the decision 
involves two competing moral claims, rather than a decision between a moral and 
non-moral claim, or a general and a specific moral claim.
That this reading conforms with Beauchamp and Childress’ own views is further 
supported by the list of five tests that the 1st edition of Principles suggested should be 
applied to any proposed moral theory. The first, second and third of these (that 
theories should be ‘internally consistent and coherent’, ‘complete and comprehensive’ 
and as simple as possible) recall Rawls’ comments regarding establishing the least 
possible variance, with the third (motivated in part by the need to create ‘no more 
rules, principles and concepts... than people are able to remember and able to apply 
without confusion’) is reminiscent of his contention that a moral theory should be 
able to be understood by anyone of ‘average’ intelligence. A theory also needs to fit in 
with ‘ordinary’ judgements, and finally must retain enough authority to cause us to 
question, in cases o f conflict, whether it is our judgement or the theory that is in 
error29, a point that at least suggests it is unlikely any theory we are ever likely to 
establish will provide infallible guidance in every possible situation. This view of 
theory is, again, essentially similar to Rawls’, who, we may remember, sought the 
‘least possible variance’ between judgements but did not rule out the possibility that 
some differences between moral principles may ultimately remain insoluble.
Given this disparity between the (over)simplicity of the 1st edition’s model of moral 
justification and the ease with which it could be held to represent a deductivist ideal 
on the one hand, and the complexities of the model of moral reasoning present 
elsewhere in the text on the other it is perhaps to be expected that later editions of 
Principles have, in their treatment of moral theory, moved towards something much 
closer to the views we attributed to Rachels in the previous chapter. In the (current) 
6th edition, any possibility that Principles should be read as expounding the kind of 
‘model inspired by disciplines such as mathematics’ frequently associated with the 
term ‘applied ethics’ is firmly rejected30; instead, Beauchamp and Childress advocate 
the use of a model closer to that found in the natural sciences, that is ‘neither strictly 
inductivist (involving only experimentation and observation) nor strictly deductivist 
(using mathematics and a priori principles)’31 and incorporates reflective 
equilibrium32 with a set of considered judgements that are found in what the authors
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term ‘the common morality’33. This consists of ‘the set of norms shared by all persons 
committed to morality’, for example ‘do not cause pain or suffering to others’. As the 
authors take pains to point out, these should not be thought of as ‘ahistorical or a 
priori’ but rather as ‘a product of human experience and history [that is] universally 
shared’34; in other words they are those particular moral judgements of which we are 
most certain (we might say, those closest to the centre of the web of ideas). Moreover, 
they are prima facie , rather than absolutely, binding: that is, they incur obligations 
‘that are absolutely binding unless a competing moral obligation outweighs them’ (so 
it may be permissible to inflict pain on another, for example, in performing necessary 
surgery on them)35.
Although, as with Rawls’, Daniels’ and Rachel’s models, this ‘set of considered 
judgements that are acceptable initially without argumentative support’ are unlikely 
to be perfect, they form ‘an acceptable starting premise’ (as, indeed, they must since 
there does not appear to be another such starting premise available). From these 
‘landmark fixed points’ we can proceed to construct more general accounts and ‘to 
match, prune and adjust considered judgements... to render them coherent with the 
premises of our most general moral commitments’. From these, theories and general 
principles can be formulated that will then be tested against other judgements, at 
which point we are obliged to ‘go back and readjust the guides further’ ; in doing so, 
we are able to guard against the danger present in ‘bottom-up’ theories (that is, those 
that proceed primarily from decisions made in paradigm cases ) that we are simply 
‘applying whatever moral maxims happen to be lying around at hand in [our] 
culture’39. The authors accept that, in may cases, it is likely that we (as yet) lack the 
adequate theoretical resources to link together all o f our more confident judgements 
about a particular issue, in which case we will need to attempt to balance the 
advantageous elements of any relevant theories, principles and/or judgements against 
each other. With regards to moral status, for example, Beauchamp and Childress 
consider five candidate theories based on human properties40, cognitive properties41, 
moral agency42, sentience43 and relationships44 noting that each ‘has elements that are 
worthy o f acceptance [but] falls into implausibility when it loses sight of the merit in 
competing criteria’45.
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Whereas the principles outlined in the 1st edition could be read, as Winkler does, as 
‘mid-level’ deductive points that prescribed set actions in all cases except those where 
they appeared to conflict, the view outlined in the 6th edition therefore necessitates a 
more complex account. On this view, the principles are not clear and unambiguous 
action-guides but rather ‘four clusters of... “general norms’”46 that experience 
suggests are most relevant to problems of medical ethics. Although it is still likely 
that in less problematic cases we can use the principles in the former sense (as part of 
what Winkler describes as a ‘quasi-deductive syllogism’) ‘moral judgements in hard 
cases almost always require that we specify and balance norms... not merely that we 
bring a particular instance under a preexisting covering rule or principle’47. However, 
even in these more straightforward cases we still may need to do some work to 
specify the sense in which a principle is being applied; for example, in the case of 
triage we can rightfully apply a fairly straightforward conception of justice based on 
the allocation of resources to those in greatest need that may, nevertheless, not be 
applicable to questions of justice relating to social provision of healthcare48 (so, for 
example, we may in an emergency prioritise the treatment of a patient in immediate 
danger o f death over that of a patient with a painful, yet non life-threatening skin 
condition; if, however, we were to apply this to the provision of healthcare as a whole, 
the latter patient would most likely never be treated -  there would always be 
someone, somewhere, with a more urgent need49). Moreover, the specification of 
justice used in triage may itself vary from situation to situation: although ‘disaster 
victims are generally sorted according to medical need [if] some survivors are medical 
personnel who suffer only minor injuries, they justifiably receive priority of treatment 
if they are needed to help others’50. As we might always be faced with a new situation 
or theoretical example that causes us to question our specification of a principle or its 
compatibility with specifications of other principles, ‘new contingent conflicts can 
always arise’51; as such ‘there is no reason to expect that the process of revising moral 
judgements and specifying and balancing principles will come to an end... 
equilibrium is an idealisation that can never be realised’ . In order to further 
illuminate how this process may take place, we will now turn our attention to a more 
detailed exploration of the principles themselves.
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Beauchamp and Childress’ Principle of Autonomy from 1st to 6th Editions
Despite Winkler’s contention, as noted above, that the 1st edition’s principle of 
autonomy is largely derived from deontological approaches, particularly Kant’s53, it is 
clear that Beauchamp and Childress never intended for it to be interpreted so 
narrowly. Indeed, they explicitly identified it as a key issue for the majority of moral 
thinkers in all traditions, citing as examples figures as diverse as ‘Nietzsche, Sartre, 
R.M. Hare and Robert Paul W olff54. Furthermore, although their initial account does 
depend heavily upon Kant for one possible definition of autonomy (‘freedom of the 
will’, defined as ‘governing oneself, including making one’s own choices’) equal 
weight is given to Mill with regards to another (‘freedom of action’, or the ability to 
act upon those choices, to the extent that one should ‘not interfere with a like 
expression of freedom by others’55). As we might expect given their views on the 
compatibility o f different ethical traditions, Beauchamp and Childress are primarily 
concerned with how these two concepts relate to each other in terms of providing 
concrete action-guides and it is reasonably clear that, on these terms, the concepts are 
self-reinforcing. Their account of Mill, for example, effectively presents him as 
providing an argument for the utility of encouraging individuals to adopt an attitude 
of practical, reflective engagement with their culture. In other words, Mill is seen to 
offer utilitarian grounds for behaving in a way which is strikingly similar to 
Beauchamp and Childress’ description of Kantian autonomy (which prohibits ‘acting 
from desire, impulse [or] habit’)56.
The different ways in which these philosophers are concerned with autonomy, 
however, lead to subtle differences in the practical consequences of putting their ideas 
into practice: ‘Mill’s view leads to a moral demand of non-interference with the 
autonomy of others in society, while Kant’s leads to a moral demand that certain 
attitudes o f respect be framed about the personhood and beliefs of others’57. As the 6th 
edition puts it, the principle can therefore ‘be stated as a negative obligation and a 
positive obligation’; according to the former ‘actions should not be subjected to 
controlling constraints by others [subject to] valid exceptions’, whilst the latter 
‘requires both respectful treatment in disclosing information and actions that foster 
autonomous decision-making’. However, neither of these senses need be mutually 
exclusive; rather (as with Hare’s contention that consideration for deontological
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concerns can help to develop more sophisticated versions of utilitarianism) an 
appreciation of the more plausible elements of both accounts leads us to a richer and
CO
more sophisticated understanding of the relevant issues . The principle of autonomy, 
so understood, covers the ‘cluster of concerns’ regarding a patient’s right to make 
decisions for themselves, with their ability to do so and the extent to which doctors 
may (or may be required to) make decisions on their behalf. Specific examples of 
situations in which these issues are likely to arise include cases of human
C Q
experimentation , refusal of treatment for either oneself or others (for example family 
members)60 and suicide61. The principle, sometimes in conjunction with others, also 
supports ‘more specific moral rules’ such as truth-telling and respect for privacy62.
One obvious area of concern covered by the principle of autonomy is that of informed 
consent in treatment and/or experimentation, Beauchamp and Childress’ evolving 
understanding o f which between the 1st and 6th editions of Principles demonstrates 
both the principles’ ability to provide firm, specific action-guides and the flexibility of 
their approach in responding to and incorporating criticisms of their earlier positions. 
The 1st edition identified four key elements necessary to ensure, as far as possible, that 
a patient’s decision is autonomous: two ‘Information Elements’ (disclosure and 
comprehension) relating to the patients access to relevant and understandable 
information regarding proposed treatment and/or research and two ‘Consent 
Elements’ (<competence and voluntariness) relating to their ability to make 
meaningful choices based on this information. On this understanding, disclosure 
requires that patients are in possession of all relevant information concerning any 
procedure they are to undergo, along with subsidiary questions of what is considered 
to be ‘relevant’ information and what (if anything) would constitute good reason for 
withholding it64. Comprehension requires that patients are, as far as is possible or 
practicable, able to understand this information65. Competence requires that patients, 
once in possession of the information furnished by the first two requirements, are 
capable o f making a rational choice based upon it66. Voluntariness requires that 
patients’ decisions are made more or less in line with this information and not subject 
to either coercion (the ‘threat of harm or forceful manipulation’) or undue influence
•  •  67(‘an excessive reward or irrationally persuasive technique’) from outside .
201
Whilst providing these particular specifications of the principle of autonomy, the 1st 
edition explicitly acknowledges that judging just how these criteria are to be applied 
is likely to prove problematic, especially with regards to competence68. In addition, 
whilst the 1st edition’s account may be seen to do an admirable job of identifying 
several different philosophical senses of the principle o f autonomy (that is, may be 
seen as the result o f using different philosophical approaches to arrive at a fuller 
analysis of the concept) these criteria are clearly open to influence from sociological 
and psychological work into, for example, just how people process information and 
reach decisions (especially in clinical settings) and legal precedents as to how they are 
seen to apply in practice. It may be accounted a notable strength of this initial 
analysis, then, that the 1st edition’s account was able to incorporate subsequent 
investigation o f the concept into the revised and deepened version of the principle 
presented in the 6th. In line with ‘[legal], regulatory, philosophical, medical and 
psychological’ literature the later edition adopts a seven-element view of ‘the building 
blocks’ of informed consent69. On this view, competence and voluntariness are recast 
as ‘Threshold Elements’; a ‘presupposition of obtaining informed consent’, since their 
absence rules this out as a possibility70. The ‘Information Elements’ now include 
disclosure, recommendation of a plan and understanding, reflecting the need for the 
doctor to offer their honest professional opinion as to the patient’s best interests71. 
Finally, the ‘Consent Elements’ include both the patient’s decision regarding a
72proposed plan and their authorization or rejusal of said plan .
The 6th edition also explores how several different kinds of substantive concern may 
affect what is required to apply each of these elements o f the principle of autonomy to 
specific practical cases. So, for example, when recommending a course of action to a 
patient it may be important for a doctor to highlight any potential conflicts of interest: 
‘[researchers]... may hold stock in a pharmaceutical company that sponsors the 
research... physicians may have an investment in a radiological centre to which he or 
she refers the patient’73. There may also be therapeutic reasons for making a more 
limited form of disclosure, for example where disclosing certain information would 
cause ‘deterioration in the patient’s condition’ or, more narrowly, likely ‘render the 
patient incompetent to consent to or refuse the treatment’74; in possible therapeutic 
uses of placebos75; and in research (although this is categorically ruled as 
impermissible ‘if significant risk is involved and subjects are not informed they are
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being placed at risk’)76. Beyond this, the way in which information is presented needs 
to take into account the results of linguistic and psychological studies into decision­
making: one study, for example, found that 25% of participants would select radiation 
therapy over surgery for lung cancer when quoted survival rates, whilst 46% would 
make the same choice when quoted death rates due to a consequently inflated 
perception o f ‘the risk of immediate death from surgical complications’77. Finally, 
there may be more complex societal issues: Beauchamp and Childress’ cite the case 
of a ‘poor white woman from Appalachia with a third-grade education’ refusing 
cancer treatment because she did not believe she had cancer, due to a misconceived 
notion of what cancer symptoms ‘were like’ and her prejudiced view of the (black) 
doctor making the diagnosis. In this case, distasteful though her views may have been, 
disabusing her o f her false belief about cancer necessarily required the intervention of 
a white doctor78.
Treating autonomy as a cluster of concerns to be explored rather than a single closely- 
defined principle to be applied also helps to defuse allegations noted in the previous 
chapter that the principle of autonomy is, firstly, overly dominant in philosophical 
discussions and secondly, reflects distinctively (and implicitly, white) North 
American moral and political values. With regards to the first point, Beauchamp and 
Childress explicitly rule out the ‘misguided interpretation [that they] have 
encountered many times in the past thirty years’ that ‘autonomy overrides all other 
moral consideration in [their] work’ noting that they have ‘always argued’ autonomy 
should not be understood as ‘excessively individualistic, absolutistic or overriding... 
to the neglect... o f social responsibilities’ (for example in the case of ‘[choices] that 
endanger the public health, potentially harm innocent others, or require a scarce 
resource for which no funds are available’) and that in general ‘it is usually a 
mistake... to frame the issues as giving an overriding status to one principle over 
another’79. With regards to the second point, the theoretical underpinnings of the 
principle in the 1st edition, as Hayry has pointed out:
... originate from Germany and England, and can therefore hardly be 
seen to impose an external threat to indigenous European moral 
thinking. And although the authors have, later on, replaced ethical 
theories with common morality as the proper framework for their
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principles, they can hardly be said to have abandoned the Western roots 
of their model °.
We may also recall from the previous chapter Gorovitz’ argument that the large 
amount of work done on autonomy by philosophers in their initial explorations of 
medical ethics was largely the result of historical circumstances rather than any 
particular ideological bias. Given that this work needed to be done, and that much of 
it was done in the United States, we should not perhaps be surprised that we have a 
great many explorations of the concept from a (white) North American perspective 
and rather fewer from other cultures.
This criticism might still be sustained if such work unfairly excludes, or were to prove 
incompatible with, further explorations o f the principle from different cultural 
backgrounds; as it happens, it is quite clear from the 6th edition of Principles that this 
is simply not the case. Indeed, as with their rejection o f the idea that autonomy should 
always override other principles, the authors explicitly engage with two studies that 
purport to show conflicts between the autonomy that patients supposedly should be 
granted, and what patients actually want from their encounters with healthcare
o  a
providers . In the first, researchers had asked elderly patients from four different 
ethnic backgrounds whether they believed doctors should disclose to them ‘the 
diagnosis and prognosis of terminal illness’, and about decision-making at the end of 
life. The results showed, amongst other things, that European Americans and African 
Americans were ‘significantly less likely... to believe that a patient should be told the 
diagnosis of metastatic cancer’ than Korean Americans and Mexican Americans, and 
that the latter two groups ‘tended to believe that the family should make decisions 
about the use of life support’82. In the second, researchers found that traditional 
Navajo beliefs regarding the ability o f language to shape and control events, 
according to which ‘telling a ... patient who has recently been diagnosed with a 
disease the potential complications of that disease may actually produce these 
complications’, meant that some Navajo patients may view disclosure of risk as 
potentially harmful in itself83. As Beauchamp and Childress point out, however, both 
studies ‘mistakenly view their results as opposing rather than enriching [a] principle
•  84of respect for autonomy’ that includes a ‘right to accept or decline information’ . The
85principle of autonomy confers a right to autonomous choice rather than a duty and a
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patient may always decide to delegate such choice86. As such, these studies are in fact 
a necessary and valuable part of discovering how this principle needs to be applied in 
different practical cases.
Beauchamp and Childress’ Principle of Nonmaleficence from 1st to 6th Editions
Unlike the principle o f autonomy, the 151 edition of Principles presents the principle of 
nonmaleficence as originating, not in detailed ethical theory, but in general historical 
traditions of moral thought both in medicine and elsewhere; as the authors note, the 
provenance of the popular maxim to ‘first, do no harm’ is obscure87 and (as they point 
out in the 6th) attempts to locate it securely in Hippocratic writings are contentious88.
It is possible that this is because the principle seems, at first glance, a simple a matter 
of common sense. Certainly, any attempt to include nonmalevolence (that is, a general 
disposition to avoid or absence of intention to inflict harm on others) as a principle 
seems ridiculous. After all, it is unlikely that anyone would enter the medical 
professions with the goal o f causing harm, and even if  someone did we could not 
expect them to pay much heed to any moral principles at all. At first glance we might 
also expect this to be the case with nonmaleficence (an obligation not to perform acts 
which cause harm to others89) as well. Indeed, the very existence of medicine can be 
seen to result from the principle, given that medicine is explicitly concerned with
nn
preventing, avoiding and/or reducing the harm caused by illness, injury and disease . 
Despite this, however, we may recall that the idea that medicine may in some cases 
itself prove harmful is not a new one (compare, for example, Plato’s account of 
Herodicus as discussed in Chapter 2) and had become more acute over the course of 
the 20th Century (we may once again remember Jonsen’s colleague’s haemodialysis 
patients as first discussed in Chapter 6).
Working primarily with a physical and psychological concept o f ‘harm’ (as opposed 
to, for example, damage to ‘property, domestic relations, and privacy’) 91 the 1st 
edition’s account of nonmaleficence begins with a discussion of those harms that may 
be caused by incompetence, negligence and/or malpractice, an account retained in 
largely unchanged form in the 6th edition92. In choosing to accept the professional and 
social position of a healthcare practitioner, Beauchamp and Childress argue, doctors, 
nurses and others ‘[create] the expectation that [they] will observe... standards [of
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knowledge, skill and diligence]’ and thus incur a special obligation to live up to such
93expectations . Such concerns are not limited to standards of personal clinical 
competence: for example, a doctor is required to have an adequate understanding of 
their own limitations, so as to know when to consult more experienced colleagues or 
specialists, and to have a good understanding of the probable harms associated with a 
given injury or disease, and the probable benefits and/or harms associated with a 
course of treatment94. We can add to the authors’ own account here by noting that we 
might firstly (as we have argued is implicitly required by both the Oath and Percival) 
expand doctors’ nonmaleficent obligations to include upholding the reputation of 
medicine as a whole and secondly, extend similar obligations to non-medical staff 
working in a medical setting (for example, given the importance of cleanliness in 
preventing the spread of disease, to hospital cleaners).
More problematic from the perspective o f the principle of nonmaleficence are cases 
(such as Jonsen’s colleague’s) in which treatment itself runs the risk of causing some 
form of harm to the patient themselves (including the risk of what Illich termed, given 
that 'pharmaceutical products [can] make you ill, hospitals [provide] hotbeds of 
infection, surgery [can be] bungled [and] tests [can be] lacking or misleading’,
Q C  - a
iatrogenesis or ‘doctor-caused illness’ ). The authors argue, in the 1 edition, for the 
rejection o f ‘vitalism’ that is, the view that ‘metabolism and vital processes [are] good 
in [themselves]’ should be rejected96. Instead, they argue that healthcare professionals 
‘should work with a presumption in favour o f the prolongation of life [my 
emphasis]’97 but that treatment should not be considered obligatory (and may even be 
considered harmful98) in cases where a patient is irreversibly dying, and perhaps in 
cases where a patient is either completely or largely unable to derive meaning from 
their continued existence also99. As with the principle o f autonomy in general, this 
particular specification of the principle o f nonmaleficence is greatly expanded upon in 
the 6th edition by drawing upon more recent discussions of several elements 
introduced into discussions of treatment and nontreatment decisions by ‘[religious] 
traditions, philosophical discourse, professional codes, and the law’, in particular: 
distinctions between withdrawing and withholding life-sustaining treatment; between 
extraordinary and ordinary treatment; between sustenance technologies and medical 
treatments; between intended effects and merely foreseen effects; and between killing 
and letting die'00.
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Whilst acknowledging that these distinctions have ‘at times [been] influential in 
medicine and law’, Beauchamp and Childress contend that they ‘are all outmoded and 
untenable... and some... are morally dangerous’101. For example, in the case of 
choices between withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment, the authors 
accept that ‘ [many] professionals and family members feel justified in withholding 
treatments they never started, but not in withdrawing treatments already initiated’, 
reflecting an ‘understandable’ common-sense view that the latter ‘render them 
causally responsible for the patient’s death’102. However, maintaining this distinction 
in practice runs the risk of both overtreatment (‘the continuation of no longer 
beneficial or desirable treatment’) and also of undertreatment since doctors,
‘ [patients] and families worry about being trapped by biomedical technology that, 
once begun, cannot be stopped’103. Moreover, it is not always clear what counts as 
withdrawing treatment (consider, for example, ‘not recharging the batteries that power 
respirators or not putting the infusion into a feeding tube’104). Even if the distinction 
were clear, it also seems to be the case that withholding treatment is not always 
morally acceptable: ‘individuals can commit a crime by omission if they have an 
obligation to act, just as physicians can commit a wrong by omission in medical 
practice’105. This uncertainty also applies to attempts to define differences between 
‘extraordinary’ and ‘ordinary’ treatment: do these refer to the ‘usual’ and ‘unusual’, 
the ‘simple’ and ‘complex’, ‘natural’ or ‘artificial’ and so on? Beauchamp and 
Childress accept that these definitions may help point to relevant factors, but argue 
that none are sufficient in themselves to rule whether ‘a treatment is beneficial or 
burdensome’106.
The question of how an intervention is to be classified also occurs, in a different 
context, in ‘debates about whether health care institutions can legitimately use the 
distinction between medical technologies and sustenance technologies’ when deciding 
whether to forego life-sustaining treatments. Beauchamp and Childress concede that 
arguments against withdrawing the latter (‘[supplying] nutrition and hydration using 
needles, tubes catheters and the like’107) have a powerful emotional charge:
‘ [provision] of nutrition and hydration symbolises the essence of care and
108compassion’ and, as such, it is ‘intuitively devastating to “starve” someone’ 
Nevertheless, it is not clear that in all cases this intuition is correct. As an example of 
how this position can break down in complex situations, the authors offer the case of a
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79-year-old patient who had suffered progressive loss of her mental abilities, serious 
heart problems, and inflammation of her veins. Following a massive stroke, the 
patient violently resisted attempts to insert a ‘nasogastric tube... into her stomach to 
introduce nutritional formulas and water’ and managed to remove it once placed. As 
medical staff ran out of locations to insert an IV, they were faced with the possibility 
of having to perform a ‘cutdown’ (‘an incision to gain access to the deep large blood 
vessels’109) in order to continue treatment. In consultation with the nursing staff and 
family, doctors decided against further treatment and the patient ‘died quietly’ the 
following week’110 (Beauchamp and Childress note elsewhere that withdrawal of 
sustenance need not mean patient discomfort as ‘[caregivers] can alleviate feeling of 
hunger, thirst, dryness of the mouth and related problems by other means’111). This 
not only appears to have been a morally correct decision, but may also be seen a 
concrete example of our argument against Maclean’s position in the previous chapter 
that existing moral practices and feelings may prove highly misleading in new and 
difficult contexts.
That traditional or common-sense distinctions may prove to be problematic in certain
complex cases is further explored through the 6th edition’s account of distinctions
between intended effects and merely foreseen effects and between killing and letting
die. The former case is considered principally in terms of the rule of double effect (in
their term, RDE112) which is revealed as problematic in two main respects. First of all
are problems associated with establishing morally relevant differences between
certain acts ‘under the abstract conditions that comprise the RDE’. For example, the
rule as usually applied would allow a pregnant woman to undergo ‘a hysterectomy to
save her life [although] this procedure will result in the death of [her] foetus’ but not
for a doctor to ‘perform a craniotomy (crushing the head of the unborn foetus)’ when
11^it is the only way to save a woman in difficult labour . Yet, as Beauchamp and 
Childress point out:
[in] neither case does the agent want or desire the death of the foetus, 
and the descriptions of the acts in these cases do not indicate morally 
relevant differences between intending, on the one hand, and foreseeing 
but not intending, on the other. More specifically, it remains unclear 
why advocates of RDE conceptualise craniotomy as killing the foetus 
rather than the act of crushing the skull of the foetus with the unintended
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result that the foetus dies. Similarly, it remains unclear why in the 
hysterectomy case the death o f the foetus is foreseen but not intended114
The RDE may be more plausible ‘in care of dying patients, where there is no conflict 
between different parties’, for example in the ‘administration of a medication to 
relieve pain and suffering... even though it will probably hasten the patient’s death’. 
Laying aside for the moment the question of how this position might be affected by 
the development of measures for pain-relief that did not carry the risk of hastening 
death, this position still allows for dispute as to ‘whether death is good or bad for a 
particular person’. As the authors note, the RDE cannot settle this question: it ‘applies 
only in cases with both a bad and a good effect, but determining the goodness and 
badness of different effects is a separate judgement’115.
This inability of a supposedly relevant distinction to settle questions of right and 
wrong is further developed with regards to questions regarding the relevance (if any) 
o f drawing a distinction between killing and letting die. Beauchamp and Childress 
accept that this ‘has long been the most critical [distinction] in law, medicine, and 
moral philosophy to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate ways to death’116. 
Nevertheless, they view it as problematic in several respects. First of all, there is the 
question of whether it is possible to ‘legitimately describe actions that involve 
intentionally not treating a patient as “allowing to die” or “letting die”, rather than 
“killing”’ or of whether the former are merely euphemisms for acceptable forms of 
the latter117. As examples of how such distinctions may be problematic, Beauchamp 
and Childress consider two cases, one in which the parents and doctors of an infant 
with Down’s syndrome elected not to undertake a life-saving operation on the 
grounds that survival was not in the baby’s interests, and of a dermatologist who 
terminated his extremely premature son’s life-support system after a neonatologist 
had broken a promise not to resuscitate the infant118. It is not at all clear, they argue, 
that deciding whether or not these actions fell into either category would settle the 
morality of the decisions made: whilst ‘[killing] may generally be wrong and letting 
die only rarely wrong, this conclusion is contingent on the features of particular
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Beauchamp and Childress acknowledge that their rejection of these traditional 
distinctions is controversial (for example, with regards to RDE, they concede that it 
may be possible that subsequent work by its advocates will ‘solve the puzzles and 
problems that critics have identified’, perhaps by concentrating on the doctor’s 
‘motivations and character’120). There are both practical and theoretical arguments to 
be made in favour of each distinction (we may recall Jonsen’s contention that keeping 
a separation between killing and letting die in practice helped to identify problematic 
cases as doctors would tend to place them in the former category) and some 
distinctions may be less problematic than others. That there are borderline cases 
where the distinctions do not offer clear guidance (or may lead further confusion) 
does not mean that distinctions cannot be drawn, given that there do appear to be 
cases where they can (and thus led to the adoption of these distinctions in the 
discussion of other cases). The authors themselves suggest that reformulating 
treatment and nontreatment decisions in terms of whether it is morally obligatory to 
treat, obligatory not to treat, or optional whether to treat a patient121 may draw out 
the kinds of substantive moral questions that tend to be at stake. First of all, on this 
account, are questions regarding the likely outcome of particular treatments: it seems 
reasonably clear that where a treatment either will not or is extremely unlikely to 
benefit the patient, or may impose burdens on them, then it is optional and in many 
cases should not be carried out; however, this is likely to involve differing clinical 
judgements and other factors such as the religious beliefs of patients or surrogates . 
Second are questions concerning quality of life for the patient; again, these are 
presented as extremely difficult to settle in many cases123.
This distinction expands on the 1st edition’s presumption in favour of prolonging life 
to establish a prima facie  obligation to treat (so that, for example, ‘withdrawing 
treatment from a competent patient is not morally justifiable unless the patient has 
made an informed decision authorising this withdrawal’124) that may nevertheless be 
overridden in certain cases (for example, ‘pain can be so severe and physical restraints 
so burdensome that these factors outweigh anticipated benefits’; we may think of the 
elderly lady mentioned above or the paraplegic refusing food as discussed in the 
previous chapter)125. For the majority o f difficult cases, however, it should be noted 
that neither the principle o f nonmaleficence nor any particular specification of it is 
likely to decisively settle them (we may also include the related question of whether it
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can ever be optional or obligatory to hasten the death of a patient)126. This need not, 
however, be construed as a weakness in Beauchamp and Childress’ position providing 
that we accept firstly, that morally difficult cases exist and secondly, that they will 
(and perhaps should) remain difficult even after detailed analysis and careful 
reflection. The 6th edition o f Principles provides the reader with a clear summary of 
many of the arguments (on both sides) as to why these distinctions may be relevant 
that are likely to arise in practical decision-making concerning difficult cases, and that 
need to be considered when encountering such cases. Furthermore, in encouraging a 
critical attitude to these distinctions, the authors emphasise the need for careful 
reflection on both common-sense moral intuitions and detailed ethical arguments 
when using them to explore such cases.
As a final point, it is worth noting that contrary to the criticism that philosophical
medical ethics considers moral problems in an overly abstract fashion, both the 1st and
6th editions o f Principles recognise that morality o f many decisions cannot be
considered in isolation from the societal, professional and legal context in which
doctors work; as such, both note that there may be important differences between the
morality of individual acts and of general practices. For example, whilst it may be
morally permissible to actively cause the death of a patient who is suffering greatly
and has very little or no chance o f recovery rather than to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment and let events run their course (and where the patient is suffering, such an
act may even be praiseworthy or obligatory) to follow this as a matter of policy would
likely result in the deaths of some patients who may have recovered, whilst ‘a rule
prohibiting killing would save some lives that would be lost if both killing and
allowing to die were permitted’127. We may add that it seems that such concerns can
arise outside of matters of life or death. The 1848 AMA Code, for example,
•  1prohibited rich physicians from offering charitable services to their social peers ; 
although in one sense performing a moral act, its widespread occurrence would run 
the risk of depriving poorer colleagues o f a fee, possibly resulting in a loss of 
livelihood that would diminish the ranks o f the profession. The 6th edition does not 
offer a comparable hypothetical example (noting, with a similarly narrow focus on 
hastening or causing death, that ‘a practice or policy that allows physicians to 
intervene to cause deaths runs risks of abuse and might cause more harm than 
benefit’129); this is likely because Beauchamp and Childress were instead able to draw
211
on a real-world example in the form of the Oregon Dying With Dignity Act 
(ODWDA), that they note does not appear to have ‘[brought] about unwarranted, 
involuntary deaths, [reduced] the quality of palliative case [or resulted] in deep-seated 
and widespread mistrust of physicians’130, once again emphasising the importance of 
research into real-world elements and consequences when using the principles to 
explore moral issues in medicine.
Beauchamp and Childress’ Principle of Beneficence from 1st to 6th Editions
As noted above, the principle of nonmaleficence was not included in the Belmont 
Report, and has often been conflated (as we have seen, for example, with Winkler) 
with beneficence. As Hayry notes, and again as Winkler explicitly argues, conflating 
the two is largely the result of viewing them as two points on a single continuum of 
moral obligations derived from utilitarian traditions in moral philosophy. Yet from the 
1 51 edition onwards, Beauchamp and Childress disagree with this supposed pedigree. 
Whilst they accept ‘there are probably no sharp breaks or transition points on the 
continuum from the noninfliction of harm to the production of benefit’ they also argue 
that although utilitarian justifications may be used to describe obligatory 
nonmaleficent actions, they fail to account for the ‘more altruistic and farther- 
reaching’ obligations of beneficence131. They note, for example, that Frankena 
identifies beneficent actions as morally desirable rather than mandatory, and that 
Singer conceives of ‘obligatory beneficent actions [as] grounded in a requirement to 
‘prevent what is bad”  resulting in the conclusion that whilst ‘society cannot 
legitimately impose affirmative duties to promote the good [it] may impose negative 
assumptions not to cause harm’132. We should note that there appears to be little doubt 
in the authors’ minds that healthcare professionals do have moral obligations to 
perform beneficent actions that go beyond what Frankena and Singer suggest (they 
cite as examples the Hippocratic Oath's requirement for the physician to ‘come for 
the benefit of the sick’ and the AMA Code's requirement to serve humanity and 
human dignity). For them, any theory o f medical ethics does not need to establish that
133this is the case, but rather why this is so
From the 1st edition of Principles onwards, the theoretical foundations of the ‘farther- 
reaching’ principle of beneficence are in fact described, not in terms of
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consequential i st thinking, but as contractarian,4 [arising] from complex social 
interactions’. On this reading ‘we incur obligations to help others because we have 
willingly received, or at least will willingly receive, beneficial assistance from them’. 
These obligations can be extended or supplemented by special obligations resulting 
from ‘explicit or implicit commitments’ such as promise-making or righting prior 
wrongs. Although Beauchamp and Childress note that this justification, derived from 
Hume, is only ‘one appropriate way o f rooting beneficence in basic ethical theory’, 
the implied alternatives are conspicuous by their absence134. This justification is 
illustrated using the example o f differing obligations for individuals involved in an 
imagined scenario involving a drowning man. As Beauchamp and Childress point out, 
a ‘passerby who is a poor and weak swimmer’ is not obliged to swim one hundred 
yards to save them (although on Frankena’s view such an action could be described as 
morally desirable). However, the passerby would be under a moral obligation to do 
something (in the case of the example ‘run several yards to alert a lifeguard’135); what 
we may term an ‘ordinary’ beneficent obligation. The lifeguard, however, as a result 
of voluntarily accepting his position and the responsibilities which attend it, would 
have incurred a ‘special’ beneficent obligation and thus ‘has a strong duty to try to 
rescue a drowning swimmer, even at considerable risk to him self136. The authors 
argue that it is just these sorts o f obligations that healthcare professionals incur. As 
such, even when there is no legal obligation for a doctor to respond to a request for 
help (for example, when passing the scene o f an automobile accident) there 
nevertheless exists a moral responsibility for them to do so accrued as a result of their
137acceptance of a particular professional role and social status
Where utilitarian or consequentialist concerns are of importance in the 1st edition’s
account of beneficence is in determining the scope of these obligations. This can
occur when duties accrued as the result o f one social or professional position need to
be weighed against those accrued as the result o f another. In the above example, for
instance, the physician need not stop at the scene of the automobile accident were
11 8  ■ •there to be considerable personal risk or inconvenience involved (especially if this 
may result in them becoming unable to perform other duties with regards to, for 
example, caring for their family139). It can also be the case that the probable benefits 
of a given course of action need to be weighed against the probable harms, with the 
aim of maximising the former and minimising the latter140. The subsidiary nature of
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utility to other principles (including beneficence but also, for example, autonomy) in 
making such decisions is emphasised by Beauchamp and Childress, however, when 
they note that this ‘should not be construed so that it allows the sacrifice of the rights 
of individuals to the interests of society as a whole’ (which would give beneficence 
primacy over the other principles)141. Where resources are scarce or finite, concerns of 
utility may also have implications for costly procedures, especially where the 
projected likelihood of a beneficent outcome is low and when time or money would 
more probably lead to a beneficent outcome when invested elsewhere142.
A further drawback of viewing both nonmaleficence and beneficence in purely 
utilitarian terms, explored in the 6th edition, is that it tends to group distinct 
obligations together in a hierarchical order that does not appear to hold in all possible 
situations. Frankena, for example, divides a single principle of beneficence into four 
elements, in the following order o f priority:
1. One ought not to inflict evil or harm.
2. One ought to prevent evil or harm.
3. One ought to remove evil or harm.
4. One ought to do or promote good.143
Beauchamp and Childress’ accept Frankena’s point that ‘obligations of 
nonmaleficence are more stringent than obligations of beneficence’ in general, and 
note that in some cases the former does override the latter ‘even if the best utilitarian 
outcome would be obtained by acting beneficently’; in an echo of ‘The Survival 
Lottery’, they rule out the possibility that it could be moral for a doctor to ‘save two 
innocent lives by killing a prisoner on death row to retrieve his heart and liver for 
transplantation’144. However, their argument that ‘we should be cautious about 
constructing axioms of priority’ is lent weight by examples in which the reverse is 
clearly true: for instance, a doctor is obviously correct to inflict ‘a very minor injury 
(swelling from a needlestick, say)’ to bring about ‘a major benefit (a life-saving 
intervention, say)’. In such cases, beneficence has priority over nonmaleficence: 
‘causing some risks of surgical harm, introducing social costs to protect the public 
health, and placing burdens on some research subjects can all be justified by the 
benefits of the actions’145.
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The importance of keeping principles separate in order to better recognise how they 
may need to be weighed against each other in practical situations is further 
emphasised in the 6th edition’s discussion of medical paternalism, debates as to 
4 [whether] respect for the autonomy of patients should have priority over professional 
beneficence directed at those patients’, which they describe as 4a central problem in 
biomedical ethics’146. As the authors point out, proponents of the absolute primacy of 
one principle over the other sometimes conflate the two (for example, they note that 
Pellegrino and Thomasma have argued that 4the patient’s preferences alone determine 
the content of the physician’s obligation to act beneficently’ which4simply restates’ 
the principle of autonomy147) whilst others attempt to justify paternalistic intervention 
through invoking "rational consent, subsequent consent, hypothetical consent or some 
other form of consent’ (for example, in Dworkin’s view of paternalism as 4a “social 
insurance policy” to which fully rational persons would subscribe in order to protect 
themselves’ ). Despite acknowledging the attractiveness of such attempts to 
harmonise the principles, Beauchamp and Childress argue that they ultimately 
misrepresent the nature o f paternalistic interventions:4 [we] do not control children 
because we believe they will subsequently consent to... our interventions [but] 
because we believe they will have better, or at least less dangerous, lives [my 
emphasis]’149. As an alternative, the 6th edition proposes justifying paternalistic 
interventions by balancing them against autonomy interests:4[as] a person’s interests 
in autonomy increase, and the benefits for that person decrease, the justification of 
paternalistic action becomes less plausible’150.
As the authors point out, adopting this view can lead to justification even of cases of 
4hard’ paternalism in which "the intended beneficiary does not accept the values used 
to define his or her best interests’ (in ‘soft’ paternalism, by contrast, the patient is 
acting with a diminished sense of autonomy and there is thus no ‘real conflict between 
the principles’; we may think of the MS sufferer refusing treatment for meningitis 
whilst depressed in Chapter 9)151. On this view, ‘preventing minor harms or providing 
minor benefits while deeply disrespecting autonomy lacks plausible justification’ 
whereas ‘actions that prevent major harms or provide major benefits while only 
trivially disrespecting autonomy have a plausible... rationale’152. So, for example, it 
may be acceptable for a doctor not to disclose to a patient that initial tests have 
detected a possible serious pathology in order to spare them needless distress and
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anxiety whilst a second set are carried out (although things may be different if failing 
to disclose the possibility led to them to refuse consent for the second set of tests). 
Similarly, a patient who does not feel drowsy after taking preoperative medication 
and so requests the side rails on his bed (normally raised to prevent drowsy patients 
falling out) be left down may be overruled by a nurse whose professional experience 
leads her to conclude that he is not only likely to become drowsy soon, but has no 
family present to watch him whilst staff are otherwise occupied. Of course, many 
cases in real world practice are likely to be significantly more complex; nevertheless, 
as with nonmaleficence, it is not clear that difficult cases could be made any less so 
by uncritically championing one principle over the other.
The 6th edition’s account of the principle o f beneficence, as with its account of 
autonomy, is further deepened through an exploration of criticism from outside the 
North American context in which it was first articulated, specifically with regards to 
the proposed principle (one of several suggested to ‘provide [a European] alternative 
to the ideals underlying the Georgetown model’153) of precaution. As Hayry notes, 
this principle ‘is best known in the context o f climate change, and the protection of 
our natural environment’ but has ‘also found its way into European discussions 
concerning medicine and health care’, first of all with regards to genetically modified 
organisms and subsequently with blood banking and human genetics154. Although 
applied in several different ways by different authors (Hayry counts four uses155, 
whilst Beauchamp and Childress report that some studies have identified nineteen156) 
one key specification is that ‘uncertainty as such can be used as an argument against 
technological development, and for protective regulations [since if] the unforeseen 
consequences of our actions could be disastrous, precaution dictates that we should 
not undertake them’157. Once again, however, it is questionable whether precaution 
offers an alternative to the principles or helps instead to further explore issues already 
implicit within them: as Hayry points out, the ‘goals [of the principle] could easily be 
shared by liberal and utilitarian ethicists’158 and the principle of beneficence in one 
specification is concerned with the prevention o f harm159. Beauchamp and Childress 
do, in fact, argue for the second interpretation and accept that some ‘modest’ form of 
the principle of precaution (rather than a general principle in its own right) is a 
necessary corollary to the principle of beneficence for cases where ‘risks cannot be 
quantified and an appropriate benefit-risk-cost analysis is not possible’160 and where
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continued vigilance is required as to the possible effects of a particular policy (for 
example the ODWDA)161.
Beauchamp and Childress’ Principle of Justice from 1st to 6th Editions
Just as Winkler’s description of autonomy as primarily Kantian was undermined by 
the 1st edition’s description of a principle supported and expanded upon in different 
ways by both deontological and consequentialist theories, and his description of 
beneficence (and, thus, nonmaleficence) as ‘classically utilitarian’ did not match up 
with principles rooted in contractarian thought and medical traditions, so his 
description of the principle of justice as contractarian is rather at odds with what is 
written on the pages themselves. Instead, Beauchamp and Childress start from 
Aristotle’s ‘rather minimal’ definition that ‘equals ought to be treated equally and 
unequals unequally’162 (restated in the 6th edition of Principles as the ‘principle of 
formal justice’,63). Theoretical approaches to justice are presented by the authors as 
ways of articulating this formal principle into material rules; a process which (like 
that o f competence with regards to the principle of autonomy) Beauchamp and 
Childress acknowledge is highly problematic164. The 1st edition considered four 
different kinds of approach: Egalitarian theories, emphasising equal access to 
rationally-desired ‘goods’; Marxist theories, emphasising allocation of resources on 
the basis of fundamental ‘needs’; Libertarian theories, emphasising the receipt of 
resources as the just reward for contribution and/or merit; and Utilitarian theories, 
emphasising a mixture of criteria necessary to maximise public and private utility165 
(the 6th edition, reflecting currents in contemporary thought, replaces Marxist theories 
with a discussion of Communitarian approaches).
In terms of content, Winkler describes the principle of justice as ‘mostly a 
mystery’166. Certainly, the 1st edition does not go into a great deal of detail beyond 
distinguishing between examples of two kinds of problem that are likely to arise in 
medical settings, namely comparative questions (in which ‘what one person deserves 
is determined by balancing the competing claims of other persons against his [or her]
claims’)167, generally concerning ‘microallocation’ (that is, questions regarding
•  168‘which person(s) will receive some scarce preventative or therapeutic procedure’ ) 
and distributive questions (those regarding ‘the proper distribution of social benefits
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and burdens [such as] paying taxes [or receipt of] welfare cheques’)169, generally 
concerning ‘macroallocation’, or the socio-economic provision of healthcare170 
(although they can also refer to, for example, questions regarding the distribution of 
risk in nontherapeutic research and the consequences of individual behaviour, such as 
whether smokers should pay higher health insurance premiums171). Despite Winkler’s 
claims, the principle of justice as presented by Beauchamp and Childress does not 
lead to any specific normative suggestions with regards to macroallocation. Rawls is 
mentioned only in the context of providing an illustration of one such theory and how 
(as a critique of the status quo in the United States at the time of writing) it might lead 
to specific policy decisions, but these are not specifically endorsed172.
A little more guidance is provided for questions o f microallocation: the authors argue 
that these decisions typically take place before funds for a new procedure have been 
macroallocated (for example, kidney dialysis had not been widely available in the 
United States until Federal funding was provided for a nationwide programme) but 
they can also apply to situations (for example the allocation of transplant organs) 
where the pool of resources is necessarily limited. Using this last example, 
Beauchamp and Childress suggest that two sets o f rules or procedures are required. 
First of all, there is the need to determine ‘the relevant pool of potential recipients’ 
(for example, those who are eligible to receive a transplanted kidney); secondly, there 
is the need to determine rules or procedures concerned with ‘final selection’ (those 
who would actually receive a kidney)173. The first criteria are easier to choose, being 
based largely on medical acceptability and the possibility that a patient will benefit 
from the treatment (the authors suggest that this should be done as though the 
resource is unlimited to help screen out ‘covert value judgements’). The second are 
more problematic as they require widespread social acceptance of a comprehensive 
theory of justice174. Whilst conceding that some theories may be suitable in limited 
circumstances (for example, as noted above, with a need-based system in triage, a
•  * •  • 175closed system in which all patients share an immediate set of medical priorities ) 
this is clearly beyond the scope of what Principles was likely to achieve.
The apparent paucity of specifications o f the principle of justice in the 1st edition, like 
the abundance of specifications regarding autonomy, can and should be considered in 
the context of why and where philosophers first came to consider questions of
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medical ethics in the mid- to late 20th Century. For one thing, questions of allocating 
healthcare resources were not as readily apparent or pressing as more immediately 
obvious matters of life and death. For another, those philosophers employed as part of 
state-sponsored bodies such as the President’s Commission were not asked to 
consider them: the Reagan administration in the United States, for example, may have 
been happy to have philosophers ‘decide’ when a person was dead, but it is unlikely 
to have asked philosophers to decide how best to spend taxpayers’ money, especially 
when their conclusions may not have matched its own political ideology. Indeed, that 
the principle existed in its initial ‘mysterious’ form seems less like a criticism of the 
1st edition of Principles than a timely insight into where more work needed to be 
done. At the time, as Beauchamp and Childress acknowledge, then-recent literature 
tended to exist as a subset of existing political philosophy, with its ‘focus on 
considerations of fair economic distribution’ (leaving questions of organ allocation
and the like less fully explored). We should note that not all questions of socio­
economic provision centre on the principle of justice: for example, the AMA’s 
argument (mentioned in Chapter 6) that government money is better spent on medical 
research than on social provision of healthcare appears to concern how best to 
maximise goods and thus seems more properly dealt with under the principle of 
beneficence (since it assumes that the government should be spending money on 
healthcare per se and is not concerned with how much money should be spent) 
although the distinction is not immediately clear from Principles itself (the authors 
describe a just allocation of beneficence, but this does not appear to be meaningfully 
distinct from beneficence guided by utility177).
Just as Beauchamp and Childress’ approach allowed the other principles to be revised 
and expanded, however, the 6th edition takes advantage of subsequent scholarship to 
consider several kinds of situation where questions of justice might be raised in 
addition to the examples offered above (and, in replacing discussion of Marxist 
theories with discussion of Communitarian theories, different ways to approach them:
1 7JIfor example by considering questions of solidarity , initially developed as a 
European alternative to justice itself179). For example, the authors note the importance 
of social research indicating that ‘in the United States... blacks and women have 
poorer access to various forms of health care in comparison to white males’
(indicating the likelihood that ‘racial and gender inequalities in employment’ have an
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impact on possession of health insurance), and that ‘the race and gender of physicians 
often [plays] a role in the quality of patient-physician interaction’180, in raising issues 
that the principle o f justice requires we find ways to address181. The authors also 
consider cases in which ‘[some] persons report feeling heavily pressured to enrol in 
clinical trials, even though their enrolment is correctly classified as voluntary’, due to 
a ‘desperate need for money’182. This is explored with a discussion of possible 
constraining situations such as lack of food or shelter, of cases of undue inducement, 
when extra benefits and/or the increased disadvantages of patients need to be weighed 
against increasing risks, and of undue profit, when a company’s financial benefits 
from developing a new product greatly outweigh those provided to research
•  101
subjects (as the authors note, it may also be possible for payments to be too high in 
the former sense and still too low in the latter: ‘$25/hr. or $ 10/hr. might be irresistibly 
attractive [to the needy] while distributively unfair’184). On a wider scale, they also 
consider how the principle of justice might be applied to global inequalities in health 
and healthcare, arguing that ‘[while] it remains unclear what would constitute an 
adequate strategy for attacking these problems’ attempts to do so ‘are amongst the 
most urgent for a theory of justice to address’185.
In addition to these new questions, the 6th edition of Principles also attempts to offer 
stronger practical guidance regarding the socio-economic provision of healthcare. The 
impetus to do so is provided by both a moral argument (that ‘[policies] of just access 
to health care, strategies of efficiency in health care, and global needs for the 
reduction of health-impairing conditions dwarf in social importance every other issue 
considered in [the 6th edition]’) and an economic one (that ‘[countries] lacking a 
comprehensive and coherent system of health care financing and delivery... are 
destined to continue on the trail of higher costs’) 186. Their proposed solution is that 
‘society recognise global rights to health and enforceable rights to a decent minimum 
of health care’187. Recognising that, barring major changes to the world’s economic 
system, the concept of a universal right ‘to every good and service that is available to 
anyone’ is ‘utopian’, they instead propose a ‘two-tiered system of health care’ in 
which ‘basic and catastrophic health needs’ are subject to ‘enforced social coverage’ 
whilst ‘better services, such as luxury hospital rooms and optional, cosmetic dental 
work, are available for purchase at personal expense’188. The authors’ suggestion that 
this might ‘[offer] a possible compromise among libertarians, utilitarians,
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communitarians, and egalitarians, because it incorporates some moral premises that
189each stresses’ may, in light of recent events in the United States, seem somewhat 
overoptimistic (and we may also note that, should someone be more comfortable 
during a hospital stay, or have a more uniform smile than another, based on nothing 
more than, say, inherited wealth, it is likely to strike us as, if  not unjust, then at the 
very least unfair). Nevertheless, Beauchamp and Childress demonstrate both the 
complexity of the issue (since ‘[we] do not now have -  and are not likely ever to have
• 10ft-  a single viable theory of social justice’ ) and the importance of finding a way to 
address it.
Conclusions
In evaluating the changes made to Beauchamp and Childress’ account of the four 
principles between 1st and 6th editions, it may be useful to consider them in two 
distinct yet complementary senses. The first o f these are changes to the principles 
themselves. In the 1 * edition, it may have been plausible to view them as attempts to 
specify in more detail precise mid-level action guides that could (and/or should) apply 
in more or less the same way to all relevant decisions in medical ethics: so, for 
example, on the 1st edition’s account autonomy could be seen as a more-or-less 
straightforward combination of Kantian and Millean perspectives that is, as 
comprising the positive and negative duties that each account emphasises. Whilst this 
reading is still present to an extent in the 6th edition, the more complex account of 
autonomy generated by including (for example) social research into the context 
provided by social class and/or cultural and ethnic backgrounds presents autonomy, 
like the other principles, as a ‘cluster of concerns’ that is both less specific and 
(perhaps surprisingly) more generally applicable. Winkler conceded that one strength 
of the 1st edition’s view was that it appeared to ‘[provide] the basic framework for a 
coherent perspective on virtually the whole range of moral issues in medicine’191; this 
assessment may now be more correct, but in a different way.
The principles, so conceived, do not provide a fully coherent perspective on what 
actions should be taken in the whole range o f moral situations in medicine, but rather 
a coherent framework highlighting the kinds o f moral concerns raised by 21st Century 
medicine and how they should be approached in terms of the arguments on all sides
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that need to be considered when attempting to come to a decision on specific issues. 
In some cases (for example in the retention of both the positive and negative 
obligations of the principle of autonomy) considering these arguments may provide a 
new practical synthesis. In others, for example with regards to the principle of justice 
and socio-economic provision of healthcare, it may be seen as a prompt that further 
theoretical work is required: ignoring, for example, libertarian objections to 
communitarian perspectives (and vice versa) is unlikely to get us anywhere beyond a 
rancorous argument. Considering the objections on each side, together with (for 
example) social and economic research, may yet enable us to come up with a more 
acceptable arrangement (that Beauchamp and Childress’ own proposed synthesis of 
these ideas for the United States has, quite clearly, not been able to win widespread 
approval, however, highlights both how difficult such a process may be and, perhaps, 
how vulnerable such debates are to outside interests). Finally, in certain cases, for 
example in the most difficult treatment and nontreatment decisions, it may not be 
possible to arrive at a single, unambiguous action-guide (or set of action-guides) to be 
applied in all cases; nevertheless, it may be possible to establish a set of concerns that 
need to be conscientiously addressed in order to make the best possible decision given 
the circumstances.
These changes in the nature of the principles may be seen to follow from the 
developments in (they may prefer ‘clarification o f )  Beauchamp and Childress’ view 
of moral theory between the 1st and 6th editions. Whilst some ‘principlist’ writers 
retain a deductivist approach (often counting one principle as having overriding 
authority over the others, for example autonomy in the work of Downie and 
Caiman192 and, arguably, beneficence in the work of Gillon193) the authors now claim 
explicitly to be following a model that incorporates Wide Reflective Equilibrium as a 
way of exploring the application of the norms they identify as part of the ‘common 
morality’194. However, as suggested above, a development of this approach in line 
with Rachels’ suggested ‘web of ideas’ may in fact be a better fit. First of all, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the common morality also contains in addition to prima 
facie norms representing considered judgements what we may refer to as theoretical 
norms, for example: ‘do the greatest good for the greatest number’ or ‘treat people as 
ends not means’. On this view, these elements would also be close to the centre of the 
web of ideas, however, judgements in particular cases and/or further reflection on the
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norms themselves may cause us to revise their position and/or become more certain of 
a particular specification of them (so, for example, we may become more certain that 
a general account of justice requires discussions of solidarity, or that, as in triage, a 
specific account of justice is particularly suited to a certain specific set of 
circumstances). Again, as with the judgement norms that the authors identify we 
should (and, in general, do) find that we have to provide a reason for going against 
these theoretical norms in practice if our actions are to be considered moral; that is, 
that we have to take them into account.
The ‘web of ideas' model may also be more suited to Beauchamp and Childress’ 
approach in that the principles and specifications of them will be influenced not only 
by developments in philosophical moral thought but by also by developments in other 
spheres, be they medical (in either a clinical or institutional sense), social, 
psychological, legal and/or political. So, for example, difficult decisions regarding 
medical nutrition and hydration only arise once such measures are possible (and, 
arguably, will be influenced by whether it is possible to alleviate feelings of hunger 
and thirst should they be withdrawn). Nonmaleficence may need to include the 
possible harm to patients and to medicine of the medicalisation of conditions such as 
‘restless leg syndrome’; in doing so it may lead us to further examine the relationship 
between medicine and commercial business. New questions regarding autonomy will 
be specified by research not only into the way different patients from different 
backgrounds may respond to certain information, but also into the ways that human 
beings process information and make decisions generally. Legislation such as the 
ODWDA, or to enable doctors to treat some competent patients against their will, is 
likely to provide new evidence and new examples to consider in terms of physician- 
assisted dying and paternalism. Debates concerning the socio-economic provision of 
healthcare will depend upon what different states provide for their citizens, and 
perhaps on what those citizens (for whatever reason) decide that they want.
Whilst the principles themselves may be seen, together with the various specifications 
and arguments used to explore them in the main body of the text, as a ‘snapshot’ of 
the current state of the ‘web of ideas’, at least as with regards to medical ethics, it is 
clear that they have changed and may change in the future. Moreover, as we can see 
from the examples above, they help to suggest some ways in which they may need to
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be further developed. In one sense, this model does commit both medical ethics and 
moral philosophy in general to a form of context-dependence; it is, however, a rather 
trivial form, namely that the kinds of problems that medical ethics deals with are the 
kinds of ethical problems that medicine, in its current form, brings up. Moreover, we 
should remember that the ‘web of ideas’ allows that philosophy does not just depend 
on context, but drives it as well: as arguments and concepts are subjected to analysis, 
as thought-experiments are created and inspire responses to them, and as theories are 
constructed, applied to cases and criticised, they (together with the influence of 
outside events) both reshape the web and cause it to be reshaped in turn. Indeed, the 
concepts of Wide Reflective Equilibrium and the web of ideas may themselves be 
seen to emerge from just this type of interaction between philosophers, philosophical 
methods and theories, and concrete issues both within the discipline and without. 
However, just -  as Hayry has pointed out -  ‘[the] Georgetown principles do not hold 
the monopoly of truth in health-care ethics’195 so this view of the approach that 
generates them may be charged with omitting certain key aspects of our moral lives; it 
is criticisms of this nature that our next chapter will move on to consider.
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Chapter 11: Further Criticism of the Four Principles in the Teaching and 
Practice of Medical Ethics
As we have seen in the previous chapter, many criticisms of the four principles -  
especially the belief ‘particularly in Continental Europe... that the values of the Old 
World are under attack’ and that ‘the Georgetown principles... are the invader’ -  are, 
as Hayry acknowledges ‘in many ways mistaken and misleading’1. Far from 
representing an attempt to promote North America ideals of individual liberty and 
social, economic and political justice as a universal program, we have seen that their 
roots lie in both earlier European philosophy (for example in the case of autonomy) 
and traditions of medical ethics (for example in the case of nonmaleficence), that the 
emphasis on North American values in ancillary work was most likely the result of 
historical circumstance and does not preclude exploring (indeed, in some senses 
requires exploring) the principles from other standpoints (for example with regards to 
different conceptions of autonomy in different cultures and with regards to issues of 
race and gender in justice), and that such exploration results in a richer understanding 
of the principles themselves, arguing for the success of Beauchamp and Childress’ 
chosen method. Nevertheless, when the 1st edition of Principles was published, ‘it 
was customary to think, at least in the English-speaking academic world, that the 
“deontological” and “consequentialist” moral views... were the only viable options in 
normative ethics’. The authors neglected ‘a third alternative... namely virtue ethics, 
which started to (re)emerge in the 1980s and became instantly popular in Continental 
Europe’2; as a result it has been argued that the use of the principles in the teaching of 
medical ethics both misrepresents the nature o f moral reflection and, regardless of the 
authors intentions, discourages such reflection in practice. The purpose of this chapter 
is to consider whether these criticisms are fatal to the use of the principles in the 
teaching and practice of medical ethics, or whether they too can be incorporated into 
the kind of approach we have argued the 6th Edition suggests.
The Four Principles and Virtue Ethics Approaches
On one (very broad) definition, a virtue is simply a trait or quality that renders 
something valuable (so, for example, we can speak of inanimate objects, systems or
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institutions in such terms3: it might be a ‘virtue’ of a particular car that it is reliable 
and easy to maintain, or a ‘virtue’ of the rule that all London black-cab drivers must 
take ‘The Knowledge’ that they are generally better at getting one to one’s destination 
than yellow-taxi drivers in New York); in slightly more narrow human terms, ‘[a] 
virtue is a trait o f character that is socially valuable, and a moral virtue is a trait of 
character that is morally valuable’4. As Hayry notes, the tradition of virtue ethics in 
moral thought has its roots in Aristotle5, and a distinction between a right action and a 
(morally) virtuous one: ‘some people who perform just acts are still not just (for 
example those who carry out the requirements o f the law unwillingly, or through 
ignorance, or for some ulterior purpose and not fo r  what they are [my emphasis])’. On 
this view, even though they ‘are doing what is right, and all that a good man is bound 
to do’ these agents lack the ‘state of mind in which a person can perform the various 
kinds of act in such a way as to be a good man’6. Virtues should not, in this sense, be 
confused with utilitarian requirements (such as some of Hare’s general principles) to 
habituate certain dispositions because they will result in certain kinds of actions. 
Rather, they are dispositions that, once habituated, themselves help to establish the 
moral character of the agent performing the action: ‘what makes the agent just or 
temperate is not merely the fact that he does such things, but the fact that he does 
them in the way that just and temperate men do’7. As MacIntyre puts it (and as we 
shall explore in more detail in a moment), ‘Aristotle’s view is teleological, but it is 
not consequentialist’8.
For Aristotle, virtues are not simply dispositions that one possesses or lacks as a 
matter of course: although we may possess the potential to be virtuous (or vicious), 
‘none of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, since nothing that is what it 
is by nature can be made to behave differently by habituation... a stone, which has a 
natural tendency downwards cannot be habituated to rise’. Rather, the virtues require 
cultivation: ‘their full development in us is due to habit’9 and, since ‘like activities 
produce like dispositions’ we must exercise the kind of actions associated with a 
virtue if we are to habituate ourselves to the degree that we may be considered to 
possess it: ‘[the] man who shuns and fears everything and stands up to nothing 
becomes a coward; the man who is afraid o f nothing, but marches up to every danger, 
becomes foolhardy [my emphasis]’10. Similarly, as is apparent from this quotation, 
whilst no-one is bom vicious, acting in a vicious way over a prolonged period of time
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will eventually undermine our capacity for virtue: ‘people get into this condition 
through their own fault... they make themselves unjust or licentious by behaving 
dishonestly or spending their time in drinking and other forms of dissipation [my 
emphasis]’11. Worse, it may in fact destroy our capacity for virtue, ‘no more than a 
sick man can become healthy, even though (it may be) his sickness is... the result of 
incontinent living... [there] was a time when it was open to him not to be ill; but [he 
threw] away his chance’12.
The repeated performance of virtuous actions, according to Aristotle, itself leads to a 
greater likelihood of performing similar actions in the future: ‘[it] is by refraining 
from pleasures that we become temperate, and it is when we have become temperate 
that we are most able to abstain from pleasures’13. This is important since a virtuous 
act, for him, must not only be consciously chosen for its own sake but also result 
‘from a fixed and permanent disposition’ towards such actions14. Actions alone, 
however, are not in themselves a guarantee o f acquiring such a disposition, since ‘it is 
in the field of actions and feelings that virtue operates [my emphasis]’15. They are 
necessary (‘there [is not] the smallest likelihood of any man’s becoming good by not 
doing them’16) but not sufficient: it is possible to consistently perform virtuous 
actions, and to do so because we know them to be virtuous, yet nevertheless not be 
virtuous if we do not feel pleasure in performing these actions: ‘[a] man who abstains 
from bodily pleasures and enjoys the very fact of doing so is temperate; if he finds it 
irksome he is licentious’17. Since ‘to feel pleasure or pain rightly or wrongly has no 
little effect upon our conduct’18 if we are to become virtuous, we must not only take 
care to perform the right actions, but to train our emotions so as to be properly 
disposed towards them.
Whether conscious direction of our action alone will be enough to accomplish the task 
of developing of a ‘fixed and permanent’ disposition towards virtue is open to 
question (it is not, as we shall see below, for Aristotle a task that everyone can 
accomplish). Moreover, many of us will not get the chance to do so (we are not, for 
example, often called upon to be courageous in our daily lives; similarly, people in a 
happy marriage seem less likely to be tempted into adultery). Perhaps consequently, 
Murdoch has suggested that, in addition to virtuous action a kind of emotional (rather 
than intellectual) reflection on the virtues and the virtuous may also be required:
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[human] beings are naturally ‘attached’ and when an attachment 
seems... bad it is most readily displaced by another attachment, which 
an attempt at attention can encourage... our ability to act well ‘when the 
time comes’ depends partly, perhaps largely, upon the quality of our 
habitual objects o f attention
So, by ‘focusing our attention’ on virtuous things (be they exemplary figures, ‘great 
art’, especially -  as we shall explore further in our section on narrative ethics, below -  
literature, and ‘perhaps... the idea of goodness itself) we may develop an emotional 
attachment to virtuous conduct and thus habituate ourselves to certain dispositions 
and actions20. It is important to note that simple imitation or inspiration at the level of 
action (‘What would Jesus do?’, ‘What would my wife think?’) would probably not 
qualify as virtuous on Aristotle’s terms (since there seems to remain an element of 
temptation to perform another action, and the actions are performed for another’s sake 
and not their own). Rather, through such reflection, we may aspire to be the kind of 
person (we think) that Jesus was, or to have those qualities that someone saw in us 
when they fell in love.
If the virtuous moral agent is so disposed towards virtuous action that they are no 
longer tempted to perform vicious actions (so, for example, have no need to remind 
themselves that they should be just, or courageous, or temperate) they will still need 
to exercise judgement in determining what is just, courageous and so on in a given 
situation. For Aristotle, this must be done by establishing (in terms of both feeling and 
action) the appropriate response to a given set o f circumstances:
It is possible, for example, to feel [emotions] too much or too little, and 
both of these are wrong. But to have these feelings... in the right way is 
to feel them to an intermediate, that is to the best degree... Similarly 
there are excess and deficiency and a mean in the case of actions... [a 
virtue] is a mean between two kinds o f vice, one of excess and the other 
of deficiency... virtue discovers the mean and chooses it21
We should note that, for Aristotle, ‘not every action or feeling admits of a mean’;
there are some that are by their nature vicious, for example ‘ [among feelings] malice,
22shamelessness and envy, and among actions adultery, theft and murder’ . More 
importantly, the mean in a moral sense is not ‘[the] mean in relation to the thing [that
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is] whatever is equidistant from the extremes’; rather it is ‘the mean in relation to us 
[that is] that which is neither excessive nor deficient, and this is not one and the same
23for all’ . So, for example ‘there are some things at which we actually ought to feel 
an8ry’24> but we must strive to be angry for the right reason (so, for example ‘the man 
who feels righteous indignation is distressed at instances of undeserved good fortune, 
but the envious man goes further and is distressed at any good fortune’25) and to the 
right extent (for example, to be more angered by a rich man escaping justice through 
his connections than by a spendthrift friend winning the lottery). Unlike the mean in 
relation to the thing, the mean in relation to us cannot be precisely calculated26; as 
MacIntyre puts it ‘what it is to fall into a vice cannot be adequately specified 
independently of circumstances: the very same action which would in one situation be 
liberality could in another be prodigality and in a third meanness’27. As such, virtue 
requires judgement (phronesis, that is, ‘prudence [or] practical wisdom’28): ‘virtue 
ensures the correctness of the end at which we aim, and prudence that of the means 
towards it’29 and ‘the man of good character judges every situation rightly’30.
Being virtuous, on Aristotle’s account, is in fact extremely difficult; moreover, though 
it is something to which we should all properly aspire, it is not something that 
everyone can achieve: ‘it is easy to get angry -  anyone can do that -  or to give and 
spend money; but to feel or act toward the right person to the right extent at the right 
time for the right reason in the right way -  that is not easy, and it is not everyone that 
can do it’. Indeed, for Aristotle, it is because o f this difficulty that those who attain 
virtuousness are so highly praised31. Nevertheless, in aspiring to become virtuous, we 
may guard against falling into viciousness and, in many cases hope to become 
‘continent’, that is, the kind of person ‘[who] acts from choice but not from desire’32 
and, though tempted, is able to resist and instead follow their better judgement. To 
become so, Aristotle suggests we should follow three particular guidelines. First of 
all, although ‘between the extremes [that is, vices] there is always the maximum 
dissimilarity’, in some cases the mean is not equidistant between them: ‘some 
extremes seem to bear a resemblance to a mean e.g. rashness seems like courage, and 
prodigality like liberality’33. Consequently, we should (like Odysseus steering towards 
the less dangerous Scylla and away from the more dangerous Charybdis), seek always 
to avoid the extreme that is furthest from the mean. Secondly, we should pay attention 
to what gives us pleasure and pain, and take precautions to avoid those vices to which
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we discover we are particularly susceptible. Finally, we should guard most especially 
against pleasure, since in this regard ‘we are not impartial judges’ and are most liable 
to error34.
Whether we accept the entirety of Arsitotle’s account o f the virtues or not, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that if we return to Rachels’ conception of the web of ideas we 
would, in fact, find something resembling virtues making up those kinds of moral 
elements that would be closest to the centre o f the web, together with some 
resembling particular judgements, and some resembling kinds of processes for 
arriving at judgements. For example, it seems reasonably certain that (in some, maybe 
the majority of cases, at least) the outcome o f our actions has some effect on their 
moral quality or lack thereof; similarly, it seems reasonably certain that by accepting 
certain roles (that of a lifeguard, say, or o f a doctor) we incur certain kinds of moral 
obligation; and it is also reasonably certain that some actions, either general (the 
gratuitous infliction of pain) or specific (the actions o f the Manson family) are 
morally wrong, whilst some are morally right. That being the case, it also seems 
reasonably certain that our character and motivations are an important element of the 
moral quality (or lack thereof) o f our actions and that our character and motivations 
are {together with our actions) an important element o f how we act and are judged as 
acting as moral agents. For this reason, it is hardly surprising that, in the 6th Edition of 
Principles, the common morality that grounds the principles themselves is described 
as containing not only a set of what the authors term standards o f action (the norms 
mentioned in the previous chapter) but also a set o f virtues (such as 
‘nonmalevolence’, ‘honesty’ and ‘kindness’) without which ‘a person is deficient in 
moral character’ (Beauchamp and Childress indicate that neither set of examples 
should be taken as a complete list)35.
As Beauchamp and Childress point out, incorporating virtues into the common 
morality also appears to capture an important part o f our moral lives that is not fully 
accounted for by the kinds of approaches we have so far encountered in our 
discussion of the four principles. Although we can ‘define moral virtue as a 
disposition to act... in accordance with moral principles, obligations or ideals’, this 
would not account for the fact that ‘[we] care morally about people’s motives, and we 
care especially about their characteristic motives’36. So, for example, ‘[when] a friend
233
performs an act of “friendship”, we expect it not to be motivated entirely from a 
sense of obligation to us, but because the person has a desire to be friendly, feels 
friendly, wants to keep friends and values friendship’37. Similarly, an emphasis on 
moral character can help to account for why, in some cases, we may regard someone 
as moral even when they perform what seems to be a morally wrong act. Beauchamp 
and Childress give the example of a doctor in the Jewish ghetto established in Krakow 
under the Nazis during World War II:
.. .faced with a grave dilemma: either inject cyanide into four immobile 
patients or abandon them to the SS, who at that moment were emptying 
the ghetto and had already demonstrated they would brutally torture and 
kill captives and patients 8
Eventually, ‘with uncertainty and reluctance’, the doctor elected to administer to each 
patient, without their knowledge or consent, a fatal dose o f hydrocyanic acid. 
Although such an act would be ‘almost universally denounced by the canons of 
professional ethics’, Beauchamp and Childress seem correct in arguing that ‘no 
reasonable person would make a judgement of blame or demerit directed at the 
physician’s motives or character’39. Even when such action proves misconceived (as 
with the European settlers fed poison to prevent their torture during the Boxer 
Rebellion by a man ‘ready to stand at the Divine bar for a thousand [such] murders’40, 
only for a night attack to unexpectedly relieve their settlement as they lie dying41, in 
Conan Doyle’s The Pot O f Caviare) the effect is one of pity rather than moral 
opprobrium.
Despite these advantages, settling on those dispositions that may and/or should be 
seen as moral virtues is not entirely straightforward; as MacIntyre notes in After 
Virtue, Arsitotle’s account of particular virtues is largely tied to the ‘ahistorical 
character of his understanding of human nature’42. However, different conceptions of 
human (moral) excellence have historically depended on the importance of particular 
social roles and have therefore been subject to variation: so, for example, the Homeric 
virtues (centred on an ideal of the warrior-king and his household) could include 
physical strength: ‘[to] excel is to excel at war or in the games, as Achilles does, in 
sustaining a household, as Penelope does, in giving counsel in the Assembly, as 
Nestor does’43; by contrast, for the Aristotelian virtues ‘the paradigm of human
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excellence... is the Athenian gentleman’44, and for Jane Austen ‘a certain kind of 
English naval officer’45. With regards to the virtues expected of members of the 
medical profession, Beauchamp and Childress note that earlier traditions of medical 
ethics incorporated virtues to a greater extent than modem professional codes, but 
these too have altered. The version of the AMA Code in use from 1957 to 1980, 
endorsed several ‘Hippocratic’ virtues, some of which (sobriety, patience) seem to 
remain relevant to doctors’ conduct. Others, such as piety, might be relevant (some 
doctors may derive a caring attitude from religious faith, others may not) and others, 
such as promptness, might be vicious in some circumstances (for example, premature 
diagnosis) and virtuous in others (such as in assuring swift treatment in life- 
threatening situations).
We should note here that, as with the seemingly unfamiliar moral elements of the 
Hippocratic and professional traditions, the unfamiliarity or apparent irrelevance of 
certain virtues may reflect changes in social and clinical context as much as any shift 
in underlying moral values. In the case of those virtues considered proper to nursing, 
for example, the change is if anything more pronounced than is the case for doctors: 
traditional (for which we may read ‘Victorian’) ‘passive’ virtues emphasised the 
nurse’s role as the ‘“handmaiden” of the physician’ and thus included obedience and 
submission; in the 20th and 21st Centuries, a new emphasis on the nurse as an advocate 
of patients’ interests replaced these with ‘active’ virtues (such as ‘respectfulness, 
considerateness, justice, persistence, and courage’)46. However, the precise nature of 
the nurse’s role has itself gone through comparably significant changes over the same 
period. At the start of the 19th Century, with ‘drunkenness and theft... the most 
commonly recorded complaints’, hospitals were concerned mainly with ensuring their 
nurses were sober and honest; the role of senior nursing staff was primarily a matter 
of housekeeping: matrons were ‘responsible for the domestic bills, as well as 
controlling... the porters and other hospital servants’47. Following Florence 
Nightingale’s recognition of the importance o f tackling squalid hospital environments, 
however, nurses became ‘ministers of hygiene’, capable of doing ‘more good than the 
physician’ through careful regulation patients’ diet and environment, and cleanliness 
and discipline became paramount48. At the same time, emotional relationships with 
patients (especially male patients) were discouraged (Nightingale’s counterpart in the 
American Civil War, Dorothea Dix, initially recruited only ‘very plain-looking
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women’ for the role49). Whilst this may have made sense in the context of 19th 
Century field hospitals, given the possibility of nurses either being taken advantage of 
or moonlighting as prostitutes, the 20th Century emphasis on caring may be seen in 
context as a reaction to both changing circumstances and the scales having tipped too 
far to one side.
Although MacIntyre recognises that virtues depend on a particular socio-historical 
context, and ‘[stresses] the degree to which they vary diachronically and 
synchronically’, he nevertheless argues that it is possible to identify ‘certain basic 
(universal?) virtues’50. This is possible, on his view, because the virtues are 
inextricably linked to human social interaction, and in particular to the operation of 
what he terms practices, defined as:
...any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that activity are realised 
in the course of trying to achieve those standards o f excellence which 
are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with 
the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended51
So, for example, ‘throwing [an American] football with skill’ is not a practice, but 
‘the game of [American] football is’52. Whilst institutions (for example, chess clubs 
and orchestras) may be required to ensure practices continue by distributing to 
participants goals external to that practice (for example, the ‘money, power and 
status’ accorded to grandmasters and first violinists)53 these rewards differ from those 
‘internal goods which may reward not even very good chess-players or violinists’54 
(we may, in the case of medicine, compare this view with the one we have argued is 
expressed in the professional regulations established by Percival and the AMA).
In order to ensure, however, that these external goods offered by institutions do not 
corrupt practices (as they might in the case of a quarterback who plays ‘only for the 
money’, or a surgeon who is concerned only with his status within the medical 
profession in contrast -  and the qualification is important, since external goods are 
genuine goods55 -  to a quarterback who plays ‘for the love of the game’, or a surgeon 
who is concerned to benefit his patients as well), in order, that is, that practices may
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continue to provide internal goods, MacIntyre argues for the necessity of three basic 
virtues: ‘[without] justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the 
corrupting powers of institutions’56. These particular virtues are required because of 
the necessarily cooperative nature of practices, both synchronically (‘[to] enter into a 
practice... is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the 
standards which currently and partially define the practice’57) and diachronically (‘[to] 
enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship... with those who have preceded 
us... particularly those who achievements extended the reach of the practice’58). And 
these relationships, MacIntyre argues, cannot be sustained without ‘fairness in judging 
oneself and others... [a] truthfulness without which fairness cannot find application... 
and from time to time the taking of self-endangering and even achievement- 
endangering risks’59. Without these virtues, and the relationships they sustain, the 
internal goods o f the practice cannot be realised60 and we have instead merely ‘a set 
o f technical skills, even when [these are] directed towards some unified purpose 
and... can on occasion be enjoyed for their own sake’61.
This ability to sustain practices is important, but it is only one o f three elements that 
MacIntyre believes are needed if we are to truly claim a disposition as virtuous; as he 
notes in the postscript to the 2nd Edition o f After Virtue: ‘I did not intend to suggest... 
that the initial account of virtues in terms of practices provides us with an adequate 
conception of a virtue’ . In addition to this quality, (moral) virtues must also satisfy 
two further criteria. Firstly, they must be ‘qualities contributing to the good of a whole 
life’63. So, for example, ‘Hector exhibited one and the same courage in his parting 
from Andromache and on the battlefield with Achilles’64 (that this conception 
requires, as MacIntyre puts it, ‘a concept o f self whose unity resides in the unity of a 
narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end’65 is 
something that we will explore in more detail below). Secondly, virtues must be 
related to ‘the pursuit of a good for human beings the conception of which can only be 
elaborated and possessed within a particular social tradition’66. MacIntyre argues that 
‘all reasoning takes place within the context of some traditional mode of thought, 
transcending through criticism and invention the limitations of what had hitherto been 
reasoned in that tradition’; more importantly, however, ‘when a tradition is in good 
order it is always partially constituted by an argument about the goods the pursuit of 
which gives to that tradition its particular point and purpose’67.
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Although we must submit to the established view of internal goods present in a 
practice at the time that we enter into it, these goods can (and should) be continually 
redefined by excellence in it: ‘[traditions], when vital, embody continuities of 
conflict’68 (we may note this is a substantially different view of practices from 
Maclean’s apparently static account as discussed in Chapter 9). Murdoch may be seen 
to develop this point further in her discussion of what she terms the ‘transcendent’ 
quality of goodness69. For her, ‘in the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego 
[and] moral philosophy is properly... the discussion of this ego and of the techniques 
(if any) for its defeat’70. This should not be read as a simple condemnation of 
selfishness but rather as a repudiation of the human tendency to substitute fantasy for 
reality, that is to mistake what is good fo r us individually for what is good itself (in 
Aristotelian terms, perhaps, to claim that the mean in relation to us in a given place at 
a given time is in fact identical to the mean in relation to the thing). For Murdoch 
‘good is non-representable and indefinable’71, nevertheless, it remains useful as an 
ideal that can be worked towards:
The idea of perfection is ... a natural producer o f order. In its light we 
come to see that A, which superficially resembles B, is really better than 
B. And this can occur, indeed must occur, without our having the 
sovereign idea ‘taped’. In fact it is in its nature that we cannot get it 
taped... [it] lies always beyond, and it is from this beyond that it 
exercises its authority12
So, for MacIntyre (whose examples tend to favour games where Murdoch’s favour 
art), we might say that whilst the idea of there ever being a ‘perfect’ match of 
association football is clearly absurd, some matches are not only better than others, 
but may (through being so) cause us to question and redefine the standards by which 
matches are judged (scoreless draws, for example, are often considered boring; 
however, the semi-final o f the 2006 World Cup between Italy and Germany remained 
scoreless at full-time and was nevertheless an exciting display of individual skill and 
tactical discipline, played in a fair yet competitive spirit between two teams close to 
the peak of their abilities).
It is important to remember that the importance of recognising those elements of the 
moral life that the virtues represent does not mean that moral norms and rules are not 
required. As Beauchamp and Childress point out, without some kind of rules, virtues
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are likely to prove insufficient as moral action-guides: the question ‘what would the 
virtuous health care professional do?’ is, in a given situation, likely to require 
specification both in terms of particular virtues (such as honesty or charity) and in 
terms of the situation (such as, for example, disclosing information to a patient), 
something that will ‘render virtue ethics very similar to the theory of moral norms’ 
they themselves provide73. In addition if, as Aristotle notes, ‘it is from the repeated 
performance of acts... that we acquire virtues’74, and if  virtues require cultivation 
(that is, if they can only be learnt and exercised in terms of performing certain 
actions) this will require the kind of structure that rules provide: we will need to 
establish what virtuous conduct is so that we may train ourselves to it (we may think 
back -  although he may have taken issue with our so doing -  to Hare’s description of 
moral philosophy as a ‘set of remedial exercises’: a way of encouraging us to think 
morally, rather than moral thought itself). Moreover, if  very few moral agents are, in 
fact, virtuous it will be necessary for the great majority to have an idea of the conduct 
a virtuous individual would follow as well as what would constitute the content of a 
virtuous emotional state: since many of us will not be able to feel courageous or 
compassionate in every situation, we will need to know when we should act as 
courage or compassion would dictate, so as to resist the temptation not to do so.
On both Aristotle and MacIntyre’s accounts, however, the exercise of the virtues will 
not only require some rules, but rules of a specific kind and (in Aristotle’s case, at 
least) a specific attitude to them. First o f all, as we mentioned briefly above, for 
Aristotle, ‘the branch of philosophy on which we are at present engaged is not, like 
the others, theoretical... we are not studying to know what goodness is, but how to
• • 75 76become good men, since otherwise it would [as a practical science ] be useless’ . 
Although ‘[action] according to the right principle is common ground and may be a 
basis for discussion’, Aristotle argues that moral rules must necessarily be of a general 
sort: ‘any account of conduct must be stated in outline and not in precise detail... 
questions of conduct and expedience have as little fixity about them as questions of 
what is healthful [both vary with circumstances77]’78. Although virtuous action may in 
outward appearance seem identical to acting ‘as principle directs’ in many cases79, the 
two should not be confused; indeed, congratulating oneself on acting rightly simply 
because one is obedient to rules is an obstacle to becoming truly virtuous: ‘most 
people... have recourse to their principle, and imagine that they are being
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philosophical and that in this way they will become serious-minded [but they] will get 
no benefit from... philosophy [my emphasis]’80. To be truly virtuous on Aristotle’s 
account requires, as we have seen, judgement rather than simple obedience: ‘agents 
are compelled at every step to think out for themselves what the circumstances 
demand’81.
The relationship between virtue and moral rules is developed further in MacIntyre’s 
discussion of the role of rules with regards to practices. Learning a practice involves 
submitting to the rules of that practice as agreed by current practitioners, and as 
established by the excellences of past practitioners. In other words, since ‘[a] practice 
involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules [to] enter into a practice is to 
accept [initially, at least] the authority o f these standards’; so for example, ‘[if], on 
starting to play baseball, I do not accept that others know better than I when to throw 
a fast ball... I will never learn to appreciate good pitching, let alone to pitch’82. 
However, it also the case that we cannot excel at the practice simply by following 
rules, and that excellence in a practice will in some way involve these rules being 
revised (so, for example, ‘when Turner transformed the seascape in painting [his] 
achievement enriched the whole relevant community’ ). MacIntyre’s account 
actually involves two different kinds of rule, with differing degrees of flexibility. First 
of all are ‘rules of thumb’ that are necessary in order to learn how to play the game: 
these are not in theory absolutely binding, but are seldom a good idea to break in 
practice (‘never pass the ball across your own area’ in association football, for 
example). Secondly, there are the rules o f the game itself, the breaking of which 
deserves to incur some form of penalty but which may, nevertheless, sometimes be 
changed or revised (so, for example, it was not always the case that a goalkeeper 
could not collect a pass back to him in his hands; however, the development of certain 
defensive tactics, and a consequent decrease in the entertainment value of games, led 
to it being prohibited).
Both Aristotle’s and MacIntyre’s accounts o f rules may be seen to share certain 
important similarities with the account of rules and principles presented by 
Beauchamp and Childress in the 6th Edition of Principles. The status of principles and 
rules as prima facie obligations does not, as we have noted in the previous chapter, 
give them absolute weight (they may be broken if we have a sufficiently good reason
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to do so), but it does give them more weight than they would have under an account 
such as Fletcher’s in that we must not only account, but sometimes pay (through guilt 
and/or regret), for breaking them when we do so. Principles does seem to allow that 
some moral rules may be similar to rules in Maclntrye’s first sense o f the word, or 
may be so in some circumstances; conceivably some of the moral norms (such as ‘tell 
the truth’) could fall into this category, together with very general and rather weak 
specifications of the principles (nonmaleficence, for example, in the case of putting in 
stitches or removing a sticking-plaster). It may not be possible to distinguish fully 
between what, in a moral sense, constitutes a ‘rule of thumb’ and what constitute the 
‘rules of the game’. One possible way o f distinguishing between the two may be to 
consider as ‘rules of thumb’ those norms we can go against without severe disruption 
to the web of ideas, whilst the ‘rules of the game’ are those that are supported by 
multiple elements and cannot be changed without revising our conception of morality 
as a whole. So, for example, it is relatively easy to think of how we might account for 
a trivial falsehood, and how we might do so for moral reasons (to spare someone’s 
feelings, say) whereas it is extremely difficult to understand how we could account for 
the gratuitous infliction of pain.
Whether MacIntyre’s distinction can be salvaged in this way or not, however, his 
description of medicine as one example o f a practice84 and his account of what would 
represent a ‘vital’ tradition within it (for example, hospitals -  for which we may fairly 
substitute ‘professional bodies’ or ‘the NHS’ -  continually engaging in debate over 
‘what good medicine is’85) compares with our own account of both the history of 
medical ethics, and of some of the shortcomings of certain approaches to it. Indeed, 
whether or not his account of the basic virtues is complete in general (and, as we shall 
see in the subsequent section, MacIntyre has been accused of omitting at least one 
virtue — in the shape of empathy or caring — that can be seen as crucial to our moral 
lives), it may in fact be easier to specify those virtues particularly relevant to the 
practice o f medicine than to specify those that are relevant to human life as a whole. 
Whilst there is likely to be some overlap between both spheres (as the elements of 
‘the good life’ in general are likely to — indeed must -  be elements of ‘the good life’ 
for doctors and/or patients as well) there are, if  we are correct to argue that healthcare 
practitioners do sometimes have moral obligations as healthcare practitioners, also 
likely to be some virtues that are of particular importance in the discharge of these
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obligations. And, in fact, Beauchamp and Childress do provide, in the 6th Edition of 
Principles a more specific (though explicitly not exhaustive86) list o f these kinds of 
virtues in addition to the incomplete list of examples given for those virtues present in 
‘the common morality’ (which may itself now be understood, not as those elements 
that ‘social groups approve [of] and regard... as moral’87 but as a vital tradition of 
morality in MacIntyre’s sense of the term).
The first of these specific virtues is compassion, defined as ‘a need to understand the 
feelings and experiences of patients [in order] to respond appropriately to them and 
their illnesses and injuries’ and ‘expressed in acts of beneficence that attempt to 
alleviate the misfortune or suffering of another person’ (so as, for example, not to lose 
sight of the ‘sick person’ beneath Foucault’s ‘endlessly reproducible pathological
O Q
fact’) . The second is discernment, or ‘the ability to make fitting judgements and 
reach decisions without being unduly influenced by extraneous considerations, fears, 
personal attachments and the like’; closely linked to the Aristotelian virtue of 
phronesis and the ‘understanding both that and how principles and rules apply in a
OA
variety of these circumstances’ . The third is trustworthiness, or to act in such a way 
that ‘is to merit confidence in one’s character and conduct’ (we may think back to our 
discussion of the relationship between ‘outward show’ and ‘inward duty’ in the 
Hippocratic tradition in Chapter 3)90. The fourth is integrity, the need to faithfully 
adhere to a set o f moral norms and not, for example, indulge in ‘hypocrisy, 
insincerity, bad faith, and self-deception’91; significantly, remembering our account of 
the Hippocratic and (especially) Professional traditions in medical ethics, breaches of 
integrity can involve ‘violations of professional standards of conduct’ as well as 
matters of personal conviction92. The final focal virtue is conscientiousness: ‘a form 
of self-reflection on, and judgement about [one’s actions]’. This ‘critical reflection’ 
bears interesting comparison with the requirements of Hare’s and Rawls’ models of 
moral reasoning examined in Chapters 8 and 9; moreover, it may include feelings of 
‘remorse, shame, disunity, or disharmony’ appropriate to the recognition by a person 
of ‘strong moral character’ that they have performed (or must perform) a morally bad 
action93 (the doctor in the Krakow ghetto mentioned above and Maclean’s ship’s 
captain as discussed in Chapter 9, for example, are conscientious; the ship’s doctor, 
and Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, are not).
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Many of these virtues are linked to an emphasis on the single ‘fundamental orienting 
virtue’ of care94 supposedly missing from MacIntyre’s account; as we shall see below, 
however, this emphasis may rightly be considered one consequence of pursuing virtue 
ethics approaches. Despite being linked together in this way, however, many must 
still -  like the principles themselves -  be specified in particular situations and 
balanced against each other and against other virtues, as placing undue emphasis on 
certain virtues may itself be detrimental. As an example of the former, Beauchamp 
and Childress give an example of a case where excessive compassion ‘may cloud 
judgement and preclude rational and effective responses’:
.. .a long-alienated son wanted to continue indefinitely a futile and 
painful treatment for his near-comatose father in an intensive care unit 
(ICU) to have time to “make his peace” with his father... Some hospital 
staff argued that the patient’s grim prognosis and pain, combined with 
the needs of others waiting to receive care in the ICU, justified stopping 
the treatment, as had been requested by the patient’s close cousin and 
informal guardian. Another group... regarded continued treatment as an 
appropriate act of compassion towards the son95
Clearly, compassion here needs to be both specified, to consider what is 
compassionate behaviour towards the son, the father, the guardian and other patients, 
and balanced (for example with discernment) to decide on the best course of action (it 
should be noted that things may be different did the father not lack the ‘cognitive 
capacity’96 to effect a reconciliation with his son, in which case justice may entitle 
them both the chance to do so). For an example of the latter, the authors note that 
‘virtues of patience, humility, and tolerance can ameliorate... problems’ between 
healthcare practitioners with differing conceptions of their personal and professional 
obligations97 (we may think back to what qualities might be helpful in resolving the 
differences between doctors and nurses in neonatal ICUs in Hoffmaster’s example 
from Chapter 9). Similarly, kindness and loyalty to an incompetent colleague do not 
mean that he should not be reported as such, as per the demands of professional 
integrity98. Neither the principles nor virtues can, in isolation, ensure moral conduct: 
as Beauchamp and Childress point out, ‘the limitations of principles, rules and so 
on... does not prove some sort of triumph of virtues over principles and rules of
9 9
obligation [rather] it shows their close connection
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The Importance of Care and Narrative in a Virtuous Account of the Principles
In her article ‘North American Bioethics: A Feminist Critique’, Farley notes that, 
whilst the various ‘normative [approaches] in North American bioethics’, including 
the four principles, can be subjected to such a critique100, exactly how this may be 
done is not easy to define, since ‘[feminist] theory... is not in every way independent 
of other theories; nor is there one definitive form of [it] that represents all of the 
implications for bioethics’101. She is, however, able to identify ‘three themes -  
women’s experience, autonomy and relationality, and evaluations of embodiment -  
[that give] some sense of the concerns that feminists bring to bioethics’102. Of these 
themes, the first derives from two general claims: that ‘it is impossible to dismiss the 
importance of experience in both the development and application of ethical 
principles’103 (and thus the importance of experience inclusive o f ‘gender... age, 
class, race and disability’104) and that ‘it is impossible to dismiss the concrete 
particular always in favour of the abstract universal’105. The latter point is clearly 
already compatible with the view of theory, judgement and principle present in the 6th 
edition of Principles, whilst the specific work suggested by the former (for example, 
research into differing experiences of women both as health care professionals and as 
patients106) mirrors concerns expressed, as noted in the previous chapter, in the 6th 
edition’s discussion of the principles of justice and (in terms of race) autonomy. The 
third theme, including the claim that ‘the ways in which individuals receive medical 
care will depend importantly both on their own interpretation of their bodyliness and 
on the interpretations they receive from the providers of their care’107 will be explored 
more fully in our discussion of narrative ethics, below.
The second theme, concerning autonomy and relationality, is concerned with several 
other issues that Farley contends ‘have become crucial for feminist ethics generally 
and feminist bioethics in particular’, including ‘questions of the relative importance of 
freedom and relationship... the nature of the human self [and] the dynamics of power 
in interpersonal and social relations, and so on’; more importantly for our purpose 
here, they are also concerned with ‘questions of an “ethics of justice” versus an 
“ethics of care’” 108. This latter distinction draws upon a body of philosophical work 
developed in response to Gilligan’s In A Different Voice, which, in 1982, had 
‘launched a new debate, not only among theorists generally but among feminist
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theorists in particular’109. Gilligan’s empirical research identified ‘two modes of 
moral thinking: an ethic of care and an ethic of rights and justice’110. The latter, 
generally advanced by men, ‘uses quasi-legal terminology and impartial principles, 
accompanied by dispassionate balancing and conflict resolution’; the former, 
generally advanced by women, is centred ‘on responsiveness in an interconnected 
network of needs, care and prevention of harm’111. It should be noted that Gilligan did 
not contend that men and women exclusively think in these terms, or that all men and 
all women display identical moral thinking; she did, however, suggest that the 
different voice expressed by ethics of care had been ‘drowned out’ by (predominantly 
masculine) traditions in ethical theory112.
As Tong has argued, ethics of care can be seen as an expression of virtue ethics, and 
of a virtue ethics o f a certain kind. On this view, as with Aristotle, virtues do not exist 
simply as a prompt to a certain kind of action but are rather an integral part of moral 
action: ‘How one does what one does is just as important as what one does; and who 
one is determines how one acts. Thus, in order to act in a truly caring way, for 
example, one must, as Aristotle implies, be a caring person’113. Despite sharing this 
concern for the importance of moral character, however, ethics of care can be 
distinguished from other (masculine) accounts of the virtues thanks to their particular 
emphasis on the importance of an affiliative virtue that:
asserts the importance of an active concern for the good of others and of 
community with them, o f a capacity for sympathetic and imaginative 
projection into the position of others, and of situation-attuned responses 
to others’ needs114
(We may note at this point that this virtue o f empathy should not be confused with 
‘the epistemological skill of empathy... which can be used for good or ill’; rather, it is 
specifically aimed at care for the other115). As Tong points out, MacIntyre’s 
‘masculine’ account of the virtues does not include this quality amongst them, 
identifying instead, as we have seen, justice, courage and honesty116 (although we 
should note that MacIntyre’s account o f courage explicitly presupposes caring about
117 ithose for whom we risk our safety and our achievements ). This is contrasted with 
Nodding’s ‘feminine’ account that places it at the centre of moral relationships, 
emphasising ‘that feelings of sympathy or fellow-feeling are innate in all human
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hearts [and] must be cultivated lest they fail to guide one’s actions’, a position 
Noddings compares with Hume’s118.
Ethics o f care approaches tend to emphasise two particular criticisms of traditional 
theoretical approaches. First o f all, it is argued that these approaches overemphasise 
concepts of impartiality or detached fairness. For example, as Farley puts it, ‘a sole or 
even central emphasis on informed consent can result in a thinning of relationship; 
paternalism [can yield] to an impersonal, distanced negotiation of rights and duties 
between strangers’119. Whilst impartiality is undeniably useful in certain situations 
(for example in delineating legal or professional duties), it may be less useful in 
others; as Carse puts it:
If one is contemplating what responsibilities one has as a nurse to one’s 
patients, appeals to impartially justified principles may be illuminating 
and appropriate. If one is trying to decide how to respond to a particular 
patient’s refusal of treatment, attunement to the peculiarities of 
individual need and to the vagaries of circumstance may be essential to 
sound moral judgement120
Secondly, ethics of care approaches tend to emphasise the importance of ‘mutual 
interdependence and emotional responsiveness’121. With regards to the first point, as 
Beauchamp and Childress note, we may agree that ‘[a] person seems morally 
deficient who acts according to the norms of obligation without appropriately aligned 
feelings’ ; as Farley puts it when in considering the relationship o f autonomy to 
what she terms ‘relationality’ ‘what is at stake here is a view... in which the capacity 
for relationship is as significant... as the capacity for self-determination [my 
emphasis]’123.
As Beauchamp and Childress accept, ethics o f care approaches are able to expand on 
important moral concerns that are not expressed by the principles or by other virtues: 
‘experience suggests we often do rely on our emotions, our capacity for sympathy, 
our sense of friendship and our sensitivity to determine appropriate moral 
responses’124. Nevertheless, as the above quotation from Carse suggests, it should not 
be forgotten that such approaches may speak in a different voice, but not one that is 
necessarily more right or more true. As Tong has pointed out, it is possible to read 
Noddings’ account of the virtue of caring (and thus, given its centrality to her thought,
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or virtue itself) as feminine rather than feminist125; on this view ‘all too many men 
will be willing to confess, as they did during Mill’s time and later, that women are 
more virtuous than m en... and therefore that it is up to women ... to do all of 
society’s emotional work’126. Similarly, as Carse implies and Lesser has pointed out, 
the cultivation of personal relationships, whilst important, is not sufficient to 
guarantee moral behaviour: ‘The Cosa Nostra would be an obvious modem example 
of great generosity within the family and organisation being combined with total 
unscrupulousness outside it’127; there will be areas (and medicine is plausibly one of 
them) where personal feelings will quite properly sometimes need to be left to one 
side.
It is hardly surprising, then, that many proponents of an ethics of care approach do, as
Carse’s contention that ‘there is no single... privileged... standpoint in ethics [my
emphasis]’128 suggests, also rule out the possibility that ‘care’ is the one value or
virtue under which all others must be subsumed. As Beauchamp and Childress put it
‘[proponents] of care ethics do not recommend a general abandonment of principles
so long as principles allow room for discretionary and contextual judgement’129.
Indeed, principles may be a necessary counterweight to some of the disadvantages
mentioned above. Farley notes that a principle o f autonomy can protect women (and
others) from ‘submersion in roles, the tyranny o f traditions, and the potential for
oppressiveness in closed communities’; similarly ‘[without] justice at least in a
minimal sense, self-sacrificial caring can harm the one caring; without a just
appropriateness in care, caring can harm the one cared for’. As a result, she argues,
‘[feminist] theory... needs... autonomy [my emphasis]’130 (we should note that
avoiding assent to the kind o f situations Farley describes seems to be what, for Tong,
• 1^1 •distinguishes feminist from feminine approaches to ethics ). As with other 
approaches to virtue ethics described above, then, ethics of care approaches may be 
seen as complementary (perhaps even necessary) to the four principles, rather than as 
in competition with them.
If the concerns expressed by proponents o f care ethics are of particular importance to 
medical virtues, then narrative, as Maclntrye argues, may be of importance to 
conception of virtue as a whole. For MacIntyre, that this is the case follows from his 
analysis of what makes an action intelligible (so, for example, to break six eggs and
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mix them in a bowl whilst following a cake recipe is intelligible because the recipe 
presupposes a certain narrative beginning with obtaining ingredients, proceeding 
through preparing and cooking them, and ending in the enjoyment of said cake; by 
contrast, the same action, performed without explanation whilst delivering a lecture 
on Kantian ethics, would be unintelligible)132 and as a result both fictional and 
historical stories (for example, the epics o f Homer, the novels of Austen and the life 
of Eleanor Marx) as well as philosophical accounts such as Aristotle’s may provide us 
with examples of virtues. The particular emphasis that virtue ethics placed on the 
narrative and interpretative elements of moral thought was subsequently taken up in 
several different fields, amongst a ‘growing company of cognitive psychologists, 
psychiatrists, theologians, historians... literary theorists, and fellow [Anglo-
•  •  1 "XAmerican] philosophers’ , and also ethnographers such as Hoffrnaster and 
continental European philosophers such as Ricoeur (who advocates a method that is 
‘hermeneutical, linking scientific, clinical and narrative histories’)134.
As Montello has pointed out, ‘research in the cognitive sciences... to analyse the
psychological processes at work in moral reasoning’ has not only emphasised ‘the
essential role of the imagination in ethical deliberation’ but revealed that many of the
‘tools that we use for moral reflection’ (such as ‘metaphor, prototypes, frame
sentences [and] basic lived experience’) are closely related to those involved in the
creation o f narratives,135. From these elements, she is able to identify how ‘the act of
reading sets into motion three core processes’ required for moral reflection:
1‘departure, performance, and change’ . On this view, reading brings about departure 
in those instances in which we find ourselves ‘lost in [the world of] a book’; reading 
both takes us away from our own lives (and narratives) and in doing so requires that 
we project upon to the world of the narrative our own knowledge and experiences of 
the world. A sufficiently skilful writer can ‘convincingly render a common 
humanity... [for] generations of readers from every culture... in a Russian axe- 
murderer tormented by conscience (Crime and Punishment) or... a barnyard pig 
pursued by fear of becoming sausage (Charlotte’s Web)’137. Reading requires 
performance in that narratives are (Montello borrows Eco’s phrase) ‘lazy machines’. 
On this view, ‘reading is an active process in which the reader participates in 
discovering a meaning in a work’, and doing so requires that ‘we... adopt the role 
which the text asks us to assume’138; in other words, a reader must constructively
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engage with rules o f a narrative in much the same way that Maclntrye argues we must 
constructively engage with the rules o f a practice. Finally, reading can bring about 
change in that the experiences that we submit to in reading a narrative can bring about 
an appreciation o f ‘new environments, cultures, values and behaviours’ and ‘reveal 
hidden primary values’ or implicit judgements in our everyday thinking139.
Montello is fully aware that any argument that the practice of reading will make us 
more moral is (just as Bronowski’s belief that science will make us more moral was, 
or Maclean’s parody-philosophers’ belief that philosophy will make us more moral 
would be, if anyone actually held it) both naiVe and plainly false: after all, ‘a good 
number o f Nazi SS officers loved their Goethe and Strauss’140. It is not reading per se 
that aids the development of moral reflection; rather, it is the opportunity reading 
affords us to develop what Montello refers to as ‘narrative competence’. This skill is 
composed of two elements. First o f all, and linked to the need to submit to a narrative 
before attempting to construct meaning from it, is the need to develop an ability to 
resist placing one’s own narrative onto another, to ‘[listen] for a story to emerge from 
[a] rendition of events’; in a specifically medical setting, for example, to make sure 
the patient’s story is not replaced by the doctor’s agenda141. The second element of 
narrative competence that ‘proves so essential to moral reasoning’ is empathy: ‘the 
ability to enter another person’s world, to see from that perspective’142. Montello does 
not suggest these skills can only be acquired through reading fictional texts143, and we 
should add that her account only seems to hold for certain kinds of fictional work 
(what she terms ‘genuine’ literature144), something she admits when noting that 
without sufficient skill, an author’s attempt to inculcate the effects described above 
will probably cause us to ‘put a narrative down’145.
Perhaps, given our own reading of his Antigone in Chapter 2, it hardly surprising to 
find that Montello’s conception of ‘genuine literature’ in this sense extends to 
Sophocles146. That she mentions Dostoevsky also seems to tie her account of the 
importance of narrative to Murdoch, who (as mentioned above) regarded art, and 
especially literature, as essential to human flourishing (even going so far as to 
describe it as ‘doubtless more important than philosophy’147). For Murdoch, the 
creation of art is one (perhaps the) paradigm of virtuous activity: ‘obedient to a 
conception of perfection ... beyond the details of craft and criticism... the magnetic
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non-representable idea of the good which remains not ‘empty’ so much as 
mysterious’148. However, it is also the case that, whilst ‘there are several starting- 
points’149, it is ‘the appreciation o f [art that] is the easiest available... entry into (and 
not just analogy of) the good life, since it is the checking of selfishness in the interest 
of seeing the real [my emphasis]’150. We should remember that this ‘selfishness’ is not 
(just) that expressed by the everyday sense of the word, rather, it extends to ‘the 
almost irresistible human tendency to seek consolation in fantasy’ (that is to take 
ourselves as the measure of all things). For Murdoch, ‘art presents the most 
comprehensible examples... o f the effort to resists this and the vision of reality that 
comes with success’151 and Dostoevsky perhaps presents this best of all. As Bakhtin 
has argued ‘Dostoevsky, like Goethe's Prometheus, creates not voiceless slaves [but a] 
plurality o f independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine
1 S9polyphony o f fully valid voices' ; for him, human beings (much like Murdoch’s 
conception of the good) were defined by their indeterminacy and resistance to simple 
and/or definitive representation.
As we shall see below, such an approach does not need to be antagonistic to one that 
incorporates a certain view of rules and principles. Nevertheless, although Montello 
concedes that ‘judicious applications of general rules remain valuable guides to action 
and safeguards for personal rights’153 she does, as Forrow points out in his response to 
her article, at times come close to giving an inaccurate view of what more traditional 
philosophical approaches do or attempt to do. In particular, her claim that ‘real ethical 
issues in medicine... do not arise in the abstract, ffee from the subjective and 
contingent nature of the moral agents’ beliefs background and character [and the] 
particular context of family, community and history’154 is one that he argues would be 
denied ‘by few, if any, serious ethical theorists’155 (we may also think back to our 
own arguments against the supposed dominance of the ‘applied ethics’ model in 
Chapter 9). In addition to emphasising the importance of the qualities Montello 
describes (in particular, attentiveness to understanding the patient’s ‘story’) to ‘good 
principle-based moral reasoning’156, Forrow also highlights some important 
reservations. First of all, it is not clear that reading will develop the skills Montello 
contends that it can in the absence o f a skilled classroom teacher; it is also possible 
that doctors who display the kinds o f skills she describes seek out and appreciate 
‘genuine’ literature precisely because they have these skills already, rather than in
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order to develop them (although it is conceivable that this could be investigated 
empirically, something Forrow appears to agree would be worthwhile)157. Secondly, 
and following on from this, it may be better for medical students to consider, not 
fictional examples, but examples of real-world case studies describing patients ‘whose 
illnesses and lives present... sought-after learning opportunities’158. Finally, it is 
conceivable (and, in one example he quotes from, demonstrable) that narrative 
accounts, whilst ‘absolutely crucial’ for understanding certain cases, may also 
implicitly or explicitly refer (when used in medical ethics) to norms or principles such 
as ‘autonomy’ and ‘beneficence’159.
Although, unlike the previous approaches discussed in this chapter, narrative ethics is
• fknot explicitly referenced in the 6 Edition of Principles, Forrow’s criticisms (together
with his acknowledgements of the importance of the kinds of skills and dispositions
Montello endorses) are similar to ideas explored by Childress in his article
‘Narrative(s) Versus Norm(s): A Misplaced Debate in Bioethics’. For him, differences
between the kind of principled approach he (and, presumably, Beauchamp) advocate
and proponents of some forms of narrative ethics occur primarily because of
misconceptions each side has (in some cases quite understandably) caused about the
kind of moral norms (including both principles and more specific rules160) the four
principles are intended to represent. Childress acknowledges his own culpability in
this, admitting (as we have already argued) that the early editions of Principles' use of
‘theory, applied ethics, application [and] charts... appear to involve only top-down
justification [my emphasis]’161. However, he also points out that some opponents of
the principles have ‘[unfurled] such banners as “the tyranny of principles,” when, in
fact, they oppose only certain conceptions o f principles, that is... as absolute,
1 •invariant and eternal [my emphasis] ’ that are not universally shared . For Childress, 
certain kinds of narrative approach are likely to complement that of the 6th edition of 
Principles163 (on which view, of course, the principles can themselves -  as prima 
facie binding and requiring specification — be argued to possess that inner ambiguity 
of struggle that Dostoyevsky identified in living beings).
As Childress points out, the principles will not complement every kind of narrative 
approach; after all, it is just as possible to impose a narrative structure onto cases as it 
is to impose principles onto them: one can ‘neglect the narrative quality of cases... by
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forcing them into “boxes”. .. such categories as patient preferences, quality of life, and 
external factors’164. Although he concedes (in an echo of Winkler’s point that, having 
made a moral judgement, we can almost always come up with a quasi-deductivist 
justification for it after the fact) that ‘appeals to norms are [not] indispensible for 
every particular judgement or decision’, he points out they remain useful in ‘many 
judgements and decisions, in moral education, and in moral justification in a 
communal setting’165. Although norms are generated and interpreted through 
reflections on cases and narratives166, they may be both features of those cases and 
narratives (in terms of ‘unarticulated assumptions’ that might cause us to present a 
case in a certain way either by characterising agents within it or choosing to highlight 
certain elements) and tools for articulating narratives in new cases167. Interpreting a 
norm will always involve some kind o f narrative (some way of putting it into
1 Aficontext) , but no form of narrative needs must be prioritised as more valuable than 
another: case-studies may be useful to illustrate norms in some ways, fictional 
examples (including thought-experiments) may be useful in others (Childress offers 
Thomson’s ‘A Defence of Abortion’ as one possible example)169.
The close correlation between principle and narrative for which Childress argues is 
exemplified through a comparison of two responses to a particular case: one that 
begins with norms (that o f Childress and Campbell) and one that begins with 
narratives (that of May). The case in question is that of Don Cowart:
.. .a very athletic man in his twenties who is severely burned in an
accident that kills his father and who over time indicates that he does not
170want to continue the treatment necessary to save his life
According to May, ‘conventional frameworks’ of medical ethics are unable to cope 
with situations such as Cowart’s: ‘the catastrophe is so devastating that the terms 
life/quality of life cannot adequately express it’171. By contrast, he suggests that ‘[the] 
dramatic, narrative language of life/death/rebirth... better expresses what is involved’. 
Eventually, however, a decision has to be made as to whether Cowart can be 
‘[brought] to a new life “without his consent’” . May takes a pro-autonomy line that 
Childress identifies as basically utilitarian: by empowering the patient to refuse 
treatment, he argues, his caregivers can empower him, should he wish, to undergo his 
transformation to a new life (the only way, May believes, his condition can be
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172overcome) . Campbell and Childress’ account did not use the language of narratives, 
but Childress feels that it does not take too much effort to incorporate it (indeed, he 
feels ‘it is consistent with and further explicates what we argued’):
[we] start with debates about the meaning and weights of the principles 
of beneficence and respect for autonomy in conflicts about paternalistic 
interventions; but we then attempt to show how difficult it is to respect 
persons in their concreteness, because they are temporal creatures (past 
present, and future) and because they are social creatures (community).
We cannot respect others without listening to their narratives in order to 
determine what their wishes, choices, and actions really are173
So, as Childress puts it, one approach ‘begins with narratives but moves to norms’ 
whilst another ‘begins with norms but moves to narratives’; moreover, both 
approaches arrived at the same substantive conclusion, that ‘after enough time had 
elapsed to determine [the patient’s] prognosis, his competence and his settled 
wishes... paternalistic interventions were unjustified’174. As he suggests, ‘the 
important but difficult task’ is not to choose between norms and narratives ‘but to 
determine how they function together in a rigorous and imaginative ethical 
perspective’175.
Childress offers two compelling reasons for adopting his (and Campbell’s) approach 
to balancing narrative and norm over May’s. The first, more general point, concerns 
the types of narrative that May brings to Cowart’s cases (life/death/rebirth, Christian 
conversion and Greek tragedy). As Childress points out, ‘[such] broad narrative 
categories can be illuminating... but [also] confusing and even dangerous... 
[archetypal] narratives may obscure individual narratives’ and may be inappropriate 
(for example, Christian narratives ‘may be quite out of context for a patient who is 
atheistic’). Rather:
[physicians] and other health care professionals should attend to the 
patient’s own narrative... rather than construing that narrative as a mere 
instance of a grand pattern of life/death/rebirth or even of a set of 
substantive beliefs, such as a religious community’s core convictions
176[my emphasis]
After all, as Childress points out (with reference to the Navajo, as per their possible 
cultural aversion to discussing risk, discussed in the previous chapter) a member of a
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particular culture ‘may largely reject [its] grand narrative or worldview’177. The 
second, more specific, concern relates to how this may have happened in Cowart’s 
case. As Childress puts it, conflicts between autonomy and beneficence can ‘arise at 
the level of narrative, just as they do at the level of concrete decision-making’. 
Although Cowart did change his forename, it is debateable whether he conceived of 
himself as the ‘new man’ May describes: functionally, he found his new name easier 
to hear, he did not seem to appreciate any meaningful distinction between his ‘former 
life’ and his current one (insisting that, though glad to be alive, his doctors had been 
wrong to treat him against his will) and appeared to generally view the case as a 
straightforward issue of paternalism178. Although useful in showing ‘what went wrong 
... over the first ten months o f [Cowart’s] treatment’179, May’s account ultimately 
imposes a narrative onto a particular situation. Childress and Campbell’s, by contrast, 
‘suggested the difficulty of interpreting what is heard’ and stressed the need ‘to be as 
careful as possible to hear what [a] particular person is saying’180.
A Virtuous Account of the Principles and Criticisms of their Use in the Teaching 
of Medical Ethics
In order to demonstrate how a caring, virtuous approach to the principles that 
incorporates the complexities o f narrative differs from a simpler ‘principlist’ approach 
that disregards these elements, it may be worth considering criticisms of the four 
principles that assume their use either always falls into the second category, or 
encourages medical professionals unused to the complexities of academic moral 
theory to think in this fashion. For one example of such an approach we may consider 
what Clouser and Gert (who coined the term ‘principlism’, one Beauchamp and 
Childress reject for just this reason) criticise as the ‘checklist ethics’ they see the four 
principles as encouraging181. On this view, ‘principles function like names, checklists 
or headings for values worth remembering, but lack deep moral substance’182; 
moreover, since the principles are ‘clusters of concerns’ rather than unambiguous 
moral directives, Clouser and Gert argue that agents ‘may give a principle whatever 
weight they wish, or none at all’183. As long as autonomy, nonmaleficence, 
beneficence and justice are ‘ticked o ff  the checklist in some way, a decision can be 
called ‘moral’. It is certainly the case that some examples of works using the
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principles appear to promote such an approach. We may consider the following 
example from English’s Bioethics: A Clinical Guide for Medical Students:
General Process for Case Analysis
Review of Clinical Facts
I. Clarification o f definitions (terminal, competent, surrogate etc.).
II. Obtaining of missing pertinent information.
Identification of Ethical Problems or Conflicts
I. Are there competing ethical principles or values?
II. Who are the interested parties (patients, family members, health professionals,
courts)?
Options
I. Take one plausible position, identifying the results and ethical implications.
II. Consider other possibilities with their outcomes.
Ethical Assessment
I. Choose an ethical position.
II. Defend that choice, including arguments for and against.
Resolutions184
At first glance, this appears to place us back in the realm of deductivist approaches to 
ethics as discussed in Chapter 9. A ‘principlist’ doctor trained to approach ethical 
problems in this way would, it seems, expect to be able to put the details of any given
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moral situation through this general process and, at the end, come out with the right 
moral answer. They would, as Aristotle might say, have recourse to their principle and 
imagine that they were being philosophical.
Despite our argument that a careful reading o f the 1st edition does not endorse such a 
position, however, principled approaches have still been criticised for misleading 
medical professionals into thinking that ethical decision-making is a matter of 
following this kind of mechanical procedure. Winkler argues that scepticism amongst 
philosophers about the adequacy of the ‘applied ethics’ model of moral reasoning was 
matched by its enthusiastic acceptance, in the form of the principles, by health care 
professionals: ‘because of its attractiveness and teachability, and because... so many 
health care professionals... attended bioethics conferences, classes, workshops and 
programs in which [it reigned] supreme’ philosophers became victims of the 
principles’ success, ‘working and thinking along [other] lines, while all around... 
[were] heard nothing but invocations o f autonomy, beneficence, and justice’185. The 
criticism that principles were or are often simply ‘invoked’ with little or no reflection 
brings us back to one made by Maclean that, even if  they do not intend to, by 
describing familiar elements o f everyday moral life in ‘technical’ language, the 
principles create the impression that morality is the proper subject of a technical skill 
possessed and defined by ‘experts’, and that our moral judgements can be delegated to 
them.
Maclean emphasises this point by drawing an analogy with Kennedy’s The 
Unmasking o f  Medicine, and in an echo o f Foucault’s view as discussed in Chapter 4, 
argues that a ‘medical’ model of illness (one which views all ill-health as ‘a matter of 
objective scientific fact’ in terms of deviation from a biological norm186) carries with 
it the danger of allowing doctors to engage in activity which ‘masquerades as... 
apolitical and value-free’ despite unavoidably involving value judgements187. For 
Maclean, to speak of beneficence, nonmaleficence and autonomy rather than ‘doing 
good... doing harm [and] allowing patients to make up their own minds’ 
misrepresents ‘familiar elements of our everyday moral lives’ as ‘the private property 
of a set of experts, to be used as they prescribe’188. This analogy, however, betrays a 
weakness in her argument, and one that leads us back to a consideration of the virtues. 
Whilst, as we saw in Chapter 6, it is certainly true that medicine can conceal value
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judgements behind supposedly objective clinical decisions, and can lose sight of the 
person behind the illness, these are unavoidable dangers of a scientific approach to 
medicine, not necessary elements o f it. Moreover, they are certainly dangers worth 
risking (and guarding against) given the significant and quite remarkable benefits 
such an approach has brought in general.
Whilst there is clearly a possibility of the principles being used (as we have seen) as 
the moral jargon of ‘checklist ethics’, this too is by no means a necessary outcome. 
Just as we have argued that the virtue o f compassion demands that doctors remember 
that scientific abstractions are properly made for the benefit of the patient as a person, 
not for their own sake, so the virtues o f discernment and conscientiousness require 
them to remember that the objective of medical ethics lies not in justifying the 
rightness of actions, but in judging and acting rightly, and the very things that 
Maclean criticises the principles for may be seen instead to encourage these two 
virtues. Why, for example, in the case o f beneficence, should we use such an unusual 
term instead of merely talking about ‘doing good’? That is precisely the point. First of 
all, it captures some important distinctions: for example that (as discussed with 
regards to special obligations in the previous chapter) the ethical demands of medicine 
may not be the same as those of everyday life. Similarly, as we mentioned in our 
discussion of nonmaleficence, whilst we should of course expect that doctors and 
other healthcare professionals mean well, this principle reminds us that in medicine 
good intentions are not enough. Whilst one could draw the rather facile conclusion 
that the principle of beneficence is that which ‘commands us to do good’, the 
recognition of these distinctions suggests another possible conclusion can and has 
been drawn. On this view, the principle o f beneficence is that which demands that we 
think and continue to think, carefully and in detail, about what ‘doing good’ actually 
means in a given context, just as the principle of nonmaleficence demands we 
consider how this may be different to ‘avoiding harm’.
Maclean argues that the process of placing the human back at the centre of medicine 
is identical with ‘the recovery... of the values which form the framework of [our] life 
as [moral beings]’189 (we may add that this seems very similar to appreciating a 
patient’s narrative in the way that we have seen Childress describe). This is a 
strikingly similar position to that articulated by Richard Cabot in opposition to the
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‘professional ethics’ o f his day. Yet it should also be remembered that for both Bacon 
and Percival, and the Hippocratic tradition also, the effective care of the patient was 
the key concern that drove (indeed, made necessary) the establishment of medicine as 
both a profession and a scientific discipline. Maclean is right to agree with Kennedy 
that the majority of decisions made in medicine are ethical ones (we have seen as 
much over the course o f this thesis); the important thing is to ensure that this is 
remembered. We have argued that a shortcoming of historical traditions in medical 
ethics is not that they caused this to be forgotten but rather that a certain approach to 
them allowed for this to happen. Relying on Hippocratic and/or professional ethics as 
the kinds of ‘principle’ that Aristotle derides, rather than recognising in them a 
conscientious expression of what MacIntyre would term a ‘vital tradition’ has, 
throughout history, let doctors and patients down. It is not in doubt that doctors who 
ruled that abortions were not necessary on ‘medical’ grounds fe lt that they were doing 
the ‘right thing’; nor that those complicit in marching soldiers through clouds of 
radiation felt that the Nuremburg Code was only necessary for ‘barbarians’. Rather, 
their failure lay in not reflecting on these feelings; by contrast, as we have seen in this 
and the previous chapter, the ‘framework o f our life as moral beings’ provided by 
Beauchamp and Childress’ account o f the principles has, as befits a ‘vital’ tradition, 
continued to grow and evolve.
Beauchamp and Childress make explicitly clear, in the 6th edition, that without this 
compassionate, discerning and conscientious approach, the framework provided by 
the principles will be little more than the kind of checklist Clouser and Gert criticise: 
‘until we analyse and interpret the principles... and then specify and connect them to 
other norms... it is unreasonable to expect much more than a classification scheme 
that organises the normative content and provides very general moral guidance’190 
(although we may note that even in the absence of these steps this scheme would at 
least be likely to render the ‘raw data’ o f moral experience and reflection more 
intelligible). Beauchamp and Childress point to the chapters outlining specific 
elements of each principle as performing these steps in their own work1. We may add 
that the example from English, above, is also explicitly identified as a starting-point 
for moral reflection on cases, not a substitute for it. The text itself makes clear that the 
outline procedure will not and is not meant to solve ethical problems for doctors; 
rather (and here an analogy with diagnosis may be an apt one) it is designed as a tool
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to help the doctor (or other professional) explore what is going on in such dilemmas. 
As English notes, ‘some structure is required for the actual thinking-through of the 
moral conflicts that are so common in medical care... attention to some outline is 
useful [my emphases]’. The principles, on this view, are not intended to settle 
questions so much as to ensure that they are raised and considered191; to ensure a 
continuing argument about those goods the pursuit of which gives to medicine its 
particular point and purpose.
Of course, as Maclean notes, we should be wary of overplaying the dangers of relying
on our ordinary moral judgements192; but we should also be wary of overplaying the
dangers of ethical theory as a consequence. As is often the case with the principles
(which, as we saw in the previous chapter, are frequently the target of mutually
exclusive criticisms) they have also been accused of doing the latter. Maclean has a
second explicit criticism of the principles that draws upon her equation of them with
everyday moral language, namely that they do not add anything new to the kinds of
101concerns they represent . As we have already argued, this does not appear to be the 
case, nevertheless her point is taken up in a subtly different way by Erin, who argues 
that the principles downplay for healthcare professionals the importance of 
disagreements between moral theories and moral philosophers. On Erin’s view, that 
the principles can bridge gaps between, for example, utilitarians and Kantians is of 
little importance: ‘.. .so what? .. .1 fear that for those who have yet to fully develop 
their considered view, enthusiasm for the four principles approach will not facilitate 
that development... it is more likely to incline the student to take a seat on the fence 
between theories’194. Laying aside for the moment Erin’s rather odd implication that 
in order to do moral philosophy one must first pick a side in debates between 
deontologists and consequentialists we may agree that there is a possibility that, once 
again, students will settle for the easy option of invoking principles rather than the 
difficult task of making judgements. On the other hand, it is reasonably clear from the 
6th edition (if not in the work of Gillon who, Erin notes, does not consider it necessary 
for health care professionals to become involved in philosophical debates195) that the 
four principles are to provide a start in approaching these problems, rather than a 
solution.
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It may of course be the case, as Maclean suggests, that bioethics courses claim to 
teach ‘moral expertise’ as the particular property of the philosopher in the manner she 
criticises196; similarly, it is likely that students other than Erin’s own:
feel that they have done all that is required of them when they submit an 
essay that contains a brief introduction, an even briefer conclusion, and 
four intervening sections that, if  they are titled, bear the heads 
“autonomy”, “beneficence”, “nonmaleficence” and “justice”197
Yet these are pedagogical, not philosophical criticisms: of badly designed courses and 
students who require improvement, not o f the principles themselves. Indeed, 
Beauchamp and Childress have done everything we might reasonably expect to 
prevent this. The 6th edition is much lighter on jargon than the first (‘microallocation’ 
and ‘macroallocation’, for example, have been excised from the text) and examples 
are drawn from medicine, the law and (as we have seen) social research as well as 
philosophy, four disciplines that we might reasonably expect should (at least) be able 
to inform our moral thinking. In addition, the importance of both theoretical debate 
and reflection on specific cases is emphasised, for example in their criticism of
1 Qficasuistry . We may recall also their discussion of the principle of justice and the 
problem of how to agree on socio-economic provision of healthcare in the absence of 
a widely-accepted comprehensive theory and note that, when discussing different 
theoretical implications for the principle of autonomy, they provide references to 
more detailed analyses elsewhere199. In addition, relying on any theory as a sufficient 
guarantee of moral conduct is ruled out, with the authors arguing that ‘neither 
morality nor any ethical theory has the resources to provide a single solution to every
moral problem’200 and that ‘general ethical theories should not be expected to yield
•  * 201 concrete rules or judgements capable of resolving all contingent moral conflicts’ . In
all these ways, Beauchamp and Childress appear to argue that the four principles be
used as a starting point for debate; a way to exercise (in both senses of the word)
certain virtues.
Conclusions
As with the various kinds of criticisms o f the four principles considered in our 
discussion of their development from 1st to 6th Editions in the previous chapter all
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three approaches discussed above can not only be incorporated into the framework 
Beauchamp and Childress offer, enriching the principles’ account of and ability to 
deal with concrete moral issues, but can themselves benefit from doing so. As 
Childress puts it with reference to narrative ethics: ‘[each] plays a corrective, 
enriching, enhancing role in relation to the other’202. Over the course of the last two 
chapters, we have argued that the reading o f the four principles that results, and that 
we have suggested is present in the 6th edition, constitutes the best available method 
for engaging with moral issues in medicine; in our concluding chapter we will 
consider how this reading may also be supported by the genealogical approach to 
medical ethics that we have pursued throughout the course of this thesis. However, as 
Forrow has pointed out, ‘just as real ethical issues in medicine do not arise in the 
abstract, assessments of the effectiveness o f alternative analytic models cannot be 
done in the abstract’203. For this reason, demonstrating the value of this approach 
requires that we consider the principles in action; as a result, we will also move on to 
consider two particular case studies in their use.
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Chapter 12: Genealogy and the Four Principles: Two Case Studies in 
their Application
At the start of this thesis, we posed three questions regarding Beauchamp and 
Childress’ decision to distance the philosophical reflection they present in the 6th 
edition of Principles from historical traditions of medical ethics. First of all, we asked 
what it was that constituted these historical traditions, and made up what Jonsen refers 
to as their ‘remarkable continuity’. Secondly, given the changes and developments 
that these traditions made over time, we asked why it was that they had apparently 
been unable to continue this growth in the mid- to 1316-20* Century, necessitating the 
kind of philosophical reflection that Beauchamp and Childress claim to supply. 
Finally, given the parallel growth of philosophy and medicine from Antiquity to the 
present, we asked just what kind of philosophical reflection the four principles were 
supposed to provide, and why it had not been present before. We may now, in our 
concluding chapter, aim both to answer these questions, and to demonstrate their 
relevance in supporting the adoption of a method that we will then explore further 
with regards to two particular cases. In order to do so, it may be helpful to revisit two 
distinctions: that made in the introductory section between what Morrice terms ‘the 
content of medical ethics’ and the ‘underlying continuity of function’, and that made 
in the concluding section of Chapter 10 between the principles themselves and the 6th 
edition’s approach to ethical theory.
Genealogy and the Four Principles
In answering the first question, we may identify two different kinds of element that 
comprised the historical traditions o f medical ethics. The first are those familiar to us 
from traditional histories such as Jonsen’s and Grodin’s: the great canonical works of 
historical medical ethics found in the Hippocratic Corpus and Oath and in the codes 
of professional ethics established by Percival and the AMA and applied by bodies 
such as the Central Ethical Committee. These works and others like them may be seen 
broadly to comprise what Morrice terms ‘content’. The second kind of element is that 
we have attempted to draw out in our discussion of the different ways these works and 
actions can be described as ethical when viewed historically in the context of the
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cultures that produced them, and the state o f medical knowledge and organisation that 
we have argued they respond to. In the case o f the Hippocratic Oath, for example, we 
have attempted to argue that, whether or not it was (as Nittis claimed) a legally 
sanctioned and binding document o r the product (as Edelstein maintained) of an 
obscure philosophical-religious cult, it can (together with relevant passages from 
works of the Corpus) be seen as a response to the moral concerns raised by doctors’ 
behaviour and methodology given the circumstances of naturalistic medicine in 
Ancient Greece. Similarly, we have argued that Percival’s Medical Ethics does not 
merely contain a set of rules relating to organisational etiquette, but rather provided 
the socio-economic and organisational framework to establish and sustain the kind of 
collective professional and scientific endeavour that was morally required by the goal 
of establishing medicine on a sure footing in the era it was written. In both cases, the 
moral reflection on issues of the time that caused these works to be produced may be 
seen to represent Morrice’s ‘continuity’.
The answer to the second question is tied to the necessarily historical character of the 
content o f medical ethics revealed through our answer to the first. From Chapter 1 
onwards, we have argued that there exist certain moral elements without which it is 
impossible to meaningfully discuss questions of medical ethics. Chronologically, the 
first amongst these was competence: as soon as the healer is established as a socially 
recognised figure possessed of certain skills and abilities, he or she incurs a moral 
obligation to train these skills, to apply them to the best of his or her ability and, 
perhaps, to strive to excel in and extend them. But, as we have also argued, the precise 
nature o f these moral elements depends to a great extend on changing, non-moral 
counterparts. In the case o f competence, for example, this moral obligation would 
take very a different form for the shaman in prehistory than it would for the 
Hippocratic doctor of Ancient Greece. As a result, as Murdoch might put it, these 
obligations elude definitive representation. Viewed ^historically -  that is, viewed in 
the absence of the continuity identified above -  many particular expressions of the 
content of medical ethics risk becoming meaningless or even harmful, especially since 
responses to moral concerns in one era can store up problems for the next. As we 
argued in Chapter 6, this is precisely what occurred with professional ethics. Doctors’ 
reticence in discussing medical matters with those outside the profession, to take one 
example, was explicable given the somewhat embattled position of late-17th Century
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medicine as discussed in Chapter 5; following new moral dilemmas thrown up by the 
advances made in the aftermath of the Second World War, however, it became in 
many cases (for example, with regards to potential conflicts of interest in research) 
increasingly inappropriate.
Following on from this, we may now attempt to answer the third question in light of 
our responses to the first two. In the previous chapter, we suggested that both 
Aristotle and MacIntyre’s account of the virtues required both rules and a certain 
attitude to those rules that Beauchamp and Childress’ account of the four principles in 
the 6th edition provides (we may add, o f course, that this account itself requires some 
form of virtue element, particularly, as we went on to suggest, in terms of discernment 
and conscientiousness). And it is just such an account as this that our genealogy 
suggests is likely to be required to avoid the kinds o f problems encountered by other 
historical traditions of medical ethics. On this view, the four principles themselves, 
and the rules created through specifying and balancing them, may be seen as forming 
the current content of medical ethics; the evolving theoretical approach that we have 
argued underpins them may be seen as a recognition for the need of an ongoing 
continuity of moral reflection (and as such, perhaps, after a fashion be seen to 
continue historical traditions). Both the principles (together with their particular 
specifications) and this theory are o f course themselves responses to given historical 
situations; both can and are likely to change, perhaps as a result of new technology or 
new case studies (with regards to the former) or new thought-experiments or 
theoretical approaches (with regards to the latter). This is, in fact, something that 
suggests the plausibility of this approach: it is one that recognises the historical 
character of moral reflection and, as such, does not merely allow for change; as we 
have suggested in our discussion of the difference between the 1st and 6th editions, and 
of the ways in which it can incorporate elements of several different theoretical 
approaches, it allows for growth.
The following case studies are intended to demonstrate the value of the use of this 
approach to the four principles in dealing with specific cases and kinds of case that 
may arise in the course of early 2151 Century medical practice. The first deals with an 
explicit criticism of Beauchamp and Childress’ approach, namely Westin and 
Nilstun’s contention that, whilst the principles can help to uncover the attitudes and
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arguments present in a problematic situation, they are unable to provide non-arbitrary 
action guides for healthcare professionals in handling them. In considering their 
arguments, we will attempt to demonstrate that several features of their own account 
in fact indicate quite the opposite and provide several concrete recommendations at 
the level of both the specific clinical encounter and in terms of wider health and social 
policies. The second considers an explicit conflict between principles in the form of 
the paternalistic interventions apparently endorsed by the Israel Patients’ Rights Act 
of 1996. Again, we will argue that using Beauchamp and Childress’ four principles 
not only helps to make sense of the moral elements of several specific cases, but that 
their conscientious application indicates how such conflicts may, even when 
apparently insoluble, still point towards the morality of particular actions.
Westin and Nilstun’s ‘Principles Help to Analyse But Often Give No Solution -  
Secondary Prevention after a Cardiac Event’
The stated purpose of Westin and Nilstun’s paper ‘Principles Help to Analyse But 
Often Give No Solution -  Secondary Prevention after a Cardiac Event’ is ‘to 
investigate whether or not ethical conflicts can be identified, analysed and solved 
using ethical principles’ *. To do so, they offer as an example the case of the 
relationship between doctor and patient when lifestyle changes are recommended for 
the latter following a major cardiac event such as ‘acute myocardial infarction, 
coronary artery by-pass grafting (CABG), and percutanous coronary intervention 
(PCI)’2. On their analysis, there is a clear conflict between (at least) two principles 
should they be used in an attempt to provide moral guidance in such cases: ‘[the 
patient’s] autonomy is challenged by the suggested lifestyle changes, the purpose of 
which is to promote the future wellbeing and health of the patient [that is, 
beneficent]’; they also argue that there is potential for further conflicts once we 
acknowledge that ‘[the patient’s] spouse is [also] involved in and affected by the 
process’3. Whilst agreeing that ‘most (if not all) physicians would strongly encourage 
life style changes’, they claim that ‘surprisingly there is no uncontroversial 
justification for this conclusion using principles’4.
In order to determine what use of the principles would recommend a doctor advise 
their patient following a cardiac event, Westin and Nilstun combine them in ‘a two
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dimensional model’: for each of the three individuals involved (patient, doctor and 
spouse) a set of recommendations is produced through an ‘ [investigation of] what 
would happen if [only] one principle [were] utilised’. Their method results in the 
following table which, they contend, shows that the use of such a method inevitably 
leads to conflict when deciding the most ethical course of action:
Table 1 A matrix table for ethical analysis in two dimensions: affected persons 
and ethical principles (the letters A to F denote the different combinations)
Affected persons Autonomy Beneficence Justice
Patients A B C
Spouses D E F
The authors argue that there is the potential for ethical conflict between ‘each of the 
cells in the matrix table’6 both horizontally (that is, between the demands of each 
principle with regards to actions taken with respect to a single person affected, for 
example A and B) and vertically (that is, between the demands of a single principle 
with regards to actions taken with respect to each person affected, for example A and 
D). It is also possible that conflicts may occur diagonally (for example, between B 
and F). Westin and Nilstun offer several examples to illustrate conflicts that they 
claim occur in the kind of situation under discussion.
Were autonomy to be ‘applied as the only principle relevant’ Westin and Nilstun 
argue, ‘the conclusion would be to respect the patient’s right to self-determination... 
[one] could even question whether any recommended life-stile [sic] changes would be 
compatible with this principle’. By contrast, should beneficence be applied in the 
same way ‘the conclusion would be to minimise harm and maximise benefit... the 
doctor should be forceful if  necessary [and] relevant guidelines should be followed 
regardless of the patient’s [wishes]’7. One seemingly straightforward resolution of this 
conflict, in keeping with the principle o f autonomy’s requirement that ‘only the fully
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informed patient is truly autonomous’, is to ensure that the patient is made aware that 
lifestyle changes may be required to improve their health whilst respecting any 
subsequent decision on the patient’s part not to implement these changes8. Westin and 
Nilstun argue, however, that this still leaves scope for conflict, due to the patient and 
doctor having different views of the significance both of the cardiac event9 and the 
importance of the patient’s lifestyle to their own sense of self (they note 
Solzhenitsyn’s remark “ [fumo] ergo sum’ (I smoke, thus I exist)’) 10. As a result, the 
patient sees the doctor’s recommendation as an attempt to take control of their 
decisions: ‘the [patient feels] that his or her autonomy is diminished [and] sees the 
doctor as acting, prescribing, and ordering’11. The authors argue that this ‘may in part’ 
lead to low compliance with regards to the suggested changes12: ‘[albeit] smoking 
cessation is associated with a reduced mortality... only approximately one third of the 
patients [advised] quit smoking after such an event’13.
This is not the only (potential) conflict that Westin and Nilstun purport to identify.
For example, they argue, the principle o f autonomy, applied to the spouse as the only 
principle relevant, would suggest that doctors ‘respect the spouse’s right to self 
determination’ and ‘ideally... be interested in the information that spouses could 
provide... thereby [showing] them respect as persons’14. Similarly, with regards to 
beneficence, the authors note that spouses often suffer adverse effects as a result of 
the patient’s condition of which the doctor is unaware (with ‘the equilibrium in the 
family... affected if one of its member has to change life style’) and that, were this the 
only principle relevant, the doctor should strive to ensure these are minimised15. 
Finally, they suggests that, were justice the only principle relevant, the spouse ‘should 
be allowed to state his or her experiences and views of the situation to the doctor 
without any limits’16. According to Westin and Nilstun, each of these obligations can 
conflict with those of doctor and patient: for example, the wishes of the spouse could 
conflict with those of the patient (in which case, the authors agree, the primary ethical 
obligation of the doctor remains to the latter)17; furthermore, the doctor is under ‘no 
obligation to generally benefit the spouse [my emphasis]’ and as such may prescribe 
changes that have a negative impact on them18; finally, they suggest, the disclosure of 
information they feel justice may require to the spouse may conflict with requirements 
established to benefit patients in medicine as a whole (they note that spouses making
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attempts ‘to get in direct contact with caregivers [are] usually rejected with reference 
to medical confidentiality’)19.
The method Westin and Nilstun use to identify these supposed conflicts seems to 
imply a ‘top-down’ application of the principles in the manner of the first edition with 
each seen as prescribing a single, narrowly-conceived obligation which must be 
balanced against the other. Certainly, this would seem to account for the extremely 
strict definitions of each of the principles (notably autonomy) used in creating the 
table20. The authors deny this, noting that they are referring instead to the method 
suggested in the then-current 5th edition21; in fact, they argue that ‘the conflict [they 
identify] between the principles derives from the fact that they have no common root, 
but are founded in what is called 'a common morality”22. On Westin and Nilstun’s 
view, such conflicts can only be resolved by adopting a yet more narrow ‘top down’ 
theory: ‘[if] we start with a [single] moral theory, Kant’s deontological ethics or 
Sartre’s existentialism we [would] have a fairly good chance of getting rules that are 
reconciled with each other’ . We may o f course object that both these theories also 
have their roots in the kind of norms that Beauchamp and Childress argue make up 
the ‘common morality’, indeed ‘[it] is difficult to see how one could come to any 
ethical conclusions whatsoever... without first considering... situations and decisions 
that are felt to be ‘moral’ or ‘ethical’... and working back from these’24. More 
importantly, in practical terms, it is far from clear whether, firstly, adopting such a 
theory would in fact lead to a situation any different from the one Westin and Nilstun 
describe, and secondly, whether the principles are, in fact, quite so impotent as they 
claim.
According to Westin and Nilstun, the need to produce more straightforward action- 
guides often leads, in their Orwellian turn of phrase, to counting one principle as 
‘more equal than others’25 (most likely -  as they note, and as we mentioned in 
Chapter 10 has indeed been advocated by some principlist writers -  autonomy). 
However, since they subsequently argue that they would be against such a step26, we 
may instead consider what would happen if we instead replaced the principles en 
masse with one of the theories they suggest would give us more consistent rules, 
namely deontological Kantian ethics. The authors seem to contend we would end up 
with new table looking something like this:
272
Table 2 A matrix table for ethical analysis in two dimensions: affected persons 
and Kantian Ethics (the letters A and B denote the different combinations)
Affected persons Kantian Ethics
Patients A
Spouses B
Were such a table an accurate reflection of the situation, the doctor may indeed have 
one unambiguously clear obligation to the patient, perhaps with some subsequent or 
consequent obligations to the spouse. However, given that the authors acknowledge 
the existence of at least one other ethical theory, Sartre’s existentialism27, and that no 
extant theory has attained sufficient status amongst philosophers (let alone doctors or 
the general population) to allow us to honestly omit all others from consideration, it 
would perhaps be more correct to describe this approach as resulting in a table like 
this:
Table 3 A matrix table for ethical analysis in two dimensions: affected persons,
Kantian Ethics and Sartre’s Existentialism (the letters A to D denote the different
combinations)
Affected persons Kantian Ethics Sartre’s Existientialism
Patients A B
Spouses C D
The picture becomes even more complicated when we consider whether or not the 
existence of Tables 2 and/or 3 would mean that the various obligations that Westin 
and Nilstun identified in their original table had as a consequence ceased to exist or
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were, in fact, merely being ignored. If we allow that anyone could hold instead the 
positions described in Table 1, or some combination thereof, and still be regarded as 
neither immoral nor insane, which seems to be a reasonable assumption to make, then 
it seems we are forced to conclude it is the latter. In fact, given the existence of other 
ethical theories than those mentioned, and given (since their recommendations would 
necessarily be those produced by one group or person’s interpretation of the theory in 
question) different specifications o f the same theories, Table 3 would properly include 
not only these initial combinations but an almost infinite number of possible moral 
obligations. A universally acceptable moral theory may, of course, avoid such 
problems, as Beauchamp and Childress point out, 4 [if] we could be confident that 
some abstract moral theory was a better source for codes and policies... we could 
work constructively on... that theory [my emphasis]’; the problem, however, is that 
4we have no such theory [my emphasis]’28.
So it does not seem that adopting any (currently available) 4top-down’ moral theory is 
likely to improve the situation. But is Table 1 a fair reflection of how the principles 
are supposed to be applied? Westin and Nilstun concede that use of the principles has 
its advantages, noting that they 4 share [Beauchamp and Childress'] opinion about the 
usefulness of the principles in the identification and analysis of ethical conflicts’ and 
that it is a strength of this analysis that "arguments [are] made explicit’29. What they 
do not recognise is that it is such analysis can and does provide concrete ethical 
action-guides and in fact does so in their own paper. First of all, we may turn our 
attention to the central conflict identified by Westin and Nilstun, which pits the 
beneficent requirement to advise the patient to make changes to their lifestyle against 
the infringement of their autonomy these changes supposedly necessitate. Such a 
conflict appears to have its roots in the narrow definitions of the principles that the 
authors adopt, something they defend by noting th a t4 if we want to assess the use of 
principles in a concrete setting you [sic] have to illuminate one principle after another 
to see what the consequences would be’30. The authors are surely correct that, in 
analysing a situation, it makes sense to start with a narrow definition of each principle 
(and articulating present behaviour in this form would seem a good place to begin). 
Yet there is no compelling reason why these definitions must be rigidly adhered to 
indefinitely; indeed, we should expect our specification of the principles involved to 
change even as our initial definitions help us to explore what is happening.
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So, with a little reflection, it is clear that the supposed conflict between beneficence 
and autonomy exists primarily because, at present, neither is properly articulated:
‘[as] Westin and Nilstun point out, low compliance is... a major problem in the 
treatment of IHD following a cardiac event; they also point out, however, that it is the 
likely result of a patient feeling they are a passive rather than an active agent in their 
own treatment’31. In other words, beneficence may be seen to be hindered, not 
because respect for the patient’s autonomy necessitates allowing them to ignore the 
advice given by their doctor, but because the nature of the clinical encounter does not 
leave the patient feeling that their autonomy has been respected enough. So, in the 
course of the very analysis which Westin and Nilstun claim offers ‘no solution’ the 
principles appear to have already produced one clear practical recommendation: 
autonomy and beneficence both seem to require that, where possible and/or necessary, 
patients should be encouraged by their doctor to feel ‘responsible for their own care’32 
(of course, what this means in practical terms with regards to interpersonal skills or 
‘bedside manner’ would require further research, but these are things that can be 
identified and passed on to doctors as ‘best practice’ in the course of their training, a 
need which could itself be expressed as an ethical requirement for the medical 
profession as a whole).
This more complex account o f autonomy also has implications for the involvement of 
the spouse in the decision-making process. Indeed, we can conclude from their 
analysis (although they do not) that in the majority of the type of cases they are 
considering, respect for the patient’s autonomy seems to hinge, at least partly, on 
involving rather than excluding the spouse when giving advice. In fact, there are 
several different ways in which autonomy can (or cannot) involve other parties. Some 
patients may be quite comfortable taking decisions on their own, but this may require 
that they consult others and consider their interests as well (for example, it is clear 
that if  a patient who does not prepare their own food ‘is advised to change their diet 
and is fully willing to do so [they are] in fact having their autonomy infringed if such 
a measure is not made practical by failure to disclose requisite information to all the 
individuals involved [my emphasis]’33). In some cases, couples may prefer to take all 
decisions jointly, in which case respecting a patient’s autonomy may include 
respecting that portion of it they have delegated to their partner. In others, as we may 
recall from our earlier discussion of differing cultural attitudes to autonomy in
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Chapter 10, decisions may be taken (as was often the case with Korean Americans 
and Mexican Americans) by the family group as a whole. What counts as respecting a 
patient’s autonomy in each case requires sensitivity to such background elements.
That Westin and Nilstun only consider the first of these models may in fact be a 
consequence of their attention to what may be one source of relevant information: 
research indicates that, in Northern Europe, ‘[most] patients suffering from IHD are 
male, often middle-aged or older... [in] the involved population the female spouse 
usually prepares food in the household [thus] changes in diet also involve the 
spouse’34. So, as suggested above, respecting such patient’s autonomy is likely to 
necessitate involving the spouse. This would also seem to be required by beneficence 
(since it is necessary in order to improve the patient’s heath) and, insofar as it requires 
doctors to take into account likely socio-economic situation of those patients most at 
risk from IHD in making decisions about what constitutes effective care for them, 
justice as well. Another related recommendation would be for the doctor to remember 
that beneficence towards both patient and spouse are to a degree intertwined and thus 
to remain conscious of the fact that the effect of a patient’s lifestyle changes on the 
spouse may themselves affect the patient in turn (again, further research would seem 
necessary, which, in fairness to Westin and Nilstun is something they appear to 
endorse35). We should recall from the discussion of Navajo attitudes to autonomy, 
however, that appreciation o f these elements does not mean making assumptions 
about patients based on class or ethnic background; rather, respecting a patient’s 
autonomy requires (and Beauchamp and Childress’ account of the virtue of 
discernment may be important here) careful judgement as to what autonomy means in 
each particular context.
It is important to note that adopting a more complex account of autonomy does not 
mean, as Westin and Nilstun suggest (with reference to the Humpty-Dumpty of 
Carroll’s Alice Through the Looking Glass), that specifying principles in these ways is 
somehow arbitrary36. Rather, the various senses of autonomy, beneficence and justice 
that are revealed (without their apparent cognisance) through their analysis draw both 
on the context provided by the kinds o f cases they describe and from careful 
consideration of what each principle might mean in these cases (it is worth noting that 
the deeper sense of autonomy we have argued the analysis suggests is somewhat less
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arbitrary than the authors’ own concept, which appears to be: ‘autonomy is the 
principle that people should be allowed to do whatever they want’ -  a concept for 
which virtually no-one, least o f all Beauchamp and Childress, would argue). We may 
recall from the previous chapter that this fuller analysis of the concept is just what we 
should expect from a virtuous (that is, conscientious and discerning) attitude to the 
principles; we may note also their evident concern that invoking a conception of 
autonomy that defines ‘every man, from a biomedical-ethical point of view, [as] an
■ 37 *island’ might be an obstacle to patients’ well-being seems rooted in compassion. As 
such, it is something o f a shame that Westin and Nilstun do not realise that they are, 
in attempting to criticise the principles, providing an analysis of just the sort that 
Beauchamp and Childress appear to recommend.
Clearly, as Westin and Nilstun point out, ‘[everyday] medical practice can be very 
challenging... not least from an ethical point of view’; whether ethical reflection on 
everyday practice (as they feel it necessary to concede) ‘may be very dull’ is another 
matter . In fact, their analysis seems to show how interesting such reflection can be, 
not only in terms of individual cases or types of cases, but o f they way in which these 
can show the need to address wider issues that impact on moral decisions in them.
The principles do not, on this view, provide a solution ‘in the sense of... one clear and 
unambiguously ‘right’ course of action’39; they are not intended to. Instead, they 
provide a set of tools for helping to work out what should be done in a given situation. 
And, in the course of Westin and Nilstun’s analysis, the principles do indeed appear to 
be doing everything which we may reasonably ask a philosophical ethical theory to do 
in such a situation. Judgement is passed on certain forms of behaviour (for example, 
the doctor should not enforce lifestyle changes on the patient); existing conclusions 
are challenged, if not definitively subverted (for example, non-disclosure of 
information may need to be rethought in certain circumstances) and possibilities for 
improving doctors’ dealings with their patients are opened up (for example, in further 
considering the needs of the spouse).
Moreover, whilst it would seem fair as a result of this analysis to hold the doctor 
responsible for acting in such a manner as to include the patient in the decision­
making process and thus raise the likelihood of their compliance with medical advice, 
and to include the spouse where permitted, individual doctors cannot be held
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responsible for ‘improving the dietary habits of a society, correcting the harmful 
impression that the medical profession exists to offer ‘silver bullet’ solutions to 
complex health [or social] problems, or regulating the relationship between a patient 
and their spouse’40. It may, however, be incumbent upon doctors who notice (as 
Westin and Nilstun do) that present practice could be improved upon to raise 
awareness of its limitations and suggest how these could be addressed, but we should 
also note that bringing about such change implies an ethical obligation not only for 
the individual doctor, but a related obligation for the profession of which he or she is 
part, to promote and respond to ethical concerns. In addition, there are more elements 
relevant to medical ethics than those relating to doctors or the profession 
(for example, as we first argued in our discussion of the Hippocratic tradition in 
Chapter 3, certain questions are inextricably bound up with the public perception of 
medicine) and for this reason, some discussion must refer to morally relevant 
elements outside of the professional sphere (for example in considering social policy, 
or media reporting o f health-related stories).
The Israel Patient’s Rights Act (IPRA) 1996
Whilst the apparent conflicts that Westin and Nilstun claimed to identify in the above 
example are largely, if  not wholly, the result of inadequate specification of the 
principles and as such easily overcome, conflicts between principles (even well- 
specified ones) can and do occur. One obvious area of potential for conflict occurs in 
cases of paternalism, which has often been cast as a conflict between autonomy and 
beneficence. We may remember from Chapter 10 that Beauchamp and Childress 
argue that acts of ‘soft’ paternalism (that is, taking decisions in the best interests of a 
patient who is either lacking the capacity to make autonomous decisions or whose 
autonomy is diminished) can often be justified under the four principles approach, 
together with some acts of ‘hard’ paternalism (overruling the wishes of a competent 
patient) where the infringement of the patient’s autonomy is trivial (we may recall the 
example of a nurse putting up guard rails on a patient’s bed). Even in cases of ‘soft’ 
paternalism, however, ‘the decision to treat any patient by force’ has been described 
as ‘wrenching [and, as a result] there are very few instances where one might imagine 
treating a competent person in defiance of his or her express wishes’; indeed, in many 
countries ‘statutes protecting patient rights... expressly [forbid] coerced treatment’.
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However, on the grounds that it was justified ‘in the spirit of a communitarian 
democratic state’, the Israel Patient’s Rights Act (IPRA) of 1996 ‘codified a wide 
range of fundamental patient rights while providing for a mechanism to violate them 
at the same time’41.
Whilst the IPRA does enshrine the right to informed consent, and obliges doctors to 
‘provide [patients with] a wealth o f information about risks, benefits, and alternative 
treatments’, it also makes provision under certain circumstances for doctors ‘to 
override the right o f informed consent and to forcibly treat competent patients against 
their will’42. Of course, as Gross has pointed out, in most cases ‘competent patients 
gladly accept medical treatment’, and where they refuse it is often the case that ‘the 
treatment does not offer significant benefits over the alternative the patient prefers’. 
Nevertheless, it is not unknown for some patients to reject ‘clearly beneficial 
treatment and, despite every reasonable effort, [continue] to reject appropriate care’. 
‘In those cases’ Gross speculates ‘one could well imagine physicians simply wanting 
to tie down their patients and treat them anyway. Well, the Israeli law allows just 
that’43. In fact, Gross somewhat overstates the case: under the IPRA, it is not enough 
for a doctor to simply decide that his patient is making the wrong decision. Under the 
provisions of the act ‘statutory ethics committees [were established] to consider a 
physician’s request to forcibly treat a competent patient who refuses medical care’ (it 
is interesting to note that these committees’ permission must also be sought to 
‘withhold medical information from competent patients’ under therapeutic 
privilege)44.
In order to receive approval, a doctor’s request must satisfy three criteria. First of all 
is ‘informed consent or more precisely, “informed refusal’” : the doctor must 
demonstrate that the ‘patient [has received] the information necessary to make an 
informed choice’ and been able to understand and make decisions based on it 
(intentionally or not, this would seem to act as a safeguard against those doctors who, 
lacking the time or inclination to explain treatments to their patients and address any 
fears they may have, might be tempted to go straight to the committee for permission 
to apply whatever treatment they felt best)45. Secondly, the doctor needs to 
demonstrate that the treatment will ‘[yield] significant, rather than simple or marginal,
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healthcare benefits’. This precondition is in obvious need of further specification; as 
Gross points out, the IPRA:
demands that a patient face “grave danger” ... a broad term meaning 
simply that the disease will kill i f  left untreated [that] says nothing about 
the quality o f life a patient may endure [and] leaves the uncomfortable 
impression that one cannot treat a patient by force if the only purpose is 
to prevent extreme disability46
Gross suggests that the adoption of quality adjusted life years (QALYs) may be a 
‘useful device’ in balancing any urge to prolong life against the probable impairment 
of normal biological function47. This is not without problems of its own, however: 
first of all, as he notes, any such calculus will on occasion return a result where the 
numbers on both sides add up equal (as Gross puts it, taking 1A as the general 
absence of disability and distress, ‘there is a point o f indifference where x years at 
1 A=x+n years at a lesser state’48); moreover, there is the question of how precise a 
value can be placed on particular losses to particular individuals (we may think of the 
Italian doctor in Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises who tells the protagonist, rendered 
impotent by war wounds: “ ‘You, a foreigner... have given more than your life [my 
emphasis]”’49). Even laying aside these concerns for one moment, there is another 
criterion that must be satisfied before the committee can authorise treatment, namely: 
‘that there must be reasonable grounds to suppose that, after receiving treatment, the 
patient will give “retroactive consent’” 50.
Gross, as his comments regarding ‘violation’ and ‘simply tying patients down’ 
suggests, clearly finds the provisions o f the IPRA for forcible treatment of competent 
patients suspect, although not necessarily wrong in principle (we shall examine his 
two specific concerns, perhaps the most important of which he does not fully develop, 
in more detail below). His, however, is not the only opinion, and the Act has its 
defenders. Glick, for example, describes it as the product of a recognition that:
it is high time that the pendulum which has swung from overbearing, 
autocratic and insensitive paternalism to an often cruel and dangerous 
autonomy, be allowed to swing back to a more moderate and sensible 
balance between autonomy and beneficence51
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His defence of the IPRA’s provisions came in response to an article in the Journal o f  
Medical Ethics in which a ‘Dr. Brian Hurwitz... almost apologetically reported the 
successful intimidation o f an elderly competent widow into accepting badly needed 
therapy for a huge ulcerated basal cell carcinoma’52. Glick has little time for those 
who would judge Hurwitz’ actions wrong on the grounds that ‘they violated this 
woman’s precious autonomy’; rather, he feels that ‘Dr. Hurwitz is to be congratulated 
for his courage’53. To properly assess Glick’s judgement, then, it will be worthwhile 
to consider for a moment the case that prompted it.
As Hurwitz himself describes it, the case began when he was called to attend a patient 
he had not met before, and found:
Mrs Thomas (not her real name)... an elderly widow living with her 
bachelor son who had given up work in order to look after her. She had 
developed a huge basal cell carcinoma on her umbilicus, a slow-growing 
skin cancer that never invades distant sites and is almost always curable 
with radiotherapy treatment54
Mrs. Thomas had rejected an initial offer of outpatient treatment, citing her fear of 
hospitals, and ‘preferred to live with the skin cancer which was not causing her too 
much difficulty at the time’55. As the carcinoma became larger and began to ulcerate, 
however, she began to require ‘daily district nursing help in an area with greatly 
overstretched community care resources’56. Her refusal to accept treatment was also 
having a negative impact on her son, who Hurwitz found ‘an anxious, frightened 
man... desperately trying to do his best for his mother’ . There was no doubt that 
Mrs. Thomas was competent: she was not delusional, her fear of hospitals was not at 
the level of a phobia, and she had shown herself able to retain and process the relevant 
information provided her58. Nevertheless, ‘the absurdity of the situation’ with ‘more 
and more community resources likely to be committed ... to the palliation of an 
entirely curable condition’59, not to mention the continued distress to her son, caused 
Hurwitz to overrule her decision: he ‘ordered her to attend hospital, and would hear 
nothing of her refusals’. Mrs. Thomas willingly went with the ambulance when it 
arrived, and within six weeks had ‘healed completely’, giving her son the chance to 
‘[retrieve] a life for him self60.
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In such cases, Glick asks, ‘when the magnitude of the beneficence is huge, and the 
weight of the autonomy consideration weak, why not let beneficence “override” 
autonomy?’61. Although he admits that he had at first regarded the IPRA with 
‘derision’, Glick now argues that it contains ‘Solomonic wisdom’, an opinion he 
formed in response not only to Hurwitz’ account above, but also to the following 
case:
a young Bedouin man was admitted [to an Israeli hospital] with 
pneumococcal pneumonia (generally a highly treatable disease in this 
age group, with reasonable expectation of complete recovery). He was 
having trouble with adequate oxygenation... [intubation] and mechanical 
respiration were medically indicated. The patient, fully “competent” by 
the usual standards, was adamant in his refusal to be intubated. The 
physicians attempted to persuade the patient, using family members... 
but to no avail... [and] treated him without intubation. The patient died.62
Glick’s reaction to this case (the kind he describes, in somewhat questionable, 
impersonal language, as ‘permitting a salvageable patient to die’63) was further 
complicated when he read, ‘in a non-medical magazine’ of a similar case in the 
United States. In this case, whilst doctors had honoured their patient’s refusal of 
intubation so long as he remained conscious, ‘immediately upon [his] loss of 
consciousness [they] intubated him, attached him to a respirator and sedated him’. 
When, within 24 hours, the patient had recovered sufficiently to be taken off from the 
respirator and have the tube removed, he expressed his gratitude to the doctors who 
had disregarded his wishes64.
Despite Glick’s dismissive sneer at notions o f ‘precious autonomy’, his griping about 
‘the civil libertarians [who] argued vigorously for the... view that no competent 
person could ever be treated against his/her will’65 and his stubborn insistence (in 
spite of the geographical circumstances of his example cases) that ‘militant exponents 
of autonomy’66 express a characteristically ‘Western’ attitude67, his views are perhaps 
not quite so radical (nor so distinct from ‘Western’ approaches) as he would 
apparently like to think. Rather, he is arguing that a narrow conception of the 
principle of autonomy ‘as an all or none phenomenon’ should not be regarded ‘as an 
absolute trump over all other values’, a position perfectly in keeping with the view of
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the principles that we have argued for over the past two chapters68. Indeed, his 
description of an ethics committee considering such a case, weighing and balancing:
the quality o f the competence of the patient, the degree of his/her 
autonomy, the potential for risk and suffering in the procedure, the 
likelihood of its success, the danger o f refusal and the likelihood of the 
patient’s subsequent reversal o f his earlier refusal69
seems to find them engaged in the kind o f reflection the 6th edition of Principles seeks 
to promote (Glick does, in fairness, concede that ‘the “four principles” method... in its 
original form, does not necessarily give automatic priority of one principle over 
another’70). Glick’s examples are persuasive and lend weight to his argument that 
autonomy ‘is not the ultimate end [but] must be considered in the context of its 
broader goals and evaluated on a case by case basis’71 but of course, as we may recall 
from the previous two chapters, this is just what we would expect if the principles are 
to be thought of as clusters of concerns that must be weighed and balanced against 
each other, if the good that medicine aims for is not fully representable, and if  medical 
ethics is to consist of the kind of ongoing argument that characterises a vital tradition.
This does not mean, however, that if we agree with Glick’s position we must also 
agree with either the IPRA itself or the way that it allows for some decisions to be 
overridden, something that brings us back to Gross’ two concerns about the Act in its 
current form. The first of these is that the Act does not appear to make a distinction 
between two quite different possible sources of conflict between a patient’s wishes 
and doctor’s preferred course of action: ‘on closer examination, it is apparent that 
these disagreements turn on either disputed facts or disputed values [my emphasis]’72. 
Disputes of the first sort can occur for a variety o f reasons: ‘patients refuse medical 
treatment because they do not fully understand the risks of nontreatment, overestimate 
pain, or ignore (or discount) pertinent information’; they are usually easier to resolve 
than conflicts of the second sort since ‘[once] the factual issue is resolved, a 
reasonably intelligent patient will usually adopt the course of treatment his physician 
proposes’73. Disputes of the second sort occur when a patient ‘[understands] the issues 
at stake and prefer alternative treatment or no treatment at all’; these can occur when 
‘the costs in terms of curtailed lifestyle... lead a patient to prefer a shorter life under 
some conditions rather than a longer life under others’ or when a patient’s religious
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beliefs preclude certain forms of treatment, for example blood transfusions in the case 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses (although arguably only in the case of those Jehovah’s 
Witnesses aware that others o f their faith have argued against the prohibition74).
For Gross, an appreciation of this distinction ‘is pivotal for any attempt to justify 
treating a competent patient by force’, partly because disputes of fact themselves limit 
the patient’s autonomy (since a refusal made on the basis of a misconception is not, in 
one sense, ‘informed’) and partly because ‘[informed] refusals stemming from 
disputed values immediately invoke the protection that respect for autonomy
75provides’ ; where disputes turn on matters o f fact, however, the situation may be 
quite different. Gross illustrates this distinction through two examples. In the first, a 
woman is admitted to hospital and diagnosed with:
a large tumour in her bladder. The preferred treatment is excision of the 
entire bladder... requiring a urine bag to collect and pass urine. In all 
likelihood her vagina will be removed as well thereby preventing normal 
sexual relations... Her life expectancy without surgery could be a matter 
of several years occasioned by intermittent bleeding and hospitalisation 
until the tumour in her bladder causes more severe complications.
Surgery, on the other hand, offers the prospect of a longer, pain free 
life
When first referred to an ethics committee, Gross reports, several members felt that 
this case was clear-cut, since ‘a longer, pain free life’ seemed to be an obviously 
significant improvement over a few years o f life marred by bleeding and hospital 
visits. As Gross points out, however, it is not ‘that [the patient] did not understand 
that her postoperative handicaps were offset by the prospect of a much longer life [my 
emphases]’, rather she did not agree that the extra years of life did, in fact, offset the 
consequent ‘lack of normal sexual functioning’77. In other words, it is a dispute of 
value and difficult (more than likely impossible) to objectively decide: ‘the 
observer... must ask whether it is self evident that this person’s life will be 
significantly improved by treatment and whether it is conceivable that a reasonable
78person could think otherwise’ .
The second of Gross’ examples, perhaps not coincidentally, is fairly similar to the two 
cases described by Glick:
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A 65 year old man enters the hospital for routine hernia surgery but 
following complications requires artificial ventilation. The patient pulls 
at his tubes [and] resists the ventilator vigorously [thus] making it 
difficult to wean him... the team decides that a tracheostomy will make 
the patient more comfortable and greatly increase the chances of 
successfully weaning the patient from the ventilator... However, it is 
difficult to communicate with the patient... Although... he understands 
his condition and is aware that he might die without intervention [he] 
seems distracted by discomfort. Without the tracheostomy the medical 
team sees little chance o f successfully weaning the patient from the 
ventilator79
In contrast to the first case, coercive treatment is, for Gross, acceptable for this patient 
because his refusal o f treatment steams from a dispute of fact: ‘[the] patient has not 
rejected his post-treatment state because he is revolted by the quality of life it presents 
but because he is marginally competent [and] does [not] fully understand the 
implications of nontreatment’ (namely, that a tracheostomy will help to wean him 
from the ventilator he finds so distressing); indeed, he will not give himself the 
opportunity to understand the implications (he ‘dismisses his doctors with a wave of 
the hand’ when they attempt to discuss the matter with him). As Gross puts it, treating 
this patient ‘does not mean violating autonomy as much as it marks a refusal to 
surrender to ignorance’80.
Gross at times writes as though this distinction is the only relevant one to be made in 
deciding whether to coercively treat a patient; his chief criticism of the IPRA is that 
‘[as] it is written [it] does not distinguish between disagreements of fact and value, 
and... tends to ignore the former’81. In doing so he seems to suggest he still holds the 
view, unlike Glick, that where it is not diminished autonomy will still ‘trump’ other 
values. On this view, coercion is acceptable in the second case because the patient is 
‘marginally competent’: ‘[he] has shown no ability to recount, explain, and defend his 
decision’ and it is ‘inconceivable that a reasonable person could think’ that treatment 
is not the best option82. Similarly, it is not acceptable in the first case because the 
patient is acting with a full autonomy that offers ‘compelling grounds for respect’83. 
As it happens, Gross is probably correct that, in a conflict of a values and/or when a 
patient’s autonomy is not significantly impaired by an inability or unwillingness to 
understand the nature of a proposed treatment, there can be no moral grounds for 
coercive treatment. However, he is more than likely incorrect to suggest that the
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wrongness of such actions results from the violation of autonomy alone; instead, they 
may be seen to turn on a second concern that he identifies in considering coercive 
treatment under the IPRA: namely the possible harm done to the patient84.
To illustrate this point further, we may recall our earlier discussions of treatment and 
nontreatment decisions, in particular that o f the paraplegic motorcyclist refusing food 
and water in Chapter 9, and the elderly patient resisting attempts to provide medical 
nutrition and hydration in Chapter 10. In the latter, it is clear that the patient’s 
progressive loss o f mental ability means that her autonomy is at best marginal: it is 
highly unlikely that her violent resistance to and subsequent removal of a nasogastric 
tube expresses a decision that she could recount, explain and defend. In the former, 
the patient might (saving his depression) arguably be seen as engaged in what Gross 
would term a dispute o f values with his doctors (it is certainly conceivable that a 
reasonable person could accept that some paraplegic people are able to find enjoyment 
and value in their lives, and still hold that this is and/or will not be possible for them). 
In neither case, however, does the decision not to treat centre around discussions of 
the principle of autonomy; rather, treatment does not go ahead because (in light of the 
patient’s likely resistance in the first case, and both the patient’s resistance and the 
possible need to perform cutdowns occasioned by the state of her arteries in the 
second) it would be, in Winkler’s terms, brutal and without foreseeable end. The key 
principle in these dilemmas is, in fact, the much-neglected one of nonmaleficence.
Nonmaleficence is clearly not the only relevant principle in the cases discussed by 
Gross and Glick; nevertheless, we may argue that autonomy’s apparent ability to 
‘trump’ beneficence stems, not from considering this principle to be ‘more equal than 
others’, but from a (perhaps implicit) realisation that a patient’s resistance to 
treatment is likely to increase the level o f  harm involved. It is perhaps not surprising 
that the three cases presented in these two articles in which coercive treatment seems 
most justified (and the two cases that we have considered in which it does not seem 
justified) involve similar kinds of intervention. In all of the former, the intervention 
does involve some harm to the patients, more so than if they accepted treatment 
willingly. Nevertheless, as Gross points out, ‘[the] indignity wrought by forced 
treatment is only one sort o f indignity and does not entail a sweeping disrespect for 
dignity in general... the coerced patient is otherwise treated in a dignified manner by
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the medical stafF85 (that Gross uses the language of ‘dignity’ rather than 
‘nonmaleficence’ may be seen as contributing to his inability to develop this point 
further). It may be significant that Hurwitz suggests he may have had a different 
subsequent view of his own decision has Mrs. Thomas resisted being taken into 
hospital C[to] my relief when the ambulance arrived she did not resist this course of 
action [my emphasis]’)86.
If we consider each of the five cases described in the course of Gross, Glick and 
Hurwitz’ articles in terms o f balancing concerns of autonomy, nonmaleficence and 
beneficence rather than as conflicts between autonomy and beneficence it is 
noticeable that in what seem to be the least problematic coercions not only is the 
patient’s ability to make an autonomous refusal either questionable or compromised, 
but the potential level o f harm seems much lower. In Mrs. Thomas’ case, for example, 
not only was a cure virtually certain (and not noticeably more unpleasant than the 
infections to her ulcerated tumour), Hurwitz also considers the possibility that the 
patient’s ‘child-like’ attitude to medicine, hospitals and doctors may have necessitated 
her needing to be under ‘doctor’s orders’ to fully comprehend the nature of her 
treatment87. In both of Glick’s examples, not only do the patients fail to understand 
the nature of the proposed treatment, but at least a significant proportion of the harm 
is transitory: the treatment is a temporary measure and the patient will not always 
require medical assistance to breathe (and in the second example, that the doctors 
waited for the patient to fall unconscious also avoided the patient suffering the 
indignity of forced sedation or causing physical harm to himself or others whilst 
resisting treatment). As we have already noted, Gross’ second example is very similar 
(again, the patient does not -  indeed refuses to -  understand the suggested treatment, 
which is intended to have the opposite effect from the one he fears). Notably, 
however, in the most problematic case (Gross’ first example) the patient appears to be 
acting with close to full autonomy (allowing, o f course, for the emotional distress 
occasioned by her diagnosis) and, if  treated, would not only be subjected to the harms 
associated with forced sedation and treatment, but to irreversible negative effects of 
this treatment: the patient would have to endure the reduced quality of life that she 
finds unacceptable for the rest o f her days.
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That the above examples suggest that a more nuanced reading of the way that 
principles interact in different situations may endorse some forms of coercive 
treatment does not necessarily mean that the provisions of the IPRA should 
necessarily be accepted. Its inability, as written, to effectively distinguish between 
disputes of fact and disputes o f value is, as Gross suggests, one major drawback. The 
other is that, without explicitly incorporating the arguments described above it can be 
seen as a more straightforward endorsement o f the idea that the state has a ‘duty to 
protect life at the expense o f liberty and dignity [my emphasis]’ and thus of practices 
such as the force-feeding o f prisoners and the application of what is (rather 
euphemistically) referred to as “moderate physical pressure” to ‘criminals 
(specifically, suspected terrorists)... during interrogation’88. Moreover, any impact of 
the Act on the public perception o f medicine, doctors and the state that could, 
conceivably, be harmful (with fear o f unwanted treatment, for example, causing 
patients to hold back from consulting doctors or driving them into the ever-welcoming 
arms of quacks and charlatans) will (as with the ODWDA) need to be investigated 
and continually monitored. Nevertheless, as Gross suggests, despite these reservations 
the IPRA may at least offer an example o f how these difficult decisions may be 
‘[eased]... through a deliberative forum and thereby serve as a model for similar
Q Q
forums in other nations’ .
This last point brings out one final, and very important element of such cases that is 
perhaps best expressed through Hurwitz’ account of his treatment of Mrs. Thomas. 
Glick is most likely correct that Hurwitz should be congratulated for his actions in this 
case; however, we may have some reservations over his apparent belief that the 
latter’s description of the case constitutes something like an apology. First of all, it is 
reasonably clear that the question ‘Did I apply undue pressure upon Mrs Thomas?’ is 
a good deal more rhetorical than Glick seems to realise: as noted above, Hurwitz does 
not always seem sure that he did meaningfully infringe Mrs. Thomas’ autonomy.
More importantly, however, Hurwitz account shows the importance of 
conscientiously engaging with principles rather than simply applying them. First of 
all, in Beauchamp and Childress’ terms, he affirms theirprima facie nature in 
accounting for an apparent breach o f autonomy by both questioning its specification 
in the particular context, and by balancing it against the requirements of 
nonmaleficence (the low likelihood of Mrs. Thomas resisting being taken in the
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ambulance), beneficence (the virtual certainty of curing her condition, the positive 
impact on her son’s life) and (in his ‘responsibility towards the community nursing 
staff and other patients... not to allow scarce and valued resources to be consumed 
by... futile and irrational treatment’) justice90. Moreover, in publicly discussing the 
case he both subjects his analysis to the judgement of others, and enables his own 
conclusions to be used in the discussion of other cases. It may, therefore, be the 
second element for which Hurwitz’ receives Glick’s congratulations, namely his 
‘raising the issue publicly’91, that is most significant: conscientiousness is not merely 
deliberative; it is also (perhaps necessarily) collaborative.
Conclusions
The two case studies above demonstrate, as we have suggested, the value of 
Beauchamp and Childress’ approach (both in general terms, and with regards to the 
choice of principles) to particular problematic situations in medical ethics. In the first 
case, the principles suggest both specific actions (for example, considering the social 
status of the patient and their relationship with others in terms of recognising how best 
to respect their autonomy) and general concerns (for example, addressing the public 
perception of what medicine is able to do, and encouraging recognition of non­
medical elements of health such as the importance of diet and exercise). Moreover, 
when compared to narrow, ‘top-down’ applications of traditional moral theories, this 
kind of approach may be seen to offer a fuller picture of the richness and complexity 
of our moral lives. In the second case, application of the principles not only ensures 
that our attention is drawn to the problematic elements of what may be morally 
necessary decisions (for example, the harm caused even by justifiable cases of 
coercion), but emphasises the need for open discussion of difficult cases and, perhaps, 
revisions to laws, rules and guidelines surrounding certain kinds of treatment. 
Furthermore, in helping to unravel the substantive questions surrounding such 
intervention, it reveals how the language of, and distinction between, beneficence and 
nonmaleficence may be more useful than a single principle of either beneficence or 
dignity.
In the case described by Westin and Nilstun, the analysis of the type we (and, it seems 
without realising, they) have carried out can reveal apparent conflicts to be, if not
289
illusory, then amenable to resolution through further reflection and specification. For 
similar examples, we may recall Daniels’ hope that certain differences between 
contractarians and utilitarians could be resolved by negotiating around differences in 
underlying theories of the person, or Hoffmaster’s that differences between doctors 
and nurses in a neonatal ICU could be resolved by negotiating around differences in 
underlying conceptions o f medicine, as discussed in Chapter 9 (so, in this case, the 
dispute between autonomy and beneficence that Westin and Nilstun encounter might, 
as we have seen, be resolved by negotiating what both terms mean in this particular 
context). In the cases encountered in our discussion of the IPRA, however, further 
reflection and specification does not make the conflicts go away. Even allowing for 
Gross’ (sensible and valuable) differentiation of disputes of fact from disputes of 
judgement, it may not be possible to reconcile the differing requirements of 
autonomy, nonmaleficence and beneficence, however complex our specifications of 
them are. Nevertheless, the kind of conscientious, discerning reflection required in 
specifying the principles is still likely to furnish us with a better understanding of the 
decisions we are making; in some we may find that even unimpaired autonomy does 
not override other elements (to return to The Pot o f  Caviare, the professor cannot ask 
the others if they wish to commit suicide since he knows that many of them will feel 
morally obliged to refuse92; we may wonder if the Krakow doctor mentioned by 
Beauchamp and Childress faced a similar dilemma). In others, for example in Gross’ 
second example, it may mean proportionally more (and could possibly continue to do 
so even in cases where the benefits were much greater and harms much smaller).
The value of this approach outside of the sphere of medical ethics remains to be seen. 
Certainly, it is highly questionable whether the norms, virtues and principles that are 
especially relevant to medical ethics will all be present, or of equal importance, in 
other sub-fields of applied ethics (business ethics, for example) or in discussions of 
ethics as a whole. Nevertheless, an account o f the principles that incorporates these 
elements as part of a web of ideas seems to offer intriguing possibilities for the way in 
which philosophy may approach moral problems of other kinds, and to itself pose 
questions about both moral reflection (philosophical and otherwise) itself and our 
responsibilities in the social, historical and political contexts in which it takes place, 
and which it (and we) help to shape. Our account of the historical development of this 
approach seems to suggest that the process of moral reflection is unlikely ever to
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reach a settled conclusion: the quest for Winkler’s ‘Holy Grail’ may be, as Murdoch 
seems to suggest, o f primarily symbolic value. Nevertheless, whilst not without 
dangers, it is very far from being a fool’s errand. There remains, and is likely to 
remain, much difficult work to be done. Nevertheless, we have grounds to hope that it 
will be important and rewarding, and very unlikely to ever be ‘dull’.
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